Chapter 3 The Colonial Middle Passage: 1689-1763

§ 1. The Genesis of the American Civilization

The institution of education in America cannot be understood in isolation from the broader scope of social phenomena in the genesis of American civilization for two reasons: first, because it is a part of that broader social landscape; second, because a civilization is a phenomenon of organized being in which all the divers parts of the corporate person are mutually co-determining. This means each is a partial effect of *and at the same time* is a partial cause of all the others.

The period approximately bounded by the years 1689 and 1763 marks an epoch in history that saw a steady change in America from a diverse set of small and mostly independent colonial settlements whose people called themselves and thought of themselves as "British" to a definably amalgamated Society, whose people now called themselves and thought of themselves as "Americans." Thwaites provides the following demographic summary of changes that occurred during this middle passage of U.S. history:

> Up to 1700 the history of each colony is the history of a unit; the impulse of colonization came in successive waves, but each little commonwealth had its own interests, its own struggles, and looked forward to its own future. From 1700 to 1750, though the separate life and history of each colony continued, there were perceptible certain great phases of common development, which will be briefly outlined.
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> Although disturbed by wars with the French and Indians, by domestic political quarrels, and by disputes with the mother country regarding the regulation of commerce and manufactures, there was a steady growth of population in British North America during the first half of the [eighteenth] century. The rewards of industry[1] were sufficient, coupled with considerable religious and political freedom, to entice a continuous, though fluctuating, immigration from England and the continent of Europe. In New England, where the English stock was practically unmixed with foreign blood, the rate of progress was less pronounced than in Pennsylvania and the South, which were largely recruited from other races. In 1700 the population of New England was something over one hundred and five thousand. By the beginning of the French and Indian War . . . it was a little less than four hundred thousand, New Hampshire having forty thousand, Massachusetts and Maine two hundred thousand, and Connecticut a hundred and ten thousand. The middle colonies commenced the century with fifty-nine thousand; but by 1750 this had, chiefly owing to the exceptionally rapid growth of Pennsylvania after 1730, increased to three hundred and fifty-five thousand, of which New York contained ninety thousand, New Jersey eighty thousand, and Pennsylvania and Delaware one hundred and eighty-five thousand. In the Southern group there was a population of eighty-nine thousand in 1700, which had grown to six hundred and twenty-five thousand in 1763, not counting Georgia, settled in 1733, which in twenty years had acquired a population of five thousand; Maryland had a hundred and fifty-four thousand, chiefly Englishmen, but there was a liberal admixture of Germans and people of other nationalities. Virginia had nearly three hundred thousand, of whom the blacks were now in the majority. North Carolina, important in numbers only, had ninety thousand, of whom twenty percent were slaves; South Carolina had eighty thousand, the blacks outnumbering the whites by two or three to one. The total for the thirteen colonies in 1750 is about thirteen hundred and seventy thousand. [Thwaites (1910), pp. 265-6]

Because the first U.S. census was not taken until 1790 population estimates prior to this are difficult to obtain. Morison and Commager provide the following population statistics for the year 1770, citing a 1909 study entitled "A Century of Population Growth":

[1] Here Thwaites means "personal industry" – individual enterprise. The Industrial Revolution still lay in the distance future for America.

TABLE 3.1: Est. American populations and annual growth rates in 1770

State	Population in 1770	Approx. Growth Rate (%)*
New England		
Maine	34,000	5
New Hampshire	60,000	3.5
Vermont	25,000	5
Massachusetts	265,000	1.5
Rhode Island	55,000	-0.6
Connecticut	175,000	1.5
Middle Atlantic		
New York	160,000	2.3
New Jersey	110,000	2.2
Pennsylvania	250,000	3
South Atlantic		
Delaware	25,000	4
Maryland	200,000	2.3
Virginia	450,000	1.5
North Carolina	230,000	2.7
South Carolina	140,000	1.3
Georgia	26,000	7.8
Total	2,205,000	2.3

* est. by author [Morison & Commager (1930), pg. 918]

Thwaites' overall population figure is consistent with the total population figure and annual growth rate percentage from the 1909 study, and both are consistent with Benjamin Franklin's estimate of the rate of population growth in America[2].

The story of the genesis of American civilization is a story of growth by means of a process of social-chemical accretion in which cooperation dynamics among the colonial groups emerged spontaneously from divers competitive interactions. By this I mean that, as small associations of people became larger and came into increasing interactions with other small associations, social-chemical bonding functions formed that determined the interactions between these groups. The individual units of which Thwaites spoke socially bonded with other units to form even larger civil associations and a practical *e pluribus unum* effect resulted. This social bonding was first a practical bonding, which only very slowly over time came to be consciously understood as a political and economic bonding. Cooperation emerged out of self interest and practical prudence.

This growth-by-accretion phenomenon is consistent with Toynbee's findings regarding the growth of civilizations, although Toynbee erred in his causal theory of how this happens. During growth, human institutions serve the formation of cooperative dynamics – not by a keenly purposive prior design but rather out of individual satisficing responses to individual disturbance events. Toynbee instead thought that civil bonding was the purposive result of actions by a small "creative minority" of individuals skilled in leading the majority of others into following their vision. It is true that factors of creativity occur, and it is true that in each instance only a minority of the total populace exhibits this creativity and leads. The principal error and weakness in Toynbee's theory is his assumption that the membership composing this creative minority is static. It is not and Toynbee did not understand the social-natural theory of the phenomenon of leadership [Wells (2010)]. Leadership is a social dynamic in which leaders change from moment to moment. Toynbee held that a few special *Übermenschen* put Societies together; this is a mystic illusion – an empty Nietzschean fantasy – contrary to both fact and human nature.

[2] Franklin had been a newspaper publisher in Philadelphia and a franchiser of newspapers throughout the colonies. He had also served as a deputy postmaster general.



Figure 3.1: Two-person interaction model representing the mental physics of each actor's perception and understanding of their physical-social intercourse. The expressions of each actor communicate to the other a semantic message by means of his actions, his body language operationalizations, and his words. The other person interprets these perceptions to assign meanings to them and in turn expresses his own reaction.

Although Toynbee erred in his mystical Platonism, other historians most often err by neglecting to take into account the actions and expressions of individual human beings, who are the social atoms of every social-natural science. Person-to-person interaction and interpersonal communication are at the empirical foundation of all social phenomena. The theoretical basis for understanding and explaining the phenomena is provided by the new science of mental physics [Wells (2009)]. A mathematical theory of mass interactions is obtained by applying a new technique, discussed in *Education and Society* [Wells (2012b), chap. 2], I have named *social-chemistry*. Traditionally historians treat Societies by juxtaposing historical political, economic, interpersonal and personality psychology, cultural, and moral factors. All of these factors are, mathematically, just individual *dimensions* in the overall mental physics of civic and uncivic actions. All these dimensions in combination must be properly accounted for if one wishes to obtain a degree of quantitative understanding of social phenomena and social institutions. In the present Critique, this is the methodology I employ. This approach is a new paradigm for social-natural science.

It is appropriate to briefly overview the elements of this paradigm that were previously introduced and discussed in Wells (2012a) and Wells (2012b). The starting point is at the level of person-to-person interactions, illustrated in figure 3.1 by the two-person interaction model (called a Weaver's model). Figure 3.1 depicts human interactions at the point where Self-determination by human beings contacts the principles and theorems of mental physics. The individual's Self-determinations of his own actions are influenced by the semantic interpretations he gives to his perceptions of the externalized actions of other people. This is the level of interpersonal social psychology. The implications of this theory produce one of the most important theorems in the theory of social contracting, namely, that *each person Self-determines his own society*. The types of interactions between individuals that follows from co-determined semantic representations each of them form can be classified as cooperative (social-chemical bonding), uncooperative (social-chemical antibonding), or non-cooperative (social-chemical non-bonding). Out of these come the person's subjective and objective judgments by which he determines his own society.



Figure 3.2: Embedding field network model of a person and his personal society. This society is called his social molecule, within which his bonding relationships with divers groups of other people (mini-Communities) constitute the corporate persons to which the person belongs as a member of their civil association. In this figure, CP denotes corporate person and MC denotes mini-Community.

These determinations are represented at the next higher level of mathematical abstraction by means of a mathematical model called the person's *social molecule*. Figure 3.2 illustrates this concept. The individual's social molecule consists of himself and other people with whom he has formed social-chemical bonding relationships. A formal mathematical method for analyzing this social system was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by Grossberg [Grossberg (1969); Grossberg (1971)] and is called *the theory of embedding field networks*. Grossberg's work was aimed at theoretical neuroscience, but he also showed that it is extensible in application to general problems including those of interest to social-natural science [Grossberg (1978, 1980)].

Among other things, the extended theory proves another key theorem of social contracting, namely that *under particular conditions cooperation behaviors emerge out of competitive behaviors*. This is the mathematical basis for the formations of Societies. Grossberg's theory can be applied at the next higher level of mathematical abstraction to represent individual corporate persons as nodes in a more abstract embedding field network (figure 3.3) to model increasingly more complex Societies. Figure 3.3 illustrates a simple granulated mini-Society represented in the form of a social Molecule that nucleates around a central mini-Community (represented by MC A in the figure) from bonding relationships between members of that mini-Community and other mini-Communities. These members might or might not be bonded to other members of the central Community. If they are not, a granulated mini-Society results. If each peripheral mini-Community is bonded to each member of the central mini-Community an ungranulated mini-Society results. In other cases, there might also be bonding relationships between members of the divers peripheral mini-Communities independently of the central one, in which case the overall Society is constituted as a partially granulated and partially ungranulated Society.

Mathematically, the connections between individuals or mini-Communities, such as the connecting arcs in figure 3.2 illustrate, are mathematical functions of the type mathematicians call *functionals*. A functional is a function having for its domain a set of functions and for its range another set of functions. The multiple dimensions (political, economic, etc.) that go into the make



Figure 3.3: Social-chemistry model of a granulated mini-Society formed by bonding relationships between individuals in a central mini-Community (MC A) to other unbonded mini-Communities (MC B-E). This social Molecule is derived from embedding field network interaction relationships.

up of any non-trivial Society are accounted for by the divers functions that define a functional connection. All this may sound very complicated – and, of course, it is in the details. But this is the usual state of scientific affairs one encounters in all natural sciences that rise above the relatively simple topic of physics. All economically or socially significant real world problems fall into this class of science – all of engineering, for example, is concerned with problems of this sort – and methodologies for practical treatment of such problems have been developed by the mathematical science of system theory. My point here is: *a scientific method already exists*.

A particularly useful advantage of using a chemistry metaphor is the opportunity it provides for using known examples of chemical phenomena as a source of ideas for modeling social phenomena. Figure 3.4 illustrates one such idea that is pertinent to a variety of social situations ranging from economic modeling of supplier-market systems to the socio-political accretion that formed the divers American colonies into an American civilization during the middle passage. Borrowing from the terminology of molecular biology, I call this form the social Molecule of an ***Enterprise-protein***. In molecular biology a protein is a polymer of very large molecular mass composed of chains of molecules called polypeptides. If we look at such social phenomena as economic or political systems, we there also encounter situations where people and events that are remote from each other geographically, temporally, etc. nonetheless are in interaction through chains of other people or mini-Communities. The links in these social chains comprise smaller social Molecules in their own right analogously corresponding to polypeptides.

We can take as one example the case of a shipping Enterprise. Within it we find a number of constituents: ship owner, ship's captain, ship's crew, cargo suppliers, cargo purchasers, financiers, etc. When one looks at this distinct socio-economic system, it is easy to discern its chain-like structure and, within it, to understand the sort of socio-economic functions that connect its members. What we find here is analogous to the structure of a protein in molecular biology, and hence the name I have given the model structure.

If you keep this paradigm in mind, it should not be difficult for you to spot an analogous form



Figure 3.4: Simple illustration of an Enterprise-protein form of social structuring. The defining features of this structure are: (1) the presence of one or more chains of interactions between individuals or mini-Communities by which remote effects at one end of the chain are indirectly produced by actions at the other end of the chain; (2) that the interaction connections are bidirectional in this embedding field; (3) the functional connections are adaptive such that the network is self-organizing; and (4) new network vertices can be added (accretion) or deleted (pruning). Note that when the vertices of the network represent mini-Communities these mini-Communities can themselves have internal embedding field networks determining their activity and external interactions. Complexity is handled by layered levels of abstract representations.

of structure taking shape in the growth of the colonies and the social changes that took place.

Quantitative solutions to scientific problems always have specific mathematical formulations. A scientific discipline that stops short of these sorts of descriptions and is entirely qualitative can be constituted as a natural history but does not achieve the status of a natural science. However, the purpose of this treatise does not lie in any one specific scientific problem. Rather, it is concerned with a general Critique of the American institution of education over the history of the United States. For that reason it is not necessary for this treatise to present involved mathematics and its presentations can remain at a qualitative level of depiction. I do not conceal from you that the quantitative science of a social-natural science of education is a nascent science. Many years of work still lie ahead before it will deliver specific quantitative answers to specific problems of education. Yet all new sciences begin so. When Isaac Newton presented his theory of universal gravitation it contained *in its principles* the theory needed to compute how to send a space vehicle from the earth to the outer planets of the solar system. To actually perform this calculation was a task that Newton in his day was unable to perform. He still lacked the practical computational methodologies needed to do this. It fell to later scientists to supply these. Such is likewise the case at the time of this writing for social-natural education science. Bearing this in mind, I now proceed to the main factors characterizing the middle passage.

§ 2. The Social Environment as Growth Provocateur

In addition to the physical and technological factors going into the make up of the colonial environment, there are several other corporate persons present in colonial America in this period.

First, there were the numerous Native American Communities present throughout the lands to the west, north, and south of the areas settled by the colonials. This civilization was on par with or only slightly behind the colonials in technology. In terms of societal organization their social organizations and institutes were more or less level to those of the colonists and in some cases, such as the Iroquois Confederacy, they were slightly higher-developed Societies. These divers Native American Communities for the most part coexisted and competed with one another as well as with the colonists. That the colonials by and large regarded themselves as superior to the Native American groups was mere ethnocentrism (which is a symptom of communal self-regard, *Selbstsucht*, and self-conceit, *Eigendünkel*).

Second, there were Communities associated with two other European colonial powers, namely France and Spain, whose relationships with Great Britain were intensely competitive, frequently hostile, and whose relationships with each other were competitive as well. In North America associates of these great Societies included military units, French and Spanish settlers, fur traders, missionaries, etc. There were likewise English, French, and Spanish settlements in the Caribbean with which some interaction took place with the American colonials. Third, there was Great Britain herself, which was presented in the colony by government officials, military units, and agents of commercial trading and mercantile associations. Lastly, there was one class of people living in state-of-nature coexistence with the colonials, namely the large population of slaves comprised primarily of people who were either from Africa or descended from Africans. Relationships among these divers groups were fluid, adaptable, frequently competitive, sometimes cooperative, sometimes civic, sometimes uncivic, sometimes non-civic (granulated but neither civic nor uncivic), sometimes actively bellicose, and always predominantly state-of-nature occasionally moderated by temporary treaties or *ad hoc* alliances.

The same thing is properly said of relationships between the colonial Communities. Accretion Progress for the American civilization is measured in terms of the relative degree of civic cooperation vs. uncivic competition activities. Interaction activities are qualitatively characterized by various social dimensions of interactions – economic, religious, political, etc. – as well as by degree of commonality in social customs, including moral customs (mores and folkways) owing mostly to the dominant factions of the colonists coming out of the same English background.

These social factors presented challenges to the early colonials' mini-Societies and provoked disturbances to individual and communal equilibrium. It is a theorem of mental physics that behavioral changes (including social behavior changes) occur for no other reason than in response to provocations that disturb individuals' mental equilibria. The growth of American civilization was a direct outcome of the provocative challenges presented in the social environment in which the colonists lived. That their response should be growth by accretion is not puzzling, and in point of fact is something Rousseau clearly regarded as self evident enough that he used it as his basic axiom of social contract theory:

> I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.
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> But, as men cannot engender new forces but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance [of the obstacles to their preservation]. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 13]

Rousseau was far from being the first European to have this general idea. A century before

him, Thomas Hobbes wrote in much the same vein:

> Nature has made men so equal in the faculty of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another might not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.
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> And as to the faculties of the mind . . . I find yet a greater equality among men than that of strength. For Prudence is but Experience which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto. . . .
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> From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), [they] endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an Invader has no more to fear than another man's single power, if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come, prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him not only of the fruit of his labor but also of his life or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another. . . .
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> So that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first makes men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second to defend them; the third, for trifles . . .
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> Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called War, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For War consists not in Battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the Will to contend by Battle is sufficiently known . . . Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of War, where every man is Enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. . . . And the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. [Hobbes (1651), pp. 76-78]

When human beings form leagues in answer to environmental provocations, they do so that each person might improve or secure the powers of his own person (personal *Personfähigkeit*) through the agency of incorporation with others to produce a corporate person – a body politic – that collectively has sufficient corporate *Personfähigkeit* to meet the perceived or imagined threats in their collective environment. All Communities and Societies are based on this. It follows, then, that to Critique the middle passage is to Critique the influences and provocations that the colonists responded to by accretion in slowly growing their corporate personhood and so realizing through it greater corporate *Personfähigkeit*. Now let us look at the historical record.

§ 3. Growth by Accretion and the Tangible Power of the Corporate Person

In their beginnings, the various colonies were independent of one another and only loosely bound to Great Britain by commercial enterprise interests affecting individuals' tangible *Personfähigkeit*. Various social and class distinctions existed to some degree in every colony; changes in the degree and quality of these distinctions is one of the observable appearances of accretive changes in the genesis of American civilization during the middle passage. Jernegan supplies an overall sketch of colonial social conditions:

> The development of numerous and important social tendencies and problems in the eighteenth century should be analyzed in more detail. (1) A relative increase in non-English racial groups occurred, the result of forced or voluntary immigration; on the one hand Negroes, and on the other Irish and German indentured servants. A great variety of free persons also immigrated. (2) The population became more complex because of the additional races represented and because of intermarriage between the races. (3) Humanitarian and philanthropic impulses increased; such as sympathy for the down-trodden and unfortunate classes, and gifts for education and charity. (4) Religion was affected by an expansion of missionary efforts, a growth of the idea of religious toleration, a decline in the influence of the clergy and also in general religious interest; shown especially in the outbreak of "The Great Awakening," a series of religious revivals commencing in 1734. (5) The cultural aspect of life received more attention and there was an expansion of the agencies for the transfer of knowledge – schools and colleges, news-papers, printing presses, books, and libraries. (6) Of great importance was the rise of a scientific attitude of mind, and the acquisition of knowledge by direct observation and experiment; and in consequence, a decline in reliance on conventions, dogma, faith, and precedent. (7) Old World ideas were more rapidly transferred and there was a more careful study of the writings of the great thinkers in every department of human knowledge – political theory, religious doctrines and ideals, philosophy, economic theory and practice, and literature, etc. (8) Underlying all these social tendencies was the expansion of the democratic idea – opposition to aristocratic government and to the special privileges claimed by the minority; and demands for great equality, privileges, and opportunities for the common man. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 397-8]

Alden provides a bit more specific detail regarding the outcomes of these tendencies as these appeared by the end of the middle passage. These are valuable as aids in analyzing the trends and developments of Enterprise-proteins occurring during the accretion process. He wrote:

> The typical colonist was a homestead farmer who lived well, with his family, in large part upon the produce of his own land. He did not send very much to remote markets; he did not buy very much from distant manufacturers. He and his were, in the main, self-sufficient. He saved his money, acquired more land, and helped his sons to get farms. The industrious and thrifty farmer was commonly prosperous. . . .
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> Not everyone who lived on the American land was a member of a family owning a home-stead farm. Interspersed among such farms were estates in the Northern Colonies tilled by tenants and bond servants, and plantations in the Southern Colonies cultivated by Negro slaves. For America had her wealthy landowners, who possessed deeds to hundreds and thousands of good acres and who formed the body of an untitled aristocracy. . . . Happily, tenants were not numerous, and they could rather readily get land. They were not permanently condemned to an inferior status. Nor were the bond servants, who were persons legally obliged to work under the control of masters and mistresses during a period of four to fourteen years. Many of them had sold their services in return for transportation to the New World. Such individuals served for shorter periods. Others had been convicted of crimes in England and had been permitted to enter into service in lieu of execution or other punishment. . . . When the bond servant was released, he might become a tenant and then a homestead farmer. The condition of the Negro, of course, was not temporary. . . .
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> A surprisingly large minority of the Americans lived in cities and towns. By eighteenth-century standards the colonies contained as many as five cities: Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Charleston, and Newport. The largest of these cities – Philadelphia, Boston, and New York – were comparable in size to Bristol, Sheffield, and Leeds in England. There were in the colonies many towns with 1,000 or 2,000 inhabitants, and more villages and hamlets. One out of every twenty Americans could be described as urban. In the cities and towns lived merchants, men whose transactions extended beyond the local, storekeepers in great variety, printers, physicians, lawyers, teachers, mechanics with diverse specialties, barbers,

> shipbuilders, household servants, and numerous laborers. No metropolis was to be found in America . . . However, her "cities in the wilderness," as they have been called, were centers of thought and political action as well as commerce.
>
> America had her social hierarchy, but it differed from those of England, France, Germany, and Spain. The lines between classes were not so sharp as they were in the British Isles. Moreover, the mass of the white colonists, on the land, in villages, and in cities was composed of middle-class folk. There was a thin upper layer in the colonial social structure of merchants, prosperous lawyers, and officeholders, together with the owners of landed estates and plantations. Such people were not usually distinguished from their fellows by a hereditary title or a coat of arms. Here and there a baronet could be found, but no American-born man was a baron, a viscount, or a marquis; nor was there an American countess. The line between Americans of the middle rank and those of the patrician order was not clearly marked, but it was nevertheless real. Fundamentally, the possession of wealth, particularly in the form of land, set the gentry apart from other Americans. Far below the patricians, and below the middle class, were the tenants, the bond servants, and the truly poor whites of the cities and of the country. Even such people could move upward in the colonial world, and they frequently did. The gentry contained men and women whose ancestors had been bond servants. . . . Below all whites, however hopeless might be their condition, were the Negroes, whether free or slave. [Alden (1969), pp. 7-9]

This draws a sketch of social conditions primarily pertinent to the commercial dimension, i.e., pertinent to individual tangible *Personfähigkeit*. The pertinence is found in functional connections of chains of economic enterprise relationships and so in a social-natural economic functional dimension in the development of Enterprise-protein social Molecules.

Social distinctions do affect people's action expressions in the interpersonal and social styles aspects of interpersonal psychology. Interpersonal behavior factors involve individuals' semantic representations, judgments of taste, and the development of personal maxims of prudence (figure 3.1). The analyst needs to beware of a long standing and still contemporary habit of making more out of class distinctions than they merit. What I mean by this is the habit of interpreting a class distinction in terms of implications that members of a higher class possess a *Kraft* of authority or skills that people in lower classes do not. All social castes are products of judgments of taste.

Such an implication is a merely subjective mysticism. The significant factor is the tangible *Personfähigkeit* an individual has at his disposal in determining his liberties of action. Class does not necessarily imply any distinctive power of the person regarding his physical, intellectual or persuasive power. In comparison with his father, Charles I, Charles II was in most respects a feeble and inept king. The same can be said of Louis XVI in comparison with his grandfather, the "Sun King," Louis XIV. A class distinction has actual *Existenz* only for so long as the people of a Society permit and tolerate it. It is worth remembering that during the Terror of the French Revolution it was the landed nobility who were the first to be guillotined. Only later did the Terror envelop the other social classes and pave the way for Napoleon to declare himself emperor. A class distinction contains in itself no mystical merit or inherent worth.

Agriculture was an obviously necessary economic enterprise that the colonists would undertake. Beyond this, matters of economic enterprises in the colonies were influenced and directed by relationships with Great Britain. Jernegan provides an extended discussion of this [Jernegan (1929), pp. 244-266] and Alden provides a less detailed overview [Alden (1969), pp. 35-39]. King Charles II and the British Parliament initiated changes in the degree of control Great Britain began to exert over the colonists, and this policy change was modified and extended by King William III and later kings and parliaments. In the early period of colonization we found:

> During the seventeenth century, England's political and economic control over the

> colonies was conspicuously weak. This was due to several influences already narrated; such as geographical isolation, the failure of English statesmen to comprehend local conditions, poorly developed administrative agencies, and inefficient officials. It was accordingly difficult for the crown to formulate plans and policies suited to the colonies, and still more difficult to enforce them. Moreover, Parliament passed only a few laws touching colonial affairs, mainly for the purpose of regulating trade. Hence the colonists enjoyed wide latitude in their internal legislation.
>
> While the crown encouraged the establishment of colonies, settlements were actually founded by individuals and private groups acting as proprietors and companies. English statesmen to 1660 had vague ideas of developments within the colonies, and hardly considered their exact relation to England. Policies did gradually develop, but rather as a reflex of experience and necessity than from carefully considered plans. England was interested in the colonies as regions valuable for agricultural development, for raw materials and trade, rather than as political entities. Hence no permanent English administrative bodies were organized whose special business it was to exercise control over the colonies. Instead, England made use of various governmental agencies already organized, assisted by special temporary boards and committees made up principally of members of the Privy Council. . . .
>
> In 1660 England commenced to experiment with new administrative organs. The King appointed a Committee of the Privy Council to look after colonial affairs, and created two special subordinate councils, one a Council of Trade and the other a Council for Foreign Plantations. For special purposes royal commissions were from time to time appointed . . . Through instructions given to these bodies the commercial policy of England was gradually developed, particularly the regulation of colonial trade for England's advantage; the execution of the acts of trade in the colonies; developing the colonies as sources of raw materials; drawing up instructions for colonial governors; protecting and advancing shipping; and encouraging the development of English manufactures. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 244-7]

These changes exhibit a change in the political philosophy of England's rulers affecting the ways in which they viewed and interacted with the colonies. They presumed right-to-rule *mutual* relationship maxims that no longer held true. The new policy was called the mercantile doctrine:

> During the eighteenth century the mercantile doctrine developed rapidly. The problem was how to enrich England at the expense of rival states, and partly at the expense of her own colonies. Two important features of the doctrine were, first, the regulation of the trade, commerce, and manufactures of the colonies by acts of Parliament for the purpose of enriching England, in other words to prevent rival states from sharing in the wealth of her colonies; and second, the enforcement of these acts by the various agencies of government previously mentioned . . .
>
> The American colonies, it must be remembered, were only one element in a far-flung empire that ranged over nearly the whole world. The commercial system and the machinery of empire were devised to regulate and expedite trade and commerce so that all of the subordinate parts of the empire, including the American colonies, would contribute to the mother country. England not only expected the colonies to obey the navigation and other acts, but she also expected them to produce those particular raw materials that would best contribute to the prosperity of the mother country. In the exchange of products it was essential that the colonies should buy more in value than they sold, so that a favorable balance of trade for England would result [*ibid*., pp. 247-8].

Alden offers the view, which in some aspects is correct, that the policies of mercantilism can have too great a causal influence attributed to them. Certainly the list of regulated acts and items stemming from the doctrine is extensive. Therefore, he wrote,

> it is not at all surprising that at one time American scholars believed that the colonists suffered a severe discrimination. However, the colonists had fewer and less substantial grievances than appears at first sight. It should be observed that the Navigation Acts fostered the colonial as well as the British merchant marine at the expense of foreign competition . . . It is also true that, when it suited them, American merchants ignored these acts, and almost with impunity, since enforcement of them was remarkably lax. Smuggling was no great crime in the eighteenth century, and the Americans, like the British, avoided custom houses and officers when it was suitably profitable for them to do so. British custom officers in the North American ports were few and not usually officious. Often they closed their eyes, after receiving a suitable present of a case of Madeira or port wine, to violations of the laws. . . . Nor were the restrictions placed upon American commerce and manufacturing so cramping as they seem, because they often required Americans to do what they would have done in any case. [Alden (1969), pg. 36]

This is so, and Alden is certainly correct that most colonists would be indifferent to most of the acts and regulations most of the time. Some colonists would personally benefit from them. The empirical demonstration of this is that during the run up to the American Revolution, from 1763 to 1776, colonists could be and were divided into three broad classifications commonly called the Patriots, the Loyalists (or Tories), and the neutrals (those who did not take sides in the questions of colonial relationships with Britain). Furthermore,

> It must be remembered that the commercial policy of England was two-sided, and included both restriction and stimulation. In the first case the main effort was to check, so far as possible, competition with her own industries, whether it arose in rival countries or in English colonies. This explains the passing of the navigation and trade acts, and those prohibiting certain kinds of manufactures in the colonies. On the other hand England was anxious to stimulate those colonial interests which would not compete with their own, such as naval stores and the production of commodities which she could otherwise obtain only from foreign trade. [Jernegan (1929), pg. 259]

One contemporary view held by some American scholars boils down to basically thinking that if British politicians had been smarter or better informed or less shortsighted in the latter half of the eighteenth century then the American Revolution might never have happened at all. This is an interesting opinion, entirely too simplistic, and scientifically unsound. The British agents of government were in fact confronted with the formidable problem of formulating policy and laws to be applied to a developing Society (colonial America) that was not only heavily granulated into mini-Communities having quite different special interests, but also one where these mini-Communities became *linked* to one another in Enterprise-protein forms of socio-economic net-works. Governance of any Society of mini-Communities – which is to say any Society consisting of more than just a very few people – is one of the most formidable, and largely unsolved, problems that any institution of government faces. Furthermore, in any Society of more than just a few individuals, *every person is simultaneously a member of more than one mini-Community*.

One government action can satisfy one of my mini-Community interests, dissatisfy a special interest of mine in relationship to another of my mini-Communities, and the net effect will be that *as a whole person* I am dissatisfied. The number of, variety of, and uncoordinated way in which they were effected practically guaranteed that the divers acts of the British government *would* produce many locally disturbing provocations up and down Enterprise-protein chains. They *would* provoke the formation of new reactionary mini-Community formations within the colonial social network overall by setting individual self-interests and Duties-to-Self into direct competition with the British government's central interest in promoting corporate *Personfähigkeit* for the British empire overall. The *only* circumstance where the latter would win out and carry the continued allegiance of the individual is one in which the individual could simultaneously satisfy

both Duty-to-himself *and* reciprocal Duty to the mother British Society. The very fact that the American Revolution happened is compelling empirical evidence for concluding that the policies of mercantilism did not succeed in providing such a circumstance in the colonies.

A brief summary like the one presented here can be accused of whitewashing certain facts, selectively highlighting others, and of being generally too qualitative to command objective commitment. More bluntly put, it can be accused of being propaganda disguising itself as science. In point of fact, problems of socio-macroeconomics are complex and any thorough quantitative study must necessarily get down to a great many minute details. However, we do not lack for specific findings coming from a detailed application of *social-natural* economics specifically considering the American colonies and the British mercantile doctrine. Adam Smith carried out the first study of this problem – and the only thorough study carried out according to social-natural principles – and published them just as the American Revolution was getting underway. His analysis runs to just over one hundred pages in *The Wealth of Nations* [Smith (1776), pp. 493-596]. It bears out the points I am stressing here regarding mini-Community granulation.

The Wealth of Nations has been employed as a propaganda tool all too often in political debates in the United States. The propagandists who do so more or less count on the predictable behavior that most people will not fact check the misrepresentations they present out of context. Smith does ***not*** in fact give any categorical endorsement to *any* of the major points of contention championed by either conservative or liberal policy advocates in the contemporary United States.

For the considerations I am presenting here, this is not difficult to understand. The problem, as it confronted people in the eighteenth century, simply had no one solution that would have worked for everyone. Smith did what a good scientist should always do: *Without taking sides*, he went over the issues one by one and explained who benefited, who was harmed, who was unaffected by each point, and why economic factors had these effects. *The overall finding Smith implicitly came to is the same as I summarize here:* the net effect was widespread provocation, both in England and in the colonies. From the establishment of the causes we can go immediately to the verdict of history: The American Revolution happened, conflicts between mini-Communities pertaining to tangible *Personfähigkeit* did occur, competition failed to produce cooperation between the colonies and the British government and instead became an internecine conflict of irreconcilable Duties-to-Self for the people involved. *Smith came to* ***no*** *one final conclusion* regarding *how to solve* the overall problem because there *was* no such solution given the social environment constraints that were in play. Two illuminating examples, out of many contained in the pages of *The Wealth of Nations*, are these:

> To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind. Unjust, however, as such prohibitions may be, they have not hitherto been very hurtful to the colonies. Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labor so dear among them, that they can import from the mother country all the more refined or more advanced manufactures cheaper than they could make them for themselves. Though they had not, therefore, been prohibited from establishing such manufactures, yet in their present state of improvement a regard for their own interest would, probably, have prevented them from doing so. In their present state of improvement these prohibitions, perhaps, without cramping their industry or restraining it from any employment to which it would have gone of its own accord, are only impertinent badges of slavery imposed upon them, without any sufficient reason, by the groundless jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers of the mother country. In a more advanced state they might be really oppressive and insupportable. [Smith (1776), pg. 519]

What Smith had no way to know, because of the long lags and difficulties in obtaining current

data regarding colonial situations, was just how rapidly the colonies were moving toward that "more advanced state." Even so, Smith *did* take into account factors contemporary economics (a social science but no longer a social-*natural* science) routinely ignores:

> Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.
>
> To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, enact their own laws, and to make peace and war as they think proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be adopted, by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, no matter how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the revenue it afforded might be in proportion to the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation, and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent and, to the great body of the people, the most unprofitable province seldom fails to afford. [*ibid*., pg. 552]

As the social atom, no aspect of being-a-human-being, especially Self-determined Duties-to-Self, can be presumptively ignored whatever the field of study for a particular social-natural science is. The phenomenon of social contracting is always the determining context affecting success or failure in all aspects of Society governance. Lack of appreciation of this fact is the norm for our contemporary policy shapers, the most well-intentioned and the most venal alike. But in one thing Smith was wrong: Britain *did* learn how to *beneficially* relinquish authority over India in 1947.

Acts of smuggling, bribing officials, and establishing black markets are empirical symptoms of emerging, self-organizing Toynbee proletariat mini-Communities. The policies and acts of the British government were effected as *rulership*, which always involves a unilateral application of force or the threat of force. *Perpetuation* of these policies therefore inevitably produced moral secession by the ruled. All this results from the Enterprise-protein topology of colonial social networking, whereby disturbances to one part of the chain propagate throughout the chain, and this helped to fuel the emergence of a distinct American civilization.

The mercantile doctrine also affected relationships between Great Britain and the other European powers. This leads us to the next aspect of corporate *Personfähigkeit*: physical power of the corporate personality of the colonies.

§ 4. Growth by Accretion and the Physical Power of the Corporate Person

The eighteenth century was a century of warfare interrupted by brief outbreaks of peace in Europe. The fundamental conflict from 1669 through 1815 was principally a power struggle between Great Britain and France, but the conflict characteristically spread to include other European powers and North America. Table 3.2 lists the wars of the period.

TABLE 3.2: European Wars and American Involvement: 1669-1814

European Conflict	American Conflict
War of the Palatinate: 1689-97	King William's War: 1689-97
War of the Spanish Succession: 1702-13	Queen Anne's War: 1702-13
War of the Austrian Succession: 1740-48	King George's War: 1744-48
Seven Years' War: 1756-63	French and Indian War: 1755-60
War of American Independence: 1775-83	American Revolution: 1775-83
French and Napoleonic Wars: 1792-1815	War of 1812: 1812-14

The wars between Great Britain and France from 1669 to 1763 grew into world wars until France basically ceased to be a colonial power in America at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War [Jernegan (1929), pp. 324-328; Bolton & Marshall (1920), pp. 261-73, 364-83; Hart (1897), pp. 23-41]. With the exception of the American Revolution, which actually traveled from America to Europe [Durant (1967), pp. 867-72], these wars began as European conflicts and then spread to the Americas [Durant (1963), pp. 691-9, 706-15; Durant (1965), pp. 451-7; Durant (1967), pp. 38-64; Durant (1975), pp. 526-7; Hart (1897), pp. 200-220; Adams & Vannest (1935), pp. 186-208; Morison & Commager (1930), pp. 292-315].

French corporate physical power was never great in continental North America. Indeed, the persecution of the Protestant French Huguenots by Louis XIV swelled the ranks of Americans by producing a wave of immigrant refugees from France who settled mainly along the Tidewater in the Carolinas. French colonial power on the continent was rather due primarily to the French corporate power of persuasion, by which French forged alliances with various Native American Societies. Jernegan reports,

> During the first half of the eighteenth century the French territory was occupied by a very small population made up largely of traders, soldiers, missionaries, and officials. Thus in time of war, French resources in men and supplies were meager as compared with the English. On the other hand, the French had more Indian allies than the English, a fact which was one of the chief sources of their strength. While the English colonies were relatively strong in population and resources, they were loosely organized, jealous of each other, and indifferent to danger to their neighbors. They could be induced to act together only when actually threatened with attack on their own territory.
>
> The year 1689 marks the outbreak of the three-quarter-century-long French wars and England's long struggle with France for empire and trade, culminating in the peace of 1763. France had been gradually extending her power towards the Great Lakes and south into the middle west throughout the seventeenth century. France, like England, was aiming at colonial and commercial supremacy in Europe, Asia, and America. . . . In the first struggle, King William's War (1689-1697), most of the fighting was on the northern frontier, and the French directed their attacks against the Iroquois, alienated from the French since 1609. The Iroquois thus served as a buffer state, protecting New York and New England from blows that otherwise might have fallen directly on the English. The most important success of the colonists was the capture of Port Royal[3] by Sir William Phips in 1690. England, for the first time, was faced with the problem of fighting both France and Spain on the continent and in the West Indies and also along the frontier of the colonies. The Peace of Ryswick (1697) failed to make a real settlement of the problem. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 324-6]

On the whole, King William's War was, militarily, a victory for the French – or, more properly put, the French's Native American allies. Their military success knocked the Iroquois out of the war in 1693. The rest of the war consisted of various skirmishes that finally end in 1697 when the Peace of Ryswick ended the war. As part of this settlement, all places that had been captured by either side during the war were returned to their original colonial powers. The colonists gained nothing from the war and the loss of life, destruction of property, and financial ruin they suffered.

The Peace of Ryswick settled nothing and France's Louis XIV remained the most threatening monarch in Europe. It was perhaps inevitable that the European war would re-erupt, and when Philip V, Louis' grandson, succeeded to the Spanish throne in 1700 it did [Durant (1963), pp. 699-706]. In 1702 Britain began a naval campaign in the West Indies, fighting erupted with Spanish forces along the South Carolina frontier, and soon afterwards French and Indian forces

[3] This is the Port Royal located in Nova Scotia, not the famous pirate lair in the Caribbean.

were engaged in fighting along the northern frontiers of New England:

> The second war in America was known as Queen Anne's War (1702-1713). Border warfare, attacks on the frontier towns of New England and massacres by the Indians were the characteristic features. It was in this war that the famous massacre at Deerfield, Mass., (1704) occurred. The Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, had one important clause bearing on the control of the interior; the French acknowledged the suzerainty of the British over the Iroquois, which amounted to a kind of protectorate. On the strength of this political relation the shadowy claims of the Iroquois to lands south of the Great Lakes were claimed by England. By the "Asiento" British slave traders gained the privilege of supplying slaves to the Spanish colonial possessions. Newfoundland, important for New England fisheries, became a British possession; and Acadia was transformed into the British province of Nova Scotia. Nevertheless the war and the peace left unsolved the great question, that of control of the interior. [*ibid*., pp. 326-7]

The fighting in the South basically resulted in a stalemate but the Spanish threat was more or less neutralized as a result. In the North, the early military successes were enjoyed by the French and their Native American allies, but in 1710 a force of 4000 colonials, supported by the British Navy, captured Port Royal again and Acadia (Nova Scotia) was overrun. However, an attack on Montreal by colonial forces failed, thwarted primarily by incompetence on the part of the English commanding officers.

In Europe the War of the Spanish Succession was ruinous for all the combatants: Britain, France, the German states[4], Austria (the shadow of the Holy Roman Empire), and Spain. The Treaty of Utrecht was basically brought on by exhaustion and bankruptcy. Durant tells us,

> So the treaties of Utrecht and Rastart achieved little more than what diplomacy might have peacefully settled in 1701. After thirteen years of slaughter, impoverishment, and devastation, these pacts settled for twenty-six years the map of Europe . . . Between France and England in America a balance was established which would hold till the Seven Years' War (1756-63).
>
> The chief losers in the sanguinary contest for the Spanish succession were Holland and France. The Dutch Republic had gained terrain on land and lost power on the sea; it could no longer match England in shipping, seamanship, resources, or war; its victory exhausted it and began its decline. France too was weakened, almost fatally. She had kept her nominee on the throne of Spain, but she had failed to preserve his empire intact; and for this tarnished triumph she paid with a million lives, the loss of her sea power, and the temporary collapse of her economic life. . . .
>
> The victors of the war were Austria on the Continent, and England everywhere else. Austria now held Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Belgium; she would be the strongest force in Europe until the accession of Frederick the Great [in Prussia] (1740). England thought more of controlling the sea than of expanding on land; she acquired Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, but valued more her mastery in the avenues of trade. . . .
>
> A chief product of the war was the intensification of nationalism and international hate. Each nation forgot its gains and remembered its wounds. Germany would never forgive the double devastation of the Palatinate; France would not soon forget the unprecedented slaughter in Marlborough's victories; Spain suffered every day the indignity of Gibraltar in alien hands. Each nation bided its time for revenge. [Durant (1963), pp. 714-15]

Wars between nations very rarely settle anything permanently – the few exceptions that have occurred are remarkable for that reason – unless the victor exterminates the loser. Such was the

[4] Germany was not yet a unified country. Among the German states, the strongest militarily was Prussia.

policy of Rome during the Third Punic War, the Mongols under Genghis Khan, and the Zulus under Chaka[5]. What usually happens is that the loser licks his wounds, bides his time, and looks forward to "the Day" when "the injustice shall be righted." That is what happened in this case. The fuse was lit in 1740 when Maria Theresa inherited the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Frederick William II, known to history as Frederick the Great, inherited the throne of Prussia. The succession of Maria Theresa, although she would prove herself to be one of Austria-Hungary's great rulers, was controversial inside the Empire; the other monarchs of Europe saw a woman as a weak successor to the throne of the Hapsburgs and smelled opportunity. Frederick inherited from his father one of the most formidable armies in Europe and possessed a keen desire to avenge Prussia's humiliation in the previous war and regain Silesia. In December Frederick invaded Silesia and the War of the Austrian Succession began. By 1744 France, the Dutch, the Spanish, and Great Britain were all involved [Durant (1965), pp. 431-57].

In America the fighting actually began in 1742 with an English expedition under General Oglethorpe against Spanish St. Augustine near the Georgia-Florida border. This amounted to a proxy war with Spain beginning before Great Britain officially declared herself a belligerent in the widening European conflagration. Jernegan summarizes what happened next:

> French aid to Spain led England into war again. Thus was precipitated the third colonial war, known in America as King George's War, 1744-48. The capture of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island by a New England military expedition (1745) was the outstanding colonial event. Border warfare and Indian raids again brought distress on the New England frontier. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, again failed to settle the main issue in America, for both sides retained the territory which they had previously possessed. [Jernegan (1929), pg. 327].

It failed to settle things in Europe, at least between Great Britain and France, as well. In America the colonials had taken great pride in their capture of Louisburg and when this was handed back to the French they felt insulted and angered. A large cash reimbursement made by England to Massachusetts failed to sooth the colonials' feelings [Adams & Vannest (1935), pp. 65-6].

After sixty years of intermittent warfare the colonies, especially Massachusetts, had begun to regard their militias as a potent military and, from their experiences with British commanding officers and European treaties, were also beginning to regard France as a "British" rather than an "American" problem (although the Native Americans were another matter altogether). In 1749 the French began expanding into the largely unoccupied region of the upper Ohio River and its tributaries. This was territory claimed by Pennsylvania, Virginia, and also by the British government. When the French began building forts in the region, the war clouds began gathering again. In Europe this war would become known as the Seven Years' War; in America it is called the French and Indian War [Hart (1897), pp. 24-39; Bolton & Marshall (1920), pp. 366-83; Nettels (1963), pp. 581-91]. For England,

> The world was at stake – not simply the American continental colonies, but the rich West Indies, the balance of power in Europe, the African trade, India, the wealth of the Orient, the lives of empires. Every resource would be needed and would have to be strained. How far could the Americans handle alone their own end of the affair? United they had great potential strength, but could they, jealous as they were, unite?
>
> England suggested that an intercolonial conference be called to consider the question from the standpoint of a joint Indian policy, for it was the Indian allies of the French that

[5] Chaka, founder of the Zulu Empire and arguably its greatest king and general, had a military policy Genghis would have understood and approved: "Never leave an enemy behind or he will rise up and tear at your throat." Under him the Zulus were the most powerful and feared nation of that time in southern Africa.

> counted rather than the French themselves. Twenty-five delegates from seven colonies met in the Old City Hall at Albany in 1754, the most distinguished gathering of native American ability that had yet been seen.
>
> Among them there were Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts, later to be bitterly hated as a Tory, at this time regarded as one of the best and greatest of Americans; James De Lancey, a man of great wealth and Lieutenant-Governor of New York; Benjamin Franklin from Pennsylvania; Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island; and others, all notable in their colonies. The Indians were also there, "King Hendrick" of the Mohawks representing the Six Nations. He complained bitterly that the French were men, building forts everywhere, the English were "like women, bare and open, without fortifications anywhere."
>
> A treaty was made with the Indians, but the plan of union advanced by Governor Shirley of Massachusetts failed. A plan proposed by Franklin was agreed upon at the convention but did not meet acceptance generally when referred for approval back to the several colonies. [Adams & Vannest (1935), pp. 67-8]

Apparently the colonists could not unite – not, at least, for the sake of Great Britain. After the failure of the Albany Conference, Britain sent two regiments of regular troops, under the command of General Braddock, to the colonies to strike at the French. Braddock was defeated and killed at the battle to capture Fort Duquesne, after which it fell to a young colonial officer named George Washington to extricate the remnants of Braddock's army. The war went very badly for the British in 1756 and 1757. In England William Pitt became Prime Minister and in 1748 Britain sent a force of 41 warships and 11,000 troops to deal with the French and their Indian allies. Louisburg was recaptured, as was Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario. Fort Duquesne was abandoned by the French, taken by the British, and renamed Pittsburg. In 1759, Fort Niagara, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Quebec were all captured, all with very little assistance from the Americans. Britain's military circumstances elsewhere were turned around as well and,

> England was victorious in all quarters by 1763. France's naval power was temporarily destroyed. She had lost India. And in the Treaty of Paris she ceded all of her possessions in North America east of the Mississippi to England except for two small islands at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. By a secret treaty, she also ceded to Spain under the name of "Louisiana" all her claims west of the river. Her North American empire had crumbled to dust. [*ibid*., pg. 70]

There was another legacy as well. After seventy tumultuous years of experience, the French and Indian War had taught many colonists that Americans united had the power to defy and evade British rulership. A schism had occurred, although it is doubtful anyone on either side of the Atlantic was conscious of it at the time. The Albany Conference, a failure in the eyes of Britain, had taught Americans another lesson, one that would be remembered when the First Continental Congress was called. In 1763 the only thing missing needed to recognize the *Existenz* of a new American civilization, distinct from Britain, was a *cause célèbre* to integrate the still-granulated colonies and embody one Society. The British government soon provided it.

§ 5. Growth by Accretion and the Intellectual Power of the Corporate Person

Empirical exhibitions of the *form* headings of corporate *Personfähigkeit* – physical power and tangible power – are relatively easy to see from political history. The principle of *Personfähigkeit* for the physical power of a corporate person is demonstrated by citizens of the Community fulfilling civic Duties. The development and growth of the colonial institutions of militia and the effectiveness of their performance in combat certainly illustrates colonial adherence to this principle and growth in this power. The principle of *Personfähigkeit* for the tangible power of a corporate person is socio-economic utility optimization. The growing sophistication of division of

labor in colonial life – inherent in an Enterprise-protein socio-economic entity – illustrates the growing power of the colonists to institute cooperative means of accomplishing congruent personal goals and satisfying congruent tangible individual Duties-to-Self.

War and commerce are two human phenomena that tend to attract historical interest and are easier for adults to grasp from their own personal experiences. The two *matter* headings, on the other hand, typically aren't made crisply distinct by most historians. This is due to: primarily, a tradition of viewing nations as the field of study for history rather than viewing Societies as its proper field; and, second, typical habits scholars of history exhibit show less interest in historical aspects that present relationship evidence of the two matter principles. Interest defines study. Nonetheless, evidence of it is there to be found in the historical record.

The principle of *Personfähigkeit* for intellectual power of the corporate person is institution of a public civic and social education of all members of Society. The more widespread is this availability and the more it is utilized by Community members, the greater is the corporate power of intellect in that Community. In colonial Societies, and especially outside of New England, the corporate intellectual power in the eighteenth century was still relatively modest and only a minority of the population went to a school. On the other hand, practical education through the apprenticeship system was nearly universal, and overall the colonies lacked nothing here that the older Societies of Europe did not also lack. Jernegan wrote,

> The intellectual development of the colonists in [the eighteenth century] may be measured and evaluated from several standpoints: the temper of their literary productions; the facilities for and ideals of education; the agencies for the expansion and transfer of knowledge; the extent of their acquaintance with the works of the important English and European writers in every department of knowledge; their scientific and cultural attainments, and their main currents of thought.
>
> While most of the publications of the colonists in the seventeenth century were religious in character, in this later period we do find an increasing number of historical, educational, social, and even scientific writings. . . . No layman better illustrates the changed attitude towards life than Benjamin Franklin. He represents the other side of New England character – its sagacity, thrift, and common sense. His writings have an earthy odor utterly unlike those of Cotton Mather[6]. Franklin's attitude, typical of an increasing number of his own generation, was to let the people attend to the things on earth, and to leave to God those that concerned heaven and hell. This was the philosophy outlined in *Poor Richard's Almanac*. . . . Franklin wished to improve conditions and society, not as a preparation for the next world, but because it would bring about more happiness in this one. . . .
>
> The facilities for education and the ideals governing educational thought show a marked change in this period. In New England the public school systems were expanded, with more specific general laws compelling towns to establish elementary and grammar schools. . . . Another feature of the educational systems of New England was the rise of the "district school." . . . The control of taxes collected within the district was demanded for the support of a school in that district. The general effect of the New England educational systems was to bring pressure to bear on towns to support schools, and to enlarge the facilities for

[6] Cotton Mather, 1663-1728, was a well known Puritan clergyman and author whose religious views were those of strict orthodox Puritanism. He authored over four hundred publications including an ecclesiastical history of New England (*Magnalia Christi Americana*, 1702), which seems to have been modeled along the lines of the example that is presented by Bede's *Ecclesiastical History of the English People* (*c.* A.D. 731). Mather was internationally known, being elected to the Royal Society in 1713. He was a principal advocate of inoculation for smallpox in 1721. On the other hand, there is reason to think he had some degree of personal responsibility for the Salem witchcraft trials, although it is a matter of record that he did warn the witch judges that some of their methods were unfair and that he thought some of the victims were unjustly sentenced. (Mather did believe in witchcraft; that is why he could think some of the sentences were just).

> education of many children. . . .
>
> In the middle colonies, where various religious groups established churches, there was a tendency to set up parochial or denominational elementary schools connected with the church. Pennsylvania and Delaware so far recognized the church as the proper agency to further schools that acts were passed legalizing this practice. . . . In the southern colonies more reliance was placed on private agencies for the establishment and support of schools. This was natural because of the sharper class distinctions and the notion that a free school was a charity or "pauper" school. . . .
>
> The general character of the elementary curriculum remained much the same, reading, writing, and arithmetic, but the curriculum of the public secondary and private schools, outside the Latin grammar schools of New England, changed materially. This was due to the demand for a more practical education, one more closely related to the economic life of the period. . . . In the Philadelphia Academy, which Franklin established in 1743, and in his *Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth* (1749) he emphasized history, geography, oratory, mathematics and its applications, and introduced apparatus for performing experiments. . . . The general tendency was first to extend the opportunity and privilege of education; secondly, to enlarge the range of knowledge to be taught; and third, to make education more liberal, practical, and vocational.
>
> Higher education is marked also by changing tendencies. Yale was founded in 1701. Harvard offered a more liberal curriculum by 1750 than at the opening of the century. The middle colonies followed New England and Virginia by founding the College of New Jersey (Princeton), 1746, the University of Pennsylvania, 1749, and King's College (Columbia), 1754. These colleges . . . set up a more liberal course of study than that of the older colleges. . . . Another phase of higher education was the tendency in the middle and southern colonies to send boys abroad to be educated in the English public schools[7] . . . The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and particularly the Inns of Court, the great law school of London, received a number of Americans . . . who later became prominent in the Revolution. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 414-20]

Schools were not the only institutions of education in the colonies or even, for most colonists, the principal means of education beyond elementary schooling. Newspapers, printers, new libraries, book-sellers, and a postal system for disseminating information and correspondence were as important, and in most cases more important, than the secondary schools and colleges.

> The opening of the eighteenth century witnessed the publication (1704) of the first successful newspaper, *The Boston Weekly Newsletter*. Before 1756 newspapers had been established in all of the colonies excepting New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia. These papers printed more foreign than domestic news, and hence helped bring the colonists into closer touch with England and Europe. One important influence was the advertisements of the booksellers, offering the "latest" books from abroad on a variety of topics, as well as domestic publications. . . .
>
> The impetus to the founding of libraries came from a number of sources. Thomas Bray . . . was instrumental in founding a number of parish libraries particularly for the southern colonies about 1700. Franklin started the Philadelphia Subscription Library in 1731, the first important semi-public circulating library in the colonies. By 1750 a number of semi-public collections existed in the larger towns . . . In 1723 Harvard had some 3200 volumes. An increasing number of private libraries approached fairly large collections . . . the largest with some four thousand volumes. . . .
>
> Lacking outstanding and original leaders of thought, as is usual in new countries, the colonists were largely dependent for their intellectual progress on the new discoveries and

[7] The English "public schools" were not "public" in the context in which I use that word in this treatise. They were semi-private/boarding schools accepting qualified boys whose parents could pay for it.

> ideas set forth by European thinkers and writers. During the seventeenth century the colonists were little interested in the progress of philosophy, literature, and science. By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the activities of the booksellers and their advertisements in the colonial press helped create such interest. The college libraries also expanded rapidly and the subscription libraries like that at Philadelphia, were active in purchasing the works of leading writers in every field of knowledge.
>
> One of the most important tendencies in the latter part of our period was the emphasis placed on the study of the writings of the great political theorists of the old world by the rising young intellectuals in the colonies. Before 1750 the works of the political philosophers like Hooker, Harrington, Hobbes, and Locke were read by many of the intellectual leaders in the colonies, lay and clerical. . . . The writings on the law of nature or natural rights, by such men as Pufendorf and by the radical French thinkers, like those of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, were all advertised in colonial papers between 1747-1752.[8] Thus there was repeated, on a small scale, that great European rationalizing movement, the intellectual revolution that shook England and Europe in the eighteenth century. [*ibid*., pp. 420-22]

We do not see a united, planned institution of education taking seat in the eighteenth century. Rather, we see granulated institutions being set up in divers ways and with a variety of uncoordinated purposes. However, this matches colonial Society in this period: granulated, divers, and responding to a variety of uncoordinated situations. A Society creates its institution of education in its own image and then this institution reforms the Society, which then reinstitutes its institution of education – progressively if the civilization is growing and decadently if it is undergoing breakdown. A Society not being reshaped by its institution of education is an arrested civilization, of which the premier example extant today is that of the BaMbuti Pygmies. During the middle passage, the American civilization was a growing civilization.

§ 6. Growth by Accretion and the Persuasive Power of the Corporate Person

Empirical evidence for the last heading of corporate *Personfähigkeit* can be the most difficult to recognize as such. This is because its principle is a mathematical principle of a mathematical entity – *viz*., the corporate person called Society – and it is a principle of evaluation and assessment of corporate power of persuasion. All Societies have persuasive power in their corporate persons because persuasion is the means for intentional cooperation and no aggregation of people who lack all cooperation with one another is a Community at all. (Instead they constitute nothing more than cohabitants in the social jungle of a state-of-nature). The question the analyst faces is how to recognize the effects of the principle in the actions exhibited by Community members.

The principle of corporate persuasive power states that this power is *measured* by the degree of generation/annihilation activity in social-chemical bonding and antibonding leadership events in the embedding field graph representation of the corporate person. Leadership, let us recall, is a social dynamic – a "happening" – and not a character trait of an individual. Who is acting as a leader and who is acting as a follower is dynamical and fluid; the roles change from one person to another in short intervals of time and no person can be created "leader" by the mere bestowal of a title. You are a leader if and only if there are other people, followers, whose actions in response to your own accord with the intentions of your actions. There is no such thing as a leader without followers. A bonding leadership event is a social dynamic that produces civic cooperation; an antibonding leadership event is a social dynamic that produces conflicting competitive actions.

[8] A number of historians overestimate the importance of Rousseau in the colonial and revolutionary periods in America, and Jernegan does this here. Rousseau's only work published prior to 1752 was his first major work, *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750). Its thesis is that when society is corrupt then music, art, drama, literature, and philosophy distract people from public problems and encourage private indulgence.

This characteristic of leadership events is what provides the empirical ground for recognition of measures of degrees of corporate persuasive power. Are there individuals whose actions are recognizably those of leaders? Do these actions produce large or a small followerships? Are there factions recognizable within the overall Community? Are relationships exhibited between mini-Communities mutually cooperative or in competitive conflict? Put broadly, what is the political dynamic of the Society? – not as an institute of government or management, but rather in terms of person and group interactions and relationships. Let us bear in mind that the word "political" has its roots in the Greek idea of *politikos* and, specifically, in this word's context of "suited to a citizen's common life" [Liddell & Scott (1996)].

When empirical appearances of this sort are sought in colonial Society they are readily found. Alden notes,

> By the year 1763 the colonists were becoming increasingly aware that they had much in common, also that they differed from their "cousins" of the Old World. They were employing the terms "America" and "Americans" to designate their settlements and themselves. In part, they used those words for convenience, as did the British. But in part it is clear enough that the names were increasingly adopted because the colonists realized that they had become a new and distinct people. They saw themselves as Americans as well as New Hampshiremen, Pennsylvanians, and Georgians. They knew they were not merely Englishmen who happened to live on the western side of the Atlantic.
>
> Let it not be thought that the colonists at that time desired to separate from Britain or to form their own union. Nevertheless, it was even then apparent to some informed and thoughtful colonials that Americans were rapidly increasing in number; that they possessed a sound and burgeoning economy; that they were not without military power; that they would before long be able, if necessary, to defend themselves; and that they were sufficiently mature to govern themselves. . . . A large fraction of the colonists were literate. In New England . . . the ability to read and write was common. The Americans were not an ignorant people. Many of them, being owners of property or taxpayers, possessed the right to vote, exercised it, and so played a part in public affairs. Colonial voters were often well versed in domestic questions. Nor were they entirely unacquainted with matters imperial and European.
>
> Not that the colonists as a whole were sophisticated. They were as yet colonial in literature and the arts as well as in politics. Indeed, they would remain culturally colonial long after the creation of the United States. . . . To be sure, America was not a cultural desert. Benjamin Franklin was already famous for his electrical discoveries. That versatile genius would soon indite his equally famous autobiography. Moreover, America was a nursery for political philosophers and craftsmen. These would before long lay the solid foundations of an enduring and great republic. No European nation possessed their equals. Before the end of the third quarter of the eighteenth century Franklin was joined on the public scene by George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, John Dickinson, John Jay, and many another man distinguished in the conduct of public affairs.
>
> To point out that the colonists were not remarkably productive in literature and the arts is not to declare that well-educated men were not to be found among them. On the contrary, although they had produced few men who added to the rich stock of English literature . . . there were many colonials who were well acquainted with Latin, Greek, Hebrew, history, poetry, philosophy, and law. Plato, Plutarch, Homer, Virgil, Cicero, Milton, and Shakespeare were not unknown on the western side of the Atlantic. The more prosperous Americans owned and read books other than the Holy Scriptures. Many a ship carried books from London or Bristol across the ocean. Nor were those colonists eager for learning always forced to master the ancient or modern classics without assistance. . . .
>
> Notable in that generation were lawyers, a few of them the products of the London Inns of Court, most of them men who had studied under the direction of practicing attorneys.

> Earlier, lawyers had been few in the colonies, but able men had increasingly found opportunity at the bar in a thriving economy and an increasingly more complex society. Lawyers in private practice have never been revered by laymen . . . However, it was otherwise in public affairs, for in that arena the interests of the younger lawyers were commonly those of the colonists as a whole. They were coming forward as more or less learned champions of American liberties. Among them was Patrick Henry, who had won acclaim in Virginia . . . Similarly, James Otis, a Massachusetts lawyer, had achieved popularity . . . Lawyers would fulminate in speech and in print in behalf of American rights during the years between the Treaty of Paris and the Declaration of Independence.
>
> Let it not be thought that the Americans had no leaders other than laymen. Her clergymen, many of them college-trained, were numerous and influential; not all of them lived in theological quiet. Less powerful than they had once been, the men of the cloth were less potent than men of money. Even so, laymen listened attentively . . . Those who occupied pulpits did not confine themselves to things holy and eternal. Many of them forthrightly instructed their listeners about questions unholy and temporal. Political opinion often came forcefully from the altar, all the more effectively because it had at least a measure of sanction from the Divine.
>
> At least as important as the clergy in the things of this world were newspaper publishers, merchants, planters, and militia officers who had been polished in the school of experience rather than by tutors and professors. Such men might be well educated as a result of wide reading, as Benjamin Franklin was. They were more often men of a practical stamp who had found out about the ways of mankind in the counting house, in the printing shop, in the management of plantations, in colonial legislatures, in campaigns against the Indians and the French. Such was George Washington of Mount Vernon, Virginia, no profound scholar but a responsible, reliable, and redoubtable man. He and others like him might not be profoundly versed in philosophy or poesy; but they had the courage, the will, the information, and the ability to govern themselves and others. [Alden (1969), pp. 12-16]

Here it is obvious that education and the preparation of people possessing leaders' skills are intimately connected. Similarly, it is obvious that education is intimately connected to enterprise skills (tangible power). When we include the practical education of training, apprenticeship and experience, it is equally clear that education is intimately connected with corporate physical power. There were no military academies in the colonies, Clausewitz had not yet been born, and Sun Tzu was unknown to the Western world; but by 1763 there were already men in colonial America who, when the time came, would prove themselves to be capable military and political leaders as well as capable businessmen. I make this remark in order to stress that *Personfähigkeit* is the synthetic combination of physical, intellectual, tangible, and persuasive power, and that these four divisions are merely *logical* divisions of a single Object.

§ 7. Education Institution in the Middle Passage

This chapter has surveyed from a panoramic view empirical data of growth of an American civilization during what I am calling the middle passage. Let us now return the core topic of this treatise and discuss the institution of education in the colonies during the middle passage.

The historical record makes it clear, I trust, that the colonies as a whole did institute a system of education throughout colonial America. It was not a system of public schools, although there were public institutions in New England. It was not a system of private schools, although private and semi-private institutes were predominant. It was not instituted primarily by means of schools, but schools were one part of the institution of schooling in general. The societal role of schools in middle passage America was primarily confined to reading and writing so far as it affected the majority of the colonial population. It was not universal; it was not always available to any colonist who wanted it; and there were a significantly large number of colonials who did not

regard most schools as useful or pertinent to their own Self-interests.

Most of the organized educational activities were practical, commercial, and instituted through the mechanism of apprenticeships of one sort or another. This kind of schooling, which has come to be mislabeled as "vocational" education, was almost universally seen as a private good specifically important to the individual person in his capacity of learner-as-a-free-person. Its institution was private or semi-public, not coordinated, and very granulated. It was consciously aimed at individual tangible *Personfähigkeit* but cooperative in the context that learner and teacher (i.e., an apprentice's master) mutually benefited from the relationship in the majority of cases[9]. It usually involved no intentional element of civic good, by which I mean the inclusion of purposive instruction of citizenship. This was left to the individual learner to teach himself through coming to know the social and moral customs of his local Community as a part of his own accidental experiences driving his private educational Self-development. Critiqued by the mental physics of human nature, it can only be objectively concluded that these lessons were in overwhelming preponderance lessons of Duties-to-Self pertaining only to maxims of prudence. It could and did educate for individually civic behavior but not for ideas of a civil Society.

The institution of public and semi-public elementary and secondary schools was almost entirely in the hands of the churches throughout the colonies. In a much smaller number of cases well-to-do private individuals might choose to establish a school. Public schools as such existed only in New England and there it was not universal. Elsewhere it was semi-public, by which I mean it was restricted in scope to members of a specific church or private group that had established a school.

Orphans, illegitimate children, and children of impoverished parents might receive no schooling at all in some places or might by law be forcibly indentured as apprentices in others. In the latter case, legally imposed indentured servitude was carried out according to various laws enacted from the mid-seventeenth century into the eighteenth. Potter tells us,

> As in Massachusetts Bay, one of the first educational acts in Virginia provided for the apprenticing of children of the poor. Unlike the Massachusetts law, Virginia's law of 1642 did not specify that the apprentice be taught to read and write. The county commissioners were authorized to select two children, either male or female, whose parents' "poverty extends not to give them breeding," and to send these children to James City to be employed in the public flax houses. An interesting wording in the Virginia law, stressing the responsibility of the state to exercise authority on those parents "who by reason of their poverty are disabled to maintain and educate" their children, gave full power to the commissioners to take the children, even though "the parents, either through fond indulgence or perverse obstinacy, are most averse and unwilling to parte withe theire children."
>
> Subsequent legislation, in 1705, provided that any orphan whose estate was so small "that no person will maintain him for the profits thereof" should be apprenticed by the county court to some master until the orphan reached the age of twenty-one. In addition to teaching him the trade, the master was "obliged to teach him to read and write." In 1769, illegitimate children were similarly provided for.
>
> Other colonies followed Virginia's lead, passing laws which required that orphans and illegitimate children be apprenticed. Some of these laws specified that reading must be

[9] There were cases where the relationship was not mutually beneficial. These were not the social norm but the circumstances existed often enough that they cannot be called "rare." Most of these involved situations in which an apprentice, who was almost always an indentured servant in the towns and cities, was regarded as a slave by his master and treated abusively. We do not have reliable figures for estimating its extent, but it is reliably documented that these circumstances did exist, e.g., Ashby (1997). It was one of the antisocial factors extant in the mixed nature of colonial Society, i.e., its mixed civil- and state-of-nature character.

> taught; others did not. In Virginia in 1717 a master named George Smyth was summoned to court to answer the complaints of his apprentice, "Rich'd Williams," who said that his master was not teaching him "to read as by Indenture he is oblig'd." When Smyth promised "to put ye said apprentice forthwith to Schoole & to doe his true Endeavor to teach him his trade," the court ordered the apprentice to return to his master and serve out his indenture. The absence of more such records might be taken as evidence that most masters were fulfilling their part of the bargain; on the other hand, it might mean that few apprentices were in a position to complain. From the number of advertisements in colonial newspapers for runaway apprentices, it appears that conditions were not always ideal for the apprentice. [Potter (1967), pp. 82-83]

The granulated nature of the Society made it inevitable that colonists would demand and get local control of the schooling of their children. Schooling institution was "national" only in the sense that some form of institution existed in all the colonies. It was far from uniform, however, and varied greatly by locale in context, content, and availability. Ideas of any sort of national system of education, as well as the idea that a national system of education was a fundamental public good and the business of the state, would be born out of the American Revolution.

The next order of business for this volume is to reduce this data by analysis to evaluate public instructional education as it was instituted by the end of the middle passage. This forms the main topic of the next chapter.

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