

Chapter 4 Public Education to 1763

§ 1. Rating Methodology

Any method of objectively evaluating a system can be only so precise as available quantitative data allows. Anything going beyond this level of precision can only be speculation with little to no practical value. In the case of the American institution of education by 1763, there is only very sparse quantitative data available. There were no census surveys, there were no professional institutes charged with measuring or accounting for any aspect of education, and institution of education in any case varied greatly from one place to another in the colonies and the fledgling United States. Attempting any sort of parametric rating in the face of these circumstances is an exercise more Platonic and academic than scientific, and of very dubious practical value. Further, parametric ratings tend to convey a false impression that the analysis is more exact than the facts make it possible for it to be. Consequently, parametric ratings have great potential for doing more harm than good by provoking misleading speculations leading to erroneous conclusions.

The situation with which we must deal in this volume happens more often in practical science than most people tend to assume. This is a circumstance long recognized by statisticians, who responded to it by developing methods of nonparametric ranking based upon such qualitative assessment of degrees as can be justified by the data at hand. Given some characteristic, the simplest and most common analysis of this type is the three-tiered relative ranking: (1) exhibits less of a characteristic; (2) exhibits the characteristic to about an even degree; and (3) exhibits more of the characteristic. This is the sort of nonparametric ranking method I use here.

It is important for the analyst to understand how the results of his analysis stand with respect to the confidence and veracity that it provides in drawing conclusions and inferences. There is an epistemological relationship always found between analysis method and knowledge of empirical reality subsisting in its outcomes. While certainty is an ideal for empirical science, it is an ideal that is never achievable from empirical experience. All empirical sciences are uncertain to some degree; the less the degree of uncertainty appears to be, the more confidence is bestowed upon the predictions and declarations made by the science's theory. Kant spoke to this point:

By 'probability' is to be understood a holding-to-be-true out of insufficient grounds which, however, have a greater relationship to sufficient ones than the grounds of the opposite. By this explanation we distinguish probability (*probabilitas*) from *verisimilitude* (*verisimilitudo*), a holding-to-be-true out of insufficient grounds insofar as these are greater than the grounds of the opposite.

The grounds of holding-to-be-true can be *objectively* or *subjectively* greater than that of the opposite. Which of the two it is one can find out only by comparing the grounds of holding-to-be-true with the sufficient grounds; for then the grounds of holding-to-be-true are greater than the grounds of the opposite *can be*. In probability the ground of holding-to-be-true is therefore *objectively* valid, but in verisimilitude only *subjectively* valid. Verisimilitude is mere magnitude of persuasion, probability is an approximation to certainty. In probability there must always be a standard by which I can appraise it. This standard is *certainty*. For as I shall compare the sufficient with the insufficient grounds, I must know how much is required for certainty. Such a standard, however, does not exist in mere verisimilitude, since here I compare the insufficient grounds not with the sufficient but only with those of the opposite. [Kant (1800), 9: 81-82]

In science there are only two sources of certainty in knowledge. One is mathematical certainty and is possible because a mathematical object is a *made* object that can be precisely defined in every detail. However, such an object is always the object of an idea, it is supersensible, and this means it can never be encountered in any real sensuous experience. Knowledge of this class has

epistemological significance but is never *ontologically* significant. The other source of certainty, empirical certainty, comes from what Kant called *judgments of perception*. Perception is mental representation with empirical consciousness, and empirical consciousness is presentation of a mental representation that *another* representation (the perception) is present and is to be attended to [Wells (2009), chaps. 1, 4]. With a judgment of perception the only certainty the perceiving human being has is *that he has perceived*. It is, therefore, a certainty having to do only with his own subjective state and never with an object of his perception. His cognition of an object of his perception requires more than just a judgment of perception. In addition it requires what Kant called a *judgment of experience*. He explained the difference between these two kinds of judgments in the following way:

Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; those, however, that are only subjectively valid I call mere judgments of perception. The latter do not need a pure notion of understanding, but only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject. But the former always demand, in addition to the representations of sensuous intuition, special notions primitively begotten in understanding, which are precisely what make the judgment of experience objectively valid. [Kant (1783), 4: 298]

By judgments of experience we come to know of objects; by judgments of perception we come to have awareness. Judgments of experience are never certain; judgments of perception are always certain *but are only subjectively valid judgments* and are non-objective.

The analysis task at hand here is analysis of an object – an institution of public education – and therefore can be nothing else than an analysis of an object of experience. Thus the data of analysis comes out of judgments of experience and therefore the analysis *can never discover a ground of certainty that is ontologically significant*. The analyst must therefore choose between: (1) an analysis of verisimilitude – comparing one empirical system of education pairwise against some other one; or, (2) a probability analysis in which different empirical systems of education are compared against a *defined* mathematical standard – in which case the relative rankings have epistemological significance but not ontological significance. An analysis of verisimilitude in this case can have ontological significance but no objectively sufficient grounding – which is to say the analysis can yield an hypothesis but cannot claim it is certain as a categorical real-explanation (i.e., as a theoretical finding about an object-in-Nature).

In the present-day embryonic stage of development of a social-natural science of education, it would be hubris and nothing more to claim the science is currently positioned to propose a scientifically adequate mathematical model of an ideal system of education. This is because it is not yet in any position to demonstrate such a model has the necessary connection to real human experience that is required to claim, with Critical objective validity, that the model stands in a *real* relationship to the nature of educational Self-development in being-a-human-being. Think about it for a moment: If we had such an adequate model, we wouldn't be trying to *understand* how to institute a system of public education that meets the social contract objectives of its Society; we would instead be trying to *design and institute* that system of education according to rigorous scientific principles of educational practice. It is, I presume, rather obvious that we are not yet ready to successfully accomplish the latter. A natural scientist, whether his topic be one of physical-nature or social-nature, is bound to observe Newton's fourth maxim:

In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exception.

This rule we must follow, that the argument of induction may not be evaded by hypothesis.

[Newton (1726), pg. 321]

Newton's maxim follows from a fundamental tenet of natural science first set out by Bacon:

There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from them, as principles and their supposed indisputable truths, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true but unattempted way. [Bacon (1620), pg. 15]

To pose a general mathematical model now would be to commit the error of Bacon's "first way" of "investigating and discovering truth." It would be Platonism and Platonism has *no* place in natural science. Modern science and scientific method began when natural philosophers began following Bacon's "true but unattempted way." This is the way of Kant's Critical Philosophy.

At the present stage of social-natural education-science the analyst is therefore committed to choosing the analysis of verisimilitude. This still leaves him facing the problem of determining what manifold characteristics of comparative systems he is to attend to. In deciding upon this, he is not free to disregard the fundamental social atom of his science – the individual human being in his *homo noumenal* nature of being-a-human-being. This is to say that the analyst must attend to the metaphysical grounding of his empirical science, which in our case is provided by the applied metaphysic developed in volume I. The 2LAR structure of the metaphysic was illustrated by figure 1.2 in chapter 1. Figure 4.1 re-presents this in 3LAR form after an analytic division of the instructional functions into two learner dimensions: the learner-as-free-person and the learner-as-member-of-a-Community. The deduction and explanation of the twenty-four functions was presented in volume I, *Education and Society*. The applied metaphysic provides the *context of the analysis* of the institution of public education. The relative degree to which each of these instructional functions is provided by an institution is made the basis for the objective analysis.




Figure 4.1: 3LAR structure of the applied metaphysic functions of public instructional education.




Figure 4.2: Key to color coded relative ratings of instituted instructional education functions.

It is sufficiently clear from the historical data of chapter 3 that the analysis requires separate ratings corresponding to the three dominant attitudes towards education that existed in different regions of the country. Based upon similarities and differences in education legislation, extent of practices of formal schooling, providers of instruction, and the social character of the instruction that was provided, I maintain the convention of logically classifying the American colonies (and, after 1776, the American states) into three groups: a northern group, a middle group, and a southern group. Except in the case of Rhode Island, these groups tend to follow a geographical distribution and this is why I maintain the naming convention northern-middle-southern. Rhode Island, although physically located in New England, maintained much the same attitude towards education as the middle colonies, namely what Cubberley terms the "parochial school attitude." The northern group – New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut – tended to follow the compulsory-maintenance attitude. The rest – which comprise the southern group of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia – adopted the third attitude, which Cubberley called the "non-state-interference" attitude, which is more or less a polite term for endorsing a state-of-nature attitude towards education [Cubberley (1919), pp. 13-24].

As to the ratings themselves, rating criteria must be tied to the social context of public education (because it is public education with which this treatise is concerned). This means that ratings are to be referred to the social objectives served by instituting public instructional education. As discussed in Wells (2012), the primary social objective pertains to the achievement of Progress in the Society and not merely to the maintenance of Order within the Society. The reasons for this were explained in *Education and Society*. To put this another way, social rating of a *public* institution of education has no context outside of the context of reasons why the citizens of a Community cooperate as a body politic to set up and maintain the educational institution. At the current stage of development for social-natural education-science, the minimal rating system must recognize four broad levels of achievement in rating each educational function: (1) the institution does not exhibit provision of the function; (2) the institution exhibits the function but does not implement it to a degree congruent with the maintenance of social Order; (3) the institution exhibits the function to a degree congruent with the maintenance of social Order; and

(4) the institution exhibits the function to a degree congruent with Progress in the Society.

We must also bear in mind that these non-parametric ratings are not logically "crisp." Rather, the degree of exhibition must be regarded in terms of what contemporary logic and mathematics calls a "fuzzy set-membership." An educational function might be – often will be – inadequate in some respects, adequate in others, and more-than-adequate in yet other respects; the overall rating of degree places the function "in" one of the four classification sets just enumerated *without* making the implication that *every* aspect of the functional implementation is realized to the same degree of achievement. This mathematical methodology was developed in the 1960s by Lofti Zadeh and over the past four decades has come into widespread practice in many practical sciences, including various branches of engineering and psychology. Fuzzy sets are formally part of a more general mathematical methodology called *set membership theory* (SMT), and the SMT methodology is epistemologically required by the Critical metaphysics of the phenomenon of mind [Wells (2009), chap. 1].

Accordingly, I represent the analysis results using the key convention figure 4.2 illustrates. Each educational function in figure 4.1 is given a regionalized score according to an evaluation of verisimilitude concerning the capacity of that region's institution of the function to meet its underlying functional objective. One important benefit of adopting this methodology is that it provides a degree of safeguard against the error of making overgeneralizations in the analysis.

§ 2. Home Schooling, Apprenticeship Schooling, and Schooling by School Institutes

The Critical real-explanation of schooling is: ***schooling*** is the *Object that understands all activities of social interaction by which one person is assisted by another person in his efforts to accomplish his purposes of educational Self-development. A **school** is a systematic institute for which the primary function is instructional education* [Wells (2012)]. Schooling, therefore, involves additional activities beyond those carried out systematically in a school. Schooling activities can be logically divided into *personal* schooling and *Enterprise* schooling activities.

Personal schooling is best exemplified by the most common form of education that existed in colonial America, namely home schooling. This personal schooling classification includes home-learned lessons in topics such as reading and also lessons taught through *home apprenticeship*, in which the child acquired practical knowledge of, e.g., farming, tailoring, butchering, baking, or etc. from his or her parents and as part of the family's economic Enterprise.

It is the contemporary habit in America to regard "schooling" as meaning "schooling by means of a formal school institute." This mainstream contemporary habit must be viewed as nothing else than a custom that developed from the Progressive Education Movement of the early twentieth century. Only since the fourth quarter of the twentieth century has there been a major movement by a substantial fraction of Americans to re-discover home schooling and to effect various means of reintroducing it as part of the American institution of education. In the seventeenth through late-nineteenth centuries, home schooling was by far the most frequent means of instituting education. Gutek remarks,

Abraham Lincoln attended school for less than a year. In many respects he was his own teacher. Borrowing books whenever he could and reading them in whatever time was available, Lincoln mastered the English language, practiced as a highly skilled lawyer, and became one of the nation's greatest presidents. . . . Becoming literate outside of school was not limited to exceptional people like Lincoln, but was a process going on in the lives of ordinary people throughout the United States. [Gutek (2003), pg. xi]

What Gutek describes here is not home schooling because it is not schooling at all; it is an example of individual educational Self-development. However, in order for an individual to

educate himself as Lincoln did, he must first and minimally learn how to read. For the great majority of Americans in the eighteenth century, this skill was learned at home with parents, and sometimes with older siblings, acting as teacher. As Gordon reported,

In the Middle Atlantic colonies, as elsewhere, the family remained the principal agent of literacy for children. This was a common social idea. Education usually began with some form of tutoring at home in reading and writing. The colonial household farm or plantation persisted as the basic economic unit in a largely frontier and rural society. Against this background literacy spread through both formal and informal intellectual and technical education. Parents and siblings taught reading in the home from hornbooks, primers, catechisms, and Bibles. Many parents sent their children to a neighbor . . . who operated a dame school.

By 1776 about 100,000 people lived in the American colonies' principal cities – Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Newport, and Charleston. Even including the secondary towns, only an estimated one of every sixteen colonists lived in an urban environment. Only here was family education eclipsed as the primary agent of literacy by the presence of schools. [Gordon & Gordon (2003), pp. 37-38]

Education scholars who study the topic of "literacy" have not come to a common universally-accepted definition of that word. There are several competing definitions of it in use currently and a few distinct "schools of thought" – basically, attitudes based upon judgments of taste – that make some one specific usage the basis of scholarly work. This is a situation commonly and nearly uniformly encountered in the pre-scientific history of every craft, including those that in time became natural sciences. Kuhn tells us,

If the historian traces the scientific knowledge of any selected group of related phenomena back in time, he is likely to encounter some minor variant of a pattern here illustrated from the history of physical optics. . . . No period between remote antiquity and the end of the seventeenth century exhibited a single generally accepted view about the nature of light. Instead, there were a number of competing schools and sub-schools, most of them espousing one variant or another of Epicurean, Aristotelian, or Platonic theory. . . . Each of the corresponding schools derived strength from its relation to some particular metaphysic, and each emphasized, as paradigmatic observations, the particular cluster of optical phenomena that its own theory could do most to explain. Other observations were dealt with by *ad hoc* elaborations, or they remained as outstanding problems for further research. . . . Those men were scientists. Yet anyone examining a survey of physical optics before Newton may well conclude that, though the field's practitioners were scientists, the net result of their activity was something less than science. Being able to take no common body of belief for granted, each writer on physical optics felt forced to build his field anew from its foundations. . . . Under these circumstances, the dialogue of the resulting books was often directed as much to the members of other schools as it was to nature. That pattern is not unfamiliar in a number of creative fields today, nor is it incompatible with significant discovery and invention. It is not, however, the pattern of development that physical optics acquired after Newton and that other natural sciences make familiar today. [Kuhn (1970), pp. 11-13]

Such is the state of education theories today, although I am tempted to say that these theories bear more resemblance to those of the days of Thales of Miletus than to the days of Newton.

If we adopt what seems to me the least ambitious usage of the term and say that literacy means the ability of a person to gain and comprehend knowledge through reading, then it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that everywhere in colonial America to 1763 home schooling was the primary means of establishing individuals' abilities to pursue educational Self-development by whatever means of other *Enterprise* institutions of education that were available.

By *Enterprise schooling* I mean teacher-assisted educational Self-development in which the teacher is not, or does not act in the context of being, a parent or other family member regardless of whether or not any implied or contractual clause of *in loco parentis* exists in the relationship. As a technical term, **enterprise** means *any undertaking actualized by an individual for reasons grounded in duties to himself or Duties to himself reciprocally with others to whom he has bound himself by Obligation*. Strictly speaking, the complete technical term is "personal enterprise." By **Enterprise schooling** I mean *schooling by means of cooperation between a learner's personal enterprise actions and a teacher's personal enterprise actions and in which both learner and teacher are motivated by self-interests of tangible Personfähigkeit*. In colonial America there was an Enterprise institution of schooling that for most Americans was more common and far more important in the formal institution of education than were the school institutes. This was the institution of *apprenticeship systems*.

When one considers that apprenticeship institutions predate history, it is curious that historians have by and large ignored it. In the 9,941 pages of Durant's eleven-volume *The Story of Civilization* there are exactly *five* index-referenced pages under the heading "apprentices" and *no* pages under the heading "apprenticeship." All five referenced pages appear in volume 4, *The Age of Faith* [Durant (1950)]. On the topic of apprentices or apprenticeship found under these five indexed references he spends exactly 46 words plus the following paragraph:

The fraternal spirit among the masters [in a guild] did not prevent a sharp gradation of membership and powers in the craft guilds. At the bottom was the apprentice, ten to twelve years old, bound by his parents, for a period of from three to twelve years, to live with a master workman, and serve him in shop and home. In return he received food, clothing, shelter, and instruction in the trade; in the later years of his service, wages and tools; at the end of his term, a gift of money to start him on his own. If he ran away he was to be returned to his master and punished; if he continued to abscond he was forever debarred from the craft. On completing his service he became a journeyman (*serviteur, garçon, compagnon, varlet*), passing from one master to another as a day (*journée*) laborer. After two or three years the journeyman, if he had enough capital to open his own shop, was examined for technical ability by a board of his guild; if he passed he was made a master. Sometimes – but only in the later Middle Ages – the candidate was required to submit to the governors of the guild a "masterpiece" – a satisfactory sample of his craft. [Durant (1950), pg. 636]

In Middle Age Europe guilds were powerful corporate entities¹, monopolizing trades and exerting considerable economic and political power. But by the eighteenth century they were well into corporate disintegration in England and no guild of any significance was established in America². The institution of apprenticeship, however, survived the fall of the guilds and, with some modifications better suited to conditions in colonial America, was transported from England and continued until early in the nineteenth century and the arrival of the Industrial Revolution. The institution of apprenticeships was similar in all three regional groups with some legal variations. In New England (excluding Rhode Island), instruction in reading and writing was mandated by law. In the Middle Atlantic region some provisions were made granting apprentices

¹ The first European universities established after the end of the Dark Ages were guilds or composed of interacting guilds. The students even had their own guilds, called "nations," that among other things tried, often successfully, to intimidate town merchants and landlords into lowering prices and rents by threatening to leave town and go to another university instead. They were a potent economic and political factor in any university town, sometimes more potent than the teachers' guilds [Pedersen (1997)].

² Trade, craft, or labor unions – call them what you wish – were never guilds, despite some incidental and quite unimportant resemblances in their governance organization, and in any case did not make their first appearance in America until the nineteenth century.

the privilege of going to night school. In the Southern region we find the greatest variation from place to place but in all cases, except in a few instances involving public laws concerning the apprenticeship of orphans, illegitimate children, and paupers, schooling was left as an entirely private matter between the apprentice's parents and the master.

§ 3. New England

The most important factors distinguishing the northern group (New England) are: (1) cultural homogeneity in the population; (2) the political practice of organizing the colony around the town as the basic unit; and (3) the generally poor soil and unfavorable agriculture conditions. Much more so than in the other colonies, the population in New England was concentrated around the towns and an economic division of labor involving numerous crafts developed very early. The New England town system affected nearly every aspect of New England Society including the institution of schools and the apprenticeship system. In New England,

a three-tier apprenticeship system mandated by law also made important contributions to overall social literacy. The basic divisions of this apprenticeship system included:

1. *Upper Level* – Parents of teenage sons paid fees to have them apprenticed with qualified lawyers, doctors, or silversmiths.
2. *Mid Level* – Parents voluntarily indentured a child as a craft apprentice or servant.
3. *Basic Level* – Poor children were indentured out by the overseers of a town or a parish as apprentices.

These laws covered three essential points: first, bringing up a child to work in some employment or trade; second, supporting a child so that he or she would not become a charge on the town; and third, seeing that the child was taught to read. It is significant to note that in all these colonial apprenticeship laws the agency for educating the child is the parent or master. No mention is made of schools or schoolmasters. The reason was that the system of home manufacturing that existed in colonial times precluded compulsory education through school attendance, as this would seriously interfere with the normal economic conditions of life for a large proportion of the population. New England also emphasized apprenticeship education to help solve two social issues that have persisted to this day, unemployment and "pauperism" and meeting labor-market needs by ensuring an adequate number of entry-level skilled workers.

The apprenticeship system was controlled through voluntary or compulsory written indenture contracts recorded in town, county, or colony records. These indentures were enforceable in the courts. The general term of apprenticeships for males was to the age of 21 and girls to 18. Children could be bound out by voluntary action of the parents at any time. [Gordon (2003), pg. 24]

And, of course, a homestead farmer could "trade apprentice" his children to himself, which is the principal form of home apprenticeship I mentioned earlier.

The division of labor in colonial New England wasn't remotely as finely-tuned as it became after the Industrial Revolution. By the end of the seventeenth century agriculture had become subordinate to commerce in New England and commercial New England was established around artisan shopkeepers, fishing, shipbuilding and textiles, intercolonial trade, and shipping trade with the West Indies, England, and Europe [Jernegan (1929), pp. 165-177]. Jernegan tells us,

Most of the farms were small, fifty to two hundred acres, and the work was performed by the head of the family and his sons, with perhaps a "hired man." There were always some indentured servants and after 1639 some negro slaves in Massachusetts and soon after in the other New England colonies. The apprenticeship system was also speedily developed, and this was one of the principal sources of supply for artisans.

The practice in New England was to form compact settlements, villages, and towns. This tended to produce a division of labor, a combination of agriculture and industry, and a population that represented many types of economic well-being. The artisan class was one of the products. . . .

Unlike the southern colonies, the system of agriculture was intensive rather than extensive. That is, for the most part, the unit was the small farm of one hundred acres more or less, worked by the labor of the family, and producing hardly more than sufficed for the support of the family. In other words New England agriculture was not based on the principle of producing a large surplus for export because the climate, soil, character of the crops and nature of the labor force made this unprofitable if not impossible. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 170-1]

The economic weakness of agriculture in New England was one of the principal features that sets the northern group apart from the other two. Jernegan also tells us,

The general condition of agriculture in New England was unsatisfactory during most of this period. The natural fertility of the soil had been exhausted by unscientific methods and lack of fertilization. As a result, New England was obliged to import quantities of food supplies, especially the cereals, obtained principally from the bread colonies, New York and Pennsylvania. In fact, wheat almost passed out of cultivation in New England by 1715; but Indian corn continued to be the chief cereal crop. Next to agriculture the principal industries in the New England colonies were as follows: fishing, shipbuilding, cloth-making, lumber products, distilling of rum, the African slave trade, and the import and export of goods for themselves and for other colonies. [*ibid.*, pp. 370-1]

Although the American South merits the historical stigma it has gotten as a consequence of slavery in America, colonial New England (and Great Britain) merits this no less. New England was a key hub in the triangle trade: molasses to rum to slaves. The South was a consumer of slaves, but part of maritime New England formed the supply chain.

The contemporary self-image of the American as a "rugged individualist" that is so commonly exploited by today's political party propagandists and cherished as a notion by many Americans is the image of a pre-Industrial Revolution New England Yankee or a Piedmont pioneer. Although there was an upper class in New England Society that emerged as a natural consequence of the division of labor – for example, there are fewer ship owners than sailors, fewer ships' captains than crewmen, etc. – the majority of New Englanders were middle class folks – shopkeepers, specialty artisans, etc. Adams and Vannest wrote,

For the most part the free white worker in colonial days was an artisan or a journeyman. When young he was an apprentice working at his master's side and usually living in his master's home as a member of the family. When older, he worked for himself. Even before the machines came, however, some trades began to undergo a change. Men began to employ groups of workmen, whether they worked together in one building or not, and in such trades, notably shoemaking, quite a new social relation came to exist between the owner of the group business and his workmen. [Adams & Vannest (1935), pp. 656-7]

If one makes the mistake of equating "worker" with "American" in this quote, it is in fact not accurate to say that the "free white worker" to whom they refer represented colonial Americans "for the most part." The accuracy is restricted to New Englanders and to the towns and cities of the other colonies. Elsewhere "for the most part" this free white "worker" (i.e., "American") was a homestead farmer. In New England, though, the broader statement is accurate and the majority of people received literary education in both reading and writing (either by home schooling or in a town school) and trade education through apprenticeship.

This system predominantly served the education dimension of learner-as-free-person and to a lesser degree the learner-as-a-member-of-a-Community. However, in this second dimension the educational Self-development occurred principally by *incidental* education of the learner in the social and moral customs of his local Society. There was no explicit *citizenship* education, but the institution of governance through the town meeting provided an *implicit* education in this, by which the learner developed his own subjective understanding of social contracting in his local Society. For culturally homogeneous New England, this implicit citizenship education was likewise more homogeneous, founded upon a more homogeneous system of mores and folkways, and thus individual educational Self-development could lead to an understanding of the local Community's social contract that was easier to grasp in New England than those elsewhere.

§ 4. The Middle Colonies

In the middle group, where the population was very inhomogeneous in cultural background, literacy education (reading and writing) was principally effected by home schooling with the rest of the typical learner's education coming through his trade education via apprenticeship – apprenticeship with an artisan in cities and large towns, and home apprenticeship in rural areas. No New England-like institution of elementary schools was possible in the middle colonies for three principal reasons: (1) the population was geographically more greatly dispersed; (2) it was more multi-national in its makeup; and, (3) establishment of schools was accordingly regarded as the prerogative of the individual churches. There was consequently a much greater variance in the number and quality of the establishments that resulted. Although the middle colonies were not solely agricultural, agriculture did dominate the overall economy:

In the middle, or "Bread Colonies," agriculture predominated. The settled regions around Philadelphia, including Delaware and Western New Jersey, were primarily agricultural, and wheat flour and bread were their most important products. Gristmills increased in number. Franklin, for example, reported to the House of Commons in 1760 that there were eighty-three in Pennsylvania. New York was also a bread colony, and many mills were set up, the average having a capacity of 100 bushels of wheat a day. Since much of the flour was put into barrels and exported, the cooper's shop was placed near the mill. In fact the windmill and flour barrel were on New York's seal as emblems of its major industry.

More and more attention was given to woolen manufactures, Germantown being a center of this industry . . . Household cloth-making was a widespread industry in New York in the eighteenth century. A report of 1708 declared that three-quarters of the linens and woolens worn by the people were of their own make. Governor Moore reported (1767), "The custom of making these coarse Cloths (Linsey Woolseys) in private families prevails throughout the whole province, and almost in every house a sufficient quantity is manufactured for the use of the family without the least design of sending any of it to market . . . everywhere swarms of children are set to work as soon as they are able to spin and card, and as every family is furnished with a loom, the itinerant weavers put the finishing hand to the Work."

Next to the flour and textile industries, lumber products were of greatest importance. Many sawmills were erected along the rivers, and staves, barrels and hogsheads were manufactured in large quantities and sent to Ireland for packing their butter and salt provisions, and to the West Indies for sugar and molasses. Franklin stated (1760) that there were about forty sawmills in Pennsylvania with an average capacity of 1500 [board] feet daily. . . . Manufacture of lumber products was carried on by men who devoted their whole lives to the work, and also by "farmer coopers." . . . Farmer-coopers, like farmer-nail-makers in New England, added to their income by using their spare time in making barrels and casks which were sent "knocked down" to the West Indies and exchanged for sugar, molasses or money. Shipbuilding was another industry well developed in Philadelphia and New York by 1750.

Another significant industry in Pennsylvania and New York was the manufacture of iron. At first most of the pig iron was exported, but by 1750 so much was kept in the colony for manufacturing that England passed an iron act to prevent further establishment of iron mills. . . . The iron industry in the colonies advanced so far by 1737 that a hearing was given in the House of Commons and testimony taken as to colonial competition and its effects. Mr. Edward Knight testified to a decrease of one-third in the output of bar iron in England since 1718. He also said that the iron mongers reported almost no demand for nails because a sufficient supply was available in America. He declared also that since 1722 no axes had been shipped to New England, New York, or Pennsylvania, and very few to Carolina; that there were sundry forges in New Jersey for the manufacture of bar iron; that andirons were being manufactured in Rhode Island, and garden spades, carpenters' axes and nails in Pennsylvania. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 367-370]

Where parochial schools were instituted in New York, these by and large followed a pattern established by the earlier Dutch settlers. These schools were mainly found in New York City, Albany, Flatbush, Schenectady, and other Dutch enclaves. The Gordons tell us,

Both boys and girls began school at the age of seven. The school was held in the largest room of the schoolmaster's house. School was held six days a week (half days on Wednesday and Saturday), usually between 8:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M., with a midday two-hour dinner recess. . . . The Dutch of America followed the educational traditions of the fatherland promulgated in 1636 . . . : reading and writing for both girls and boys, but with little arithmetic except in the more commercial atmosphere of New Amsterdam [New York] and Albany. . . .

The first book in the Dutch curriculum was an alphabetical reader called the "cockbook," named after the crowing cock on its title page. Its contents included: the alphabet in different type sizes, vowels and syllables, the Ten Commandments, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the prayer of Solomon, morning and evening prayers, church ceremonies for baptism and communion, and later the Dutch counting table.

Next the child received a reading book consisting of gospels and other selections from the New Testament. Later texts included the Old Testament, history selections, psalm books, and the Heidelberg Catechism, the official doctrine of the Dutch Reformed Church. [Gordon & Gordon (2003), pg. 39]

However, we must bear in mind that schools like these were urban institutes and most New Yorkers did not attend them. The Gordons add,

Literacy was largely an individual's responsibility. Schools were not the essential institutions of literacy; rather, a combination of the family, apprenticeships, and the churches served this function. . . . But most "schools" were short lived, for teaching arrangements were often temporary, schoolmasters moved from city to city, and students sought out different masters for different subjects. The typical teacher held more than one job and advertised his expertise as a teacher educated in England. . . . These teachers often taught both children and adults, acting as schoolmasters for children by day and tutors for adults in the evening. . . . Adult evening schools in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia were also private ventures. . . . Many indentured apprentices attended and studied reading, writing, and arithmetic, thereby fulfilling the literacy obligations of the apprentice's master. A large part of the rise in literacy in New York City can be traced to these entrepreneurial schoolmasters. [*ibid.*, pp. 40-41]

Pennsylvanians had basically two educational options, viz., institutes in: (1) Philadelphia; and (2) everywhere else. The Anglican Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) opened a number of charity schools in the Philadelphia region but

Outside the main center of Philadelphia, a significant level of literacy was never attained in colonial Pennsylvania. A general plan to provide basic literacy through public schools in colonial Pennsylvania was never followed because [the population was heterogeneous] to an extent unknown in any other colony. The Quakers, English, Scots-Irish, Germans, Welsh, Swedish, and Dutch colonists split into so many different religious denominations that conflicting social, political, and theological beliefs retarded any united efforts to support literacy education.

Throughout the period families continued to be dispersed over a vast wilderness area. The French and Indian Wars brought long periods of virtual anarchy on the frontier, inhibited travel, and destroyed many families. Incessant wars also meant a heavier tax burden. These basic life-and-death matters lessened the importance of literacy to such a great extent that the literacy revolution occurring in some of the other colonies never really got off the ground in Pennsylvania.

By 1775, not only was the number of scholarly men and women, particularly in rural areas, small, but comparatively few adults could do more than read, write, and do simple arithmetic. Many children and adults throughout the colony remained wholly illiterate. [*ibid.*, pp. 47-8]

In New Jersey the population was also quite heterogeneous and its early settlement was divided between a Quaker, Dutch, and Scots-Irish East and a Swedish Lutheran West. These two halves were administratively aggregated in 1702 under a royal governor. The development of literacy and of parochial schools was, as the Gordons put it, "a very fractured affair":

The Quakers were the predominant religious group in central and southern New Jersey. Through their meetinghouse schools they educated youth in ethics, practicality, and piety. As we have seen, the Quakers placed a particular emphasis on apprenticeship education. They relocated many poor and orphan children to homes where they would receive a basic education and often a skilled trade. . . .

The Anglicans opened their first New Jersey school in 1712 under the sponsorship of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG). This schoolhouse and other later classrooms were operated as charity schools.

After 1660 many Scots-Irish Presbyterians settled in New Jersey. Because of their strong belief in religious education, many parochial schools were attached to their local churches. . . . Because of this great religious diversity, literacy education in New Jersey remained heavily dependent upon the private initiative of individual churches throughout the colonial period. [*ibid.*, pp. 48-9]

Gordon and Gordon summarized their analysis of literacy education in the middle colonies in the following way:

The great diversity of ethnic groups settling in the Middle Atlantic colonies had the result of limiting literacy education for their population. Unlike New England, the many different religious beliefs and languages raised formidable social barriers to any unified community response. The geography alone was prohibitive to the spread of literacy since the region contained a large, trackless frontier wilderness with widely scattered towns and villages. It was practically impossible to provide this dispersed population with adequate schools or schoolmasters.

Literacy opportunities were further narrowed since these colonies seldom taxed themselves to establish community schools. There were even few public subsidies of private education programs. The public literacy laws were only weakly enforced. There is no accurate way to determine the exact number of children or adults who were taught in a schoolhouse or by private schoolmasters, tutors, or parents. With only a few notable

exceptions, there was little public commitment to schooling and literacy in the middle colonies. [*ibid.*, pp. 51-52]

This sounds like a harsh criticism and, of course, it is meant to be one. On the other hand, and before reviewing the southern colonies, there is a question that should be asked: Were the education provisions Gordon and Gordon tell us were lacking in the middle colonies viewed as a lack by the colonists themselves? Here one must consider that, no matter how geographically fragmented, ethnically divided, or religiously divided the middle colonies were, *the Society did contain mini-Communities spread throughout it and none of the causal factors named above would have prevented the mini-Communities **individually** from making up for a perceived lack.*

That the institution of education in the middle colonies did not match the model contemporary scholars regard as necessary or important for literacy is, in terms of a Society, quite irrelevant. In point of fact, each mini-Community does appear to have had *some* institution of education, even those where this went no farther than home schooling and home apprenticeship. This fact all by itself establishes that *local* mini-Community interests were being satisfied by the *local* institutions. Let us remind ourselves that BaMbuti Pygmy Society has gotten along quite well, for far longer than any other contemporary Society has even existed, without in all those millennia discovering any "need" for literacy whatsoever. What is the real social-natural lesson to be learned here?

From the vantage point of human nature, the answer to this is simple enough to be disappointing. The middle colonies established no "unified community response" to the issue of literacy because the middle colonies were not in fact a single unified Community commonly bound by a single social contract. Until and unless conditions in the social environment arise that provoke the people living in that environment to seek a stronger support for the individual powers of their persons, the *potpourri* of diverse mini-Community institutions was a satisficing response to individuals' needs within and confined to their own mini-Communities.

With the benefit of the hindsight of history we today do recognize that the colonial social environment was soon to change drastically, and when it did the fundamental problem of establishing social-chemical bonding between granulated mini-Communities posed a major challenge for the colonists. The year 1763 was the edge of a watershed crisis point for the Americans. When it came, the problem of integrating diverse mini-Communities – related to one another by state-of-nature relationships of the same sort that characterize modern nations in times of peace – was made more challenging by the disunity of institutions of education.

But until then, from the point of view of the great majority of the colonists, there simply was not a *real* social problem that needed solving. Social friction develops only where divers mini-Communities come into contact with each other via personal interactions. The fact that the King of England *declared* that the region called "New Jersey" was *one* colony made New Jersey neither one Community nor one Society. As Abraham Lincoln is alleged to have once said, "Calling a tail a 'leg' doesn't make it a leg." A Community comes into real *Existenz* only when the members of that Community bind themselves to association with one another for their mutual benefit. The King of England never lived in New Jersey.

This lesson is basic to the rating analysis presented in this chapter. *The viewpoint of the analyst cannot be separated from the analysis.* In this treatise, the overall objective is to Critique *contemporary* American institution of education *for the United States of America*. The results of the analysis itself presume this standard gauge of reference – as, of course, does the thesis that Gordon and Gordon present. What we have here is an instance exhibiting what we might well choose to call a relativity principle for natural-sociology.

The relativity principle is even more significant for the southern colonies, to which I now turn.

§ 5. The Southern Colonies

One finds increasingly disintegrated institution of education in the colonies as one passes from the northeast and New England to the South. More than anywhere else in colonial America, the southern colonies resembled feudal England except that the southern gentry was much better educated (by private means) than typical feudal English lords were. These colonies were founded with private personal gain as the objective and developed as split Societies composed of a ruling oligarchy and rural, heavily-granulated, subjugated mini-Communities. As a whole, its corporate tangible *Personfähigkeit* operated in the mode of *uncivic* free enterprise³ and it was deeply segregated by a social convention of class/caste divisions. The system of government in every colony was the oligarchy form, in which a few rulers rule a larger body of subjects who submit to this rulership out of maxims of prudence based on Duties-to-Self with regard to their individual external situations. The relationship between rulers and ruled is the outlaw relationship and has no social contract for its basis. Rather, it is based on the threat of force. In these colonies wealth-assets were employed as the most common weapon for imposition of state-of-nature rulership.

§ 5.1 The Tidewater Region

Things did not begin this way in the South. Prior to 1700 there was a group of a few dozen planters who had built up sizable plantations with numerous servants and slaves, but the greater majority of southerners owned small plantations with few or no servants or slaves. Colonists lived within about 50 miles of the Atlantic coast scattered along the river valleys. This region came to be known as the tidewater region [Jernegan (1929), pp. 82-3]. Colonists in the tidewater came from a culturally homogeneous background, largely from the middle and southeastern counties of England. The southern population increased slowly during the seventeenth century and in the early colonial period about ninety percent of the southern population lived in Virginia and Maryland. The population of the South did not increase rapidly until the eighteenth century. It was during this time that settlement of the Carolinas and Georgia took place and that the southern population was swelled by a large scale importation of slaves, a significant influx of indentured servants, and a dumping of deported criminals and orphaned children carried out by the British crown government, almost all of whom arrived as indentured servants. Dickens' "Artful Dodger" was a fictitious character but he was based on historical fact.

The eighteenth century also saw waves of non-English immigrants, mostly Palatine Germans⁴, Scots, Scots-Irish, and French Huguenots. This last group, Protestant French refugees driven out of France by the king, settled in the tidewater region of the Carolinas. The rest settled in the "backcountry" region between the fall lines of major rivers and the Appalachian Mountains. Disregarding colony boundaries, this region, the Piedmont plain, is known as "the Old West" and it extends from the northern into the middle colonies and south into Georgia. Socially but not administratively, the Piedmont constituted a fourth colonial region culturally distinct from the English and Dutch "Old East." Relationships between Piedmont mini-Communities and eastern mini-Communities tended to be non-civic, often hostile, and sometimes violent. This granulation was the source of many problems in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas. The political entity contemporary professional political party rulers call "the solid South" did not exist in the antebellum South. In colonial times the polite term for the Piedmont colonists was "the frontiers-

³ I have previously discussed the social-natural distinction between *uncivic free enterprise* and *civic free enterprise* in my essay *The Idea of the American Republic* [Wells (2010), chap. 7]. Those who object to "capitalism" use the wrong label for the Object of their objection. What they in fact object to is *uncivic* free enterprise. I refer the interested reader to the source just cited for a discussion of this point.

⁴ The Palatinate is a district of Bavaria west of the lower Rhine River. It is a fertile country that has had the historical misfortune of being made a battlefield in some of Europe's most destructive wars.

men"; the impolite term was "the squatters."

In the developing South the power to rule was seated in the tidewater and particularly in the hands of what became the southern aristocracy, more politely called "the gentry." The economy of the southern colonies was based on raising and exporting staple crops, primarily tobacco with later diversification into rice, indigo, cereals, cattle, sheep, and hogs. Lumber was an important industry, as was pitch, turpentine, and tar exported as naval stores. The southern economy was built up to depend on the availability of cheap, unskilled labor and this had a direct effect on how southern demographics developed. As it turned out, the large planters were not very smart businessmen and this, too, had a direct effect on how social institutions developed in the South:

The planters, knowing that there was plenty of rich virgin soil to be had at low cost, made little to no effort to conserve their holdings by careful cultivation or by the use of fertilizers. As soon as a few crops had been grown, they preferred to allow the land to go to waste and secure other rich tracts.

The inevitable result was rapid depletion of the soil, and consequently a scarcity of available, fertile, virgin lands. The tendency in the latter portion [of the seventeenth century] was to develop large plantations with thousands of acres with only a small proportion under cultivation at any one time. That portion uncultivated consisted of worn-out and abandoned land, of forests, and areas held in reserve for later cultivation or for speculation. This system also produced a scattered population with but few towns and villages, mostly located near the coast. The great planters loaded much of their produce for export on boats and ships at their own wharves at the river banks. Another tendency was a rise in the value of the better lands. Immigrants, principally poor people, were thus forced to take up the less fertile lands, first back from the river valleys, then in the interior counties, and later west to the mountains. . . . Because of the rapid exhaustion of the soil there were decreasing returns from the land and resort to poorer land, even by the great planters.

The principal land problem was to prepare wild regions for cultivation. . . . The first method called for the expenditure of prodigious physical labor by a large number of laborers, with primitive implements such as the axe, spade, and hoe, and perhaps a wooden plough. Laborers were relatively scarce because few immigrants had the money to pay for their cost of transportation . . .

This difficulty led to an economic and social invention – the headright system. Land, to the amount of from 50 to 150 acres, was granted as a free gift to anyone who would import a laborer into a southern colony, or to one who migrated at his own charge. If the immigrant was unable to pay the cost of his transportation, he might sign an indenture, or contract, with a shipowner, a planter, or his agent. That is, in return for his transportation, food, clothing, and shelter, he promised to work for the planter four or five years and in some cases seven or more. Many emigrants were willing to make such agreements because at the end of their term of service they became free men. They also generally received a tract of 50 acres of land free, as provided by the laws of the southern colonies. . . . This was the only method of securing laborers or land in large quantities except through the purchase of negro slaves. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 84-6]

Perhaps this sounds like an equitable enough exchange, but it did have a catch in it. The catch subsisted in an innocent little phrase "as provided by the laws of the southern colonies." A "legal" clause is not necessarily a "justice" clause, as attested to by the old Roman warning *caveat emptor*⁵ – which has for centuries been one of the most important maxims of prudence in uncivic free enterprise. Who might you suppose actually legislated the provisions of "the laws of the southern colonies"? Here's a hint: it wasn't the British Parliament, the King of England, or Oliver Cromwell, the "Lord Protector."

⁵ "Let the buyer beware."

The indentured white servant was practically a semi-slave for a term of years. Generally speaking the planter was under few restrictions with respect to the amount or severity of the labor he could exact, or the nature of the shelter, food, and clothing he might supply, or the punishments he might inflict. The servant often tried to escape his hard lot by running away but the penalty, upon capture, was time added to his service, perhaps a year or more. Theoretically the indenture and the laws protected the servant, calling for good treatment and care in case of illness. But few of those unjustly or cruelly treated could bring their cases into court and gain redress. One chief advantage of the system to the planter was the reasonable certainty of labor supply. By the end of the [seventeenth] century, however, pressure for economy led to the introduction of more negro slaves. They were cheaper, and their term of service, for life, was much longer. The opportunity to purchase more land for money (1705) and the tendency towards large-scale production both influenced the planters to substitute the negro slave for the indentured servant.

The introduction of the negro slave into the southern colonies was due to several reasons. The precedent was set by the Spaniards in the West Indies, Mexico, Central, and South America. . . . Thus when, in 1619, the first negroes were brought into Virginia by a Dutch ship they were welcomed by the planters. From this date slaves were introduced into other colonies by the Dutch and English, into New Netherland and New York, and as early as 1638 in Massachusetts, where later the slave trade became an important industry. Negro slaves, however, were not as numerous or important in the seventeenth century as the indentured servants. Indeed, it is estimated that in 1683 there were about 12,000 indentured servants in Virginia, and only about 3000 negro slaves.

The first negroes imported were not legally slaves but servants. The southern colonies, however, passed laws defining the status of the negro. In general he was eventually deprived of most of those political, economic and social privileges often accorded to free citizens. The significant feature of the negro slave labor system was absolute control by the master: such as power to buy and sell, punish, work, and otherwise use or abuse his slave for his own profit, with little or no legal restriction. Negro slaves increased not only by importation, but because the laws provided that the child of a female slave became a slave, whether the father was bond or free. [*ibid.*, pp. 87-88]

I could leave off the historical account at this point and let you form an impression that the large planters were the most heinous sort of sociopaths. In actual fact this was not true and that explanation is too simpleminded. The fundamental cause was that, in addition to being poor businessmen, most members of the planter aristocracy were vainglorious spendthrifts who got themselves deeply into debt to British financiers. They might have looked, behaved, and thought of themselves as "Lords of the Manor" but this was a facade of vanity concealing personal debt loads that only a person ignorant of the most basic precepts of economics would assume⁶.

In the tobacco colonies, Maryland and Virginia, overproduction, low price, and heavy import duties levied in England brought the planters into debt. In 1724 Hugh Jones, author of *The Present State of Virginia*, complained that "planters who have had a great dependence upon their year's crop of tobacco for the support of themselves and families have instead of clearing anything been brought into debt by it." The planters, however, failed to solve one of their most serious problems – depletion of the soil due to inefficient methods of cultivation.⁷ With the price of land rising and old lands wearing out, the

⁶ This, too, is not an historical rarity. An impressive list could be compiled of kings, nobles, politicians, and contemporary so-called business leaders who are every bit as economically ignorant as the gilded peacocks of the colonial southern aristocracy were. It's not an uncommon hole dug by satisficing decision-making.

⁷ It can be argued the planters simply didn't know why their land was becoming less productive. However, it can be answered that inadequate institution of education is the reason they didn't know or couldn't find out. Middle Atlantic farmers had known about better cultivation methods and fertilizers since learning about it either directly or indirectly from Native Americans.

eighteenth century witnessed a serious drop in the number of hogsheads of tobacco produced per acre. In fact, contrary to common belief, many if not most of the tobacco planters of Maryland and Virginia had great difficulty in making their plantations pay.

By 1732 debts were so numerous that English merchants sought parliamentary legislation. The planters stated their side in a famous pamphlet, *The Case of the Planters of Tobacco in Virginia*. The principal grievances presented were overcharges by the merchants, excessive duties levied by England on imported tobacco (six pence per pound); and the high cost of marketing tobacco, including freight charges, commissions, brokerage, cartage, warehouse rent, etc. The Virginia planter could not export direct to the continent, though about four-fifths of the tobacco that reached England was re-exported by the English merchants.

After 1732 it may be said that the normal condition of many Virginia planters was that of debtors. "Factors" or agents in Virginia warned the English merchants against granting too "loose" credit. . . . While the English government and merchant were in large part to blame for the troubles of the tobacco planter, yet the planter himself was not free from responsibility. He was often guilty of excessive importation of negro slaves purchased on credit; of extravagant living, and of purchasing goods, far in excess of his needs. [*ibid.*, pp. 363-4]

Complaining about your enterprise's economic environment and blaming it for your problems instead of either adapting your enterprise to that environment or translating it to a new and more profitable environment is a classic symptom of being an unskilled manager. Compounding this lack of skill by digging yourself into an even deeper financial hole by debt consumption for purposes of self aggrandizement is a symptom of business incompetence:

By 1689 some of the great planters lived in spacious houses, were provided with the best foods, drank from the finest liquors and wore expensive imported clothes. . . . The social position of the upper class was made known through the titles, "Mr." for a gentleman, "Esq." for a member of the council, and "Hon." if the occupant of a high office; by the wearing of fine cloths, of velvet, silk, and lace, by powder and periwigs, and especially through the display of coats of arms on coaches and tombstones. In the counties of Essex, Lancaster, and Middlesex, Virginia, forty-seven families made use of such coats of arms before 1700. [*ibid.*, pg. 98]

However false the facade, such displays do make effective propaganda. John Adams wrote,

Why do men pursue riches? What is the end of avarice?

The labor and anxiety, the enterprises and adventures, that are voluntarily undertaken in pursuit of gain are out of all proportion to the utility, convenience, or pleasure of riches. A competence to satisfy the wants of nature, food and clothes, a shelter from the seasons, and the comforts of a family may be had for very little. The daily toil of the million, and of millions of millions, is adequate to a complete supply of these necessities and conveniences. With such accommodations, thus obtained, the appetite is keener, the digestion more easy and perfect, and repose is more refreshing than among the most abundant superfluities and the rarest luxuries. . . . Why do any men affront heaven and earth to accumulate wealth, which will forever be useless to them? Why do we make an ostentatious display of riches? Why should any man be proud of his purse, house, lands, or gardens? or, in better words, why should the rich man glory in his riches? What connection can there be between wealth and pride?

The answer to all these questions is, *because riches attract the attention, consideration, and congratulations of mankind*; it is not because the rich have really more ease or pleasure than the poor. Riches force the opinion of a man that he is the object of congratulations of others, and he feels they attract the complaisance of the public. His senses all inform him

that his neighbors have a natural predisposition to harmonize with all those pleasing emotions and agreeable sensations which the elegant accommodations around him are supposed to excite.

His imagination expands, and his heart dilates at these charming illusions. His attachment to his possessions increases as fast as his desire to accumulate more; not for the purposes of beneficence or utility, but from the desire of illustration. . . .

What is it that bewitches mankind to marks and signs? A ribbon? a garter? a star? a golden key? a marshal's staff? or a white hickory stick? Though there is in such frivolities as these neither profit nor pleasure, nor anything amiable, estimable, or respectable, yet experience teaches us, in every country of the world, they attract the attention of mankind more than parts of learning, virtue or religion. They are therefore sought with ardor . . .

Fame has been divided into three species. *Glory*, which attends the great actions of law-givers and heroes, and the management of great commands and first offices of state. *Reputation*, which is cherished by every gentleman. And *Credit*, which is supported by merchants and tradesmen. But even this division is incomplete, because the desire and object of it . . . is not confined to gentlemen nor merchants, but is common to every human being. There are no men who are not ambitious of distinguishing themselves and growing considerable among those with whom they converse. . . . And as, when it receives a happy turn, it is the source of private felicity and public prosperity, and when it errs, produces private uneasiness and public calamities, it is the business and duty of private prudence, of private and public education, and of national policy to direct it to right objects. [Adams (1790), pp. 344-349]

A man who has made himself slave to his own vainglorious maxims of self-love, and who feels threatened by the loss of the external signs and symbols that harvest accolades to which he has made himself addicted, will be able and self-compelled to self-excuse almost any action he elects to take for their preservation. The mental physics of the motivational dynamic makes this quite plain to see. In the earliest years of the Virginia colony social governance was republican in its character; its mutation into the despotisms of rulership, with the resulting enormities perpetrated and perpetuated on the great majority of southerners, can be traced back directly to ever more desperate measures, necessitated by a lessening of *Personfähigkeit* among the upper class, taken to preserve a crumbling capacity for self-aggrandizement. As the Bard put it, "To be thus is nothing; But to be safely thus" [Shakespeare (1605-6), Act III, Sc. 1]. Financially, thrift is safety.

Class divisions inevitably poison any social contract and reduce a Society to a state-of-nature condition among the classes moderated only by personal maxims of prudence. Jernegan reports,

The laboring class, those who emigrated as servants, laborers, or artisans, were generally from a lower stratum of English society . . . An observer in the middle of the [seventeenth] century says: "The people that are sent to inhabit the Colony are the most of them the very scum and offscouring of our nation, Vagrants or condemned person, or such others as by the looseness and viciousness of their lives have disabled themselves to subsist any longer in their nation; and when they come thither either know not how, or will not betake themselves to any sober, industrious course of living." Convicts and felons, indentured as servants, were forced on Maryland and Virginia in such numbers that the Virginia House of Burgesses passed an act in 1670 to forbid their further shipment. The act, though vetoed by the king, speaks of "the great number of felons and other desperate villains sent hither from the several prisons of England"; and adds that through such imports "we are believed to be a place only fit to receive such base and lewd persons." On the other hand it must be remembered that those called criminals were often only poor people who through stress of circumstances had committed some minor offense, such as stealing a sheep. Others were political offenders. There is no good evidence that most of the servants were criminally inclined; rather they were poor folks with no crime record. A number even became planters

and founders of families of considerable consequence.

Southern society was an outgrowth of the English political, economic and social system, inherited and transported to the new world, but modified by the efforts of the colonists to adjust themselves to their new environment. Among the prevailing ideals was the belief that a wealthy minority should control the government and hold this power by restricting the political opportunities of the majority. . . . Again the inherited class distinctions were stimulated by the presence of the indentured servant and the negro slave. Social prestige of one class of freemen as compared with another class was based on family, official position, and wealth.

It was natural that an aristocratic type of government should arise. [Jernegan (1929), pp. 96-7]

It was also natural in such a heavily granulated and antibonded Society that social governance would abandon individuals to come by their private educational Self-determinations without any significant common public support. In such a Society these divers resources for education would tend to only focus upon the learner-as-a-free-person and neglect the learner-as-member-of-a-Community because Communities in the South were generally uncivic Communities outside the family or the clan. Each did what they thought necessary and had the resources to accomplish for themselves without regard to a wider scope of Society. They formed a natural, not a free, Society:

Although portions of the middle colonies and New England were rural, neither area encountered the extreme dispersion of population that typified the southern colonies. This physical environment and the region's unique population imposed some severe limitations on literacy opportunities.

The means of providing literacy instruction were quite varied. It was usually out of the question for most families to send their child to any school. But small farmers or planters sometimes opened cooperative elementary schools to provide basic literacy for their families. A remodeled old tobacco shed or a one-room schoolhouse in an infertile field "long abandoned to pine and broom-straw" became the site of the southern "old field schools." There the local neighbors united to hire a schoolmaster, perhaps an indentured servant, to teach basic literary skills.

Denominational churches were another important source of literacy throughout the region. Many Anglican churches established a local parish school. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) introduced its charity schools in the early 1700s and led in the establishment of schools for African-American children throughout the southern colonies. But the greatest impact of denominational literacy followed the later 1700s religious revival movement by the Scots-Irish and Germans.

Charleston and the few other southern towns of any size established grammar schools, but these urban schools served only a few children. Apprenticeship education practices were common in the South as in all the American colonies and represented a significant literacy practice.

The dominant Tidewater planter aristocracy pursued other literacy options for their children's schooling. William Byrd of Westover plantation in Virginia . . . could not find a good enough education for his children in the southern colonies, so like many other southern aristocrats, he chose to send all four of his children to England for their education.

A more practical solution was employing a resident tutor. This literacy practice followed the educational practices of the eighteenth century English aristocracy. Tutoring became very popular, particularly in Virginia and the Carolinas. [Gordon & Gordon (2003), pg. 55-6]

In Virginia,

Literacy developed in colonial Virginia around three distinct groups: planters, white servants and craftsmen, and African-American slaves. The planter group itself was subdivided into two categories. The aristocratic planter class owned large tracts of land, buildings, and slaves. The lesser planters and small farmers owned much less land, maybe only a few acres, and held few slaves or, in many instances, none at all. It was the comparatively small aristocratic planter class that largely set up the pattern for literacy development and was mainly responsible for any literacy legislation passed by the colony.

The white servant and craftsmen class was formed from the unique economic conditions existing in seventeenth-century England. An indenturement system was created so that men, women, and even children could find the economic means to emigrate to the colonies. The master would advance the passage money, and the servant would labor for a set term of years. . . . Indentured servants became such an important part of the southern colonies that they constituted by 1671 nearly one-sixth of the entire white population. . . . In 1754 slaves constituted about two-fifths of the total population. The uniqueness of this labor system directly affected the progress of literacy in Virginia.

Like those of its northern neighbors, the first Virginia literacy laws in 1619 and 1631 were tied to furthering religious worship. Parents were responsible for teaching their children, servants, and apprentices to read the catechism. However, unlike New England, the attitude of the colony sharply differed when it came to assuming any public financial obligations for the literacy education of the general population. Instead, the colony only assumed a literacy obligation for orphans, the poor, or those children whose parents were not likely to provide instruction at home or elsewhere. The apprenticeship system was used for these children by including an educational clause in their indenturement contract. The basic assumption made in Virginia was that education was a private affair and that parents were capable, on a voluntary basis, of providing a basic literacy education for their own children.

Though it seems that families had to bear the total responsibility for literacy, they seemed to do so with remarkable effectiveness, as is indicated by Virginia's high literacy rate throughout the colonial period. Families recruited local teachers as private tutors and brought in educators from England or the northern colonies. Local schoolmasters were paid by guardians to take orphans into their classes or instruct them privately.

The household farm or plantation was the basic economic unit throughout the colony. Against this social backdrop, formal and informal instruction took place in the daily life of a child, with the young learning through both experience and explanation. Reading was taught in the home by parents, siblings, or other relatives from hornbooks, catechisms, primers, and the Bible. Particularly in the tidewater region extended families were common, sometimes representing two or three generations. This network of relatives had a profound effect on the literacy education of children. [*ibid.*, pp. 56-7]

As for the Carolinas,

Throughout the eighteenth century in both North and South Carolina, the home literacy instruction of children was a common educational custom, both in families of modest means or through tutors and governesses by planters who could afford it. This does not mean, however, that the vast majority of children were either well educated or even partially literate.

Before the American Revolution (1776-1783) many South Carolina planters sent their sons to Oxford or Cambridge to complete their education. Old field schools and private tutors were as commonly used as in Virginia to give Carolina's children their basic literary skills.

As in Virginia many parents in the Carolinas, out of either personal preference or economic necessity, did undertake at least the basic literacy education (and sometimes much more) of their children upon themselves. The *Memoirs of Martha Laurens Ramsay*

offer us a fairly detailed record of how an eighteenth-century mother conducted the day-to-day education of her children at home. [Mrs. Ramsay became an exceptionally remarkable self-developed educator; she was a member of the upper class and had self-acquired an upper class education as a girl].

Martha Ramsay's advanced home education program could not be duplicated by many other parents in South Carolina or any of the other American colonies. But it does show how parents did have access to popular education literature. Uncounted families throughout the South and in other regions of colonial America devoted their own steady attention to their children's education. They took a lively personal interest in their children's daily concerns and for childhood literacy forged more personal pathways that many parents in our modern era now envy. [*ibid.*, pp. 69-71]

§ 5.2 The Piedmont

Spanning several colonies, the Piedmont was in many ways a separate Society from the Tidewater and eastern New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. The greatest expansion of American population, other than the slave population of the South, was in the Piedmont. Settling this frontier area was initially seen by the colonies in terms of establishing a military buffer zone between themselves and hostile Indians. The headright system of indentured servitude was a key factor in its settlement – an economic one in this case – because newly free former indentured servants were owed a grant of land and as the eighteenth century progressed the only affordable land to be had was on the frontier. Jernegan tells us,

From the opening of the eighteenth century some of the colonies commenced to bid for settlers by grants of land on the frontier, with the idea of using the settlers for frontier defense. New lands were needed also because of the pressure of population, due to natural increase and to immigration. Moreover, the better lands near the coast had risen in price and little good unoccupied land was available. This condition led many to purchase the cheaper lands farther west. If settlers did not have the money to purchase land they often took up land illegally as squatters. [Jernegan (1929), pg. 337]

It must be remembered that the frontier and "backwoods" lands were claimed by the colonies and colonial proprietors such as William Penn. They "legally owned" this land only by dint of the colonial charters and the declaration of the British government. If the land happened to already be occupied – say by Indians or the relatively few French colonials – then it was "disputed." The terms "legally" and "illegally" have to be kept in perspective here, and the one Jernegan presents above is the perspective of the colonial governments. Where a state of nature exists there is no such thing as "justice" and "legally" is an empty term more or less defined by whoever has the most firepower. Japan might equally well say it legally owned Korea – which in fact it did say in 1905 after a short, sharp war in which the Japanese Imperial Fleet soundly beat the Russians and "settled" the "Korean dispute." The Koreans, it should be noted, had a different idea about who "owned" Korea, but for the next few decades they didn't have much say in the matter. It is not too surprising, therefore, that a like difference of opinion sprang up between men like Penn and the so-called "squatters" who were in physical possession of the land in the Piedmont.

The colonial governments were naturally opposed to squatting for a variety of reasons. On the method of settlement depended the security of the settlers and the safety of the colony. Again, indiscriminate settlement led to confusion of land titles and many disputes arose between settlers and the colonial governments. Further, the latter were continually in trouble with the Indians because squatters encroached on Indian lands. Then those colonies and a quit rent system were deprived of a large revenue because the squatters paid little to no rent.

On the other hand, the poor immigrant or pioneer not only had no money but he could not afford to wait for the long delay involved in making accurate surveys, purchasing land from the Indians, or making treaties with them. He was willing to take the risk of defending himself, considered that the Indians had no rights, and even adopted the idea that the pioneer had a "natural right" to land, similar to his right to life and liberty. He felt that in a way he paid for the land by risking his life, by blazing a path through the forests, by fighting the Indians, and by protecting the coast population in wartime. [*ibid.*, pp. 344-5]

It is also not surprising that grievances arose between frontier settlers and the colonial governments or that the Piedmont developed a Society strikingly different from their eastern neighbors:

The structure of society in the frontier regions was very simple. Indeed there was little, and could be little, of that division into classes so common in the coast towns, based on wealth, family, and occupations. The population was not yet segregated into classes; family prestige counted for little; and practically all the people were following the same calling, viz., agriculture and closely allied industries. The frontiersman, often a squatter, . . . seized and settled on some piece of land that fitted his immediate needs, caring little to whom it belonged – whether Indians, proprietors, the crown, or settlers. In such a frontier society one class predominated – independent farmers working tracts of land from 50 to 200 acres, purchased or squatted on.

The frontiersman was largely self-sufficing and produced primarily for home needs. In a few localities produce was finding its way from the upcountry to the region along the coast. As early as 1750, stock raising had developed in the back country of the southern colonies. . . . This industry developed to a point where herds of cattle were driven to Baltimore for market from distant points in the Carolinas. . . . Roads and bridges, however, were poor and few in number so that there was comparatively little intercourse between frontier and coast. This isolation of the population is important, for it accentuated differences in political, social, and economic ideals between the two regions.

The general attitude of the frontier population towards life in all of its aspects was democratic. The frontiersman however wished to apply democratic ideas directly to his own needs in a way that made the coast population and their representatives in the colonial assemblies fearful of the results. It is true that the democratic idea made progress in the assemblies, in their struggles both against the royal governors and against English political economic and commercial policy. . . . Paradoxical as it seems, the colonial assemblies often turned a deaf ear to frontier petitions and demands calling for equality of representation, equitable taxation, equal benefits from taxes paid, local self-government based on choice of officers by the people, fair administration of justice, churches and schools, and religious toleration and liberty. Such an application was anything but pleasing to most of the assemblies, which represented chiefly the more important property owners along the seaboard. For the most part they refused to pass legislation which would make possible such reforms. Here was the basis for internal sectionalism . . . West against East. [*ibid.*, pp. 347-8]

Fortunately for what would soon become the United States of America, the frontiersmen disliked England's political and economic policies just as much as the tidewater colonials did. When the American Revolution broke out, the Piedmont was willing to ally itself with the Tidewater – at least for the duration of the war [*ibid.*, pp. 351-2]. As an Arab proverb says, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" – for now; later is another matter altogether.

It is evident from the structure of Piedmont Society that the institution of education had no other viable option than home schooling and home apprenticeship. There were no major towns and life itself on the frontier was hard and dangerous. Schooling, other than for religious reasons and for the practical necessity of teaching their children skills they would need as adults, had to be and was a low priority with the Piedmont settlers.

§ 6. Functional Doctrine in Critique of Colonial Instructional Education

There are two dimensions pertinent to the objectives a Community has in instituting a system of instructional education under civil association in a social contract. One is the dimension of the learner-as-a-free-person; the other is the learner-as-a-member-of-the-Community. The former is pertinent to the individual's own *Personfähigkeit*, which is an originating ground for his interest in educational Self-development. The other is pertinent to the Community's common interest in its corporate *Personfähigkeit*. The colonial Societies each differed greatly in how their institutions satisfied the objectives in these two dimension, and so they I analyze them separately.

The first thing that must be done is to establish the standard of the Critique. The colonies were not yet a single united Society in 1763 nor did the colonials associate in one civil Community. Colonial Society overall was granulated into a great many mini-Communities and mini-Societies in a wide scope of population ranges extending from family and clan to confederated hamlets, districts, towns, and, of course, the colonies themselves. There was no United States of America yet because the colonies were not yet nationally united or even confederated with one another.

However, it is the United States that is the context-setting Object for this Critique of the institution of instructional education, and its ultimate objective is the *public* function of this institution within the context of a United States comprised as *one* civil Community. Whether or not the United States actually exists in this form, now or at any point in its history, is a question best put off until after the whole Critique has been carried out. In 1763 forming a United States of America was not yet a recognized objective in any colony.

To Critique an institution of instructional education is to Critique that institution in relationship to the functions of public instructional education that were deduced in volume 1, *Education and Society*. Critique *in detail* must necessarily refer back to the specifics of these functions as these were set out in chapters 6 through 9 of volume 1 [Wells (2012)]. From those details two templates for evaluating the institution can be set out – one for the personal division of instruction and the other for the social division of instruction.

Figure 4.3 is the evaluation template for the personal division of instruction. The template lays out the specific instructional functions with brief statements of their outcomes for this dimension.




Figure 4.3: template for evaluating public instructional education in the personal division of instruction.




Figure 4.4: template for evaluating public instructional education in the social division of instruction.

Figure 4.4 is the evaluation template for the social division of instruction. In both dimensions, if a function's implementation is satisfactory for the maintenance of Order in the Society then that function *minimally* accomplishes its outcome. If it fully or nearly fully satisfies its outcome then the function's institution is satisfactory for Progress in the Society. An unsatisfactory institution of a function is one failing to suffice for meeting the Order requirement of the Community.

Evaluation of how well these functions were provided is made relative to social governance of the colonies-as-wholes within their specific regions (Northern, Middle, Southern) in terms of the *practical* role education played as an *institution of governance* in a civil Community. It is important to understand that "governance" and "government" are two terms that, although close to each other in meaning, are *not* synonymous. **Government** is the system of institutions formed by members of a Society for the purpose of realizing Order and Progress through the dynamics of governance. **Governance** is the mutually co-determined Self-regulation of individuals' action expressions during civic interactions. The latter is the form of a leadership dynamic exhibited in the Society due to these Self-regulated interactions. Thus, for example, the moral customs of a Society are *always* part of its governance but are not necessarily functionalized in its government. Public education is always a part of the institution of governance in a body politic but has rarely been made a part of its government in the great majority of all historical cases. In the United States the institution of education has never been made a formal part of government and has rarely been understood to be the real part of the institution of governance that it always is.

I do not doubt that the idea of education-as-part-of-civil-governance is unfamiliar enough that many people will not immediately embrace it. It is not, however, a *new* idea. More than a century and a half ago, Mill pointed out the inherent *real* indivisibility of education and government:

We have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division of the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its actions upon men and by its action upon things; by what it makes of the

citizens and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them and by means of them. Government is at once a great influence acting on the human mind and a set of organized arrangements for public business . . .

The difference between these two functions of a government is not, like that between Order and Progress, a difference merely in degree but in kind. We must not, however, suppose that they have no intimate connection with one another. The institutions which assure the best management of public affairs practicable in the existing state of cultivation tend by this alone to the further improvement of that state. . . . Nor is there any mode in which political institutions can contribute more effectually to the improvement of the people than by doing their more direct work well. And, reversely, if their machinery is so badly constructed that they do their own particular business ill, the effect is felt in a thousand ways in lowering the morality and deadening the intelligence and activity of the people. But the distinction is nevertheless real, because this is only one of the means by which political institutions improve or deteriorate the human mind . . .

Of the two modes of operation by which a form of government or set of political institutions affects the welfare of the community – its operations as an agency of national education and its arrangements for conducting the collective affairs of the community in the state of education in which they already are – the last evidently varies much less, from difference of country and state of civilization, than the first. It also has much less to do with the fundamental constitution of government. . . . It is otherwise with that portion of the interests of the community which relate to the better or worse training of the people themselves. [Mill (1861), pp. 20-22]

Furthermore, education-as-part-of-governance had been recognized in the United States seventy years before Mill wrote this by a handful of America's revolutionary leaders. This group included Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, James Madison, Benjamin Rush, Noah Webster, John Dickinson, and many other less-remembered, once-prominent individuals. Their views on this will be examined in chapter 6.

Although no colonial government seems to have known it, the diverse colonial governments themselves were significant factors in the determination of the ratings of public institutions of education. Actions taken by agents of government *always* provoke educational self-development actions by some of the people in a Society, and over time provoke such activities in *every* person in a Society. By *what* the agents of government do, *how* they do it, and *who* benefits or suffers disbenefit by their actions, they unintentionally *teach* individuals lessons about the Community's social contract and the faithfulness by which their Society is adhering to its terms and conditions. From these lessons people make judgments of allegiance or non-allegiance to that Society. It is an unfortunate fact of history that most agents of government, from the lowliest clerk to the highest executive, legislator, or judge, never realize that when they act to work the machinery of government they are acting as educators of the governed people.

So it is that the forms of government set up in the colonies is also pertinent to evaluation of the institution of education in colonial America. In the northern group the form of government was primary local democracy with a limited degree of federal republic. In the middle group (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and later Delaware) primarily-republican governments were established, although these forms varied in detail from colony to colony. In the southern group (MD, VA, NC, SC, GA) the government form was an English-style oligarchy with a royal governor at the top and a hierarchy of appointed assemblies, courts, etc. beneath him. These forms of governments, and the usual actions of their agents, all made fundamental contributions to practical public education in every colony – and in almost every case these educating actions were unintended by the government agents. Only in New England do we find evidence of agents of colonial government intentionally acting with conscious educational purpose.




Figure 4.5: Ratings of the public educational functions in the three colonial regions in 1763 for the personal dimension of learner-as-a-free-person. "Insufficient" means inadequate for the maintenance of stable social Order in civil Community within the colonial region.

§ 7. Critique of the Institutions in the Personal Dimension

Figure 4.5 presents the evaluation results for the implementations of the basic functions of public education in the personal dimension of instruction for the three colonial regions as this had developed by 1763. In no region were the functions of public education in the personal dimension implemented with sufficient social competency to produce a Society attuned to Progress. It is important to note here that the ratings pertain to the regions as a whole in terms of the general body politic of that region. They do not pertain to individual social classes/castes within those regions. What this means is that lack of sufficiency for overall social Progress does not imply a complete absence of progressive education in the colonies. In point of fact, educational functions adequate for satisfaction of social Progress *were* provided to a few people in every region. These were those people whose families' general level of economic prosperity made it possible for the individual to obtain higher levels of education, either by means of college or overseas in English schools. It also pertains to a small number of enterprising individuals – here Benjamin Franklin is the outstanding example – who through their own private efforts succeeded in providing themselves with a personal education sufficient for Progress.

But the number of these individuals added up to only a tiny fraction of the overall colonial population. It is not an accident that the best known Patriot leaders came out of the ranks of lawyers, clergy, publicists, and aristocrats in the colonies. These men were individuals who had by accident of personal circumstance acquired a sufficiently good education – either formally or practically – to participate in that great 18th century intellectual and political movement known as the European Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was a great social revolution that swept Europe from the Atlantic to St. Petersburg and helped prepare the ground for the great political

revolutions at the close of the eighteenth century. In regard to Europe, Durant wrote,

The growth of knowledge was impeded by inertia, superstition, persecution, censorship, and ecclesiastical control of education. These obstacles were weaker than before, but they were still far stronger than in an industrial civilization where the competition of individuals, groups, and nations compels men to search for new ideas and ways, new means for old ends. Most men in the eighteenth century moved in a slowly changing milieu where traditional responses and ideas usually sufficed for the needs of life. When novel situations and events did not readily lend themselves to natural explanations, the common mind ascribed them to supernatural causes and rested.

A thousand superstitions survived side by side with the rising enlightenment. Highborn ladies trembled at unfavorable horoscopes . . . Thousands of people wore amulets or talismans to avert evils. . . . Most peasants were sure they heard elves or fairies in the woods. The belief in ghosts was declining but the learned Benedictine Dom Augustin Calmet wrote a history of vampires . . . The worst superstition of all, the belief in witchcraft, disappeared in this century except for some local vestiges . . .

Meanwhile persecution of dissent by Church and state, by Catholics and Protestants, exerted its terrors to keep from the public mind any ideas that might disturb vested beliefs and powers. . . . Many Protestant states agreed with the Catholics on the necessity of persecution. In Denmark and Sweden the laws demanded adherence to the Lutheran faith . . . In Switzerland each canton was free to choose its own faith and enforce it. In Germany the rule that the people must follow the religion of the prince was increasingly ignored. In the United Provinces Protestant ecclesiastics rejected toleration as an invitation to religious indifference, but the laity refused to follow the clergy in this matter and relative freedom from persecution made Holland a refuge for unorthodox ideas and publications. In England the laws allowed religious dissent but they harassed Dissenters with social and political disabilities. . . .

Censorship of speech and press was generally more relaxed in Protestant than in Catholic countries . . . In France censorship had broadened from precedent to precedent since Francis I and was renewed by an edict in 1723 . . . Meanwhile the *philosophes* contrived a variety of ways to elude the censorship. They sent their manuscripts to foreign publishers, usually to Amsterdam, The Hague, or Geneva; thence their books, in French, were imported wholesale into France; almost every day forbidden books arrived . . .

Only second to the censorship as an obstacle to free thought was the control of education by the clergy. . . . It is significant that neither Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Maupertuis, Helvétius, nor Buffon attended a university. The French mind, struggling to free itself from theological leading strings, flowered not in universities but in academies and salons.

Learned academies had sprung up in this century in Berlin (1701), Uppsala (1710), St. Petersburg (1724), and Copenhagen (1743). [Durant goes on to name the founders of what became the Swedish Royal Academy and fourteen major cities in France where academies were set up]. The academies steered clear of heresy, but they encouraged science and experiment, and they tolerated and stimulated discussion . . . Learned journals added to the intellectual stimulation. . . . Typical of the eighteenth century . . . was a spreading eagerness for knowledge – precisely that intellectual lust which the Middle Ages had condemned as a sin of foolish pride. Authors responded with a zeal to make knowledge more widely available and intelligible. . . . Finally, encyclopedias took form to gather, order, and transmit the new stores of knowledge to all who could read and think. . . .

By 1789 the middle classes in Western Europe were as well informed as the aristocracy and the clergy. Print had made its way. That, after all, was the basic revolution. [Durant (1965), pp. 493-500]

In today's America fruits of the Enlightenment are taken for granted. That is how we lost them.

The colonies as a whole did not yet have them, although a few well- and mostly self-educated men and women did. I return to this latter point in chapter six. But for the typical colonist the institution of education was threadbare and, while usually satisficing for immediately local affairs, did not provide the foundational grounds in personal educational Self-development that are necessary for the possibility of the education of *a citizen* capable of fulfilling his role in the maintenance of Order and the achievement of Progress in his colony. *Public* institution of instructional education must first serve *private* benefit for the learner's *Personfähigkeit* because without this that special and cherished Society of small outlaws known as children will never grow up to commit themselves to Obligations and Duties to the greater Community. The majority will remain outlaws and not make themselves become citizens⁸. All tenets of mutual Obligations and civic Duties are grounded in private Duties-to-Self. To get the former from education, the latter must be served. In no colony was the institution adequate for this task.

§ 7.1 Evaluation of the Corporal Education Institution

Education in general is the acquisition, development or perfection of knowledge, skill, mental capability, practical character, or aesthetical taste by an individual. Instructional education is education by means of the transmitting of knowledge, etc. to a pupil or student from a teacher. The division of corporal education is instructional education as this pertains to the physical power of the person, i.e., the *homo phaenomenal* capacity of a human being to acquire experience and make semantic representations. In-depth comprehension of the functions of corporal education requires an understanding of the metaphysical development of this division from *Education and Society* [Wells (2012), chap. 6]. Specific to corporal education is the concept of *scheme building*, i.e., instruction in which the learner exercises his sensorimotor schemes as an integral part of acquiring new knowledge. The principle of corporal education is: *learning by doing is necessary for the possibility of learning in general*.

A scheme is a mental representation of an action that can be generalized and repeated. The basis of a learned scheme is a developed concept of a procedural schema, represented in the person's manifold of concepts, by which his perceptions evoke an habituated sequence of action expressions. Corporal education deals with developing habitual behaviors. The Critique of the education institution examines how and what sort of habits the learner develops. The first corporal function in the personal dimension of the learner (craftsmanship laboratory) deals with establishing skills in solving problems involving inanimate objects and tasks. Basic schooling in reading literacy, where this was actual in the colonies, provides an example of the craftsmanship function in the teaching of the alphabet to small children by, e.g., such means as reciting the A, B, Cs. More generally, sensorimotor skill versatility was taught and habituated by apprenticeship schooling in the colonies. The apprentice acquired experience and skill by manually practicing the divers tasks involved in his art under the guidance of his master. Apprenticeship was the primary form of instructional education used throughout the northern and middle colonies, and the outcome of this schooling was generally sufficient in providing educational Self-development experiences by which the learner became able to make a living and fulfill his or her economic role in the society of a family. Thus the N and M groups both demonstrate a level of sufficiency adequate for the satisfaction of Order in the Community. In the southern colonies, on the other hand, a large fraction of the population were used as unskilled plantation or farm laborers, proper apprenticeships were less available than in the N and M groups, and so this education function was not adequate for sustainable Order. Scott wrote,

⁸ No person can be *made* a citizen by another person; he can only be seduced into *making himself* one. To merely "grant citizenship" to a person – as the fourteenth Amendment does – is to grant a legal entitlement to particular privileges *and that is all it does*. A mere *entitlement-citizen* is not a socially-*real* citizen.

Journeymen and apprentices entered completely into the family circle and in the common activity found a bond of union. The reciprocal duties of master and apprentice are set forth in a general way in the indentures . . . These indentures show that the chief duty of the apprentice was to serve his master faithfully, not only in business but in the performance of household tasks or other services; the master was obliged to teach the lad his trade, to house, feed, and clothe him. More than this, he was supposed to give the youth such moral and religious training as a boy of immature years would naturally require. In a word, it was his duty to prepare the boy to be not merely a good craftsman but a good citizen as well. . .

The apprenticeship system . . . offered opportunity to the youth of learning all branches of his trade. The shop was small; master and apprentice often worked side by side at the same bench. The master himself worked all the processes of his handicraft, and therefore it was comparatively easy for him to teach all processes to the lad at his side. It was comparatively easy, too, for the lad to follow all the workings of his master and to imitate them. The number of apprentices being small the master could give each one a large part of his attention. Furthermore, as there were but few apprentices and journeymen, there was but little division of labor, and therefore but little of the modern tendency to keep a boy employed on one or two of the processes to the exclusion of all others. It was to the interest of the master that the apprentice be able to assist him at every process of the craft. To the master, too, accrued all the profits of his apprentice's toil during the latter's term of service, and the more skillful the boy, the greater the gains of his employer. . . . Then, too, since whatever the apprentice earned went to his master, the young man was forced to find his rewards, not in immediate pecuniary gain, which might tempt him to quick, superficial work, but in his employer's praise and the joy of artistic creation. Finally, the fact that he was one day to be a master himself would naturally lead the apprentice to a desire to acquire a knowledge of all processes of the craft, and to a dexterity of hand and artistic skill in construction. In general, then, the interests of master and apprentice were largely identical. Apart from the matter of personal attachment between the two, it was to the economic interest of each that the apprentice should become a skilled, artistic master-craftsman. [Scott (1914), pp. 51-52]

With appropriate minor changes in details, this description applies equally to home apprenticeships and, with appropriate modification for gender roles, to both sexes. Scott's description, which specifically was aimed at medieval apprenticeships, holds true for American apprenticeships in the northern and middle groups. In the south, however, this system existed only on the smaller homestead farms and in the Piedmont. Otherwise the masters had no common interests with their apprentices, were not concerned whether or not the apprentice would grow into a successful and independent adult, and the mutuality of affection and interest of which Scott wrote was frequently not to be found in the southern colonies outside the family. The system there exhibited instead a large degree of serfdom. Hence, the lower rating that is given to the S group.

The second function, art cultivation, pertains to learning methods for doing some particular thing. The primary difference between this function and the first is this: in the first function, the emphasis is upon the accomplishment of the task, in the second on the *means* of accomplishing it. Perfection of means involves a subtle difference, namely that how *not* to accomplish something is as important as how *to* accomplish it. This means that the second function brings in matters of skill in discrimination between practical rules, all of which produce the same end but which differ in the means to that end. Here the homogeneous northern group had a slight cultural advantage over the middle colonies inasmuch as the judgment of acceptable means was more constrained by social convention than in the heterogeneous middle colonies, which operated with a slightly more state-of-nature-like set of conventions that made the task of maintaining Order more challenging. For example, Benjamin Franklin once published in his newspaper an article falsely reporting that one of his competitors had died; however humorous his readers might have found this when the truth came to light, such a tactic is hardly congenial to social Order and it would have been rather

scandalous in stiff-collar New England. Thus, although the N and M groups are closer in ranking than the "crisp" classification in figure 4.5 suggests, the northern group does score higher in terms of Order than the middle group. In contrast, the southern group and its more state-of-nature environment of uncivic free enterprise, with an accompanying more pronounced tendency to see the ends as justifying the means, ranks below the middle colonies, even though both receive a "1" rating (because the function was not altogether absent in the southern group). Convention cultivation was more strict in the northern group and progressively less strict as one travels south.

The third function, corporal civic values, imparts lessons going beyond maxims of prudence and pragmatic maxims (at which the first two functions are primarily aimed). Maintenance of Order and achievement of Progress both require more than just prudence and pragmatism. They also require the development of habitual maxims congruent with the general moral customs of the Community. The third function deals with exercises that guide the learner's self-development of value maxims. Here the northern and middle groups were very much alike because the teaching of value maxim development occurs almost automatically in a closely knit master-apprentice relationship (see quote from Scott above). Those value maxims pertinent to social Order are maxims that begin to develop the learner's base set of practical rules (in his manifold of rules) that are productive of rules of reciprocal Obligation. Inasmuch as these lessons were not designed lessons (other than to the minor degree that morality lessons of a sort did appear in primers and catechisms in elementary school settings and home schooling), it cannot be said that instructional education in either group was sufficient for maintenance of social Order. In the southern group, where the incidence of illiteracy was higher and instructional education emphasized prudence and pragmatism because of the greater level of antibonding granulation in southern Society, it cannot be said that this function was exhibited at all. Indeed, it was in the personal interests of the south's oligarchy of rulers that the subjugated population-at-large *be* divided and expend its energies in quarrels with each other. "Divide and rule" was an old maxim in England applied by the British in all their colonies. It was even codified as a policy in India.

§ 7.2 Evaluation of the Intellect Education Institution

Intellectual power is the power of a person subsisting in his *capacities* of knowledge, intelligence, and judgment [Wells (2012), chap. 7]. It does not pertain to what a person knows in terms of specific objects-of-knowledge but, rather, *what the person can do with what he knows*. Intellect education is education in how to use knowledge, not education for knowledge-of-objects (which is what tangible education deals with). The concept specific to intellect education is the concept of intelligence-building, and its principle in the personal dimension is adaptation of one's knowledge to suit one's personal situation, i.e., *new uses for old knowledge*.

If we look for evidence of lessons of this sort in the American institutions of instructional education, we do not find it. Neither rote learning in colonial schools nor craft instruction in apprenticeship deal with adaptability. Rather, both are instruction presuming the maintenance of a *status quo* – which is not the same thing as the maintenance of social Order. *Status quo* only coincides with maintenance of social Order in cases of arrested Societies (such as found in the case of the BaMbuti Pygmies). In colonial America the environment precluded the possibility of establishing an arrested Society. Therefore neither the schools nor apprenticeship provided the sorts of lessons required for intelligence-building in any of the three specific functions of instructional education. All three groups therefore receive a zero rating for all three functions. This lack had a profound effect on the later course of American social development when the Industrial Revolution came to America's shores. It guaranteed that solutions to the challenges brought by this great social change would develop *ad hoc* as non-robust satisficing methods.

In regard to this, Mill set out a precept that is of the greatest pertinence to governance in all

Societies of every type. It has to do with a metaphysical presupposition one encounters in almost every organization and Society. I call this presupposition **the fallacy of self-maintaining status quo**. Mill wrote,

What is suggested by the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as much the prevention of falling back. The very same social causes – the same beliefs, feelings, intuitions, and practices – are as much required to prevent society from retrograding as to produce a further advance. Were there no improvements to be hoped for, life would not be the less an unceasing struggle against the causes of deterioration, as it is even now. . . . The natural tendency of men and their works was to degenerate, which tendency, however, by good institutions virtuously administered, it might be possible for an indefinite length of time to counteract. Though we no longer hold this opinion; though most men in the present age profess the contrary creed, believing that the tendency of things, on the whole, is towards improvement⁹; we ought not to forget that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind; which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions of some persons constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the importance of the strivings which take place to improve and elevate human nature and life to suppose that their chief value consists in the amount of actual improvement realized by their means, and that the consequence of their cessation would merely be that we should remain as we are. A very small diminution of those exertions would not only put a stop to improvement, but would turn the general tendency of things towards deterioration; which, once begun, would proceed with increasing rapidity, and become more and more difficult to check, until it reached a state often seen in history, and in which many large portions of mankind even now grovel; when hardly anything short of superhuman power seems sufficient to turn the tide, and give a fresh commencement to the upward movement. [Mill (1861), pp. 16-17]

The fallacy of the *status quo*, and the cessation of exertions Mill speaks of, is something I have observed first-hand over my lifetime and in every sort of social organization with which I have personal and direct experience. The fallacy arises from a satisficing judgment of taste that calls upon type- α compensation behavior (ignorance) and is mirrored in an often heard remark, "Well, that's that!" expressing satisfaction in some achievement presumed to be "done once and for all."

Adaptation involves, minimally, the construction of maxims for type- β compensation and, at the higher levels, comprehended maxims of type- γ compensation – which adapts knowledge use for recognition of general principles and comprehension of overarching practical principles. This *faculty* is essential for counteracting the natural trend towards deterioration of which Mill spoke. It is arguably the most important outcome of intellect education, and the colonists did not provide themselves with this it. The consequence is a Society that finds events driving it rather than its social aims driving events. The resulting circumstance is one of the principal causes of the fall of Societies. It is worthwhile to note that, despite the surface appearance of a lack of any sort of education institution in their Society, the BaMbuti Pygmies in fact *integrate* functions of intellect education into the very fabric of their social customs. This is how they are able to maintain the arrested *status quo* of their Society (so long as they are able to isolate themselves from outside Societies whenever they wish by retreating into the deep forest).

The concept specific to intellect education is intelligence-building, i.e., the constructing of mental schemes for how to effectively adapt knowledge to uses. Rote learning and dogma cannot provide this and, indeed, dogma is antithetical to it. Mimesis and dogma are handmaidens. The absence of lessons conducive to intelligence-building results in a stunting of judgment that in the

⁹ This was a popular presumption of 19th century liberalism that the horrors of World War I shattered.

realm of objects is called naive empirical realism and in the realm of moral judgments is called moral realism. All human beings begin life as naive realists and it is only by means of acts of educational Self-development that any of us make ourselves capable of developing past this. Socialization – learning through intercourse with peers – is found to be necessary for the child to progress through the stages of development in moral judgment [Piaget (1932)] illustrated in figure 4.6 and get beyond naive moral realism. Most people accomplish this for themselves up to *a degree* in childhood without instructional education, but further progress in adult life tends to require instructional persuasion education [Wells (2012), chap. 9].

Intelligence-building counteracts the naive egocentrism characteristic of infants and young children and it appears to require instructional education to grow beyond it unless the person has some extraordinary experience with situations so disturbing that one can call them traumatic. Otherwise the person in most cases will not grow beyond the intellectual capacity limits of simple empirical realism and egocentric reasoning bound to subjective judgments of taste. From Piaget we learn,

Logical activity is not the whole of intelligence. One can be intelligent without being particularly logical. The main functions of intelligence, that of inventing solutions, and that of verifying them, do not necessarily involve one another: the first partakes of imagination, the second alone is properly logical. Demonstration, research for truth, is therefore the true function of logic.

But on what occasions do we experience the need to verify our thought? This need does not arise spontaneously in us. On the contrary, it appears very late and for two reasons. The first is that thought puts itself at the service of the immediate satisfaction of desire long before forcing itself to seek for truth. Thought's most spontaneous manifestation is play, or at any rate that quasi-hallucinatory form of imagination which allows us to regard desires as realized as soon as they are born. All writers who have concerned themselves with the play, the testimony, and the lies of children have realized this. . . .

But this is not all. Even when thought turns away from immediate satisfaction and play, and gives itself up to disinterested curiosity in things for their own sakes (and this curiosity




Figure 4.6: stages of development of moral judgment.

appears very soon, certainly from the age of 3) the individual still has the peculiar capacity for immediate belief in his own ideas. It is, therefore, not for ourselves that we try to verify our statements. One of the most striking things one finds about the child under 7-8 is his extreme assurance on all subjects. . . . "I know!" . . . is the only proof that is used for a long time in childish logic. True, the child is always asking questions, but up to the age 7-8 a large number of the questions asked are rhetorical: the child knows his own answer, and often gives it spontaneously without waiting for the other person to speak. . . .

It must be remembered, moreover, that experience itself does not undeceive minds oriented in this fashion. Things are wrong, not they. The savage who calls down rain by a magic rite explains his failure as the work of an evil spirit. He is, according to the famous saying, 'impervious to experience.' . . . This applies even more strongly to the child whose every material want is anticipated by his parents' care. Only in his manual games does the child learn to understand the resistance of objects. . . .

What then gives rise to the need for verification? Surely it must be the shock of our thought coming into contact with that of others, which produces doubt and the desire to improve. . . . We are constantly hatching an enormous number of false ideas, conceits, Utopias, mystical explanations, suspicions, and megalomaniacal fantasies which disappear when brought into contact with other people. The social need to share the thought of others and to communicate our own with success is at the root of our need for verification. Proof is the outcome of argument. All this, moreover, is common knowledge for contemporary psychology. . . . Logical reasoning is an argument which we have with ourselves and which reproduces internally the features of a real argument. . . . Discursive talk and reasoning are the product of intercourse between individuals. When a man cannot fit his personal thoughts and emotions into this scheme, when he ceases to think socially, the mere fact of this isolation destroys the logical structure of his thought. Psychoanalysis arrives at a very similar result from a completely different angle, and it is to the lasting credit of this science that it has discovered two ways of thinking, one social, communicable, guided by the need for adapting oneself to others, 'logical thought,' the other personal, incommunicable as such, 'autistic thought.' Now Freud and his disciples have shown that by the mere fact of its 'autism,' this second way of thinking was bound to be confused, undirected, indifferent to truth, rich in visual and symbolic schemas, and, above all, unconscious of itself and of the affective factors by which it was guided. [Piaget (1928), pp. 201-5]

Mental physics confirms this empirical conclusion and explains it on the basis of the synthesis of judgmentation and the motivational dynamic. Rote learning – characteristic of colonial schools and apprenticeship training both – and dogma – characteristic of religious instruction – each work to produce a stunted mental growth that leaves the individual at the stage of empirical realism. In a highly homogeneous Society habituated by tradition into particular and narrow moral customs, there is much less occasion for social intercourse to produce the tensions that provoke discourse and logical reasoning, both of which are energetics for intelligence-building. A highly homogeneous Society is one which is more emotional, more easily swayed by propaganda, and less inclined to diplomatic intercourse. It is not really an accident that Massachusetts in particular and New England in general were the principal agitators of the American Revolution, or that at times their positions were so extremist that even the other colonies regarded them as such. After all, how logical do you suppose it is for a tiny agrarian nation to think it can take on what was at the time the world's mightiest superpower and win? Colonial America was Great Britain's Vietnam.

§ 7.3 Evaluation of the Tangible Education Institution

Tangible *Personfähigkeit* subsists in the person's stock of goods. In many ways the phrase "commercial power of the person" conveys more accurately the actions of a person that derive from his tangible *Personfähigkeit* because this power-of-the-person is the most common means by which he gains his liberties of interaction (*commercium*) with other people. The power is

tangible only in the context that tangible *Personfähigkeit* refers to a person's ability to "touch" the lives of other people in the course of living his own.

Tangible education pertains to education of means of acquiring and using tangible power. The personal dimension of tangible education pertains to the individual's assessments of his own state of Welfare and tranquility in regard to his individual pursuit of happiness. The social dimension pertains to the state of Welfare of his Community as a whole, i.e., *commonwealth*. Tangible and persuasion education both pertain to the mathematical manifolds where the individual and the Society meet and fuse or meet and collide. Tangible education is the division of instructional education where the lessons can most immediately attract and hold the learner's attention and interest *in concreto*. The concept specific to tangible education is nothing other than the Community's social contract and its principle is education for fulfillment of Duties-to-Self within the capacity of the person to act as a citizen of his Community.

The categorical function of tangible education in the personal dimension is called the lessons-of-vocation. Contemporary usage of the word "vocation" has long been habitually over-narrowed to mean simply "what one does for a living." This is the general, and misleading, connotation that is found when education theorists speak of so-called "vocational education." It is true enough that "voc-ed" deals with practical and theoretical skills specific to some particular trade or occupation. However, this overly-restrictive usage leaves out of the picture a factor much more fundamental, namely educational Self-development of concepts pertaining to Duty and Obligation. In contexts of human nature, the older meaning of the word "vocational" is the more important: vocation as one's self-wrought and affective judgment of a "calling" in his or her life. Let us remember that the root of English word "vocation" derives from the Latin verb *vocare*, "to call."

In the course of my years as a manager, one of my assigned tasks required me to regularly review and evaluate the job performance of each person placed subordinate to me in the company management and control structure. I had the benefit of "growing up" as a manager while working in a corporate environment where one of the most important management policies dictated that if an employee was underperforming or failing to satisfy the requirements of his job, then it was the responsibility of the manager to work with that person, with the advice and consent and under the "watchdog eye" of the personnel department, to attempt to develop him into a better performer. Only after that attempt had been made and had failed to achieve this result (which was umpired by the personnel rep, not the manager) could a manager then turn to the last resort of terminating the individual's employment¹⁰. Usually an employee development action worked.

But we don't teach people how to do this in college, and so in order to do my job I had to learn how to do this on-the-job. One important discovery I made in the course of experience in evaluating employee performance was this: Those people who were consistently top performers in their jobs were also the people who were doing that job because they loved doing that kind of work. I never met one single person who ever became a consistently higher performer because of a raise in salary. Eventually I came to the conclusion that if a person wanted some particular job just because of the money or status that went with it, then he was the wrong person for that job.

¹⁰ There were a very few – about ten – exceptions to this policy. All involved actions such as theft, violence in the workplace, sabotage, industrial espionage, blatant insubordination, etc. – basically, antisocial actions. These were known informally among managers as "the ways to crash land" and were by policy grounds for immediate termination of employment. These were very, very rare events in our company. There were a few more ways to crash land applying to managers: bribery of suppliers, customers, government officials; retaliation against employees who raised legitimate grievances or voiced strong work-related opinions; sexual harassment; violation of labor laws; discrimination in hiring or employment practices; falsification of financial or other data; etc. These were also very, very rare "zero-tolerance" events. For the jaundiced few who might be wondering, during my time there our company grew to make, first, the Fortune 500 and then the Fortune 100 lists of U.S. companies, and we became one of the thirty Dow Jones Industrials.

People like these top performers I met over the years are people said to "have a vocation" for their line of work. I see the same thing in consistently top-performing students (who I now study because I developed a sharp scholarly interest in causes of the phenomena of general individual enterprise performance). Show me a prodigy and I'll show you a young person with a calling – which he or she usually can't explain. Show me a chronically poor-performing engineering student and I'll show you a young person who chose to major in engineering because his parents pushed him into it or someone convinced him he should become an engineer "because they make good money" or "because it's a stepping stone to a rewarding management career," or etc. The same, with appropriate variation, applies to other major study areas. I tell you straight out: I've never met a "dumb" college student; I have met a lot of naïve, misguided, or misinformed ones.

In no colony was the institution of lessons for vocational education beneficial to a cultivation of vocational tastes for any but a small segment of the population. The curriculum of the dame, Latin grammar, or 3R schools was irrelevant for this function. To a restricted degree some of the private school curricula provided a limited amount of technical education for those who might be interested in those subjects, but in no school was any part of the curriculum designed to help the learner explore what his vocational tastes might be or to develop any such tastes as he might have developed for himself. The biggest deficiency, however, was the social and financial restrictions laid upon the apprenticeship system. In all regions there was social pressure for the individual to "know his station" and, while it was not forbidden for an ambitious young person to try to "rise above his station," the cost of securing an apprenticeship that would help him to do so was often out of reach of the young person's family. Benjamin Franklin, for instance, indicated that he would prefer to be apprenticed to a silversmith but the family could not afford this and he was apprenticed as a printer instead. Home apprenticeships offered no cultivation of vocation at all. The only apprenticeship a homestead farmer could offer to his son was as a farmer, and similarly for most craft tradesmen in the towns. The institution simply did not provide the function for cultivation of vocational tastes. Hence all three regions receive a zero rating for this function.

Skills of civil liberty in all regions was provided solely through the apprenticeship system. This system did provide education in skills important for the learner's personal Welfare success in later life (except, of course, in the case of slaves, for whom apprenticeship was unavailable). The benefit to individual self-respect was limited, however, by the social pressure on the individual to "respect his station in life." This conduces to social Order but contributes nothing to Progress. In the South, even apprenticeship was not beneficial to self-respect. The only institution of it that existed at all was provided by home apprenticeship and, as time passed and it was made more difficult for the young person to obtain grants to good farmland, economic pressure forced more people to emigrate to the frontier – an action that produced granulated mini-Communities rather than preserved Order within the original Community. The large fraction of southerners who were held as slaves had no opportunities or avenues in regard to skills of civil liberty, and the misuse of the apprenticeship system around the plantations, by employing apprentices in unskilled labor, deprived the white apprentice of it as well. The northern and middle groups can be given a rating of two for this function, but the southern region can be rated no higher than a one.

Practices for developing interpersonal skills – the basis for learning cooperation in skill enterprises – existed only through commerce and bartering. In the northern and middle groups an apprentice would gain some experience in cooperative interpersonal skills but the system of uncivic free enterprise from which all these experiences were sourced could provide only lessons of prudence in regard to buyer-seller relationships and conduced to competition rather than cooperation between individual enterprises. Adam Smith bluntly described the uncivic character of economics when it is ungoverned by principles of social contract:

In civilized society [every person] stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship

of a few persons. . . . [Man] has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. [Smith (1776), pg. 13]

What Smith says here is no more and no less than a direct consequence of the mental physics of being-a-human-being and is a fact that cannot be ignored by institutions of a Society. In the case of buyer-seller interactions, the self-interests involved are clear to the transacting individuals. In the case of competitors, however, their immediate self-interests are in conflict because if seller A concludes a successful transaction with buyer B then *ipso facto* competing seller C does not.

However, free enterprise – whether civic or uncivic – relies upon the *Existenz* of Order in the Society. In a pure state-of-nature, if you and I both want the same object and only one of us can have it, our self-interests are common only inasmuch as both our self-interests lie in eliminating the competition for the desired object. The simplest and most prudent means for me to do this is to kill you then take the object. If both of us live in a social environment where we both have religious maxims common to the extent that we both have made it an Obligation-to-Self to obey the sixth commandment ("you shall not murder"), this option isn't open to either of us. But there is no commandment requiring either of us to care whether any other tactic (short of stealing from each other) leaves the other to starve. (It is mere metaphor to talk of "stealing" the customer of a competitor). There is no economic religious commandment, "you shall not kill your competitor's enterprise." A prudent entrepreneur operating in an environment of uncivic free enterprise has an interest of self-love in obtaining and keeping a monopoly – which effectively amounts to killing all other competing enterprises. Action aiming at this purpose always produces an uncivic form of competition; if successful, it produces uncivic barter leading to breakdown of Order in Society.

However, in a civil Community – whether operating under civic or uncivic free enterprise – every member of that Community has what Mill called a "remote" self-interest, namely the preservation of the communal alliance, because without the Community the individual is thrown back utterly upon his own resources in a state-of-nature. Lessons of cooperation of skill enterprise are lessons that bring out more remote social interests of this sort and define what is "civic" in civic cooperation. Remote self-interests of this type are rarely or never self evident in normal socio-commercial intercourse. Apprenticeship education in the northern and middle regions did not adequately provide these lessons; to the limited extent that educational Self-development experience was provided at all, these could come from nowhere but divers religious institutions with the various mini-Communities. This was not sufficient to institute respect for social Order and so both these regions can be scored no higher than a '1' for this function. In the southern region, with its geographically dispersed and semi-isolated population, even religious institution did not concern itself with this function of tangible education, and the region must therefore be scored with a zero rating.

§ 7.4 Evaluation of the Persuasion Education Institution

Persuasive power of the person subsists in his ability to sufficiently communicate his thoughts and ideas to other persons and thereby gain their consent, agreement or cooperation. Human beings all undertake persuasive actions for the same general underlying reason in human nature,

and this is nothing other than striving to achieve a state of personal equilibrium. The process of practical Reason in *H. sapiens* seeks psychological equilibrium *and nothing else whatsoever*, and a person will do whatever he judges necessary to achieve it. Persistent failure to re-equilibrate one's state in the presence of disturbance factors has the most severe pathological consequences for a human being. It is for this reason that the specifying concept of persuasion education is the concept of **equilibrium pursuit**: *the learner pursues equilibration to the full extent that his liberty of action is unconstrained by his practical manifold of rules until he achieves empirical consciousness of a satisfaction in a state of equilibrium.*

As Piaget remarked [Piaget (1932)], morality is the logic of action, just as logic is the morality of thinking. Theories of morality are called ethics, covering both personal and social *Moralität*. Ethical precepts are developed from experience and in order for a system of ethics common to all members of a Community to be possible, the ethical system must be a deontological system. The divers and conflicting mini-systems of ethics in the colonies were products of divers ontological ethics theories, which can be broadly grouped into systems of primarily virtue ethics and systems where consequentialist ethics were primary. In the former, "the means justify the ends"; in the latter, "the ends justify the means." In neither case can a commonly-agreeable system of Community ethics adequate to serve a social contract be achieved beyond a very small and homogeneous population base. Ontology-centered ethics fails in larger or heterogeneous bodies politic. The principle of persuasion education is learner perfection of deontological ethics, both theoretical and practical, and of precepts of moral leadership dynamics in civic and civil cooperation. Persuasion education is effective practical ethics education.

The human nature of the development of moral judgment and its stage-wise progression (figure 4.6) was vividly illustrated in the observations made by Piaget and his coworkers in Piaget (1932). Piaget's empirical findings did not "get beneath the surface" to uncover the fundamental mental physics at work in this development and were of necessity limited to documenting human behavioral development. To the small degree that Piaget delved into theoretical hypotheses aimed at establishing a scientific theory, a number of his assumptions do not square with the mental physics of human nature. In point of fact, Piaget's speculations amounted to little more than to comparisons among a few of the more prominent sociological and psychological hypotheses of his day with some attempt to blend these into a more coherent whole. What I am saying here is that the importance of this work is in the observations obtained, not the speculations of theory that Piaget's book offers.

Experimental learning is the problematic function of persuasion education, by which I mean it is the function for teaching the learner to develop his faculty for discovering possibilities and options in dealing with whatever situations he may encounter. Learning how to discover new possibilities and develop options that give him a breadth of versatility for his actions is not a skill the individual is born possessing. Piaget has documented the development process young children undergo in learning to discover new options available to them rather than always being self-forced to act according to a pseudonecessity of repeating what the child has experienced before [Piaget (1981)]. He reported that,

the young subject does not begin by considering reality only, constituted by pure observables, and later complete this by constructing possibilities and necessary relations. Rather, the ontological status of the initial state is one of nondifferentiation: reality as perceived or manipulated appears as being necessary as it is so that it represents the only possibility, except for occasional variations that are accepted as realizable because they have already been observed . . . First, the formation of possibilities does not proceed by simple free associations but consists rather in real *openings* requiring a liberation from limitations and obstacles of varying strength. Second, these limitations result from the fact that within this initial nondifferentiation, reality, possibility, and necessity (genuine, not

pseudonecessity) block one another's development . . .

Given these considerations, it is evident that the initial lack of differentiation results essentially from an insufficiency of the subjects' activities concerning possibility and necessity . . . [On] the one hand, the pseudonecessities attributed to all aspects of reality interfere, naturally, with the formation of possibilities; on the other, authentic necessity is based on systems of transformations and involves coordination between possibilities. It can therefore not be acquired in the absence of possibility. Pseudonecessities, of course, do not provide the reasons for a property or an event . . . still they show that the subjects believe that these exist. However, they evaluate them as restrictive only, excluding all possible variation. Thus, reality is conceived of as too impoverished – with respect to possibility – but as over-inclusive with respect to necessity. In this way, each of the modalities is altered as a function of the other two. . . .

In fact, from the sensorimotor level on, one can distinguish four processes: (1) assimilations that function in the immediate present and lead to success; (2) accommodations that are similarly direct; (3) positive (obstacles) and negative disturbances (gaps and limitations) inhibiting (1) and (2) or opposing their realization; and (4) compensations that neutralize (3) and bring about new accommodations that become possible through a differentiation of (2) and that constitute, thus, the beginning of a procedure. . . . [We] have called attention to two elementary processes that lead from one possibility realized to an opening up of the next. One has to do with the mechanism of choice: as soon as subjects understand an accommodation that is getting actualized as resulting from a choice, they realize that the solutions not selected become possibilities or at least point the way in which these can be constituted . . . The other derives from the fact that any accommodation, once obtained in one context, can generate procedural transfers to analogous situations.

The dynamics of possibilities are more complex than these simple, directly observable openings of one possibility toward the next may lead one to suppose. There is also the fundamental fact that all of subjects' prior activities and experiences lead to the formation of new possibilities, not only to those that are immediately realized but also to what we might term a *field of virtualities*. Subjects who have solved certain problems, encountered disturbances, successfully carried out compensations . . . when confronted with situations that are entirely novel to them no longer find themselves in their initial state of 'innocence.' On the contrary, they are well aware that, since they were able to find a suitable heuristic in the past, this will enable them to find new ones for each novel situation. [Piaget (1981), pp. 148-152]

Inflexible, non-adaptable behavioral strategies repeated over and over despite lack of success, especially when the subject's repertoire of behaviors is limited, is one of the clinical symptoms of a psychiatric personality disorder. In view of Piaget's findings showing the learned character of possibilities development, one is bound to wonder at once whether or not some psychiatric cases of personality disorder might in fact be the outcome of damaging educational Self-development learning episodes in the personality-disordered person's past. The point Piaget raises above, that *acquiring a faculty to develop new possibilities and options is a learned capability*, is a finding of such widespread fundamental import that it cannot be ignored. Yet this is something traditional institutions of education have utterly ignored and there are very few organized teaching programs designed to provide the learner with this sort of instruction. Instead people are left to Self-develop whatever capacity for this they can by accident of experience.

In the case of living successfully in a civil Community the importance of this faculty cannot be underrated. To live successfully and well as a member of a Community requires the individual to learn ways and means of satisfying his Duties-to-Self without suffering retaliations by others. This means he must learn how to forge social-chemical bonding relationships and avoid or negate the forging of antibonding relationships. This calls to mind the moral lesson in one of the sayings

of Ali-ibn-Abi-Talib¹¹:

He who has a thousand friends has not a friend to spare,
And he who has one enemy will meet him everywhere. – *A Hundred Sayings*, 7th century A.D.

There is nothing evident in the institutions of schools, apprenticeships, or, least of all, religious instruction in any region of colonial America to indicate lessons aimed at developing the individual's ability to discover new possibilities and options were being presented to learners. All three regions must be given a zero rating for this function. There is no reason to think this rating is any different today.

The dogmatic character of social life in the northern and middle regions actively discouraged the search for novelty of ends and means. A Society tied up by traditions is an arrested Society. The antisocial character of uncivic free enterprise only promotes uncivic ends/means maxims. To a degree, the relatively lesser class divisions in the northern and middle regions did allow for a certain flexibility of initiative for the shopkeeper or homestead farmer to innovate, and mistakes made by apprentices as they were learning their trades would have at times led to experiences that could unveil new means or expose new ends, provided that the master or parent recognized utility in the mistake's outcome and provided positive rather than punitive feedback to the learner. The history of science is rich in examples of important discoveries leading to entirely new technology that were born of discovery-by-error. This, however, suffices for no more than a '1' rating. In the southern region, the exceptionally uncivic character of free enterprise and of class division, and the insistence of its institutions of governance upon the *status quo*, would not promote this and in fact would generally produce the opposite effect. A lower-class person who demonstrated too clearly a penchant for innovation was denounced as "uppity" and became a target of enmity. It is probably not an accident of personality that Eli Whitney, the inventor of the cotton gin, lived in New Haven, Connecticut, and not in the Cotton South. The southern region does not exhibit the ends and means planning function of persuasion education.

As for the civics contracting function (instruction promoting an individual's synthesis of tenets of Duties and Obligations), the homogeneity of New England moral custom tended to moderate expectations for what could be accomplished by competition alone. The influence of the Quakers in the middle region had much the same effect. All *civil* liberty is based upon self-restraint and this is a learned habit. Here probably the divers religious institutions of the northern and middle regions played the most important role in instituting this persuasion education function. On the other hand, the moderation produced was not so great as to hinder outlawism and so was not adequate to achieving social Order. Hence these regions each receive a '1' rating. In the southern region, the uncivic environment that prevailed there actually favored outlawism and so here this persuasion education function must be given a '0' rating.

§ 8. Critique of the Institutions in the Social Dimension

In the social dimension of public instructional education, the Northern colonies score slightly better ratings than in the personal dimension for three out of the four headings. Middle colonies' overall rating holds steady, and the Southern colonies' rating drops slightly. Figure 4.7 gives the ratings outcome for the institution of public instructional education in the social dimension by 1763. Only in the case of corporal instructional education is the rating markedly worse in all three regions than the ratings in the personal dimension. An important factor in this outcome is the form of governance instituted in the northern, middle, and Piedmont regions.

¹¹ Ali-ibn-Abi-Talib (c. 602-661) was Islam's fourth caliph and the son-in-law of Muhammad. In his day he was known as "The Lion of God."




Figure 4.7: Ratings of the public educational functions in the three colonial regions in 1763 for the social dimension of learner-as-member-of-a-Community. "Insufficient" means inadequate for the maintenance of stable social Order in civil Community within the colonial region.

Every institution of government in every agency of government acts from time to time as an institution of public education, whether the designers of that institution would have it this way or not. One fact in common with government institutions at every level of a Society is that they are in some way or another intrusive on the lives of the Community's members to a greater or lesser degree. This is because the social contract requirement for Order in the Community necessarily calls for institutions that act to moderate inclinations of natural liberty and attempt to promote in its place expressions of civil liberty. Agencies of government can no more avoid occasionally delivering provocations of educational Self-development to some portion of the population than a whale can avoid occasionally coming up for air. When I reflect upon this, I tend to feel there is a kind of irony to be found in the fact that the chaotic and free-wheeling governance of a BaMbuti Pygmy group actually scores a higher or equal rating in all twenty-four functions of public education (the BaMbuti score a '2' in every category) than does colonial America's institution of public education. But perhaps the empirical fact that BaMbuti civilization is probably the oldest and most stable Society on earth should warn us to not be surprised at this relative outcome. In view of this, I can hardly avoid asking myself from time to time, "Which of us are the 'civilized' people and which of us are the 'uncivilized' people?"

Jernegan tells us,

To explain satisfactorily the origin and evolution of all phases of education in the American colonies, one must consider many influences, such as physical, racial, economic, political, social, literary, intellectual, and particularly religious factors – all of which tend to perpetuate, modify, or change prevailing practices. The ideals of the teaching force, the methods and textbooks used, and the curriculum as a whole are, to a large extent, the product of ideals and achievements of previous generations. It is clear, then, that to enumerate the factors that influence the progress of education one must take into consideration a great variety of facts and forces. This view implies that educational development is

dependent on all the factors which influence human life and progress.

The most important contributory factors which influenced the educational development of each of the American colonies were: ethnic or race elements – including inherited ideas or practices and the spirit of the race; environment – including geographical conditions, climate, and physiography; economic conditions – including distribution of land and population, industrial organization, and economic well-being; religion – including the relation of church and state, religious motives for education, and the influence of religious sects in promoting and controlling education; political conditions – including the relation of the state and education, the influence of forms of local government, such as town or parish; social conditions – including home influences, social classes and groups; intellectual conditions – including the proportion of educated men to the total population, average intelligence of the race, and the means of distributing knowledge, such as printing, libraries, and newspapers. The progress of education is dependent on all these factors and others not mentioned. In short, to understand its real development, we must know the reaction of geographical, economic, religious, political, social, and intellectual influences on education in its narrower meaning. [Jernegan (1931), pp. 61-62]

Jernegan doesn't share with us what he means by the "average intelligence of the race." He does not use this notion, whatever he meant by it, in his subsequent discussion. Scientifically, from the principles of mental physics the phrase itself is quite meaningless outside of a zoological context (e.g. contrasting exhibitions of intelligent behaviors of, say, apes vs. frogs). Westerners have a habit of using the word "race" to mean "group of people" (as, e.g., when someone speaks of "the American race" or "the race of poets"), and if that is all Jernegan meant then: this merely refers to what Mill called "the amount of capacity which a people possess for doing new things and adapting themselves to new circumstances" [Mill (1861), pg. 7]; the point is valid; and it might in other words be called "the strength and rigidity of the hold tradition¹² has on people within a Society." Other than for a need to clarify this fine point, the rest of what Jernegan wrote is objectively valid according to the theory of the Social Contract.

§ 8.1 Evaluation of the Corporal Education Institution

Corporal education functions are typically independent of the seven Jernegan factors unless the institution of social government (political factor) explicitly makes these functions part of the process of schooling as, e.g., it did in ancient Sparta. Probably the most common modern forms of this still extant are found in: team athletics Societies, where governance (the coaches) use physical exercises, drills, and practice sessions to instill in each athlete conventions of teamwork; in military academies; or in military training where basic training exercises for what the U.S. Army calls "small group dynamics" are used to "form" new recruits. Dyer provides the following description of basic training in the U.S. Marine Corps:

The training, when it starts, seems impossibly demanding physically for most of the recruits – and then it gets harder week by week. There is a constant barrage of abuse and insults aimed at the recruits, with the deliberate purpose of breaking down their pride and so destroying their ability to resist the transformation of values and attitudes that the Corps intends them to undergo. At the same time the demands for constant alertness and for instant obedience are constantly stepped up, and the standards by which the dress and behavior of the recruits are judged become steadily more unforgiving. But it is all carefully calculated by the men who run the machine, who think and talk in terms of the stress they

¹² Traditions are manifestations of practical maxims commonly found exhibited in the actions of a social group. These practical maxims support judgments of taste in the subjective aspects of decision-making and choice in the process of human judgmentation. The higher practical maxims of wide practical scope often form the basis for moral custom (*Sittlichkeit*) in a Society.

are placing on the recruits . . . The aim is to keep the training arduous but just within most of the recruits' ability to withstand. One of the most striking achievements of the drill instructors is to create and maintain the illusion that basic training is an extraordinary challenge, one that will set those who graduate apart from others, when in fact almost everyone can succeed. . . .

Even the seeming inanity of close-order drill has a practiced role in the conversion process. It has been over a century since mass formations of men were of any use on the battlefield, but every army in the world still drills its troops, especially during basic training, because marching in formation, with every man moving his body in the same way at the same moment, is a direct physical way of learning two things a soldier must believe: that orders have to be obeyed automatically and instantly, and that you are no longer an individual, but part of a group.

The recruits' total identification with the other members of their unit is the most important lesson of all, and everything possible is done to foster it. They spend almost every waking moment together . . . and during most of the time they are enduring shared hardships. They also undergo collective punishments, often for the misdeed or omission of a single individual (talking in the ranks, a bed not swept under during barracks inspection), which is a highly effective way of suppressing any tendencies toward individualism. And, of course, the DIs [drill instructors] place relentless emphasis on competition with other "serials" in training . . .

Nothing is quite so effective in building up a group's morale and solidarity, though, as a steady diet of small triumphs. Quite early in basic training, the recruits begin to do things that seem, at first sight, quite dangerous: descend by ropes from fifty-foot towers, cross yawning gaps hand-over-hand by high wires . . . and the like. The common denominator is that these tasks are daunting but not really dangerous . . . The goal is not to kill recruits, but to build up their confidence as individuals and as a group by allowing them to overcome apparently frightening obstacles. [Dyer (1985), pp. 112-114]

The social art laboratory function of corporal education is a curriculum of physical exercises that are designed to teach the learner how to employ the physical capacities of his body in building sensorimotor schemes involving his ability to accommodate his social intercourse expressions in divers mini-Communities, and to assimilate habitual expressions of social intercourse in the divers mini-Communities he can be reasonably anticipated to encounter in life. This differs from the aim of the Marine Corps basic training Dyer describes *only* inasmuch as Marine Corps training does not aim at social versatility among divers mini-Communities (other than those represented by rank in the Armed Forces and those represented by "other units" – other platoons, companies, regiments, etc.). Basic training aims strictly at one ultimate Community – the Corps itself. In no region of colonial America was any organized function of team-building schooling instituted and all three regions must receive a zero rating for this function.

The convention cultivation function consists of group corporal activities aimed at developing notions of behavioral conventions. In every region of the colonies actual institution of this function rested on pressure others would exert on individuals to conform to the folkways and mores of the Community, which in most cases were generalizations reflecting lessons the learner would have acquired through Catechism as a child. The principal unifying factor found in this social governance institution of education was the more or less common interpretations almost every sect of Christian religion gives to the Old Testament ten commandments, particularly the third through tenth commandments. However, antibonding relationships between different sects, or within a specific sect, provoked a degree of outlawism that tended to incline individuals to maxims of prudence rather than reciprocal maxims of Duty to one's Community-as-a-whole. Thus while moral custom acted as an institution of this function for social moderation and an institution of instruction through experiences in social intercourse, the institution fell short of what is needed

to maintain Order in Society. For this reason, all three regions score only a '1' rating.

The corporal civil values function is comprised of designed corporal exercises in scheme-building that produce the general form of a Society-intended value structure within the learner, according to which his expectations of civil Obligation are made congruent with the social contract of his Society. Although instituted lessons provoking formulation of maxims of prudence – which address only tenets of Obligation-to-Self – are found in the personal dimension of instructional education, in no colony or region were mechanisms of instruction put into place to educate the learner in developing practical tenets of citizenship and civic or civil value structures. All three regions are therefore given a rating of '0' for this function.

It is important to emphasize that corporal education addresses the learner's Self-construction of practical maxims, and that in *H. sapiens* these are represented in the individual's practical manifold of rules. The maxims and tenets produced through corporal education are not conscious representations (perception is not part of the process of pure Reason) but they do determine the individual's action expressions and constitute part of what we loosely call his "personality" and his "character." A young Marine cannot explain to you why he "can't" exhibit cowardice in front of the other members of his unit; the maxims that hold him to the performance of his duty in battle are not mere speculative "ought to" maxims but, rather, his training has provoked him into developing pure practical rules that make it, for him, a moral imperative to stand and do his duty so long as the other members of his unit are also doing so. He has made these practical maxims a part of his individual and private "moral code" of conduct, and this is one of the key objectives of military basic training. The phrase "unthinking obedience" in fact means something very real and quite intentionally developed in a properly trained soldier because it exhibits a moral reflex.

The effectiveness of basic training is exhibited by the fact that soldiers in combat will exhibit extraordinary feats of courage on occasion. The soldier *has been trained make "being brave" a moral imperative*, and the very fact that most ex-soldiers will deny that they were ever personally brave but in the same breath tell you that the men they served in combat with are heroes testifies to the non-cognitive nature of the sort of maxims corporal education is designed to provoke the individual into developing. In point of fact, the idea of "being brave" has no context unless the situation is also accompanied by feelings of "being scared" because if you are not afraid then you have nothing to be brave about. Bravery and cowardice are each *learned* traits and are learned through corporal educational Self-development.

It is also important to emphasize that, because the rule structures developed through corporal education are structures within the individual's manifold of practical rules, a human being is most malleable to corporal education when he or she is still very young – by and large well prior to his or her early twenties. As the person gets older the manifold of rules becomes increasingly complicated, interconnected, structured, and less flexible. This makes it much more difficult for corporal instructional education to intentionally effect specifically desired behavioral changes. It is ridiculously futile for a commercial company to try to train its middle aged workforce in "company values" by summoning its employees out to some countryside campground and making them repel down fifty-foot towers. The effective options available for the corporal instructional education of older people are quite limited. This is one major reason why real Progress in a Society is slow to develop but social breakdown can be very rapid. It is also one reason why the social phenomenon that was called 'the generation gap' in the 1960s is a red flag for a Society.

§ 8.2 Evaluation of the Intellect Education Institution

To the small degree that institutionalized intellect education existed in the American colonies, this was confined to unintentional adult education and was the unplanned product of government institution in the colonies. It was a casual byproduct of political life in the colonies and the fact

that this educational function existed at all was unrecognized by the colonists.

Planned exercises for developing heuristics of social custom were not instituted in any of the colonial regions. This function consists of exercises through which the learner practices *developing his ability to construct* heuristic social procedures applied to situations of social intercourse. A part of this is schooling in good manners, and this was not absent in any of the colonial regions. It was provided to children through home schooling. Lessons of this sort were probably taught more effectively in the southern region than elsewhere. However, politeness and good manners are primarily matters of moral custom – folkways – and schooling that goes no farther than this, while it does develop procedures of behavior, does not develop the ability to *construct* flexible and adaptable schemes of social intercourse in a Society faced with the need to meet new challenges. It is therefore inadequate to meet what is required to maintain social Order. In fairness to the colonial Americans, it should be noted that this function of intellect education was not really given any better public institution anywhere in Western civilization during this period in history. Psychology in general did not yet exist as a science, therefore neither personality psychology nor interpersonal psychology existed. What speculations touching upon the matters of these sciences that did exist was unscientific and grounded in ancient ontological presuppositions of pseudo-metaphysics. Social heuristics were a matter of mimicry and no more.

What institution of the function of non-frustrating social failure that did exist in the colonies was an unintentional institution of adult education. As I previously discussed in *Education and Society*, failure is an unexpected feeling of dissatisfaction experienced when the appearance of an actual outcome disagrees with an expectation of anticipation. It evokes synthesis in judgmentation and is the empirical cause of all acts of educational Self-development. In every Society and in every era, the principal arena of non-frustrating social failure experience is found to occur in the natural intercourses occurring between children during the process of their socialization by means of interactions with other children. It is amply documented [e.g., Piaget (1932)] that social interactions among children is the basis in experience for mental development beyond childish egocentrism and moral realism (refer to figure 4.6)¹³.

Here it cannot be correctly said that children "teach each other" these lessons because this implies an intentionality that simply is not present in childish social intercourse. Therefore childish socialization cannot be called an institution of Society. Rather, it is a human-natural social process and its characteristics are much the same everywhere on earth. When I consider phenomena of childish socialization as a scientist, I am struck by how very little attention is paid to the sociology of mini-Communities of children. Most of the time most adults go about their lives with complete ignorance of these phenomena. When adults do notice it, they tend to do so with either semi-nostalgic amusement ("Boys will be boys") or with unwarranted alarm ("What is wrong with kids today?"). Nothing is "wrong" with children, children will learn through (not "from") each other how to get along with each other the same way you did, and will do so by acts of educational Self-development that do not depend on adult supervision for their realizations. If you are uncomfortable about characteristics of the new forms of natural society that develop, generation by generation, out of these accidental social dynamics, and would prefer that the next generation develop a Society more or less identical to your own, blame the changes you dislike on your own Community's neglect of active educational guidance as it develops through accidents of children's personal experiences. Blame the lack of this function of instructional education.

Institutions of functional social exercises in non-frustrating failure in the colonies are found

¹³ An obvious question that can be raised in this regard is how or even whether this is true in geographically dispersed rural Societies. Here I will merely remark that farm families of the period were large families and that the basic social unit of the family was extended through kinship and clan relations. There was no shortage of children for other children to socialize with.

only within an unintended process of adult education, namely the colonies' institutions of political government. In the northern region and the Piedmont, the characteristic political form was non-consensus democracy and was instituted through the town meeting. In the middle region, the institution differed in that the political institution there is more properly called a republic with democracy used as the primary means of determining who is selected as a representative in the various assemblies. The educating function itself was inherent in the political process and formed in debates over various acts of legislation and by political coverage in newspapers and town meetings or rural assemblies. It was, of course, also "informed" by deliberate propaganda. It is pertinent in this regard to note remarks made by Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts delegate to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, recorded in the Convention Record for May 31, 1787:

[Mr. Gerry remarked:] The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue¹⁴; but are the dupes of pretended patriots¹⁵. In Massachusetts it has been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. [Farrand (1911), vol. I, pg. 48]

I think it likely that the statement, "politics is a frustrating process," is not going to be regarded as controversial. It is also pertinent to note an observation made by Tocqueville decades later which, although he made this observations a great many years later, reflected a long-standing political practice also found in America during the earlier period:

At the extreme borders of the confederated states, upon the confines of society and the wilderness, a population of bold adventurers have taken up their abode, who pierce the solitudes of the American woods and seek a country there in order to escape the poverty that awaited them in their native home. As soon as the pioneer reaches the place which is to serve him for a retreat, he fells a few trees and builds a log house. Nothing can offer a more miserable aspect than these isolated dwellings. . . . Who would not suppose that this poor hut is the asylum of rudeness and ignorance? Yet no sort of comparison can be drawn between the pioneer and the dwelling that shelters him. Everything about him is primitive and wild, but he is himself the result of the labor and experience of eighteen centuries. He wears the dress and speaks the language of cities; he is acquainted with the past, curious about the future, and ready for argument about the present; he is, in short, a highly civilized being, who consents for a time to inhabit the backwoods, and who penetrates into the wilds of the New World with the Bible, an axe, and some newspapers. It is difficult to imagine the incredible rapidity with which thought circulates in the midst of these deserts. I do not think that so much intellectual activity exists in the most enlightened and populous districts of France.

It cannot be doubted that in the United States the instruction of the people powerfully contributes to the support of the democratic republic; and such must always be the case, I believe, where the instruction that enlightens the understanding is not separated from the moral education which amends the heart. But I would not exaggerate this advantage, and I am still further from thinking, as so many people do think in Europe, that men can be instantaneously made citizens by teaching them to read and write. True information is mainly derived from experience; and if the Americans had not been gradually accustomed to govern themselves, their book-learning would not help them much at the present day.

I have lived much with the people in the United States, and I cannot express how much I admire their experience and their good sense. An American should never be led to speak of

¹⁴ What Gerry means by this phrase is that the people do not "lack" virtue. The word "want" was commonly used as a synonym for "lack" in the speech mannerisms of eighteenth century America.

¹⁵ In Madison's original notes he wrote "demagogues" rather than "pretended patriots." The latter might be a correction or an amendment to his notes made at a later time.

Europe, for he will then probably display much presumption and very foolish pride. He will take up those crude and vague notions which are so useful to the ignorant all over the world. But if you question him respecting his own country, the cloud that dimmed his intelligence will immediately disperse; his language will become as clear and precise as his thoughts. He will inform you what his rights are and by what means he exercises them; he will be able to point out the customs which obtain in the political world. You will find he is well acquainted with the rules of the administration, and that he is familiar with the mechanism of the laws. The citizen of the United States does not acquire his practical science and his positive notions from books; the instruction he has acquired may have prepared him for receiving these ideas, but it did not furnish them. The American learns to know the laws by participating in the act of legislation; and he takes a lesson in the forms of government from governing. The great work of society is ever going on before his eyes and, as it were, under his hands. . . .

In Europe we frequently introduce the ideas and habits of private life into public affairs; and as we pass at once from the domestic circle to the government of the state, we may frequently be heard to discuss the great matters of society in the same manner in which we converse with our friends. The Americans, on the other hand, transport the habit of public life into their manners in private; in their country the jury is introduced into the games of schoolboys, and parliamentary forms are observed in the order of a feast. [Tocqueville (1836), vol. I, pp. 316-18]

If you wish to enslave a free people and reduce them to a crude state of peasantry, you must first prevent them from, or at least disincline them to, personal participation in the mechanisms of government. All tyranny depends on crippling the intellectual power of the persons subjugated.

In colonial America, practical institution of empirical intellect education was instituted in the divers political and governmental processes of the colonies. Only in the Tidewater region did the social division between ruler and subjugated abolish its institution. Nonetheless, although the institution of the function is found everywhere else, nowhere did that institution sufficiently provide *constructive* lessons of non-frustrating failures adequate for social Order. The institution went only so far as to address a narrowed horizon of more or less immediate self interests and inclined decision-making maxims to be grounded in traditional subjective judgments of taste.

The civil planning function of intellect education consists of exercises that stimulate the learner's development of procedural schemata applied to social situations. This function, as I just said, was precisely where colonial intellect education left off. The capacity for civil planning in a Society inherently involves a common understanding of social contract terms and conditions. If it is to be robust and progressive as well, it requires some foundation in theoretical understanding of the psychology of social interaction and leadership dynamics. In no region of colonial America was any such curriculum publicly provided either by formal institution or accidentally through government institution. All three regions score a '0' for the third function.

§ 8.3 Evaluation of the Tangible Education Institution

The tangible power of a person pertains most closely to the state of his own Welfare as it is by means of tangible power that the individual obtains the stock of consumable wealth assets he needs to maintain his own *Existenz*. His personal economic enterprise is the means by which he acquires his stock of goods, and it is in part to protect this stock and in part to ease his acquisition of it that men associate with one another in civil Community. The most familiar economic outcome of civil association is called the division of labor. Adam Smith wrote,

This division of labor, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain

propensity in human nature which has no such extensive utility: the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. . . .

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labor. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armorer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or movable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbors, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labor, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labor as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business. [Smith (1776), pp. 12-14]

These illustrations Smith provided are, of course, rather oversimplified and he compresses into a short span of time a socio-economic change that usually takes a great many years to evolve. Nonetheless, the flavor of his illustration is essentially correct. A socio-economic system that this trucking disposition (*trocquer*) develops is such a common feature of every Society comprised of more than a handful of people and is so commonly familiar that most people take for granted the artificial social conventions that accompany its expressions.

One of the key factors implicit in Smith's remarks that must not be overlooked is this: The development and institution of any socio-economic system depends upon the establishment of particular social conventions pertaining to exchange, barter, and trade – and, as well, to the acquisition of the skills needed for an individual to successfully take part in the divers activities going on within it. Smith's primitive armorer would not find it in his own interest to cultivate the skill of making bows and arrows if his neighbors were in the habit of stealing them from him rather than exchanging some other wealth asset for them. The ongoing *Existenz*, maintenance of Order within, and advancements of Progress through any socio-economic system is crucially conditioned by the social and moral customs of the social environment. In turn, the details and mechanisms of the socio-economic system rebound into and affect the particulars of those conventions of social and moral custom. The two simply cannot be separated and made to stand independently of each other because the nature of being-a-human-being cannot tolerate any such real division over the long run. These are thoroughly co-determining social phenomena. Effect any sort of revolutionary change in either of them, and another revolutionary change will take place in the other.

Co-determined changes of this sort can work either for further perfection of the corporate anthropological person of a Community or to tear it down and disintegrate it. Specific activities that are partial causes of either effect are generally dispersed unevenly throughout the body politic and primarily communicate their effects indirectly through the chained interactions that occur within the Enterprise-protein structure of the Society. Consequently, by the time particular individuals personally experience disturbance provoked by socio-economic effects, the causes of these are remote to his experience and he frequently does not know or misunderstands what constitutes these causes. He will, however, respond to disturbance effects through his understanding or misunderstanding of its cause with some Self-determined action of his own. *Ceteris paribus*,

without some moderating means of governing individual reactions, reactions to disturbances will reflect the satisficing nature of human reasoning and the social chain reactions are more likely to forge antibonding relationships and work to break down the Community than to forge bonding relationships and strengthen it. This is because the individual will always act on the basis of his maxims of Self-determined Duties-to-himself. Mill was almost correct when he remarked,

When we talk of the interest of a body of men, or even of an individual man, as a general principle determining their actions, the question of what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter. As Coleridge observes, the man makes the motive, not the motive the man. What it is the man's interest to do or refrain from depends less on any outward circumstances than upon what sort of man he is. If you wish to know what is practically a man's interest, you must know the cast of his habitual feelings and thoughts. Everybody has two kinds of interests, interests which he cares for and interests which he does not care for. Everybody has selfish and unselfish interests, and a selfish man has cultivated the habit of caring for the former and not caring for the latter. Everyone has present and distant interests, and the improvident man is he who cares for the present interests and does not care for the distant. It matters little that on any correct calculation the latter may be the more considerable if the habits of his mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely on the former. [Mill (1861), pg. 71]

Where Mill errs here is in his reification of the idea of "interests." To put it bluntly, anything a person "does not care about" *is not an interest for him*. There is no such thing as an "interest" outside and apart from the person *whose interest it is*. It is altogether different if the person does not understand cause and effect relationships pertinent to his interests and makes a determination of his actions based upon misunderstanding how social dynamics affect his interests. Mill is correct that "the question of what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter." He forgets this-his-own maxim when he reifies "interest" in the way he does here.

I need not tell you that social dynamics within any Community of more than just a few people are very complicated, nor that in any such particular Community there are few, and most likely none, who understand everything about these dynamics. Social and moral customs are efficacious precisely because, in the absence of detailed individual understandings, they provide maxims and habits comprehensible to individuals that reflect a Society's collective experience of past situations and pragmatic means of coping with them without throwing the Community into disorder and calamity. As Santayana remarked,

One of the great lessons . . . which society has to teach its members is that society exists. The child, like the animal, is a colossal egoist, not from a want of sensibility but through his deep transcendental isolation. The mind is naturally its own world and its solipsism needs to be broken down by social influence. The child must learn to sympathize intelligently, to be considerate, rather than instinctively to love and hate: his imagination must become cognitive and dramatically just, instead of remaining, as it naturally is, sensitively, selfishly fanciful. [Santayana (1905), pg. 48]

A person who does not know "that society exists" is, from the perspective of personality psychology, an isolated individual who finds himself surrounded by innumerable others, some of whom he finds attractive, useful or benevolent, others of whom he finds repulsive, threatening or malignant. Social and moral customs are embodied corporate maxims by which a Society is made identifiable in his understanding. The lessons of *mos maiorum* in tangible education serve the functional purpose of orienting the learner's Self-developed principles and expectations of mores and folkways to be in congruence with those of others in his Community. Instructional education here cultivates the learner's taste to favor the moral folkways of his Community.

Colonial New England, by dint of its physical and ethnic circumstances, was in the best situation of any of the regions to provide instructional cultivation of common moral tastes. Not the least reason for this was its ethnic and cultural homogeneity and more or less common class heritage they brought over from England. The township structure and the codification of policies such as those of the Massachusetts laws of education enabled them to institute a region-wide practice of lessons of *mos maiorum* sufficient to establish and maintain Order in their Society. In the middle region, the heterogeneity of backgrounds, the manifold diversity of the religious sects, and the differing ethnic heritages represented prevented coalescence in a common *mos maiorum* crossing ethnic, religious, and mini-Community boundaries. Consequently, although each mini-Community was able to provide a local institution of this function of tangible education suitable for Order within itself, the regional differences hindered this achievement on a regional level. Hence, the middle region scores a '1' rather than a '2'; not because in any locality the attentiveness to social and moral custom was any the less or worse – they were not – but because the region as a whole could not command a common allegiance to a sufficiently moderating moral code. Indeed, only in a strictly homogeneous Society can any *ontology*-centered system of moral code succeed in satisfying requirements for social Order. In a heterogeneous Society, the only possibility of a common system of moral code is deontological. Finally, in the southern region the predominant social environment was decisively more a state-of-nature and outlaw environment in which mini-Communities were splintered from each other and more purely competitive than cooperative. In such an environment, no institution of lessons of *mos maiorum* was possible because the southern region was really not constituted as a single civil Community.

For the economic system of any Society to function sufficiently well to maintain that Society, it must satisfy the needs and requirements of individual Welfare for all the citizens of its civil Community. Otherwise the consequence is granulation and the formation of an outlaw Toynbee proletariat in its midst. For it to do so, the individual enterprises of the members must be cooperative in the main and all competitive interactions must remain civic. The *social* skills to make this possible must be possessed by the members of that Society, and this is the educational function I call the *skills of enterprise*: inclusion of lesson matters perfecting the learner's self-actualization pertaining to his personal Welfare by the expression and practice in applying his individual enterprise skills. Put another way, the Society as a whole must learn how to practice Enterprise skill in the cooperations and intercourses of individuals' enterprises in such a way that civil liberty of actions remain congruent with justice under the Community's social contract. This is the practical manifestation of what is meant by the phrase *civic free enterprise*.

In the northern colonial region there developed a somewhat greater degree of economic division of labor because of its diversity in areas of commerce and the lesser role of agriculture. Coupled with the region's homogeneously integrated system of moral customs, this made the implicit teaching of skills of civic enterprise easier to accomplish with the apprenticeship system. The northern region was therefore able to achieve a sufficient level of proficiency in instituting this function of tangible education to satisfy the basic requirements of Order in the Society. In the middle region, lessons of skill enterprise were sufficient for self-actualizations locally but, as the sometimes violent frictions between the eastern area and the Piedmont in the middle region attests, it demonstrated a lack of sufficiency for social Order across the region as a whole. Thus, the middle region receives a '1' rating. Finally, in the southern region the overwhelmingly dominant agrarian economic system promoted more individual isolation in free enterprise and this isolation resonated with granulation of social and moral customs across the region to produce *uncivic* practices of free enterprise. No institution of civic lessons of skill enterprise was possible and the southern region accordingly is given a '0' rating for this function.

Finally, prior to the Industrial Revolution there was little incentive for creating a great degree of joint Enterprise activity in any of the regions. Thus there was little motivation for instituting

the function of cooperation of social Enterprise, the Object of which is development of skills in *organizing a joint Enterprise*. Some degree of such instruction was inherent in the apprenticeship systems of both the northern and middle regions because joint Enterprise did occur in both regions and was of sufficient economic importance to require minimal skill levels. But in neither case was the educational institution sufficient for the maintenance of social Order. This would be clearly demonstrated by widespread uncivic free enterprise activities that attended the start of the Industrial Revolution when this reached American shores. In the South, small-scale and temporary civic joint Enterprise existed in the individual homesteads and hamlets as matters of contingencies. For such locally specific situations reliance upon "common sense" and satisficing **consensus** democracy in decision-making, coupled with locally strong folkways, was sufficient for most occasions. There was, therefore, no perceived need for the educational function. On the great plantations there was not a true Enterprise instantiated but, rather, the *personal* enterprise of the ruler was imposed upon the rest of the subjugated plantation people by force or the threat of force. *Socially*, this is not free enterprise at all¹⁶. Let us clearly understand: the South did not suffer from a lack of mores and folkways in its societal institution; the divers localities and mini-Communities in fact had very strong and effective *local* social and moral customs. The hindrance faced by the South was not "lack of morality" but, rather, a glut of *too much* of it because the local systems were granulated from each other, frequently incongruent, and one mini-Community's system was often incomprehensible to the other mini-Communities. Morality is the logic of actions, and in the colonial South there were too many different logic systems at work, each unconscious of the fact that others' systems were *merely different* rather than *wrong*.

§ 8.4 Evaluation of the Persuasion Education Institution

The ability to synthesize ends and means congruent with those of other members of the civil Community is essential for preventing breakdown of social-chemical bonding relationships and generating antibonding relationships. The collective strength of a Society is realized by no other means than by individuals who make up part of the body politic persuading others to cooperate with them for the achievement of congruent personal objectives and necessitated social ones. However, knowing how to get other people to cooperate with you is not something human beings are born knowing how to do. Educational Self-development of this ability through experiences with adults during early childhood produces somewhat distorted maxims of skill in this because adults tend to tolerate in children behaviors they will not tolerate in other adults. The ability to get others to regard you as "lovable" seems to be a social asset at any age, but if so it is one with limitations to achievement.

The more important educational Self-development of this ability in childhood occurs during the socialization process when children learn how to form the child mini-Society that grows within every Community beyond the level of the family. Yet this, too, produces severely limited maxims. It is one thing for two little boys to settle the issue of who outranks who in the social hierarchy of childish mini-Community by having a wrestling match or a fistfight; these maxims are wholly unsuitable in adult society. Childhood socialization experience provides at best only examples and develops only baseline maxims to seed later development of skilled maxims of interpersonal relationships. You only need count the number of "self help" books and training courses popular with adults to conclude that leaving the development of this social skill to uninstructed accidents of personal experience tends to produce unsatisfactory results in

¹⁶ Every human being has a natural power of liberty of action, this liberty hindered only by physics. The concept of "enterprise" has context in the state of nature but the idea of "free enterprise" has no context and the adjective "free" is there a redundant and meaningless term. The *social* context of free enterprise has practical meaning and application, but only insofar as it stands in relationship to civil liberty, and here the adjective "free" has practical connotation, namely that of choice based upon tenets of civic Obligation.

adulthood. The function of social experiment in persuasion education in the social dimension consists of designed lessons and exercises in heuristic experimentation aimed at developing maxims for *discovering* common grounds of and means for gaining cooperation through negotiating consensual agreements among people.

In New England and, to a lesser degree, in the middle colonies experience in township governance and administration was the only public institution provocative of educational Self-development of this sort; the activities characteristic of the experience make up the base practical meaning of the word "politics." Township governance in New England, with its more Athens-like features of direct democracy, tended to produce individuals socially skilled enough to negotiate cooperations sufficient to maintain Order in Yankee Society – although this ability also appears to have been limited to within New England and the Yankees seem to have been no better skilled in forging inter-regional cooperations than the other colonies. In the middle region, the more limited direct involvements in township governance and greater remoteness of the politics of republican assemblies were not able to achieve the same degree of skill in forging intra-region cooperation. This is made evident by demonstrations of the sometimes hostile and often uncooperative relationships that developed between the "old East" and Piedmont sections of these Societies. Thus, the northern group can be rated at '2' for this persuasion education function, but the middle region can be given no higher than a '1' rating. The southern region, with its oligarchy system of uncivic governance and its institution of uncivic free enterprise, could not provide even this unintended instructional education and must be assigned a '0' rating for the social experiments function.

The consensus planning function of persuasion education in the social dimension consists of lessons and group exercises in producing consensus in the planning of ends and means of group Enterprises. Consensus is unanimity of agreement or consent in a group of people. The northern and middle regions, in which the economic institution set up more non-agricultural Enterprises than took place in the South, to a degree provided practical lessons in this, but it was a degree notably limited by factors of uncivic free enterprise that existed in the commercial enterprises that were established and the degree of compromises falling short of true consensus building that is characteristic of the democracy form of governance under the tenet of "majority rules." Therefore the unintended public institution of persuasion education for consensus planning rates no higher than a '1' in either region. In the South, even the minimal tenet of "majority rules" was not followed and, instead, the dominant maxim followed was the fallacy of "might makes right." There were, of course, isolated exceptions such as when a group of rural neighbors might come together to set up the South's famous old field school, but these exceptions were in no way adequate to counterbalance the prevailing southern feudal system of governance and the uncivic lessons conveyed by plantation commerce. Thus, the southern region must be given a '0' rating for the consensus planning function.

Finally, in *no* region was there any public institution of the civil contracting function. This function aims at developing individual personal tenets of commitment to assuming the *citizenship* responsibilities necessary for equilibrium in a civil Community and maintenance of a social contract. In the American colonies the word "citizen" was not used in Rousseau's context of social contracting and instead was employed as a synonym for "resident." If you lived anywhere in America and were not slave or an indentured servant, then you were called a "citizen." This is arguably an improvement over the "freeman" or "yeoman" classifications inherited from England, but socially is an otherwise rather meaningless title. The word "citizen" appeared exactly once in the Declaration of Independence, once in the Articles of Confederation (in Article 4), in Articles I through IV of the U.S. Constitution in 1787, and in the wording of the 11th Amendment (1795). The word "citizen" was not given any *technical* definition until the 14th Amendment in 1868, and then it merely declared that a "citizen" was any person "born or naturalized in the United States

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." Nowhere does it say that with citizenship comes any sort of Duty or responsibility to the American Community. It is merely a grant of entitlement. It is, I presume, quite evident that a people who do not have a distinct concept of what citizenship means in the connotation of a social contract are also a people incapable of instituting the third function of persuasion education in the social dimension. All three regions must receive a '0' rating for this function.

§ 9. References

- Adams, James Truslow and Charles Garrett Vannest (1935), *The Record of America*, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Adams, John (1790), *Discourses on Davila*, in *The Portable John Adams*, John Patrick Diggins (ed.), NY: Penguin Books, 2004.
- Bacon, Francis (1620), *Novum Organum*, NY: P.F. Collier and Son, 1901.
- Cubberley, Ellwood Patterson (1919), *Public Education in the United States: A Study and Interpretation of American Educational History*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Dickens, Charles (1837-39), *Oliver Twist*, Charles Dickens Ed. of 1867, NY: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2003.
- Durant, Will (1950), *The Age of Faith*, part 4 of *The Story of Civilization*, NY: MJF Books, by arrangement with Simon & Schuster, ISBN 1-56731-015-x.
- Durant, Will and Ariel (1965), *The Age of Voltaire*, vol. 9 of *The Story of Civilization*, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Dyer, Gwynne (1985), *War*, NY: Crown Publishers, Inc.
- Farrand, Max (1911), *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, revised edition in four volumes, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Gordon, Edward E. and Elaine H. (2003), *Literacy in America*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Gutek, Gerald (2003), "Foreword to *Literacy in America*," by Edward E. and Elaine H. Gordon, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, pp. xi-xiii, 2003.
- Jernegan, Marcus Wilson (1929), *The American Colonies 1492-1750*, NY: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1943.
- Jernegan, Marcus Wilson (1931), *Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America 1607-1783*, NY: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960.
- Kant, Immanuel (1783), *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band IV*, pp. 253-383, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1911.
- Kant, Immanuel (1800), *Logik*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band IX*, pp. 1-150, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1923.
- Kuhn, Thomas (1970), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Mill, John Stuart (1861), *Representative Government*, Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publications reprint. No date given.
- Newton, Isaac (1726), *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, 3rd ed., Snowball Publishing, 2010, contact BN Publishing at sales@snowballpublishing.com

- Pedersen, Olaf (1997), *The First Universities: Studium generale and the origins of university education in Europe*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Piaget, Jean (1928), *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*, Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Adams, 1966.
- Piaget, Jean (1932), *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, NY: The Free Press, 1965.
- Piaget, Jean (1981), *Possibility and Necessity Volume 1: The Role of Possibility in Cognitive Development*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
- Santayana, George (1905), *Reason in Society*, vol. 2 of *The Life of Reason*, NY: Dover Publications, 1980.
- Scott, Jonathan French (1914), "Apprenticeship as an Educational System," in *Historical Essays on Apprenticeship and Vocational Education*, Ann Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Press.
- Shakespeare, William (1605-6), *Macbeth*.
- Smith, Adam (1776), *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, NY: Everyman's Library, 1991.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de (1836), *Democracy in America*, NY: Everyman's Library, 1994.
- Turnbull, Colin M. (1961), *The Forest People*, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1968.
- Wells, Richard B. (2009), *The Principles of Mental Physics*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2010), *The Idea of the American Republic*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2012), *Education and Society*, vol. I of *The Idea of Public Education*, available free of charge from the author's web site.