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Chapter 2 Critique of Puritan New England

§ 1. The Incubation Period of American Civilization

What I am calling the incubation period is the nearly one and one-half centuries from the establishment of Jamestown in 1607 until 1750, just after the end of King George's War (1744-8). This is the period in history telling the story of what became the United States of America from the evolution of divers British colonial enterprises into a distinctly different North American civilization. Meaning no disrespect to the people of the also-American nations of Canada and Latin America, I am going to call this 'the' American civilization because I have to call it something and because when "America" is referred to today in most countries what is most often meant by this reference is the USA (judging from my experiences of being called an "American" by people from every continent except central and South America, whose people have tended to call me either a "*yanqui*" or a "*norteamericano*," and Australia, whose people have tended to call me a "Yank"; real Yankees, however, laconically inform me I am *not* one of them).

The date 1750 is somewhat arbitrarily chosen. A number of historians have seemed to favor the year 1763 to mark the historical epoch, apparently on the basis of, as Morison and Commager put it, "it was not until 1763 that the Thirteen Colonies began to strain at their imperial leash." In point of fact crisp dates marking historical epochs are rarely justifiable by actual events. One period tends to ooze into the next in a fuzzy transition, making crisp boundary-marking-year conventions a matter of logical classification rather than historical fact. To me 1750 seems to be a convenient choice because it lies between two noticeably different qualitative attitudes that were exhibited by colonials in their political relationships with Great Britain in two consecutive wars that took place on either side of that year – namely, King George's War and the French and Indian War (1754-63).

Colonial military cooperation with the British in the former exhibited a degree of enthusiasm (as marked, e.g., by the battle of Louisburg[1] in 1745) that was noticeably lacking after the end of that war [Adams and Vannest (1935), pp. 65-66]. In the next war, colonial cooperation was at best, in the eyes of the Crown Government, lukewarm and left Great Britain herself shouldering most of the task of conducting the war. This was exemplified in the disappointing Albany Congress of 1754 [Bolton & Marshall (1920), pp. 369-383]. It also left, for the first time, a sizable standing army of British redcoats in the colonies and helped set the stage for the series of crises leading up to the American Revolution.

§ 2. Puritan New England

The Massachusetts colonies at Plymouth (1620) and Massachusetts Bay (1628) were, directly or indirectly, the foundational colonies for all of New England. Its history up to 1691 is also a sort of petty microcosm restaging the Reformation in Europe and the much earlier political wrestling between the Latin-Roman and Greek-Orthodox factions of the Christian Church in the sixth through ninth centuries [Durant (1950), pp. 517-529]. One could hardly ask for a better example of men ignorant of history repeating it in almost eerie detail. From 1630 to 1691 the colonial government was a theocratic oligarchy with imperial ambitions. These were hindered by passive-aggressive Congregationalists exercising local authority in the towns, who exploited the fact that the oligarchs often acted in violation of the colony's charter [Jernegan (1929), pp. 125-160]. Almost from the very beginning, the Massachusetts oligarchs conducted themselves as if Massachusetts were an independent nation rather than a British colony. That New England would later be the powder keg of the Revolution is not in the least surprising.

[1] Today this is the Fortress of Louisbourg National Historical Park, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada.



Figure 2.1: Governance profile of Puritan New England up to 1691. The colony was a granulated Society comprised of a theocratic central oligarchy attempting to rule a democracy-minded collection of towns.

The Pilgrims who settled at Plymouth harbor, not all of whom were Puritans, had originally been chartered to settle in Virginia. The establishment of their colony, therefore, was without the sanction of a charter and they resolved this problem by forming the Mayflower Compact, an agreement by which all who signed it were pledged to submit themselves to "such just and equal laws" thought best for the general good of the colony. As squatters, they had no legal standing in England, and so they sought, and received, a charter from financial backers in England in 1621. By 1627 they had successfully paid off their London financiers and were then free to develop themselves as an independent unit. Their government took shape from the start as a democracy [*ibid*., pp. 119-122].

It was not until 1643 that they politically joined with the Massachusetts Bay colony and Connecticut in forming a confederation calling itself the United Colonies of New England. New Hampshire at that time was sparsely settled. The land, as well as the largely unsettled frontier of Maine, was claimed (illegally as it turned out) by the Massachusetts Bay colony. Rhode Island was specifically *not* invited to join this league, which the colonists formed for the purpose of self defense against a developing threat from hostile Indians. The confederation was loosely governed by an eight man Commission who were chosen annually with two each appointed from Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the New Haven Colony (which was not yet part of Connecticut). In a way, this Commission foreshadowed the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation during the Revolutionary War. The commissioners lacked any real power but did form and provide an organizational center around which a common defense, promotion of their common religion, and expanded funding of Harvard College could nucleate.

The net result, profiled in figure 2.1, was a granulated New England Society in which a delicate balance was achieved between the town Congregationalists and the autocratic theocrats. The franchise was limited to Church members, a restriction that left a sizable number of colonists without a voice in their government, producing a semi-state-of-nature Community. As a result the



Figure 2.2: 4LAR analysis of the New England Community social contract structure. Each heading is labeled by the qualitative character of the corresponding principle as it was realized (or not) in the Community aggregation. Label **p** denotes a social-natural dynamic of human Society according to basic mathematical principles of mental physics and so is common to all Community organizations.

New England social contract (ignoring Rhode Island for the moment) took shape, as figure 2.2 depicts, in terms of the sixteen social contracting principles required for a stable civil Community. As will be seen later, the essential differences between New England Society and those of the Middle and Southern colonies are all contained in the contracting effected in regard to *Personfähigkeit* (power of the corporate person) and the organized anthropological person.

There are at first glance a number of characteristics of Puritan Society that can seem puzzling and even contradictory. How could there be a divergence in doctrinal views between the oligarchs and the Congregationalists (self-contradiction in the anthropological person)? How is it that the presence of non-Puritans[2] in a Community founded upon a principle of religious intolerance did occur in New England? How could any sort of local democracy come to exist with active participation from a clergy famous for their intolerance of Presbyterians? How could a select group of theocrats be set up to rule a church famous for its anti-episcopal opposition to the Church of England? If contemporary oversimplified views of Puritanism were true then New England was a social phenomenon that never should have happened at all.

Yet the phenomenon that was colonial New England does not require miraculous explanation. Understanding it merely calls for an understanding of certain ambiguities written into Calvin's original religious doctrine plus an appreciation of a few historical sociological accidents and how these come to bear on the social ideas and tastes taking root in the anthropological personality of

[2] For example, the Mayflower's famous Captain Myles Standish, who was one of the leaders of the Pilgrims who settled at Plymouth, was not a Puritan or a member of the Puritan congregation. A group of merchant non-Puritans, known as the "Dorchester Adventurers," arrived in Massachusetts and actually established the foundations of the colony prior to the arrival of the stern and uncompromising first Puritan governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony, John Endicott. The charter by which this colony was set up made no provision that the colony was to be a religious commonwealth that would operate largely independently of both the Crown and the English stockholders who financed it.

their Society.

John Calvin (1509-1564) was, along with Martin Luther, one of the leading figures in the Protestant Reformation. It is generally accounted that the period from April of 1532 to November of 1533 is when he underwent his conversion from Catholicism, and Calvin himself credited his conversion to a divine revelation. He published his doctrine of Protestantism in 1536 in a treatise entitled *Christianae religionis institutio* (*The Principles of the Christian Religion*). Calvin later summarized his doctrine into twenty-one articles. The doctrine in the main follows that of Luther but he breaks with Lutheranism over the issue of the Eucharist by maintaining that communion is only a spiritual participation through faith and that the Eucharist is not substantially the body and blood of Christ. Calvinism itself is no longer a specific religious sect, but many Protestant sects are based upon Calvin's doctrine. Some or all of Calvin's 21 tenets are familiar to contemporary Christians (including Catholics; a great deal of Catholic theory and doctrine survives in Calvin[3]). In summary form, these are:

1. the sovereignty of God is infinite and transcendent;
2. man's supreme purpose is to know God;
3. God is known to man through the Scriptures;
4. the authors of the Scriptures were "sure and authentic amanuenses of the Holy Spirit" (i.e., the Scriptures were dictated to their authors by the Holy Spirit);
5. God is the source of all good;
6. man is guilty and corrupt;
7. the first man was made in the image of God with original purity, integrity, and sanctity;
8. depravity and corruption attached to man from Adam's fall (Calvin doesn't mean men today are blamed for Adam's sin; he means Adam "infected" man with his own depravity and since then all men *are born* corrupt and depraved);
9. all men are condemned before God, who accepts nothing but righteousness, innocence, and purity;
10. Christ came into the world to redeem man from corruption;
11. until a man is united with Christ he is not redeemed;
12. this union is achieved through the special operation of the Holy Spirit in the faithful, who "thus partakes in Christ's death and resurrection" (this is the root of the "born again" tenet);
13. having joined to Christ, the believer has life in Christ and knows he is saved, having the witness of the Holy Spirit that he is a child of God and having the promises, which the Spirit has impressed on his mind, sealed by the same Spirit in his heart (in other words, if you are saved you know so by divine revelation and become utterly committed to faith);
14. from faith springs repentance, proceeding from a sincere fear of God, and consisting in the mortification of the flesh and a vivacity of the spirit;
15. through faith the believer receives justification, his sins are forgiven, he is accepted by God and is held by Him as righteous, and the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him;
16. regeneration and sanctification come to the believer from Christ;
17. God predestines some to eternal life and some to eternal death;
18. the church and its ordinates and sacraments are the external means by which God unites men into the fellowship of Christ;
19. the church is universal in the multitude gathered from diverse nations, agreed in one common faith, and bound by the tie of the same religion (tenet of "the one true faith");
20. wherever the word of Christ is sincerely preached and the sacraments are duly administered according to Christ's institution, there is a Church of the living God;
21. there are two sacraments: (a) baptism; and (b) communion.

The Puritans' reputation for dogmatic rigidity was a consequence of strictly adhering to their

[3] It is to be remembered that the Reformation was a protest movement predicated on the thesis that the rulers of the Catholic Church had become venal agents of the devil (especially the Pope) and that their teachings had become corrupt. Protestants had identified the Pope in particular as the Antichrist.

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interpretation of these articles. Of more immediate concern to us in this treatise are Calvin's organizational views of the church. These included the following points:

1. the policy of complete freedom of the Church from state control; since there can only be one true Church, this is not an article of religious freedom but rather one of religious supremacy;
2. the Church is to be organized by a division into parishes;
3. the permanent officers of the Church are pastors and teachers; to the former belongs the presiding over the discipline of the Church, the administration of the sacraments, and the admonishment of the members; to the latter belongs the expounding of the Scriptures; the government of the Church belongs to these officials joined with: (a) pious men comprising a senate in each church; and (b) deacons entrusted with the care of the poor;
4. the election of officers is to be by the people (members), and those duly chosen are to be ordained by the laying on of the hands of the pastors;
5. excommunication is permissible under the power of elders chosen by the Church senate in conjunction with the approval of the clergy;
6. religious education according to the Catechism is mandatory.

Theocracy at the *local* level of the parish is inherent in Calvin's doctrine. However, the issue rapidly becomes vague as soon as one begins to consider the universal Church, i.e., to consider the Church in terms of a union of the parishes. This does not seem to be specifically addressed by Scripture and at least two interpretations are possible. One is that the division into parishes requires a hierarchy of church officials; under this interpretation, John Winthrop, Thomas Dudley, and the other original leaders of the Massachusetts Bay colony were justified in holding themselves to be a ruling oligarchy. This would seem to raise another issue, one that appears to have been ignored by the New England Puritans: if Winthrop *et al*. were at the top of the Church hierarchy in New England, who were *their* superiors? After all, unless one adopts the view that the one true Church is exclusively the one in New England, then legitimate parishes also existed elsewhere in the world and higher levels in the hierarchy would be required. The New England Puritans recognized no such higher mortal authority over themselves.

The other interpretation is that there is, owing to divine revelation and the role of the Holy Spirit in the person's conversion to the faith, no layer at all between the local officials of the parish and God Himself; under this interpretation, officials of the local congregations were justified in challenging the authority of the oligarchs. The practical teeth in this argument are: (1) it solves the problem of who the foreign Church authorities were by eliminating the job altogether; and (2) church hierarchies are inherently episcopal and the Puritans held themselves to be an anti-episcopal sect. At issue is: what makes an officer a bishop instead of an officer?

Local democracy, insofar as the election of church officers is concerned, is explicitly recognized in Calvin's doctrine for how the church is to be organized. What is ambiguous is whether or not that elected body is to be republican in character or oligarchic in character.

As for the presence of non-church members residing in the same parish community, this policy logically follows from the supposed "nature" of predestination and conversion. All men are born depraved but those predestined to be saved will have this destiny revealed to them in time. No living man knows who God has predestined for eternal life and who He has predestined for eternal death. It is not up to men, therefore, to take upon themselves the prejudgment of who is who. The officials of the Church were, of course, responsible for judging if a person's conversion to the faith was true or not, as well as if a person became apostate and reverted to sin[4]. Therefore

[4] It is not clear from Calvin's doctrine how or even if one of the faithful *could* lose his faith since this was "sealed in his heart" by the Holy Spirit. Calvin's doctrine did leave a host of practical issues unaddressed. Different Protestant sects arose from different proposed solutions for these issues.

the presence among them of the non-faithful was tolerable and permissible. However, since the doctrine of the church did require righteousness in the conduct of life, non-church members could be and were constrained to live according to Puritan church doctrine because the church was supreme over the civil government. One could live in a Puritan town as a quiet infidel but not an overt heretic. This policy, at least, was congruent with Christ's admonition to "do unto others as you would have others do unto you."

Issues like these – and a great many of them come up in religious matters – always come up sooner or later when a sect is faced with having to practice the tenets of its faith. There are three ways of dealing with such issues. The first is by type-α compensation (ignórance). The nature of being-a-human-being is that human beings are satisficing problem solvers. Furthermore, the process of human Reason is an impatient process. Satisfaction is usually attained most quickly, if only temporarily, by type-α compensation – i.e., by ignoring problems. The Puritans, no less and no more than other religious sects around the world, ignored a great many questions and issues until these became so pernicious that they had to be faced and the practice of ignórance (ignorement) was no longer capable of satisfying. When this point is reached, the problem can be dealt with by either of two more ways. One is to decide the question by fiat. In religious matters, this can never be anything other than a subjective judgment, i.e., a judgment of taste rendered by the decider. This is the method most commonly used by the world's various churches and accounts for much that is autocratic in their historical behaviors.

The other method is to attempt to establish a more objective means for deciding questions and issues. In religious matters this can never be entirely successful and a significant degree of subjectivity in judgment remains. However, the degree of subjectivity can be reduced, and this is what a religious *theology* aims to accomplish. The Puritans, like the majority of Protestant sects[5], had only a very limited theology to call upon in comparison to, say, the Roman Catholic church. At root, a religious theology is a doctrine based upon some set of religious axioms establishing some set of objective tenets and rules of reasoning for judging and deciding upon religious questions and issues. Those issues that cannot be settled within the established theology are called the "mysteries" of the religion and every religion has its set of mysteries. To a notable extent, how a religion deals with its mysteries operationally defines the character and temperament of that religion.

Beneath the umbrella of Puritan religious doctrine, the development of New England Society took place in the presence of a special set of external circumstances. First, the arrival of the settlers took place in the years just after the local Native American population had been decimated by a plague (1610-1620). The original colonists were therefore unendangered by hostilities with the Indians. The only serious instance of this occurred in 1635-7 when settlers moving into Connecticut encountered the native Pequot Indians in the eastern section of the new colony and conflicts between them developed. In 1637, responding to an appeal for aid from colonists in the Connecticut valley, a colonial army launched a surprise attack on the Pequots' main town and slaughtered the population. The Pequots were driven south and west and almost exterminated [Thwaites (1910), pp. 136-7]. By 1643 incidents arising due to colonial expansion into and encounters with Native Americans caused sufficient concern among the New England

[5] Protestant Christianity is not alone in this. The theology of Islam, especially fundamentalist Islam, is also very slight when compared to Roman Catholicism. The one theological tenet every Islamic sect agrees upon is the most famous one: There is only one God and Muhammad is His prophet. Different sects in Judaism are likewise distinguished by different degrees of specificity and exactness in their theologies. Hinduism, as judged by the contents of English translations of the *Bhagavad-Gita* ("the Song of God"), seems to have a rather free-wheeling theology when viewed from Western cosmological suppositions, but viewed from Vedanta philosophy contains a very coherent perennial theology having more in common with Christianity than the great majority of Christians realize.

colonists that they formed the aforementioned confederation in 1643. Even so, no serious armed clashes with Native Americans took place until King Philip's War broke out from 1675-8. This conflict, as we will see, had some very serious consequences.

The second special circumstance took place in England rather than in the New World. In 1642 civil war broke out in England between King Charles I and the primarily Puritan Parliamentarians led by Oliver Cromwell. This concluded in the overthrow of the Stuart monarchy, the execution of Charles I, and the installation of Cromwell as Lord Protector. For nearly twenty years, until the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II in 1660, affairs at home occupied the British so thoroughly that the colonies, and particularly the development of New England's attitudes toward independence from British authority, were by and large ignored by the British government.

These are the principal social circumstances behind the development of the profile of figure 2.2. This Society was to undergo a series of blows in the years from 1660 to 1697 that resulted in the breakdown of Puritan New England Society and its replacement by what became, by the time of the American Revolution, Yankee Society. These two Societies are *not* related by simple evolutionary continuation. They have different profiles and took on quite different social characteristics. Scientifically, the change was neither an evolution nor an adaptation of *one* Society. Rather, it was a *break* involving the death of an old one and the growth of a new one. To understand why Puritan Society was unable to cope with the Toynbee challenges[6] of its terminal period, we need to examine the implications of figure 2.2.

§ 3. Destabilizing Factors in the Social Profile of Colonial New England

Of the eight non-mathematical headings in figure 2.2, the New England (excluding Rhode Island), Middle, and Southern colonies were all set up with the same relationship to the principles represented by four of these. These are: (1) the principle of conceptualizing; (2) the principle of tangible power; (3) the principle of *psyche*-teleology; and (4) the principle of *psyche*-aesthetics. These four principles are called, respectively: (1) the principle of institutions of self-governance; (2) the principle of social economics; (3) the condition for social contracting; and (4) the principle of justice. What is said here in regard to Puritan New England is therefore also true of the Middle and Southern colonies.

The social organization in all the colonies (including Rhode Island) complied with the principle of institutions of self-governance. This compliance, denoted A in figure 2.2, is what made it possible for each of the colonies to form any kind of Society in the first place. One of the

[6] Toynbee introduced the notion of "challenges" that affect the growth or breakdown of a civilization. He wrote, "A society, we may say, is confronted in the course of its life by a succession of problems which each member has to solve for itself as best it may. The presentation of each problem is a challenge to undergo an ordeal, and through this series of ordeals the members of the society progressively differentiate themselves from one another. Throughout, it is impossible to grasp the significance of any particular member's behavior under an ordeal without taking some account of the similar or dissimilar behavior of its fellows and without viewing the successive ordeals as a series of events in the life of the whole society" [Toynbee (1946), pp. 3-4]. "In studying the growths of civilizations we found that they could be analyzed into successions of performances of the drama of the challenge-and-response and that the reason why one performance followed another was because each of the responses was not only successful in answering the particular challenge but was also instrumental in provoking a fresh challenge . . . Thus the essence of the nature of the growths of civilizations proved to be an *élan* which carried the challenged party through the equilibrium of a successful response to an overbalance which declared itself in the presentation of a new challenge. This repetitiveness or recurrency of challenge is likewise implied in the concept of disintegration [of a civilization] but in this case the responses fail. In consequence, instead of a series of challenges each different in character from a predecessor which has been successfully met and relegated to past history, we have the same challenge presented over and over again" [*ibid*., pg. 363].

basic theorems of the Social Contract phenomenon is the theorem stating that ***every person forms his own society***, i.e., every person decides for himself who is and who is not part of his personal society [Wells (2012a), chap. 11 §5]. In order for a Society to form out of a collection of personal societies, these personal societies must associate into mini-Communities and then these mini-Communities must interact with each other cooperatively enough for the idea of a Society to be able to exhibit any real meaning[7]. In a pure state-of-nature *the basic relationship between interacting individuals is not cooperation but rather competition*. However, under favorable social circumstances competition can produce cooperation. This is a theorem of the mathematics of interactions, for which a rigorous proof was developed by Grossberg (1978). Institutions of self-governance are mechanisms for regulating competitive dynamics in such a way that cooperative dynamics emerge from competitive motives. The emergence of institutions of self-governance through the actions of a group of interacting individuals empirically demonstrates that their relationships conform to the principle. As Mill reminds us,

> Let us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions (however the proposition may at times be ignored) are the work of men; owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. Men did not wake up on a summer morning and find them sprung up. . . . In every stage of their existence they are made what they are by human voluntary agency. [Mill (1861), pg. 3]

All three major colonies (the minor colony of Rhode Island excepted) were set up and organized such that these Societies stood in conflict with (i.e., in opposition to) the condition for social contracting and the principle of justice. This does not mean that there was an utter absence of social contracting or an utter absence of justice in any of these Societies. On the contrary, there were socially bonded mini-Communities within them, e.g. families, conforming to both principles insofar as their own members were concerned (otherwise their mini-Community would not have formed). It does mean that the condition for social contracting and the principle of justice were not put in place uniformly for *all* members of the colonial Society. For example, the non-church-members living within Puritan Society did not have the same civil liberties nor were they granted the same civil rights as the Puritan members of the Society had. In *no* colony were the indentured servants on equal footing with the "freemen" of the Society[8] with regard to justice. The condition for social contracting states: *The association will defend with its whole common force the person and goods of each individual in such a manner as by which each associate is able to unite himself with all the others while at the same time is still able to obey himself alone and remain as free in his liberty of action as he was before joining the association*. The principle of justice states: *Living in a socially contracted environment of a Community must not frustrate expectations for fulfillment of the condition of the social contract because of the perpetuation of injustice*. Anything that violates the condition of the social contract is **unjust**, and ***justice*** is the negating of

[7] The Critical real-explanation of Society is: a Society is the Object understood as a higher concept of divers individual concepts of society retaining what is contained in common among these divers concepts. This Object is a mathematical Object and for it to have an objective real meaning the individual concepts of society that are held in common by those said to belong to the Society must be exhibited in the actions of these individuals. Toynbee was correct when he wrote, "The truth seems to be that a human [S]ociety is, in itself, a system of relationships between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense that they could not exist at all without being in this relationship to one another. A [S]ociety, we may say, is a product of the relations between individuals, and these relations of theirs arise from the coincidence of their individual fields of action. This coincidence combines the individual fields into a common ground, and this common ground is what we call a [S]ociety. If this definition is accepted, an important though obvious corollary emerges from it. Society is a 'field of action' but the *source* of all action is in the individuals composing it" [Toynbee (1946), pg. 211].

[8] Rhode Island Society was not set up in opposition to the principle of justice; it merely ignored it.

anything that is unjust.

The consequence of this is that, while Puritan Society (and the others) produced a Community, it did not produce a *civil* Community. This is to say that the Society consisted of an aggregation of *granulated mini-Communities* where antagonistic (antibonding) relationships existed between different pairs or groups of mini-Communities. The Society itself was still possible, but its on-going *Existenz* was dependent upon the capacity of one part of that Society to keep other parts of it regulated and coerced into compliance with tenets of Order demanded by the ruling members by means of force or its credible threat. This is to say that the members of a particular mini-Community were citizens *of that mini-Community* with respect to *its* internal relationships but the Society overall was composed with mixed citizen and outlaw mini-Community relationships.

The presence of granulated mini-Communities within the body politic of an overall Community is one of the most difficult challenges that governance of a Society faces. Opposition to the condition for social contracting and the principle of justice are not, in and of themselves, sufficient conditions to cause the disintegration and death of a Society. Societies can be, and often are, held together through the threat of force that its rulers are able to command. History is replete with examples of this. But opposition to these principles does favor breeding of the formation of a Toynbee proletariat within the Society, and the disintegration of a Society always originates from within a Toynbee proletariat. Rousseau was correct when he wrote,

> The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an explanation of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will – at most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?
>
> Suppose for a moment that this so-called *"right"* exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest always being in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly the word *"right"* adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 5]

All three major colonial regions (and Rhode Island as well) also neglected the principle of social economics. Social economics-in-general is the production, distribution and consumption of assets of wealth-in-general. The principle of social economics is a principle of economic utility optimization for the Society as a whole. Now, here we encounter several terms that contemporary economics finds itself unable to agree upon in regard to what they mean. The Critical theory of the Social Contract, on the other hand, is able to provide objectively valid real-explanations for them. ***Unwealth*** is lack of what is practically needed (by an individual) to attain a state of satisfaction. A ***wealth-asset*** is any good for which its use negates unwealth and an ***economic wealth-asset*** is a wealth-asset the use of which further perfects a person's tangible power. ***Utility*** means having the character of being usable as or for a wealth-asset. ***Optimization*** in general is the activity of perfecting some object by minimizing the degree of difference in intensive magnitude between the state of the object as determined by a measure of its perfection and a standard of perfection. Every human being is a Self-optimizing agent with regard to the state of his *Personfähigkeit*. Taken together, these concepts mean that each individual will always act in such a way as he thinks best to perfect (make more complete) his general state of personal satisfaction. However, his personal judgment of what he thinks he needs to realize this condition is influenced,

in his judgments of taste, by what he sees in the Society around him. If he sees others in the Society who, again according to his judgments of taste, are able to achieve better satisfaction in their lives than he, and if he judges that his Community contributes less than he expects of it to aid his own power to achieve this, then his Duties-to-himself with regard to his external situation tend to provoke him into withdrawing his allegiance to this Community. The principle of social economics, on the other hand, is an animating principle of the corporate person. The principle states that the Community exists, in part, to aid each individual within it in his enterprises aimed at perfecting his state of *Existenz* by satisfying his wealth-asset needs.

It is very important to note that this is ***not*** a principle of material egalitarianism. It in no way implies redistribution of wealth so that every person possesses it in equal degree. This is because the principle is a principle of *satisfaction* and satisfaction is not measured and accounted in terms of tangible goods. It is, rather, a subjective judgment each individual makes for himself, and what an individual determines is needed to satisfy himself is a *personal*, i.e. Self-, determination. *It is a fundamental ontological error to suppose that wealth subsists in an object regarded as an economic good.* It subsists, rather, in the subjective judgment of the individual who *values* that object *as* a good. Mill made an extremely important observation when he noted,

> Governments must be made for human beings as they are, or as they are capable of speedily becoming: and in any state of cultivation which mankind, or any class among them, have yet attained, or are likely to soon attain, the interests by which they will be led, when they are thinking only of self-interest, will be almost exclusively those which are obvious at first sight, and which operate on their present condition. It is only a disinterested regard for others, and especially for what comes after them, for the idea of posterity, of their country, or of mankind, whether grounded on sympathy or on a conscientious feeling, which ever directs the minds and purposes of classes or bodies of men towards distant or unobvious interests. And it cannot be maintained that any form of government would be rational which required as a condition that these exalted principles of action should be the guiding and master motives in the conduct of average human beings. A certain amount of conscience and of disinterested public spirit may fairly be calculated on in the citizens of any community ripe for representative government. But it would be ridiculous to expect such a degree of it, combined with such intellectual discernment, as would be proof against any plausible fallacy tending to make that which was for their class interest appear the dictate of justice and of the general good. [Mill (1861), pp. 72-73]

The pages of history do not run short of examples of hypotheses of economic utility optimization of the character Mill described which run counter to human Nature. Three of the most well-known theses are those set out in the French Revolution's idealistic notion of *égalité*, the so-called "socialism" of Owen in the late 1820s, and the bankrupt Communist doctrine of Marx and Engels. Without exception, these ideas were Platonic fantasies, subjectively judged in terms of what the Critical theory calls "adult moral realism," and utterly lacking real objective validity. These are, of course, the big, famous examples of false speculation but lesser examples are abundant in many contemporary Societies. The "grand socialist experiment" has been run, the findings are in. Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who was in his youth a committed "socialist," reports to us what these findings are:

> Arguably, [socialism] was the most popular idea of any kind, surpassing even the great religions. Like them, socialism spread both by evangelization and by the sword, but no religion ever spread so far so fast. Islam conquered an empire that at its height embraced 20 percent of mankind. It took 300 years before Christianity could speak for 10 percent of the world's people, and after two millennia it can claim the adherence of about one-third of the human race. By comparison, within 150 years after the term "socialism" was coined by the followers of Robert Owen in the late 1820s, roughly 60 percent of the earth's population found itself living under socialistic rule of one kind or another. . . .

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> Once empowered, socialism refused to yield its promised rewards. The more dogged the effort to achieve it, the more the outcome mocked the humane ideals it proclaimed. Yet for a century and a half, no amount of failure dampened socialism's appeal. Then suddenly, like a rocket crashing back to earth, it all collapsed. Within a couple of decades, socialism was officially repealed in half the places where it had triumphed. In the other half, it continued in name only. Today, in but a few flyspecks on the map is there still an earnest effort to practice socialism, defended in the manner of those marooned Japanese soldiers who held out for decades after 1945, never having learned that their emperor had surrendered. [Muravchik (2002), pp. 2-3]

The colonial Societies were in no sense socialist Societies. Nor in the colonial Societies was socialism's logical opposite, namely free and pure state-of-nature enterprise, set up. If it had been so, the profiles of the colonies would not be rated as *neglect* but, rather, as *opposition* (as would also be the case if these colonies had embraced socialism). In every colony, to some degree or another, there were mediating factors of moral custom (mores and folkways) that limited the extent to which personal enterprises were at liberty to engage in uncivic activities. But this did not mean that the Societies took any proactive steps in their corporate animations to promote *civil cooperation* in individual economic enterprises. It is this *lack* of commitment by the divers colonial Communities that is meant by labeling them as *negligent* of the principle of social economics. They did not *intentionally* act contrary to human nature but did *allow* unnatural acts.

Agreement with the principle of social economics is what Critical social-natural economics, a *natural* science, designates by the name ***civic Community enterprise***. What this term means is defined in the glossary and discussed in Wells (2010), chapter 7. I often use the phrase ***civic free enterprise*** as a synonym for it. (Detailed technical treatment of it and its ramifications awaits a forthcoming treatise I am planning to call *The Economic Idea*). General non-quantitative concepts of the principle are familiar through experience to many contemporary Americans. One excellent expression of the general flavor of this concept was penned in 1963 by Thomas J. Watson, Jr., the legendary Chief Executive Officer of IBM, in *A Business and Its Beliefs*, a little book that stirred up quite a bit of controversy among American business executives at the time. Watson wrote:

> Our national beliefs have come to us in many ways – some from documents like the Declaration of Independence, others from tradition, legislation, and practice. They survive because our people continue to value them. From them, I believe, comes much of the strength which moves the United States forward.
>
> These beliefs are well known . . .
>
> We believe in political and religious freedom and in the need to exercise these freedoms with responsibility.
>
> We believe in a government of law to serve man and in the changeability of law to meet changed conditions.
>
> We believe that society exists to help the individual better himself – intellectually, spiritually, and materially.
>
> We believe in equality of opportunity and in extending a hand to help people to help themselves.
>
> And finally, we believe in freedom of enterprise. We equate it with equal opportunity. We believe that everyone should have the opportunity to do as much as he can for himself with a minimum of interference and restriction. . . .
>
> Self-reliance cannot always provide an answer to every need, especially in a society as big as ours where people can get caught up in forces over which they have little personal control. Thrift is a necessary virtue, but there are times when even thrift does not make it possible for the ordinary family to cope with extraordinary problems.

> Programs which assist Americans by reducing the hazards of a free market system without damaging the system itself are necessary, I believe, to its survival. If large numbers of people are made to feel that they're entirely at the mercy of that system or that they will be abandoned every time it undergoes one of its periodic adjustments, they can be expected to have less enthusiasm for the system than it deserves. . . . [If] we businessmen insist that free enterprise permits us to be indifferent to those things on which people put high value, then the people will quite naturally assume that free enterprise has too much freedom. And since the people have voting power, they will move against free enterprise to curtail it in their own interests. They do this, however, not because they are opposed to free enterprise, but to obtain and, in some cases, to protect the rights they believe themselves entitled to under a free enterprise system. [Watson (1963), pp. 85-90]

The colonies were not in opposition to civic Community enterprise, but neither did they take any steps to promote its cooperative *civil* outgrowth from the dynamics of economic competition. In point of fact, this idea did not exist at that time and did not appear implicitly until 1776 in Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* [Smith (1776)].

These four characteristics of the colonial profiles are, as I said earlier, common to the Puritan New England, Middle, and Southern colonial Societies. Yet the Society of Puritan New England is the only one that fell prior to the American Revolution. Why did the others not disintegrate as well? To understand this, we must look at the particular challenges Puritan Society failed to meet and what in that Society's profile caused its downfall.

§ 4. Challenges Facing Puritan Society

In the final analysis, the root cause of the fall of Puritan Society was a fundamental conflict the organization of their Society set up in its anthropological person that the power of its corporate person was unable to resolve (figure 2.2). To understand this it is necessary to examine aspects of mental physics that caused the failure. However, in order to understand this analysis we must first look at empirical specifics of the challenges that brought Puritan Society to its final crisis. By doing so the *context* of the Critical analysis will be easier to comprehend.

§ 4.1 Political Governance of Massachusetts

The Massachusetts colonies were mother to the rest of New England, and during the early decades of New England Massachusetts more and more assumed the role of a local imperial power. In a manner of speaking, Massachusetts became the 500 pound gorilla no one in New England could ignore. The story of the breakdown of Puritan Society in Massachusetts is the story of the breakdown of Puritan Society throughout New England.

The founders of the two principal settlements in Massachusetts, the Plymouth colony and the Massachusetts Bay colony, were religious leaders rather than political scientists. It is therefore not very surprising that the colonies' original social contracts were formed from satisficing decisions made in response to event-driven accidents. In retrospect, Critical analysis must hold that the Plymouth colony made the wiser start in this. Comprised as it was of a significant population of non-Puritans, the original Plymouth social contract took the form of the Mayflower Compact. Jernegan tells us,

> The Pilgrims, unlike the colonists to Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, were without a charter. It was necessary that some form of government should be set up; therefore the company drew up a document on board ship, November 11, 1620, known as the "May-flower Compact" or "Civill body politick," signed by forty-one men, seventeen of whom were from Leyden. The essential feature of the agreement was this: all who signed it agreed to submit to "such just and equal laws" thought best for the general good of the colony.

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> Conformity to the laws of England and the method of making laws were not mentioned. John Carver was chosen governor, and on his death in April 1621, William Bradford succeeded him, though his duties as governor were not defined. The whole body of the free male settlers met and enacted the laws – the first pure democracy in America. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 119-120]

The significance of the minority of Pilgrims being from Leyden is that this congregation, which had migrated from England to Leyden in 1609 for religious reasons, had been the original instigator of the plan to establish a colony in the New World. The specific wording of the Mayflower Compact was,

> We whose names are under-written, the loyall subjects of our dread sovereign Lord, King James, by ye grace of God of Great Britaine, Franc, & Ireland king, defender of ye faith, &c., haveing undertaken, for ye glorie of God and advancement of ye Christian faith, and the honour of our king and countrie, a voyage to plant ye first colonie in ye Northerne parts of Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly and mutualy in ye presence of God, and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves togeather into a civill body politick, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of ye ends aforesaid; and *by virtue hereof* to enacte, constitute, and frame such just and equal lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meete and convenient for ye generall good of ye Colonie, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience. [Thwaites (1910), pg. 118]

The initial form of governance taken on by the Plymouth Colony was a simple commune. This was in no way incompatible with non-consensus democracy because the colony was very small (around 102 settlers). By the following April, 44 of them had died, including all but four of the original 18 married women. Were it not for a treaty of peace and friendship they established with the Wampanoag tribe and the aid of two Native Americans living with them, the entire colony would probably have died that first winter [Jernegan (1929), pg. 120]. Thirty-five new settlers joined the colony in the autumn of 1622 and every year after that brought more settlers to Plymouth. Growth in the colony, as well as in the Massachusetts Bay colony, was driven in no small part to increasing persecution of Puritans in England.

In 1624 the commune system in Plymouth broke down and was replaced by what was to become the familiar New England town system. Each freeman was allocated one acre of land, and in 1627 this was increased to twenty acres per household. In that year as well, the colony paid off its London partners and became wholly independent of any economic or immigration dictation from England. Prior to this, new colonists had been selected by the London sponsors of the colony and many of the colonists selected did not belong to the Plymouth Puritan sect. After 1627 the colonists controlled their own immigration policy and began restricting it to members of their own faith. By 1643 Plymouth colony had three thousand colonists, living in eight distinct towns, along with several independent trading and fishing stations established along the coast. In 1638 a General Court consisting of the governor, his assistants, and two delegates from each town was formed to try felony legal cases and assist the governor in the administration of the colony. The General Court was given no lawmaking powers; this continued to be in the hands of the whole body of freemen. Thus, from nearly its beginning, the Plymouth colony was and remained a democracy until 1691. At that time it was incorporated with the Massachusetts Bay colony to form the colony of Massachusetts [Thwaites (1910), pp. 120-124].

The establishment of the Massachusetts Bay colony, even more so than at Plymouth, was driven by the anti-Puritan hostility of King James and, after him, Charles I, who succeeded James in 1625. An attempt was made to colonize the present site of Gloucester by a merchant association in Dorchester, England, but the colony proved to be unprofitable and the attempt was

abandoned in 1626. Most of those settlers returned to England. John White, described as a conforming Puritan rector at Dorchester, was determined to make the colony a success and set about organizing a colonization plan of "raising a bulwark against the kingdom of Anti-Christ" [*ibid*., pg. 125]. In 1628 John Endicott arrived in Salem with sixty other persons to reinforce what remained of that colony. This venture had been organized as a trading company chartered as "the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay in New England." Almost at once thereafter, another 300 colonists came over to settle the new colony. In 1630, the seat of government of the colony removed itself from England and came over to America. It was led by John Winthrop, who brought with him 840 new Puritan colonists. The reestablishment and transformation of this government from an English trading company into an American colonial government was done without legal sanction in England. By then the colony consisted of several independent congregations and Boston became the capital of the colony. By 1631 the colonial government had assumed the form of a religious oligarchy [*ibid*., pp. 127-128; Jernegan (1929), pp. 126-128]. Jernegan tells us,

> The reasons for this procedure were doubtless as follows. The leaders had in mind a peculiar and special type of colony; first, a Bible Commonwealth, in which the lives of individuals should be regulated in harmony with the will of God as interpreted by those appointed as rulers and best qualified for the purpose; second, a desire for unanimity of opinion, for the allowance of different views of government and religion might wreck the plans of the leaders and endanger the success of the colony. It was necessary then, so the leaders argued, that there should be restrictions of political privileges and religious toleration. Religious toleration was not considered desirable for Massachusetts. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 129-130]

Rule by oligarchy did not sit well with all the colonists, and dissension and challenges to the oligarchic government followed. There was a series of political wrangling and compromise, leading to the eventual establishment, in 1634, of a representative assembly. However, the oligarchic leaders proved to be more skilled at political maneuvering. Despite the form of government taking on the now-familiar appearance of a representative democracy, restrictions limiting the franchise of who could vote for deputies to the assembly left the Massachusetts Bay colony a theocratic state. Enough opposition still existed in the towns to put down attempts to establish an aristocratic rule, but, as Adams and Vannest remarked, this opposition was not strong enough to stop "the attempt of the leaders, such as Winthrop and Cotton, who were opposed to democracy, to prevent its application to civil government" [Adams & Vannest (1935), pp. 45-46; Jernegan (1929), pp. 129-131; Thwaites (1910), pp. 127-9].

Growth in the colony neither strengthened the local town governments nor played into the hands of the ruling theocracy so that they might more strongly enforce their rule. As people were forced, by the necessity of increasing population, to settle farther and farther away from the central Meeting House, the effect was to granulate and eventually break down the congregation-based town governments in both Massachusetts Bay and in Plymouth. Even in 17th century Puritan Society, a growingly clear split between civil government and the authority of the religious parish became more and more evident as time passed. Figure 2.3 provides an illustration of this process. Cubberley wrote,

> By the close of the seventeenth century . . . many of the forces which at first required a compact form of settlement had begun to lose their hold. New settlements arose within towns miles away from the meeting- and schoolhouses. To attend church or town meeting in winter was not always easy, and for children to attend town school was impossible. The old laws as to place of residence had to be repealed or ignored, and as a result church en-



Figure 2.3: Illustration of the evolution over time from central town government to a system of distributed districts in Massachusetts. Proliferation of separate parishes tended to granulate the congregation and reduce the political power of the central town. By the 18th century the Puritan Society had given way to a Yankee Society in New England, which established the system of district governance in New England.

> thusiasm, town as opposed to individual interests, and zeal for education alike declined. New towns also arose farther inland, which soon broke up into divisions or districts. By 1725 the population of most of the towns had been scattered over much of the town's area, and small settlements, cut off from the central town by hills, streams, forest, or mere distance, had been formed. Due to the difficulties of communication, these little settlements tended to become isolated and independent. [Cubberley (1919), pp. 42-3]

This, however, did not strengthen the power of the oligarchy. The same environmental forces that granulated the towns also hindered enforcement of edicts by a central oligarchy that lacked both a standing militia of its own and the authority to raise one. Massachusetts was slowly drifting towards political breakup.

Somewhat ironically, the great unifying factor that did hold the Massachusetts colonies together was Charles I. Massachusetts Bay was moving quickly and energetically towards a state of complete independence from Great Britain, with Plymouth following suit at a less aggressive pace. In the late 1620s and early 1630s a number of non-Puritan "undesirables" were driven out of both Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay and sent packing back to England. Thwaites tells us,

> The uncongenial spirits whom [the colonists] had driven from Massachusetts Bay made complaints in England of the ill-treatment they had received, and carried to Archbishop Laud and other members of the Privy Council reports that the Puritans were setting up in America a practically independent state and church. As an immediate consequence, emigrants, early in 1634, were not permitted to go to New England without taking the royal oath of allegiance and promising to conform to the Book of Common Prayers.
>
> In April a royal commission of twelve persons was appointed, ostensibly to take charge of all the American colonies, secure conformity, and even to revoke charters; but it was well understood that Massachusetts was especially aimed at. The Massachusetts people were speedily ordered to lay their charter before the Privy Council. Their answer, however, was withheld, pending prayerful consideration. Meanwhile, Dorchester, Charlestown, and Castle Island were fortified; a military commission was set to work to collect and store arms; militiamen were drilled; arrangements were made on Beacon Hill, in Boston, for signaling the inhabitants of the interior in case of an attack; the people were ordered, on pain of death, in the event of war to obey the military authorities, and no longer to swear allegiance to the Crown, but to the colony of Massachusetts. [Thwaites (1910), pp. 130-1]

Revolutionary war might have broken out between Massachusetts and Great Britain right at that

time. That it was avoided was due to two factors: (1) some adroit political maneuvering and shrewd diplomacy on the part of the colonists; and (2) the outbreak of the English civil war between Parliament and Charles I in 1642. This quickly expanded until it became a British civil war involving England, Scotland, and Ireland and four different religious faiths.

The colonies were the immediate beneficiaries of the bloody political upheaval in Great Britain. For the next two decades, until the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660, New England was left more or less free of any further British intrusiveness and the theocracy could turn its attention to Massachusetts' religious dissenters within the Puritan ranks.

§ 4.2 Rhode Island

History has traditionally portrayed two individuals most prominently in the foundation of the colony of Rhode Island: Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson. There is no doubt that both these people were indeed significant historical figures of the time. Critical analysis also suggests that the stories of Williams and Hutchinson present empirical surface evidence of deeper developing social problems that were taking root within Massachusetts. Rhode Island is easily recognizable as what Toynbee called an "external proletariat" in its relationship to Massachusetts. What historians have tended to miss, or to at least underestimate, is the Toynbee internal proletariat that was forming at the same time inside Massachusetts. The former is a social-natural symptom of the *Dasein* of the latter because where the former arises from exile, ostracism, or persecuted exodus, the latter will also arise from the same social-natural causes.

Roger Williams was pastor of the church at Salem. There is some disagreement among historians regarding the date at which he arrived in Salem. Thwaites wrote that this was in 1633, whereas Jernegan tells us it was in 1631. All, however, agree that he was pastor at Salem by 1635 and that some of his religious and political views were heretical according to the Massachusetts theocracy. He held [Thwaites (1910), pp. 132-3; Jernegan (1929), pp. 131-2]:

- that the civil government had no power to pass religious laws and no power over a man's conscience or his religious beliefs or to punish men for infraction of religious laws;
- that civil government had power only over men's bodies, goods, and outward estates (a principle of complete separation of church and state);
- that meetings or associations of clergy were contrary to the congregational system of church government and each church congregation was its own master; he advised his own congregation to renounce all communication with other Puritan churches;
- that the Massachusetts charter had no legal basis because the king did not own the land; legitimate land patents could only be obtained from the Indians by purchasing the land from them;
- that the government had no right to require enforced attendance of church, and that all monetary contributions to the church that were not voluntary should be abolished.

Some of Williams' views were regarded as heretical according to Puritan-Calvinist doctrine, and his denial of the king's authority over colonial lands was regarded as treasonous. In 1635 the General Court banished him from the colony. Williams avoided deportation back to England by slipping away with the help of the Indians, and in 1636 he and five of his followers founded a settlement at Providence as a proprietary association with the right to admit other settlers.

Anne Hutchinson of Boston had formed a religious study group, in which she assumed the role of teacher. Her meetings attracted a large following and some even said she was divinely inspired. Her religious views were deemed heretical by the Boston theocracy, although the conflict basically boiled down to a difference of opinion over the proper interpretation of Calvin's articles 12-16 summarized earlier in this chapter. For these views, Hutchinson and a number of

her followers were excommunicated and banished. Other colonists, who like Williams and Hutchinson held views contrary to the ruling doctrines in force in the Massachusetts Bay colony, likewise emigrated to Rhode Island. William Coddington, along with a group of eighteen friends, founded a settlement called Aquidneck on an island in Narragansett Bay in 1638; that town became Portsmouth. When Hutchinson and her followers came to Portsmouth, Coddington apparently was ousted as judge. He and seven associates moved to Newport and founded another new "Bible Commonwealth" [Jernegan (1929), pp. 135-6]. Warwick was established by some of Hutchinson's other disciples in 1643. Thus, between 1636 and 1643, four independent towns had been set up in Rhode Island. In all cases, the land was purchased from the local Native American tribes. In 1647 these towns banded together for mutual self-protection, formed a civil government and later became the officially chartered colony of Rhode Island. As Jernegan put it,

> Rhode Island was thus started without a church establishment, or taxes for the support of religion or compulsory religious attendance. There were no religious tests for the right to vote or hold office, no disciplining of individuals or churches for their views, and no trouble or wars with the Indians. Rhode Island was founded not as a result of conscientious planning, but by bands of fugitives, exiles, and individuals seeking escape from religious intolerance and arbitrary government, settling at different places, at different times and, for a time, without cooperation or relation to each other. The spirit of individualism was strong, but outside influences forced these independent settlements to join their forces to form the colony of Rhode Island. [Jernegan (1929), pg. 137]

Rhode Island thus became a haven for those who would not tolerate being made to conform to the systems established elsewhere in New England, and also for new immigrants from all over Europe who came to America either out of persecution at home or simply to seek better lives for themselves. The word "individualism" commonly used to describe Rhode Islanders is not what is meant by the term "individualistic axis" in the circumplex description of social profiles. This axis denotes a controlling, i.e. *ruler's*, attitude, whereas in Rhode Island the compelling motive was the desire of people to rule only themselves and to not be ruled by others.



Figure 2.4: Social governance profile of Rhode Island.

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The causal human motivation underlying the establishment of Rhode Island was Self-determination in accordance with individuals' Duties-to-themselves. That a Society did form, rather than a mere community of hermits or isolated families, was due to a common need for cooperation in order to survive in the face of physical challenges and political challenges posed by competitive outside Societies. Therefore Rhode Island *Society* was not individualistic in its basic character but, rather, gregarious. This is the formal polar opposite to the individualistic Society organization (figure 2.4). In Critical terminology, ***individualistic*** means *characterized by operationalization expressions conveying a competitive & ambitious, suspicious & jealous, cunning & opportunistic personality style*. The personality style associated with the central range of the octant is the narcissistic style. On the other hand, ***gregarious*** means *characterized by operationalization expressions conveying a trusting & forgiving, respectful & content personality style.* Personality styles associated with the extreme edges of the octant are the avoidant and the schizoid/schizotypal personality styles, and the octant represents a blending of these two extremes. The gregarious octant in the D-PIPOS circumplex is associated with *laissez faire* attitudes of social governance, hope, and trustworthy interpersonal relationships.

The consequence of this is that Rhode Island colony took on the form of a collective of semi-*Gemeinschaft*-like Communities whose relationships were based on cooperation when necessary and independent Self-determinations otherwise. When contemporary authors and orators speak of the "rugged individualism of the American" as if it were a virtue, *this* is the social style to which they refer. "American rugged individualism" would more accurately be described as "American gregariousness." It is the attitude of "mind your own business and I'll mind mine, but if you need a helping hand I'll extend it to you if you'll do the same for me." A gregarious Society is one in which a balance is struck between the *ad hoc* and somewhat anarchistic character of the *Gemeinschaft* Community and the *asocial* principle of majority *rule*. It is a manifestation of what Santayana called a ***free society***:

> Free society differs from that which is natural and legal precisely in this, that it does not cultivate relations which in the last analysis are experienced and material, but turns exclusively to unanimities in meanings, to collaborations in an ideal world. The basis of free society is of course natural . . . but free society has ideal goals. Spirits cannot touch except by becoming unanimous. At the same time, public opinion, reputation, and interpersonal sympathy reinforce only very general feelings, and reinforce them vaguely; and as the inner play of sentiment becomes precise, it craves more specific points of support or comparison. It is in creatures of our own species that we chiefly scent the aroma of inward sympathy, because it is they that are visibly moved on the same occasions as ourselves; and it is to those among our fellow-men who share our special haunts and habitats that we feel more precise affinities. Though the ground for the feeling is animal contact and contagion, its deliverance does not revert to those natural accidents, but concerns a represented sympathy in represented souls. Friendship, springing from accidental association, terminates in a consciousness of ideal and essential agreement. [Santayana (1905), pp. 146-7]

The gregarious Society is a hybrid of the Amiable style of pure *Gemeinschaft* Community and the Analytic style of pure non-consensus democracy. It is found in many small towns across the length and breadth of the United States. *Gemeinschaft* Community tends to be *ad hoc* and operates under the influence of vague customs and habituated expectations. Non-consensus democracy, on the other hand, is *legalistic* and prefers to *codify* rules. Some contemporary sociologists hold what I have to call an overly romantic view of *Gemeinschaft* Society. A pure *Gemeinschaft* Society is what Santayana called a *natural society* and is not the peaceful everyone-gets-along-harmoniously-with-everyone-else sort of place some wistful descriptions of pre-Industrial life portray. The premier example of real *Gemeinschaft* Community is provided to us by what may be the oldest surviving Society on earth, the BaMbuti Pygmies of the Congo.

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Anthropologist Colin Turnbull describes for us the nature of *Gemeinschaft* governance in a BaMbuti Community:

> There were no chiefs, no formal councils. In each aspect of Pygmy life there might be one or two men or women who were more prominent than others, but usually for good practical reasons. This showed up most clearly of all in the settling of disputes. There was no judge, no jury, no court. . . . Each dispute was settled as it arose, according to its nature.
>
> Roughly, there were four ways of punishing offenses, each operating as an efficient deterrent but without necessitating any system of outright punishment. In a small and cooperative group no individual would want the job either of passing judgments or of administering punishment, so like everything else in Pygmy life the maintenance of law was a cooperative affair. Certain offenses, rarely committed, were considered so terrible that they would of themselves bring some form of supernatural retribution. Others became the affair of the molimo, which in its morning rampages showed public disapproval by attacking the hut of the culprit, possibly the culprit himself. Both these types of crime were extremely rare. The more serious of the other crimes, such as theft, were dealt with by a sound thrashing which was administered cooperatively by all who felt inclined to participate, but only after the entire camp had been involved in discussing the case. Less serious offenses were settled in the simplest way, by the litigants themselves either arguing out the case, or engaging in a mild fight. . . . [Turnbull (1961), pp. 110-111]
>
> In fact, Pygmies dislike and avoid personal authority, though they are by no means devoid of a sense of responsibility. It is rather that they think of responsibility as communal. If you ask a father, or a husband, why he allows his son to flirt with a married girl, or his wife to flirt with other men, he will answer, "It is not my affair," and he is right. It is *their* affair, and the affair of the other men and women, and of their brothers and sisters. He will try to settle it himself, either by argument or by a good beating, but if this fails he brings everyone else into the dispute so that he is absolved of personal responsibility.
>
> If you ask a Pygmy why his people have no chiefs, no lawgivers, no councils, or no leaders, he will answer with misleading simplicity, "Because we are the people of the forest." The forest, the great provider, is the one standard by which all deeds and thoughts are judged, it is the chief, the lawgiver, the leader, and the final arbitrator. [*ibid*., pg. 125]

Individual Rhode Island towns did not achieve this same natural-society state of *Existenz* but instead mingled in with it a minimal amount of law-making by means of Athens-like democracy. Thwaites describes this form of governance in the following words:

> The freemen [of Portsmouth] conducted public affairs in town meeting, with a secretary, a clerk, and a chief magistrate. Newport was similarly organized; but when Newport and Portsmouth reunited, a more complex government was instituted. A General Court was then established, in which sat the governor, the deputy-governor, and four assistants – one town choosing the governor and two of the assistants, and the other the deputy-governor and the remaining assistants; the freemen composed the body of the court and settled even the most trivial cases. In 1641 it was declared that "it is in the power of the body of freemen orderly assembled, or the part of them, to make and constitute just laws by which they shall be regulated, and to depute from among themselves such ministers as shall see them faithfully executed between man and man." At the same session an order was adopted "that none be accounted a delinquent for doctrine, provided it not be directly repugnant to the government or the laws established."
>
> By the other colonies Providence and Rhode Island were deemed hot-beds of anarchy. Persons holding all manners of Protestant theological notions flocked thither in considerable numbers, and it is true that for many years there were hot contentions between them, often to the disturbance of public order. [Thwaites (1910), pg. 148]

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

Figure 2.5: The 4LAR structure of Rhode Island social contracting.

Figure 2.5 illustrates the 4LAR of the social contracting structure that developed in Rhode Island. It is interesting to contrast this profile with that of Puritan New England as well as with the profile of the Middle colonies. It is sharply different from the Puritan profile in both the power of the corporate person and the anthropological personhood of social optimization, differing in five out of the seven non-mathematical headings. By contrast, it differs in only three out of these same seven headings in comparison with the 4LAR of the Middle colonies. Thus, Rhode Island did not transform into a Middle colony when it broke with Puritan New England. It does, however, lie intermediate between the circumplexes of Puritan New England and the Middle colonies. After the fall of Puritan Society, the new Yankee Society that took shape was one that pulled the Puritan colony profile strongly toward the profile of Rhode Island. Rhode Island Society did not become Yankee Society, nor did Yankee Society become Rhode Island Society. Yankee Society became considerably more gregarious than Puritan Society but remained more idiosyncratic than Rhode Island.

The Rhode Island Society profile is important for understanding the transformation from Puritan to Yankee New England for the following reason. The people of Rhode Island comprised an external proletariat in relationship with the Massachusetts colonies. Indeed, the eventual unification of Rhode Island as a *single* colony was partially motivated by concerns over what can fairly be called the imperialist-like expansionism exhibited by the Massachusetts Bay colony, which annexed New Hampshire for some forty years despite the fact that New Hampshire, too, was a place where exiles and emigrants from Puritan Massachusetts had migrated.

However, the emigration of people from Massachusetts to Rhode Island also provides real evidence for concluding that an internal Toynbee proletariat within Massachusetts itself had also formed. The profile of this proletariat would have been much the same as the Rhode Island profile because it was caused by the same factors, differing only in that its members, to use a phrase popular since the 1960s, "went underground" and thereby avoided formal forced exile from Massachusetts. More evidence of this is provided by the collapse of the Puritan institution of public education that took place during the subsequent external challenges this Society faced and failed to meet. These challenges provided the *coup de grace* to disintegrating Puritan Society.

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§ 4.3 The External Challenges

An internal Toynbee proletariat is a population of people living within a Society who have either: (1) never committed themselves to a pledge of allegiance to that Society[9], or; (2) who have withdrawn their allegiance to it by moral secession because of perceived injustices perpetuated by other members of that Society in violation of the proletariat's understanding of the social contract. Puritan Society was a granulated Society within which antibonding relationships developed between its divers mini-Communities. Indeed, the actions of agents of its Puritan government were responsible for the Society's loss of the corporate *Personfähigkeit* that it needed to meet the challenges with which it was now faced. Toynbee wrote,

> For proletarianism is a state of feeling rather than a matter of outward circumstances. When we first made use of the term 'proletariat' we defined it, for our purpose, as a social element or group which in some way is 'in' but not 'of' any given society at any given stage of that society's history . . . The true hallmark of the proletarian is neither poverty nor humble birth but a consciousness – and the resentment this consciousness inspires – of being disinherited from his ancestral place in society. [Toynbee (1946a), pg. 377]

In my opinion, this Toynbee context makes the not-uncommon phrase "denied the promise of the American dream" one of the most darkly ominous phrases that can pass an American's lips.

The first external body blow to hit Puritan Society was King Philip's War (1675-77). It might have come sooner, with the restoration of Charles II in 1660. Charles harbored animosity towards Massachusetts and thoroughly disliked the Puritan religion. However, he was faced with several enormous problems at home, including near-bankruptcy of the British treasury, little spats of revolt here and there from religious groups that saw his restoration as a threat to them, and, not least of all, a renewed war with the Dutch. Added on top of this was the fact that Charles II was not a particularly strong or skillful monarch, was inexperienced in ruling, and preferred to let his royalist Parliament handle the major affairs of state. As a result, the colonists were able to buy some time before being confronted by the consequences of the Stuart restoration, and their ranks were swelled by a new influx of immigration by Puritans removing themselves from the personal danger they perceived Charles to represent [Durant (1963), pp. 244-287]. Nonetheless, when Cromwell died in 1658, New England lost its most important friend in Great Britain.

For New England the more important succession in 1662 followed the death of Massasoit, the chief sachem of the Wampanoag, who had befriended the settlers at Plymouth. Massasoit had two sons, called Alexander and Philip by the colonists. At that time the Wampanoag and Narraganset were two strongest Native American tribes neighboring the New England colonies. Both had been important friends to the early colonists but by 1674 relationships between the colonists and the Indians had turned ugly. This was primarily due to the high-handed treatment dealt out to the

[9] Simply mouthing the words to an oath of allegiance does not constitute an actual pledge of allegiance if the oath-taker makes no practical internal Self-commitment to tenets of Obligation to the Community. Without such a Self-determination, making it a personal Duty to accept Obligation and fulfill the Duties the Obligation requires, oath-taking is nothing but an insincere gesture and the act of a outlaw who chooses to remain an outlaw in relationship with the Community whose oath he feigns to take. All reciprocal Obligations and societal Duties are grounded in Duties-to-oneself with regard to one's external situation. If the individual does not see citizenship in the Community as something benefiting his own *Personfähigkeit* and serving his Duty-to-himself, the deontological grounds of necessitation for reciprocal Obligation and mutual Duty is lacking and a state-of-nature relationship continues in effect between the individual and the citizens of the Community. One principal objective of public instructional education is to cultivate in the individual Self-determinations by which he will lead himself to making a true Self-commitment to the Community. In this subsists the *public good* of public education.

Indians by the colonists. Massasoit had apparently been succeeded by his son, Alexander, but in 1662 Alexander had died suddenly while at Plymouth, where he had been summoned to answer a charge of plotting with the Narragansets against the whites. Metacom ("Philip") became chief sachem of the Wampanoag. By some accounts, Philip believed the whites had poisoned his brother and so became a bitter enemy of the colonists [Bolton & Marshall (1920), pp. 191-2].

Historians' accounts vary in the details of events of the next twelve years, although all more or less agree that the colonists were chiefly to blame for numerous provocations leading up to hostilities. These accounts also tell of some Indian provocations of the whites [Thwaites (1910), pp. 170-172; Jernegan (1929), pp. 150-152; Brandon (1961), pp. 175-178]. The following accounts appear to be undisputed. In June of 1675 a war party of Wampanoags attacked the town of Swanzey "killing many settlers and perpetrating fiendish outrages" [Thwaites (1910), pg. 171]. War parties from Mount Hope spread out across the countryside and were joined by some members of other tribes. The King Philip's War had begun.

The Narragansets were initially neutral although clearly more sympathetic to Philip than to the colonials (against whom they also had grievances). Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, and Connecticut had joined themselves together in a defensive alliance before the outbreak. The Mohegan tribe, who were enemies of the Narragansets, allied themselves with the colonials. Fearing that the Narragansets would throw in with Philip, a force of one thousand men attacked a Narraganset stronghold of some three to four thousand warriors and families near what is now Kingston, RI, in December, 1675. Four hundred wigwams were burned and between four hundred to as many as a thousand Indians were killed, including women and children.

The war was fought with great savagery on both sides. Brandon wrote,

> For it was the most devastating war New England has ever experienced, before or since, ancient or modern. Philip had been underrated. The Indians had not yet learned proper battle tactics, but they were better armed with muskets than had been expected, and they had made some progress in learning how to do their own gunsmithing . . . In matters of larger strategy Philip revealed another unexpected talent. [Brandon (1961), pg. 176]

Jernegan tells us,

> Deerfield was attacked by the Indians and most of the houses burned; and again, a second time when a force of sixty men sent to relieve the town was ambushed and almost every man killed. The Indians were, however, gradually driven back while they suffered severely for want of corn. They were hunted down and scattered, the captives held as servants, and some sold into slavery to the West Indies.
>
> The New England colonists also suffered severely. Five hundred white men were captured or killed, and nearly forty towns were damaged. Sixteen in Massachusetts and four in New Hampshire were destroyed or abandoned. The cost in money was half a million dollars, equivalent to several million today[10]. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 151-2]

Among those sold into slavery was Philip's 9-year-old son, grandson of the man whose friendship saved the Pilgrims at Plymouth from starving to death during their first winter in America. He was sold only after Puritan ministers first intensely debated having this innocent little boy beheaded instead by authority of Old Testament Scripture [Brandon (1961), pp. 177-8].

Thwaites' book clearly exhibits anti-Indian personal bias. Nonetheless, when he tells us, "It was many years before the heavy war-debts of the colonies could be paid; in Plymouth this debt

[10] Jernegan's equivalent dollars must be multiplied by roughly 12 to get 2012-equivalent dollars. For New England and for the Indians, King Philip's War was an economic catastrophe as well as a human tragedy.

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exceeded in amount the value of all the personal property," this is probably true [Thwaites (1910), pg. 172]. It is beyond reasonable doubt that economics was a factor in the war:

> The encroachment of the frontiers on the Indian hunting ground was the primary cause of the war, but other events were contributory. By 1660 the fur trade had declined, fish and lumber having become the important exports. This trade brought in silver, and wampum ceased to be the medium of exchange. With the passing of furs and wampum, the Indian became less and less useful to the white man, who looked upon him with contempt. The Christianizing of the Cape Cod Indians by the Reverend John Eliot and other missionaries was viewed sullenly by the Wampanoags, who saw in it an attempt to weaken their power. [Bolton & Marshall (1920), pp. 191-2]

King Philip's War was an unmitigated disaster for the Indians, but it also cracked the social foundations of the Puritan colonies. Cubberley wrote,

> King Philip's War had cost the New England colonists half a million dollars – a large sum for that time – and had almost exhausted the people. Twelve out of the ninety existing towns had been destroyed, and forty others had witnessed fire and massacre. A number of towns were so poor they could not pay their colony taxes, and the maintenance of schools, either by tuition or tax, became exceedingly difficult.
>
> The general result, though, of the war was such a punishment of the Indians that the colonists felt free thereafter to form settlements inland, and a marked expansion of New England took place. The same was true of the central colonies, new settlements now being founded farther and farther inland. These new towns in the wilderness, owing their foundation to an entirely different cause than the original towns, and being founded by younger people who had never known European religious zeal or oppression, at once gave evidence of less interest in religion and learning than had been the case with the towns nearer the coast. Even in these earlier coast towns, the second and third generations then in control began to turn from religion and agriculture to shipping and commerce, and with the rise of trade new interests began slowly to displace the dominant religious concern of the early colonists.
>
> As early as 1647 Rhode Island had enacted the first law providing for freedom of religious worship ever enacted by an English-speaking people, and two years later Maryland enacted a similar law. Though the Maryland law was later overthrown, and a rigid Church-of-England rule established there, these laws were indicative of the new spirit arising in the New World. The witchcraft persecutions at Salem and elsewhere in New England did much to weaken the hold of the ministry on the people there[11]. By the beginning of the eighteenth century a change in attitude toward the old problem of personal salvation and church attendance became evident. New settlements amid frontier conditions, where hard work rather than long sermons and religious disputations were the need; the gradual rise of a civil as opposed to a religious form of town government; the increase of new interests in trade and shipping, and inter-colony commerce; the beginnings of the breakdown of the old aristocratic traditions and customs, originally transplanted from Europe; the rising individualism in both Europe and America; – these all helped to weaken the hold on the people of the old religious doctrines. The importation of many "indentured white servants," who for a time were virtually slaves, and the deportation from England of many paupers and criminals from the English jails, most of whom went to the central and southern colonies, likewise tended not only to reduce the literacy and religious zeal of the colonies, but also to develop a class of "poor whites" who later deeply influenced educational progress in the States in which they settled. [Cubberley (1919), pp. 37-38]

[11] Jernegan gives a brief account of the Salem witchcraft trials (1692) and the witch hunts that erupted elsewhere in New England [Jernegan (1929), pp. 286-7]. He concluded, "From a political standpoint, the witchcraft movement was an effort on the part of the old clerical order to retain their influence and power."

When jingoism is set aside and the landscape of consequences is viewed impartially, it would seem that King Philip's War was a Pyrrhic victory for New England Puritanism. Whether or not the Puritan theocracy could have, given time, stemmed the expansion of the Toynbee proletariat now becoming established in New England is argumentative at best and most likely doubtful. Regardless, they were not to have the time.

In 1685 Charles II died and his younger brother became King James II. It has long been debated whether Charles II really harbored any religious convictions at all, but in James' case this has never been a question. He was a public Anglican, an actual Catholic, and he attempted at once to put down Protestantism in Great Britain. Almost immediately the threat of rebellion and overthrow was at his door. Unlike his brother Charles, he took an immediate keen interest in the New England colonies, who he regarded as harboring those responsible for the execution of his father, Charles I. The 500 pound gorilla soon found itself confronted by a British 1200 pound gorilla.

Throughout the reign of Charles II ongoing efforts had been made by the Crown government to bring the New England colonies under more direct supervision and control by the Crown. These were met by evasion, delay, and occasional defiant insubordination (particularly from the Massachusetts Bay colony). In 1684 Massachusetts Bay's trading charter was revoked and in 1685 James II made plans for broader actions against the New England colonies. These were put into effect in 1686. A royal governor, Sir Edmund Andros, was installed as governor of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, New Hampshire, and Maine. The charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut were revoked, and by 1688 Andros was also the ruler of New York and New Jersey.

Andros' rulership was perceived as despotic and provoked open rebellion. This, however, was an economic and political rebellion rather than a religious one. The large Toynbee proletariat in New England deserted the old clerical theocracy and it was swept away. They united instead under their own civil leaders. Meanwhile, in 1689, William of Orange landed in England with an army and the publicly announced purposes of "saving Britain" and, as several rebelling English lords put it, delivering England from "a perpetuation of evil." The War of the English Succession had begun. The colonists immediately sided with William, cheering his overthrow of James II and acknowledging him as their own king. Andros was forcibly deposed, arrested, and in 1690 was deported to England. (He soon returned as Royal Governor of Virginia and of Maryland).

William's motive in overthrowing James II probably had less to do with him than with the real threat to Protestant Europe, namely France's King Louis XIV [Durant (1963), pp. 690-699)]. The accession of William III touched off a world war, known in continental Europe as the Palatine War and in America as King William's War (1689-97) [Thwaites (1910), pp. 253-4; Jernegan (1929), pp. 325-6; Bolton & Marshall (1920), pp. 261-7]. In terms of international *realpolitik*, King William's War accomplished nothing on the American side of the Atlantic, but its social effect was profound. By its conclusion the disintegration of Puritan New England Society was complete and after a brief interregnum a new Yankee Society had formed.

One effect of William's accession was the colonials' self-restoration of their charters and the end of Charles' and James' plans to reorganize the colonies. Another was the overthrow of theocratic government in New England. But William III did not just simply go away. Thwaites writes,

> In September, 1691, Plymouth and the newly acquired territory of Acadia were united to Massachusetts under a new charter, which had been secured from the king chiefly through the agency of the Rev. Increase Mather of Boston . . . In May following (1692) this new charter for Massachusetts was received at Boston. It was not as liberal as had been hoped. The people were allowed their representative assembly as before, but the governor was to be appointed by the Crown; the religious qualification for suffrage was abolished, a small property qualification (an estate of £40, or a freehold worth £2 a year) being substituted; laws passed by the General Court were subject to veto by the king . . . Thus Massachusetts

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became a Crown charter colony . . .

> Connecticut and Rhode Island received their charters back; New Hampshire was governed by its proprietor, Samuel Allen, but without a charter; Maine continued under Massachusetts, – the Bay Colony now extending from Rhode Island to New Brunswick except for a short intervening strip of New Hampshire coast. [Thwaites (1910), pp. 176-7]

Connecticut (into which the New Haven colony had been absorbed) and New Hampshire had been breakaway colonies from Massachusetts in the first place. Now, with the blessing of the new king and the perceived end of the Indian threat after King Philip's War, they were independent once again from the imperial-territorial ambitions of the old Massachusetts government. That government was gone now and a new one – not quite a parliamentary monarchy but not yet a democratic republic – had taken its place. Jernegan wrote,

> The final effects of the revolution [in Great Britain] were far-reaching. First it resulted in the overthrow of the Puritan theocracy; for in the new charter of 1691 the religious qualification for the franchise was changed to a property qualification, and Plymouth was united with Massachusetts. Massachusetts was also obliged to accept a royal governor appointed by the crown with veto power, and judges appointed by the governor with consent of the council. Her laws were also subject to disallowance by the king. Hence she was unable to act as independently of England as before. Within the colony the democratic elements – political, religious, and economic – now had a chance more fully to express their views, and gradually to prepare the way for resistance to arbitrary or undemocratic government, whether it arose within the colony or was imposed by England. [Jernegan (1929), pg. 160]

§ 5. Analysis

It has not been the way of either American or European historians to view history from a sociologist's perspective and recognize the events that transpired in New England as constituting the disintegration and fall of one Society and the rising of another. As a social-natural craft, if not yet a social-natural science, history traditionally has not examined whether or not the questions historians raise and ask are the scientifically meaningful questions to raise and ask. This occurs only rarely, as when Kuhn raised the issue in regard to science history or Toynbee did in regard to the history of civilizations. Toynbee wrote,

> Historians generally illustrate rather than correct the ideas of the communities within which they live and work, and the development of the last few centuries, and more particularly of the last few generations, of the would-be self-sufficient national sovereign state has led historians to choose nations as the normal fields of historical study. But no single nation or national state of Europe can show a history which is in itself self-explanatory. If any state could do so it would be Great Britain. In fact, if Great Britain (or, in the earlier periods, England) is not found to constitute in herself an intelligible field of historical study, we may confidently infer that no other modern European national state will pass the test. . . . [Toynbee then proceeds to examine British history in overview]
>
> Our brief examination of English history, though its result has been negative, has given us a clue. The chapters which caught our eye in our glance backward over the course of English history were real chapters in some story or other, but that story was the history of some society of which Great Britain was only a part, and the experiences were experiences in which other nations besides Great Britain were participants. The 'intelligible field of study', in fact, appears to be a society containing a number of communities of the species represented by Great Britain – not only Great Britain herself but also France and Spain, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and so on – and the passage quoted from Acton indicates the relation between these parts and that whole.

> The forces in action are not national but proceed from wider causes, which operate upon each of the parts and are not intelligible in their partial operations unless a comprehensive view is taken of their operation throughout the society.[12] Different parts are differently affected by an identical general cause, because they each react, and each contribute, in a different way to the forces which that same cause sets in motion. [Toynbee (1946a), pp. 1-3]

Toynbee was correct in raising this thesis but he fell short of completing it. He gave the focus of his attention over to *political* Society (which is more or less what he meant when he used the word 'society') and did not generalize to other species of Societies, such as that of the Community of scientists (Kuhn), or individual society (biography). For the study of history to be made into a social-natural science historians must expand the scope of how they view history. To be a social-natural science it must pursue real causes – as Toynbee and Kuhn were doing – and it must be grounded in Critical metaphysics and placed in the general context of social contracts.

Toynbee's theme – the rise and fall of civilizations – is just one species of a more general and recurring human phenomenon, *viz.*, the rise and fall of Societies [Wells (2012b), chap. 4]. Seen in this context, the rise and fall of Puritan New England is as much an example of the rise and fall of a Society as are the rise and fall of Hellenic civilization two millennia ago or the rise and fall of the Hewlett Packard Company in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The only practical difference between Hellenic civilization and the other two is that the rise and fall of Puritan New England has not been recognized as what it was and commercial Society is still in denial of the event in the case of Hewlett Packard. (A name on a door doesn't tell you who you'll find inside the office). Watson, with more intuitive prescience than he has been credited with, wrote,

> Of the top twenty-five industrial corporations in the United States in 1900, only two remain in that select company today. One retains its original identify; the other is a merger of seven corporations on that original list. Two of those twenty-five have failed. Three others merged and dropped behind. The remaining twelve have continued in business, but each has fallen substantially in its standing.
>
> Figures like these help to remind us that corporations are expendable and that success – at best – is an impermanent achievement which can always slip out of hand. [Watson (1963), pg. 3]

Why did the Puritan New England Society fall? More germane to the topic of this volume, why did not its system of public education prevent this fall? Institution of public education by a Society is realized, ultimately, for one purpose only: to sustain that Society. Why did public education in Puritan New England fail to achieve that objective?

To understand this we begin the Critique with figure 2.2, the 4LAR of New England social contracting. Alone among the three colonial regions, New England colonization was intended by its founders from the outset to be a *specific* kind of new Society, whereas the other two were the products of personal enterprises grounded in the Duties-to-Self held by individual colonists. The Societies arose naturally (not by design) from the interplay of individual social dynamics. Self-love interests were not absent in New England's case; this is especially so in regard to the individual Puritan's religious Self-interest in personal salvation. The founders of New England did make a beginning in establishing their envisioned Society but the construction proved to be unstable and unsustainable even over the relatively brief period of less than one century.

[12] Here Toynbee is summarily restating 'the earlier passage quoted from Acton': "General history naturally depends on the action of forces which are not national but proceed from wider causes. The rise of the modern kingship in France is part of a similar movement in England. Bourbons and Stuarts obeyed the same law though with different results." – Lord Acton



Figure 2.6: 2LAR of the Puritan anthropological person,

The principal mediate cause[13] of the instability and eventual disintegration of Puritan New England Society was a fundamental contradiction in the institution of what Social Contract theory calls the ***anthropological person*** of the Society (figure 2.6). In the case of an individual human being, anthropological person is the character of a person who participates in a community and undertakes processes of Community-building. In the context of a Society regarded as a body politic, anthropological person is its process of social optimization. This is the context figure 2.6 exhibits. This *mathematical* personation is deduced from the mental physics of psychic animation for the individual human being, who is the social atom in all social-natural sciences [Wells (2012a), chap. 12 §4]. The four principles called out in figure 2.6 are the governing social-natural principles of corporate anthropological person.

In the case of Puritan New England, their error is the contradiction they set up between the principle of the condition of social contracting and the term of social contracting (the principle of citizenship). It is possible for a Society to maintain itself for a time – sometimes for a lengthy time – in the presence of a *contrary* relationship between these two principles, but not in the presence of a *contradiction*. This contradiction was set into the fabric and structure of the Massachusetts Bay colony from its very inception. It was not inherent in the initial inception of the Plymouth colony because the humble terms of the Mayflower Compact contained no such contradiction. Unfortunately for Puritan Society, it was the larger and more aggressive Massachusetts Bay colony that succeeded in a short amount of time in becoming what Toynbee termed a 'universal state.' He pronounced this a technical term but, rather irritatingly, described what he meant by example rather than by actually providing a definition [Toynbee (1946b), pp. 1-75]. Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Bay colony was clearly another example of it and fits snugly inside Toynbee's description.

In principle it wouldn't have taken much for Plymouth to have become a *Gemeinschaft* Society and perhaps even to have avoided eventually being swallowed up by the 500 pound gorilla living

[13] The *root* cause of their fall was an ontology-centered metaphysical error causing them to adopt an *un*natural theory of human Nature. The Puritans are not the only people to have made this mistake. The root cause error is to presume moral customs are ontology-centered rather than deontological. In the case of the Puritans, this error became institutionalized by their interpretations of the basic articles of Calvinism.

next to it. If the Plymouth colonists had adopted the considerably more raucous but much more stable principle of *consensus* democracy rather than following the parliamentary English example of non-consensus democracy; if they had avoided evolving toward political exclusion of the non-Puritans in their Society; if they had maintained rather than broken their friendly relationship with the Wampanoags (thus preventing the Indians from becoming an external Toynbee proletariat); if they had had the manipulative cunningness exhibited by the BaMbuti Pygmies (who have a keenly developed persuasive power for manipulating outside Societies; see Turnbull, 1961) and applied that sort of "political jujitsu" to seducing the Massachusetts Bay colony into following Plymouth's leadership (all the while giving them the illusion that they, Massachusetts Bay, were leading[14]); then it's possible a Puritan Society could have survived in America. But, of course, something "in principle" is a long way from something "in practice." It is most likely that the Plymouth colonists were too socially Anglicized in their judgments of taste to accomplish all this.

The fundamental contradiction is set by Puritan Society's *opposition* to the condition of social contracting in conjunction with its *agreement* with the principle of the term of social contracting. Briefly, the condition of social contracting pertains to what each member of the Community requires from the Community-at-large. The term of social contracting pertains to what the Community-at-large requires of each member. Every social contract requires a *quid pro quo*: a term for a condition. Puritan Society had a required *term*, namely complete submission to the authority of the church as represented by the clerics. There is no doubt that they enforced this term, as witness the ostracism of Roger Williams and the excommunication of Anne Hutchinson. But the Society gave nothing back to the individual in exchange for his assuming a *personal* Obligation to meet the required term. Put another way, the Society made no provision for satisfying an individual's personal condition for *uniting* in civil Community. This condition is: the association will defend with its whole common force the person and goods of ***each*** associate in such a manner as by which each associate is able to unite himself with all the others *while at the same time is still able to obey himself alone and remain as free in his liberty of action as he was before joining the association*. The Puritans proscribed free speech, were intolerant of contrary opinion, met criticism with zealous bigotry, and its agents *ruled* rather than *led* the Society.

There is no surer way to guarantee that a Toynbee proletariat will result. Thoreau hit the mark squarely when he wrote,

> It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous, wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If I devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man's shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. . . .
>
> The broadest and most prevalent error requires the most disinterested virtue to sustain it. The slight reproach to which the virtue of patriotism is commonly liable, the noble are most likely to incur. Those who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and support, are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform. . . .
>
> Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy *is* worse than the evil. *It* makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is

[14] "As for the best leader, the people do not know he leads them." – Lao Tzu (6th century B.C.), 16

> hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its faults, and *do* better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ, and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels? [Thoreau (1849), pp. 6-7]

Contradiction between the principle of *psyche*-teleology and the principle of *Anordnungskräfte* produces a self-contradictory social contract and leaves every member of the association to decide for himself what social contract terms and conditions are right for him. In such a situation it is impossible for the Society to institute any system of justice that can avoid acting *unjustly* in the eyes of at least some of the Society's associates because there is no common social contract in force that allows for a common understanding of what is just and what is unjust. Thus, the Puritan Society was organized in opposition to the principle of justice (*psyche*-aesthetics) and its zeal in enforcing its terms practically guaranteed its agents of government would commit enormities that produced the dissatisfied Toynbee proletariat within the Society.

With injustices perpetuated by the system, the Society therefore found itself *organized* to be in on-going opposition to the principle of civic cooperation. Civic cooperation is not granted freely by an internal proletariat. A credible threat of sanctions can provoke actions of prudence that *look* like civic cooperation; but they are in fact nothing else than outlaw precautions. The Puritan organization of the Society was instituted from the outset to produce outlaws rather than citizens; the Desire of its ruling agents to preserve their ideal of Order destined them to be a Society that could not adapt to meet the internal challenges its own institutions produced.

No human Society has ever come into being, or ever will come into being, that is perfect in its first institution. Perfection is a goal for one to pursue, not a destination arrived at. Societies that grow and develop *make themselves* flexible, adaptable, and progressive. Societies that break down and disintegrate *make themselves* inflexible and reactionary. Toynbee wrote,

> When we have completed our analysis we shall find that the qualitative change which disintegration brings with it is exactly opposite in character to that which is the outcome of growth. We have seen that, in the process of growth, the several growing civilizations become increasingly differentiated from one another. We shall now find that, conversely, the qualitative effect of disintegration is standardization.
>
> This tendency towards standardization is the more remarkable when we consider the extent of the diversity which it has to overcome. The broken-down civilizations bring with them, when they enter into disintegration, the extremely diverse dispositions . . . that they have severally acquired during their growth. And they are also further differentiated from one another by the fact that their breakdowns overtake them at widely different ages. . . . If sister civilizations can run to such different lengths of growth span, it is manifest that the growths of civilizations are not predestined to any uniform duration; and indeed we have failed to find any reason *a priori* why a civilization should not go on growing indefinitely, once it has entered this [growth] stage. These considerations make it plain that the differences between growing civilizations are extensive and profound. Nevertheless, we shall find that the process of disintegration tends to conform in all cases to a standard pattern [Toynbee (1946a), pp. 367-8].

To say all this is to say nothing else than what is stated in the mathematical organizing principles of approval of taste (figure 2.2). It is to say that a healthy and growing Society is socially *progressive*. This, however, requires a citizenry that has not only the inclination to be progressive but also the knowledge and skill to *realize* social Progress. *That* is the task set for the institution of public education. Puritan Society, alone among the colonies, *had* an institution of public education. Why did it fail them?

The answer to this is starkly simple: It wasn't designed to serve the Society. In volume I it was



Figure 2.7: The objective of public instructional education.



Figure 2.8: The applied metaphysic of public instructional education.

shown that the human-natural basis for justifying any institution of public instructional education lies in the social contract of the Society that institutes it, and that specifically the prime objectives of the educational institution are set up to maintain the civil Community, promote Progress in the *Personfähigkeit* of each of its citizens, and set foundations for producing through them Progress in the corporate *Personfähigkeit* of the Community overall. This was depicted in the 3LAR of its objective (figure 2.7). What is needed in order to accomplish these objectives was deduced in deriving the Critical applied metaphysic of public instructional education (figure 2.8).

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The Puritan founders of New England had a quite different purpose in mind for education. This purpose was stated in 1643 in the pamphlet *New England's First Fruits*. The institution of education was set up so as not "to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches when our present ministers shall lie in the dust" [Cubberley (1919), pg. 16]. Indeed, at first this was not intended to be a *public* institution at all. Parents were to see to it their own children learned how to read well enough to read their Bibles and catechisms and to understand the laws governing the colony. Public education was not instituted until the Massachusetts law of 1647. This law did recognize in its preamble that education was a public good inasmuch as that "It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of ye Scriptures," effort must be made to thwart this "old deluder that learning may not be buried in ye grave of our faith in ye church and commonwealth" [Johnson (1904), pg. 2]. This and the providing of means to fit boys for Harvard College so that the commonwealth would be supplied with ministers were the purposes of instituting public education in New England.

The New England system of education did not fail to meet this objective. Here we have a first-rate example of an institution of education fulfilling a mistaken objective (in the sense that it was set without understanding the human nature of educational Self-development). The Puritan – and, for the matter, the English – system of education was premised on the mistaken notion that learning could be imposed upon the learner and failed to understand that what the learner is going to actually learn is determined by the learner himself exclusively. All that any institution of instruction can do is provide appropriate experiences and supply material for these experiences, out of which the learner will develop his Self-determinations.

The Puritans' Desire, of course, *was* the preservation of their commonwealth, but the Puritans thought that this was something the church accomplished. Education was seen as merely a tool in the enterprise. It was thought that the Faithful's inspired devotion to God and to his own Salvation would provide all the personal incentive required once the authority of the clerics had shown him what was expected of him. This set of presuppositions, however, is utterly contrary to human nature and to the mental physics of educational Self-development. In actual fact, what the individual was to learn of his relationship to his Society overall he learned from another institution of education in Puritan New England, *viz*. his apprenticeship training. This training addressed only one of the two dimensions of Progress in figure 2.7, namely, Progress in the learner's *Personfähigkeit* with respect to the learner-as-a-person. The other dimension, the *Community* dimension, *was not adequately covered by any institution of education at all*.

In the earliest stages of colonization in New England the overall educational institution – schooling in reading and apprenticeship – did work well enough to get the colonies established and to survive the harsh physical and economic challenges they initially faced. Nettels writes,

> In most towns the class distinctions were not so marked as to induce the upper-class groups to provide separate schools for their children. . . . Between 1635 and 1645 the principal towns of New England, excepting in mainland Rhode Island, made provision for the public support of a local schoolmaster. Massachusetts, caught in an economic depression in 1642, endeavored to foster home industry by requiring that parents and masters teach their children and apprentices to read and to master a trade; if a parent failed, the child might be apprenticed to a master who would give proper instruction. Then in 1647 Massachusetts ordered that each town of fifty families provide a schoolmaster to teach the children to read and write. This extremely important act permitted the town to pay the schoolmaster through either a tax levy or tuition fees collected from the parents. Unfortunately, many of the poorer towns preferred to pay a fine of £5 rather than support a schoolmaster; hence the act did not have the colony-wide effect which its authors intended. The act was copied in part by Connecticut and in part by New Hampshire and Plymouth Colony. Rhode Island, as a colony, made no move to establish schools . . .

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> In considering the meager facilities of colonial schools, it should be remembered that the home, the farm, and the shop had a high educational value. There the child learned how to avoid injury, how to do the practical things that sustained life, how to get along with associates; from his elders he learned a thousand lessons taught by the experience of the race. In the elementary schools there was no marked class influence on the subjects taught; nor did the American environment alter the course of instruction [from what it had been in Europe]. Reading, writing, arithmetic, and rules of conduct were the foundations of all education, both vocational and cultural, serviceable alike in America and in Europe, to rich and poor, to children destined to be farmers, artisans, or gentlemen of leisure. The most important trend in elementary education appeared in New England after 1690 – the result of demands that facilities be extended so as to serve all people. As the settled areas of the towns increased, families remote from the local school petitioned that the town be divided into districts and that their tax money be used to support a new school near at hand. The creation of such district schools kept education close to the people, although the instruction was often of poor quality and the school term only a month. [Nettels (1963), pp. 488-490]

It is extremely important to note, as Nettels did, the closely intimate tie between educational Self-determination and social economics. Combined, these factors were determining for the social politics of the colony. Critically, this is because these factors strike home immediately to Duties-to-Self and only secondarily, through the social contract, to civic Duties. Nettels writes,

> During the seventeenth century the Puritan land system had been reasonably conducive to social integration. The title to the lands of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island was vested by the charters in the colonial legislatures and they in turn made initial township grants to small bodies of settlers called town proprietors. . . . In disposing of lands the legislatures did not require a money payment but they did impose conditions in order to provide for group settlement conducive to defense, cooperation in economic pursuits, and a common social and religious life. . . .
>
> At the outset the proprietors composed the main body of working settlers; hence the township was originally a democratic institution. When the proprietors met together they formed the town meeting, and there they decided upon the utilization and disposition of the land. Each proprietor received a home lot (from two to five acres) located near the village common where the church, school, minister's residence, and town market were placed. Surrounding the common lay the planting and mowing fields; these were divided into small plots which were distributed among the proprietors by lot. The ungranted land belonged to the proprietors in common: pasturage, timber lands affording wood and stone, undivided arable and mowing fields, and waste and swamp land. In order to build up the community the proprietors attracted outsiders by granting them small plots and by permitting them to attend and participate in the town meetings. Thus there occurred a division between the proprietors and non-proprietors or newcomers, but as long as the former constituted the majority the cleavage was not important. . . . Moreover, in the early days the proprietors apportioned lands on a fairly equal basis: although the wealthiest settlers received more land than their poorer neighbors the former got disproportionately small shares – an arrangement necessary to prevent dissatisfaction in the initial period of extreme hardship and privation. [Nettels (1963), pp. 527-8]

This system recognized implicitly a social contract basis for the civil Community. However, the recognition *was* implicit and the educational environment did not provide even for maintenance of Order in social-chemistry bonding relationships as the town grew. Nettels goes on to say,

> The gradual influx of newcomers sharpened the competition for the ungranted lands as they became increasingly valuable. Then there appeared a pronounced antagonism between the original proprietors or their heirs and the non-proprietors. In the later apportionments of the commons the proprietary party insisted that it alone had the right to give title to land,

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> whereas the non-proprietors urged that the whole body of inhabitants possessed that power. And in granting individual lands the proprietors now tended to assign tracts on the basis of individual wealth. . . . Similarly the town proprietors began to deny to non-proprietors the privilege of using the commons for grazing purposes or as sources of timber and stone. And bit by bit the wealthier townsmen purchased the small plots of their poorer neighbors so that by 1715 the process of accumulation was propelling the landless out toward the frontiers. At the same time it supplied the proprietary class with surplus funds which they could use for speculating in wilderness lands. [*ibid*., pp. 528-9]

One outcome of this developing class division was a change in the New England method of creating new towns. After 1725 Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire began selling townships to speculators rather than granting them to settlers. The speculators then acted as promoters who worked to induce new settlers to settle in the speculators' townships. Predictably, one subclass of speculator appeared: the speculator who bought land and then sold it to another speculator. Nettels continues,

> Two principal results issued from the new land system. The early New England ideal of community solidarity and the use of land grants to promote compact settlement gave way to unregulated competition for individual holdings, while on the frontiers isolated farms replaced the integrated towns common to the seventeenth century. Secondly, the frontier farmers viewed the speculators as their natural enemies who withheld land from cultivation, waged war against squatters, forced the price of land upward, controlled town governments as absentee voters, and failed to contribute toward the defense and welfare of the new communities. [*ibid*., pp. 529-30]

What Nettels documents here is a social-revolutionary turn from a civil Community, within which there were recognized *social* distinctions but not *class* distinctions, into an increasingly uncivil granulated Society in which state-of-nature antibonding social-chemistry relationships were being formed. This begins the disintegration and fall of a Society. Notice that the New England institution of education did nothing whatsoever to hinder this change. The common schooling most New Englanders received as small children was conveyed by: the one page Hornbook, which contained the alphabet and, usually, the Lord's Prayer; the Bible; and a primer that contained a catechism presented as a series of religious and moral verses or jingles and some unillustrated "Lessons for Youth." No primers printed prior to 1700 seem to have survived but there is no reason to think that the few from the early 18th century that have been found are substantially different. Johnson provides some examples probably representative of the earlier primers:

A In Adam's fall
We sinned all.
B Heaven to find,
The Bible Mind.
C Christ crucify'd
For sinners dy'd.
D The Deluge drown'd
The Earth around.
G As runs the Glass
Our Life doth pass.
H My Book and Heart
Must never part.
I Job [Iob] feels the Rod,
Yet blesses GOD.
K Proud Korah's troop
Was swallowed up
&etc. – [Johnson (1904), pg. 78]

The "Lessons for Youth" consisted of short little precepts such as

> **F**oolishness is bound up in the Heart of a Child but the Rod of correction shall drive it from him.
> **L**iars shall have their Part in the Lake which burns with Fire and Brimstone.
> **U**pon the Wicked God shall rain an Horrible Tempest. [Johnson (1904), pg. 82]

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However much benefit lessons like these had for preserving moral customs – and there is evidence that this benefit was considerable – lessons like these in no way provided for refined political thinking in later life nor developed in the learner a *social* sense of justice. Indeed, since it is not possible to teach a child of age four to six abstractions such as this, the appeal of these lessons could be placed nowhere else in the child's educational Self-development than in Duties-to-Self for, e.g., avoiding feeling the Rod or ending up in the Lake. The little learner was strongly admonished to shun "wickedness" but what "wickedness" or "sin" *meant* was not something the school dame was in any position to explain other than by Biblical example. The child's Self-developed understanding of these concepts could come from nowhere else than from his experiences with social approbation and disapprobation. Indeed, these lessons would have reinforced rather than hindered individuals' inclinations to develop maxims of social stratification and distinction, which would likewise be reinforced by articles 15, 17, 18, and 19 of Calvinist doctrine listed earlier in this chapter. Jernegan tells us,

> By the structure of society is meant the relative power, influence, and prestige of the various classes and groups of the population. The transfer from England of twenty or thirty thousand people did not at first essentially change the relation of people and groups to each other. The social process, however, influenced by the new environment did gradually rearrange the people into new groups and classes. In the seventeenth century New England was not a region where the people were granted equal economic, political, religious, and social privileges. In fact a minority was in control, while the majority was struggling for more opportunity and freedom. . . .
>
> The division of society in the towns into economic, political, and religious groups, each with particular privileges and powers, has already been partly described. These inequalities were the basis for social groups. From a social standpoint there were superior and inferior individuals, and various customs and devices show how much the New Englanders prized social prestige. This may be illustrated by a description of the interesting custom of "seating" in the church, and laws on "excess apparel." . . .
>
> The early New Englanders . . . believed that one of the functions of dress was to emphasize class distinctions so that the social prestige, rank or breeding of a person might be known. The upper crust of society was jealous when common people commenced to wear fine clothing "above their station" in life. In a Massachusetts Act, 1651, the "intolerable" excess of apparel was complained of thus:
>
> "We declare our utter detestation and dislike that men and women of meane Condition should take upon themselves the garb of gentlemen, by wearing gold or silver lace or buttons, or points at their knees or to walk in bootes or women of the same rancke to weare silke or tiffany horlles or scarfes, which though allowable to persons of greater estates, or more liberal education, yet we cannot but judge it intolerable in persons of such like condition."
>
> Such laws did not apply to magistrates or public officers, or their wives or children, or anyone above ordinary degree or whose estate was once considerable but "now decayed," or to those of "liberal education." [Jernegan (1929), pp. 178-80]

Every New Englander learned his or her own peculiar and private concept of the Society's social contract from experiences in the fields and towns of New England – not in the form of practical tenets of civil Obligation but instead in terms of maxims of Duties-to-Self. The latter is part of core *homo noumenal* human Nature, but the former is always and only the product of acquired learning, and the institution of education in New England did nothing to provide for this acquisition. John Adams, who was in his day one of America's keener social-natural political scientists, would later write,

> A desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his

> fellows is one of the earliest, as well as keenest, dispositions discovered in the heart of man. . . . Wherever men, women, or children are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected, by the people about him, and within his knowledge.
>
> Moral writers have, by immemorial usage, a right to make a free use of the poets.
>
> > The love of praise, howe'er conceal'd by art,
> > Reigns, more or less, and glows, in every heart;
> > The proud, to gain it, toils on toils endure,
> > The modest shun it, but to make it sure.
> > O'er globes and sceptres, now on thrones it swells,
> > Now, trims the midnight lamp in college cells.
> > 'Tis tory, whig – it plots, prays, preaches, pleads,
> > Harangues in Senates, squeaks in masquerades.
> > It aids the dancer's heel, the writer's head,
> > And heaps the plain with mountains of the dead;
> > Nor ends with life; but nods in sable plumes,
> > Adorns our hearse, and flatters on our tombs. – [Edward Young, *Love of Fame*, 1725]
>
> A regard to the sentiments of mankind concerning him, and to their dispositions towards him, every man feels within himself, and if he has reflected, and tried experiments, he has found that no exertion of his reason, no effort of his will, can wholly divest him of it. In proportion to our affection for the notice of others is our aversion to their neglect; the stronger the desire for the esteem of the public, the more powerful the aversion to their disapprobation; the more exalted the wish for admiration, the more invincible the abhorrence of contempt. Every man not only desires the considerations of others, but he frequently compares himself with others, his friends or his enemies; and in proportion as he exults when he perceives that he has more of it than they, he feels a keener affliction when he sees that one or more of them are more respected than himself. [Adams (1790), pp. 139-140]

By its lack of the kinds of lessons specified in figure 2.8 as well as the contents of what it did teach New England children, the institution of education in New England not only failed to hinder the arousal of state-of-nature competitions leading to hostile granulation of the Society but in fact tended to promote it. Why didn't the New England institution of education help preserve Puritan Society? It was never designed to, and in a number of ways was unintentionally designed to have just the opposite effect.

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