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Chapter 7 The Passage to Industrialization

§ 1. Public Education in the 19th Century

Critique of the American institution of public education from independence throughout the entire 19th century up to the time of Dewey can only conclude that the entire century was a Dusk Age for public instructional education. By this I mean an era of intellectual shadow in education institution, not devoid of Enlightenment reform influences, yet inadequate even to meet the requirements for Order in American Society overall. 3LAR functional ratings in both dimensions fail to re-achieve even the modest levels of achievement in pre-Revolutionary New England. In this chapter and the next the reasons for this are examined. Three periods can be distinguished: reinstitution prior to Horace Mann; the era of Horace Mann and republican educational reform; and post-1870 "Gilded Age" plutocratic reformation. This chapter deals with the first period.

Several social factors in combination contributed to generally poor levels of achievement in education institution. Topping the list is the human factor of satisficing decision-making relying on judgments of taste that are based on destabilized sets of old customs and traditions. Adding to this with barely less impact is the effect of the Economy revolution and its advanced phase, the industrial revolution, in America. Another factor that cannot be discounted is the establishment of a new and antisocial force in America, namely, the formation of national political parties in the 1820s through 1855. All of these factors had generally negative effects on public education. One more factor was a shift in American political attitudes from the republicanism of the Founding Fathers to an antisocial populism in the form of an increasing institution of non-consensus democracy in political governance. This last phenomenon can be regarded as a mixed blessing because: on the one hand, it probably headed off devolution of governance into the mode of oligarchy rule and it did contribute to the eventual abolition of slavery; but it also maintained and led to higher degrees of granulation in American Society. This resulted from widespread uncivic competitions that led to anti-bonding relationships and many serious violations of the American social contract established in 1788.

At the dawn of the 19th century home schooling and home apprenticeship were still primary institutions of education for the majority of the American population. The quality of instruction in these institutions was very idiosyncratic, varying greatly from family to family. Up until 1820 the United States was still principally an agrarian nation although, as noted earlier, the trend toward a coalescing of populations into townships and counties had been a feature of westward expansion from the beginning. America had passed through the first phase of the Economy revolution but had not yet begun its second phase, which some call the age of mechanization and others call the American industrial revolution. Universal apprenticeship institution, which had been the major means of public education in America, was gone by 1800 and what remained of it on homestead farms and in small towns must be regarded as private instructional education.

The Revolutionary War had, of course, cut off the supply of manufactured goods shipped to America from England. This gave rise to an expansion of cottage industries for what crude goods were manufactured in the United States. Some historians have referred to these private enterprises as "infant industries." What is usually called "the machine age" had not yet begun in America, and so the trade schooling received by young people during the period of cottage industry was in practical respect the last remnant of the old apprenticeship system because a breadth of craft skills were required to sustain it. Even before the start of the 19th century, however, there were early signs of the coming second phase in the Economy revolution, which would usher in the age of the unskilled laborer. It is said that the first true factory in the United States was established by 1787 in the town of Beverly, Massachusetts, and the first cotton spinning-mill was set up at the falls of the Pawtucket River in Rhode Island in 1791 [Cubberley (1919), pg. 103].

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The social impact of this development and its effect on schooling institution in the United States would not be keenly felt until the 1830s. In the meantime, government institutions in the United States were occupied with the urgent matters of getting commerce back on its feet, dealing with issues of westward expansion, and, at the national level, coping with international and domestic problems provoked by the French Revolution in 1789 and the French and Napoleonic Wars in Europe that began in 1792. It cannot be fairly said that the state governments and the national government completely neglected education during this period, but the problem of education was a low priority for the agents of government.

§ 2. Government Promotion of Education: 1785-1829

The degree of state government support for public education at the turn of the century varied from state-supported efforts to re-establish pre-War local systems of schooling to an utter lack of state government support for the institution of schooling. The well-educated and liberal-minded members of the American Philosophical Society might have recognized that universal public education was a true function of republican government and vital to achieving and maintaining the Framer's 1887 vision of a uniquely American confederate republic, but this understanding was not shared by the state legislatures or by the agents of the new general government. Blake (1961) has called the period from 1789 to 1829 a "period of state efforts to promote education," but this is at best a misleading label for what state governments were doing during that period. Potter documents in some detail what actions the states took during this period [Potter (1967), pp. 134-159]. Cubberley suggested a three-fold classification of groups for these efforts: (I) a "good-school-conditions" group, made up of Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts (including Maine), and New York; (II) a "pauper-parochial-school" group made up of Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland; and (III) a "no-action" group made up of Rhode Island, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The approaches and attitudes taken in these states affected the development of schooling institution in western territories of the United States and the new states admitted thereafter to the U.S. Union. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the rating results of these efforts. Figure 7.3 illustrates the geographical distribution, excluding Florida, of the approaches in states east of the Mississippi River to 1850 [Cubberley (1919), pg. 70]. State support in new states tended to follow the characteristics of the original places from which the settlers had emigrated. For example, upstate New York was settled by New Englanders and this made New York State more like New England than its Middle Atlantic neighbors despite Middle Atlantic attitudes in New York City.

In no case were all the Enlightenment visions presented in the essays discussed in chapter 6 pursued. Support in the "strong state support" group in figure 7.3 was strong only in the sense that here the state constitutions and legislatures sought to reestablish the traditional schooling that they were accustomed to from colonial days (with some slight modifications made from notions employed in the academy institutes that had begun with Franklin in Philadelphia in the mid-18th century). This demonstrates a pattern of behavior that Toynbee disparaged as "mimesis." The other groups likewise followed mimesis patterns in the types of institutions of schooling they reestablished after the War. Territories settled by people originally from these states tended to copy whatever schooling institution was familiar to the settlers from their home states. In those territories settled by people coming from different states, the schooling institution reflected a compromise mixture of ideas copied from the divers home states.

The general government was barred by the Tenth Amendment from a direct role in schooling institution. What national effect the general government did have was not the act of the new Constitutional government but rather was due to a 1785 act of Congress under the old Articles of Confederation: the Land Ordinance of 1785. This act addressed how new territories ceded to the United States by Great Britain in the peace treaty ending the Revolutionary War were to be

incorporated into the new nation. In a 1780 resolution agreed to by the states, it was agreed "that the manner and condition of the sale of the lands in dispute [the new territories] should be exclusively regulated by Congress." In other words, the states agreed to give up their individual claims on the new western lands and acknowledge these territories to be national property. The Land Ordinance followed from this. Keith and Bagley describe it for us:




Figure 7.1: Ratings of the functions of public educational instruction in the personal dimension during the initial reinstitution. The ratings are broken down in terms of state attitudes towards schooling.




Figure 7.2: Ratings of the functions of public educational instruction in the social dimension during the initial reinstitution. The ratings are broken down in terms of state attitudes towards schooling.

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


Figure 7.3: Levels of state government support and encouragement of public education in states east of the Mississippi River to 1850. School institution during the westward expansion of the United States was primarily influenced by where the settler populations emigrated from. In regions where most of the new population came from the same background, school institution copied that of the home states. In regions where a mixture of people from different Cubberley groups settled, school institution was a matter of compromise between the different groups of settlers, resulting in weak support for schooling institution.

> This action by Congress had a salutary effect. . . . [In] May, 1785, Congress adopted a plan for the disposal of this new national territory. The lands were to be divided "into townships six miles square"; each township was to be subdivided into thirty-six lots, one mile square; the lines of these 640-acre lots were to be run in the same direction as the external lines of the townships and the lots were to be numbered from 1 to 36. Out of every township, the four lots numbered 8, 11, 26, 29, were reserved by the United States Government for future sale; and the lot No. 16 of every township was dedicated to "the maintenance of public schools within the said township." . . .
>
> Even before the War for Independence . . . colonial experience had proved the worth of land endowment as a means of insuring free schools. Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, having won the vast public domain as a national asset, followed the established precedent and decreed that Lot 16 in each township in this vast domain was to be dedicated to the "maintenance of public schools." The Ordinance of 1787 . . . contained the famous declaration, – "Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary for good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged." This language is a reaffirmation, in general terms, of the act of May, 1785, but it is not the declaration by which Lot No. 16 is specifically set aside for public schools. [Keith & Bagley (1920), pp. 15-16, 20]

It is important to note the use of the word "encouraged" in the 1787 ordinance. This is a toothless term and stops a great deal short of mandating education as a requirement. Most of the states did at least pay lip service to "encouraging" education, but this is something far different from the idea of "encouraging" *public* education as an institution of government even at the state level. The group-II states "encouraged" church-sponsored parochial and private enterprise education only; the group-III states didn't bother to "encourage" non-private education of any sort.

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A considerable degree of caution must be exercised by scholars in using material from Keith & Bagley. Their book is not an impartial historical treatise but is, as the authors themselves state, a manifesto lobbying for the establishment of a national school system generally and for the passage of a bill then pending in Congress – the Smith-Towner Bill – that would have created an "executive department in the Government to be called the Department of Education, with a Secretary of Education, who shall be the head thereof" . . . and "That it shall be the duty of the Department of Education to conduct studies and to report thereon. Research shall be undertaken in (*a*) illiteracy; (*b*) immigrant education; (*c*) public-school education, and especially rural education; (*d*) physical education, including health education, recreation and sanitation; (*e*) preparation and supply of competent teachers for the public schools; and (*f*) in such other fields as, in the judgment of the Secretary of Education, may require attention and study." To their disappointment, and despite the fact this bill would have created nothing more than a cabinet-level research organization, the Smith-Towner Bill failed to become law.

Nonetheless, their book is a valuable source of documentation and data regarding numerous issues related to public education. One need only take care to separate facts from the authors' opinions. For example, Keith and Bagley subtly equate "public schools" with "free schools" throughout their book; these two phrases were by no means synonymous in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. "Public" schools were not "free" schools; they were public in the sense that no one was excluded from being able to attend them provided they could afford the tuition that was charged. Only pauper schools were financed by public money and were free to poor children and parents who were eligible to make use of them. Part of the eligibility requirement was that the family had to make a formal public affidavit that they were paupers – an action most people in those days regarded as so shameful that many poor people who were otherwise eligible refused to do it. In no state or territory were public schools "free" schools.

Scholars regard the educational policies of New England, and Massachusetts particularly, as providing the leadership example most directly responsible for the evolution of public education in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is instructive to see what the example being set for others to follow was. Massachusetts' constitutional provision, later copied by New Hampshire, read

> Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislatures and the magistrates, in all future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage private societies and public institutions by rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social affections and generous sentiments among the people. [Cubberley (1919), pg. 63]

I suppose it is nice if legislatures and magistrates have a duty to "cherish" these named interests. But what exactly does this mean? Webster's (1962) lists three usages for this word:

> **cherish**
>
> 1. to treat with tenderness and affection; to take care of; to foster; to nurture.
> 2. to hold dear; to value highly.
> 3. to indulge and encourage in the mind; to harbor; to cling to; as, to *cherish* the principles of virtue.

Which of these usages is intended by the language of the state constitution? Because it does not specify, the constitutional provision is left as meat for constitutional lawyers to pick over. Even if we assume the context was "to foster; to nurture; to take care of," this is hardly any better description of what precisely it was to be the duty of the state government *to do*.

What the group-I ("strong state support") states *did* do is described by Cubberley:

> *Vermont*. First general state school law in 1782. District system authorized. Support of schools by district tax or rate bill on parents optional. State aid granted. 1797 – Districts failing to provide schools to receive no state assistance. 1810 – Town school tax obligatory and gradually increased from 1 per cent to 3 per cent by 1826. 1825 – State school fund created. 1827 – New school law required towns to build school buildings; required certificates of teachers; made the beginnings of school supervision; and added spelling, grammar, history, geography, and good behavior to the list of required school subjects.
>
> *New Hampshire*. First general state school law in 1789. Town tax required and rate fixed; teachers' certificates required; English schools and Latin schools required in the larger towns. 1791 – Town taxes for schools increased. 1821 – State school fund created. 1827 – Poor children to be provided with schoolbooks free.
>
> *Massachusetts*. First general state school law in 1789. This legalized the practices in education of the past hundred and fifty years and changed them into state requirements. A six-months elementary school required in every town, and twelve-months if having 100 families. Also a six-months grammar school required of every town having 150 families, and twelve-months if 200 families. All teachers to be certified, and all grammar school teachers to be college graduates or certificated by the minister as skilled in Latin. These laws also applied to Maine, which was a part of Massachusetts until 1820.
>
> *Connecticut*. Laws of 1700 and 1712 required all parishes or school societies operating schools to maintain an elementary school for from six to eleven months a year, varying with the size of the parish. Law of 1714 required inspection of schools and teachers. These laws continued in force by the new State. A permanent school fund had been created in 1750 by the sale of some Connecticut lands, and in 1795, on the sale of the Western Reserve in Ohio for $1,200,000. This was added to the permanent school fund. 1798 – School visitors and overseers ordered appointed.
>
> *New York*. Little of an educational nature had been done in this State prior to the Revolution except in the matter of church charity schools. In 1795 a law, valid for five years, was enacted which distributed $100,000 a year to the counties for schools. By 1798 there were 1352 schools in 16 of the 25 counties and 59,660 children were enrolled. On the expiration of the law, in 1800, it could not be reenacted. By 1812, when the first permanent school law was enacted, New England immigration into the State had counterbalanced the private-parochial-charity-school attitudes of New York City. The Massachusetts district system was instituted, local taxation required, state aid distributed on the basis of school census, and the first State Superintendent of Schools provided for. In 1814 teachers were ordered examined. By 1820 New York schools were probably the best of any State in the Union. [Cubberley (1919), pp. 65-67]

This last note of opinion isn't necessarily saying very much. One can say with equal truth that the Civil War field hospital with the highest immediate-post-operative survival rate for amputations had the best institution of surgical practices of any field hospital; it doesn't mean the treatment was very good. In point of fact, more Civil War amputees died later from infections or other post-operative complications than died on the operating table. Often these men were never counted on the casualty lists as killed *from* (rather than "in") combat action.

American readers might find these descriptions quite familiar even today. It is undoubtedly true that New England commandingly led the development of schooling institution in the United

States over the long run. Probably the most chronic challenge facing the young states, then as now, was the apparently never-ending question of who was going to pay the costs of the schooling institution. Having been among the most vocal of those who feared centralized power in a federal-national government for the nation as a whole, the group-I state legislatures did not hesitate to centralize the power of government in their own state. State legislation mandated the creation of local schools and school districts and, when these districts demonstrated unwillingness to tax themselves to do so, eventually did not hesitate to force them to do so – a tactic a number of so-called conservative states today howl about loudly when the U.S. Congress does the same thing to them. The latest political term used to denounce this tactic is "unfunded mandate."

It is not difficult to "cherish" something if you command the physical power to force others to do all the work and bear all the costs regardless of whether they would have done so or not of their own accord. In this case, all you really need is the loyalty of your militiamen. The same state governments who today criticize the general government for unfunded mandates ignore their state's townships and school districts when these protest against the state government for doing the same thing to them. The situation does tend to bring to my mind John Adams' warnings,

> 2. A single assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burdens, which it will lay, without compunction, on its constituents. . . .
>
> 6. [A] single assembly, possessed of all the powers of government, would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their own favor. [Adams (1776), pg. 236]

Centralized state governments are, corporately, single assemblies. In every state in the United States they have the capacity to act, and frequently enough do act, as despotically as many Revolutionary-era people feared a powerful central government of the nation would act. It is a governance tradition modeled on conquerors' rulership methods that are older than history.

This habit of institution-by-tradition was also demonstrated in the new states when numerous practical difficulties and issues pertaining to the specifics of the Lot No. 16 provision of the Land Ordinance of 1785 came to light. The first case occurred in Ohio and it is worthwhile to examine it in some detail because, as Keith and Bagley noted, it illustrates practically all the difficulties involved in administering the Land Ordinance of 1785:

> In 1802 Congress passed an act enabling the people of Ohio to form a constitution and state government under certain conditions that were clearly set forth in the act itself. Relating to land grants, this law provided:
>
> First, "That the section numbered sixteen in every township, and where such section has been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto and most contiguous to the same, shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township for the use of schools."
>
> Second, "That certain salt lands and springs should be granted to the state for the use of the people under regulations to be set up by the legislature of the state."
>
> Third, "That one twentieth of the net proceeds of all lands within the state sold by Congress after June 30, 1802, should be set aside for the laying out and making of public roads."
>
> These grants, however, were subject to the following condition:
>
> > "Provided always that the three foregoing propositions herein offered are on the condition that the convention of the said state shall provide by an ordinance, irrevocable without the consent of the United States, that every and each tract of land sold by Congress, from and after the 30th day of June next, shall be and remain exempt from any tax laid by order, or under the authority of the state, whether for state, county, township, or any other purpose whatever, for the term of five years, from and after the date of sale."

> This five year exemption from all taxes, which was to constitute an inducement to settlers, was made a condition of granting the sixteenth section of each township for the use of schools. [Keith & Bagley (1920), pp. 23-24]

There were, however, complications in carrying out this plan. The school lot had been granted to the township's people, but who was to administer the setup, manage the sale, and pocket the proceeds of these lands? Here the U.S. Congress, by another act passed in 1803, made the state legislature the responsible agent:

> The Congressional act of 1803 "vested in trust in the legislature all lands appropriated by the United States for the support of schools." The legislature of Ohio tried to lease the lands for fifteen years, but settlers wished to buy lands, not lease them. The state then planned to lease the lands for ninety-nine years, but this met with only small success. Ohio finally applied to Congress for authority to sell the school lands outright. Congress made no reply, for it had already made Ohio the trustee for the school lots of the state. In 1827, the Ohio legislature made plans for the sale of these lands as follows:
>
> (1) The sale of Lot 16 was to be voted on by the people of each township.
>
> (2) If the township favored the sale, the lands were to be appraised and not sold below the appraisement.
>
> (3) On payment in full by the purchaser, a deed in fee simple was to be made by the state.
>
> These school lands were thrown upon the market in competition with the lands owned by the United States and by the Ohio and Symmes companies[1]. They were consequently sold at a very low price to investors and settlers.
>
> The money thus covered into the state treasury was credited to the township to which it belonged and the interest paid to the school officials of the township. The investment of this money became a considerable problem. An act of the Ohio legislature in 1837 provided that the school funds might be loaned to the state, to counties, or to the Canal Fund, at six per cent interest, five sixths of which was to go to the township. Finally the state took the whole fund and spent it for its temporary needs, substituting an "irreducible debt" bearing interest at six percent. This interest is raised by general taxation; the land endowment, therefore, became a burden to the taxpayers, quite contrary to the plain intent of the Federal legislation authorizing the grants. [*ibid*., pp. 25-27]

Similar actions also occurred in Illinois, Indiana, Alabama, Louisiana, and Missouri. The sorts of complications just described were later avoided by Congress by the expedient of making later grants of Lot No. 16 directly to the states (i.e., to the state legislatures) instead of the townships. The net effect was that, instead of providing a self-regenerating source of school funding from the lease of Lots No. 16, support for schooling had to be provided by state systems of taxation. Keith and Bagley seem to have regarded this as a good thing because "the inadequacy of the funds" thus led to state systems of taxation from which "the policy of state support for local schools gradually evolved" [*ibid*.]. Perhaps. It reflects nothing more than my own personal opinion, but I find it difficult to see how a deliberate inadequacy is somehow a desirable feature in any institutional planning. I also see no "*the* policy of state support for local schools"; every state has its own policy and while they have many similarities – including in most states placing the principal revenue burden on property taxes – there are enough differences and changing legislative-political attitudes involved to refute a contention that there is any general "the" as *one* policy.

One effect that *was* general was placing the power of the purse string in the centralized hands

[1] The Ohio Company and the Symmes Company were land speculators who had received land grants in Ohio by acts of Congress.

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of state government rather than in the hands of the townships where the schools are. With the power of the purse string naturally comes the power to coerce, and it is usually accompanied by attitudes held by agents of the state government that townships must therefore be made subservient to the state government. In every state I have visited, I hear propaganda slogans about the sanctity of "local control of the schools," and in every state I have visited the reality is that local control is effected only when the controllers strictly comply with the mandates of the state government. I know of not one township in America where the local School Board is subservient to a Parent-Teacher Association or where a county tax assessor's office is at liberty to ignore a command from the state government to raise its property tax assessment levels. When the number of intrusions and their personal effects on individuals are tallied up, the time-worn propaganda slogan "intrusive big government" is in practical reality more properly applied to your local Statehouse than to your general government in Washington, D.C.

My point in bringing this up is to illustrate a functional disconnect between the institutions of state government and the institutional objectives for the general government that had been so carefully worked out at the 1787 Constitutional Convention and explained in *The Federalist*. The confederate governance institution of the general government is not copied at the state level, where the institution of government was established by traditional reasoning and habit, and in manners much more similar to the old European forms except for divers degrees of representative government that depended on the extent of the franchise in the early years of the states. I also bring this up to point out that, at first, the general government was attempting to encourage a high level of local governance of the school system but that it also kept within its understood boundary regarding the extent to which it could dictate specifics to the state governments even in the newly added states.

Let us recap the legal basis for state support of public schooling in the United States. Each state, as a condition for admission to the Union, assumed an obligation to set aside 1/36th of the land in each township for the purpose of public schooling. What sort of instructional education was not specified. Having sold the granted land, thereby becoming divested of property ownership, the state government was nonetheless still obligated to see to it that public schooling was provided. Because the proceeds from the land sale were diverted to other state purposes, meeting this obligation necessitated a state system of taxation for the support of schools. Again, no details were specified by the original legislation, nor were standards set out to define whether or not the state was meeting its obligation, nor was there any stipulation about what actions the general government was empowered to take in the event a state government failed to meet its assumed obligation[2]. In every state, the institution was set up by decision-making and policy more or less copied from tradition or examples from other states previously admitted to the Union. Such was the starting point for the reinstitution of public education in the United States.

§ 3. The Literacy Performance of the System of Basic Schooling Institution

To a person who has a disposition to like plans and organizations to be neat and tidy in at least a formal way, the history just cited might leave a disturbing impression. Practically speaking, it

[2] There is no Constitutional provision by which the general government can kick a state out of the Union, nor are there any other sanctions the general government has *explicit* Constitutional empowerment to take against a state. Indeed, Constitutional scholars are still debating whether the Southern Confederacy really did or did not have the right to secede from the Union in 1861. Social Contract theory is explicit about this latter question: They did not because there had been no actual violation of the social contract at the time the southern states seceded. Whether or not the Congress had the Constitutional power to end slavery is another question altogether. Social Contract theory says this would have required a Constitutional amendment. That is, in fact, what ended slavery in the United States. The 13th Amendment, not Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, ended the formal institution of slavery in the U.S.

does not essentially matter whether or not the planning and organization are neat and tidy; what matters is whether or not the instituted system works sufficiently well to meet its objectives. To assess this, we must look at some empirical indicators of practical success or the lack thereof. In dealing with new social institutions, it is also wise to allow the new system to have time to "settle in" a bit, and to allow its agents to make adjustments to it based on empirical discovery of start-up problems unwittingly built into the original design, before passing judgments on its performance. We already know that the Economy revolution of the 18th century deprived the U.S. institution of public education of some of its key factors for achieving the objectives of an institution of public instructional education. What effect this had we will examine when we turn to the next phase of that Toynbee challenge, namely, the American industrial revolution.

Before that, however, let us look at how well or poorly the remaining functions – those that had been part of the pre-Revolutionary schooling system – fared in the century that followed and whether or not the three distinct state government approaches (groups I, II, and III) showed any difference in performance levels. Owing to a lack of all the empirical data that should properly be accounted for in an assessment of this sort – and restraining from hypothetical speculations in lieu of this data – we find there is only one fairly reliable indicator for which a substantial amount of documentation is readily available at present. The indicator is basic literacy, a capability everyone acknowledges to be a primary skill imparted by education. The main source of data for assessing this indicator comes from U.S. Census Bureau.

Even here an assessment of the 19th century is not without important issues. One of the most important is the question of what the most scientifically accurate definition of "literacy" is. This is an issue currently being debated – sometimes with a certain amount of heat – by scholars of education today (see Gutek, 2003). Unfortunately for our immediate purposes, "literacy" was defined in 19th and early 20th century census-taking as "the ability for a person ten years of age or older to write in any language." It was presumed that the ability to write implied the ability to read – and, by proxy, that inability to write is indicative of inability to read – something we know is not necessarily true. For a scientist this situation means he must be cautious about drawing sweeping conclusions and avoid posing causal hypotheses on the basis of such data. Yet if we bear this in mind, the available data is pertinent to the question and is not something to be dismissed out of ignórance if it contradicts Desire or taste. Nor is it something to be embraced enthusiastically if it appears to support a pet speculation or supposition.

With these ground rules in mind, I present in this treatise an analysis of schooling performance factored into seven geographical regions of the continental United States with some additional breakdown on a state-by-state basis. The reference year of 1910 is taken for the evaluation "snap-shot." This provides a sufficiently long window to allow for all 48 contiguous states to come into the Union, for the traumas of the 1861-1865 Civil War and the following years of Reconstruction to settle out, and for the Census Bureau agents to develop and improve their methods. Because the institutions of public schooling by the later states were carried out principally by mimesis, the extended time interval should not mask the effects of the state attitudes at the beginning of the period or be overly-affected by the industrial revolution and populism in the "Age of Jacksonian Democracy" period (roughly, 1828 to 1900).

One dynamical social factor that cannot be ignored in this evaluation is the growth in U.S. population state-by-state and region-by-region during this period. In 1800 the population of the United States stood at 5,308,483 according to Census figures. In 1910 it stood at 91,972,266. This is a 17.3-fold increase over a period that saw the expansion of the United States reach across the continent. It is therefore pertinent to examine how this growth took place and to ascertain whether or not by the beginning of the 20th century the growth rate was stable.

Table 7.1 provides relevant census data from the year 1800 to 1900 [Morison & Commager

(1930), pp. 918-19]. It is organized into seven geographical regions defined in the table. These are: (1) the New England region; (2) the Middle Atlantic region; (3) the South Atlantic region; (4) the South Central region; (5) the North Central region; (6) the Mountain States region; and (7) the Pacific region. These regional definitions are used throughout the analysis, and census data compiled by Keith and Bagley (1920) has been reformatted to fit this regional schema.

Tabulations such as table 7.1 usually do not adequately convey a "sense" of what the data is telling us. Graphical representation, however, is often very good at accomplishing this. Figures 7.4 illustrate the decade-by-decade growth in U.S. and regional populations for this period.

Table 7.1: U.S. Population by State and Region from 1800 to 1900

State	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900
New England	1,233,011	1,471,973	1,660,071	1,954,717	2,234,822	2,728,116	3,135,283	3,487,924	4,010,529	4,700,749	5,592,017
Maine	151,719	228,705	298,335	399,455	501,793	583,169	628,279	626,915	648,936	661,086	694,466
New Hampshire	183,858	214,460	244,161	269,328	284,574	317,976	326,073	318,300	346,991	376,530	411,588
Vermont	154,465	217,895	235,981	280,652	291,948	314,120	315,098	330,551	332,286	332,422	343,641
Massachusetts	422,845	472,040	523,287	610,408	737,699	994,514	1,231,066	1,457,351	1,783,085	2,238,947	2,805,346
Rhode Island	69,122	76,931	83,059	97,199	108,830	147,545	174,620	217,353	276,531	345,506	428,556
Connecticut	251,002	261,942	275,248	297,675	309,978	370,792	460,147	537,454	622,700	746,258	908,420
Middle Atlantic	1,402,565	2,014,702	2,699,845	3,587,664	4,526,260	5,898,735	7,458,985	8,810,806	10,496,878	12,706,220	15,454,678
New York	589,051	959,049	1,372,812	1,918,608	2,428,921	3,097,394	3,880,735	4,382,759	5,082,871	6,003,174	7,268,894
New Jersey	211,149	245,562	277,575	320,823	373,306	489,555	672,035	906,096	1,131,116	1,444,933	1,883,669
Pennsylvania	602,365	810,091	1,049,458	1,348,233	1,724,033	2,311,786	2,906,215	3,521,951	4,282,891	5,258,113	6,302,115
South Atlantic	2,286,494	2,674,891	3,061,063	3,645,752	3,925,299	4,679,090	5,364,703	5,853,610	7,597,197	8,857,922	10,443,480
Delaware	64,273	72,674	72,749	76,748	78,085	91,532	112,216	125,015	146,608	168,493	184,735
Maryland	341,548	380,546	407,350	447,040	470,019	583,034	687,049	780,894	934,943	1,042,390	1,188,044
Dist. of Columbia	14,093	24,023	33,039	39,834	43,712	51,687	75,080	131,700	177,624	230,392	278,718
Virginia	880,200	974,600	1,065,366	1,211,405	1,239,797	1,421,661	1,596,318	1,225,163	1,512,565	1,655,980	1,854,184
West Virginia								442,014	618,457	762,794	958,800
North Carolina	478,103	555,500	638,829	737,987	753,419	869,039	992,622	1,071,361	1,399,750	1,617,949	1,893,810
South Carolina	345,591	415,115	502,741	581,185	594,398	668,507	703,708	705,606	995,577	1,151,149	1,340,316
Georgia	162,686	252,433	340,989	516,823	691,392	906,185	1,057,286	1,184,109	1,542,180	1,837,353	2,216,331
Florida				34,730	54,477	87,445	140,424	187,748	269,493	391,422	528,542
South Central	335,407	786,208	1,358,169	2,062,096	3,025,430	4,303,522	5,768,658	6,434,410	8,919,371	11,170,137	14,080,047
Kentucky	220,955	406,511	564,317	687,917	779,828	982,405	1,155,684	1,321,011	1,648,690	1,858,635	2,147,174
Tennessee	105,602	261,727	422,823	681,904	829,210	1,002,717	1,109,801	1,258,520	1,542,359	1,767,518	2,020,616
Alabama			127,901	309,527	590,756	771,623	964,201	996,992	1,262,505	1,513,401	1,828,697
Mississippi	8,850	40,352	75,448	136,621	375,651	606,526	791,305	827,922	1,131,597	1,289,600	1,551,270
Arkansas		1,062	14,273	30,388	97,574	209,897	435,450	484,471	802,525	1,128,211	1,311,564
Louisiana		76,556	153,407	215,739	352,411	517,762	708,002	726,915	939,946	1,118,588	1,381,625
Oklahoma										258,657	790,391
Texas						212,592	604,215	818,579	1,591,749	2,235,527	3,048,710
North Central	51,006	292,107	859,305	1,610,473	3,351,542	5,403,595	9,096,716	12,981,111	17,364,111	22,410,417	26,333,004
Ohio	45,365	230,760	581,434	937,903	1,519,467	1,980,329	2,339,511	2,665,260	3,198,062	3,672,329	4,157,545
Indiana	5,641	24,520	147,178	343,031	685,866	988,416	1,350,428	1,680,637	1,978,301	2,192,404	2,516,462
Illinois		12,282	55,211	157,445	476,183	851,470	1,711,951	2,539,891	3,077,871	3,826,352	4,821,550
Michigan		4,762	8,896	31,639	212,267	397,654	749,113	1,184,059	1,636,937	2,093,890	2,420,982
Wisconsin					30,945	305,391	775,881	1,054,670	1,315,497	1,693,330	2,069,042
Minnesota						6,077	172,023	439,706	780,773	1,310,283	1,751,394
Iowa					43,112	192,214	674,913	1,194,020	1,624,615	1,912,297	2,231,853
Missouri		19,783	66,586	140,455	383,702	682,044	1,182,012	1,721,295	2,168,380	2,679,185	3,106,665
North Dakota							4,837	14,181	135,177	190,983	319,146
South Dakota							0	0	0	348,600	401,570
Nebraska							28,841	122,993	452,402	1,062,656	1,066,300
Kansas							107,206	364,399	996,096	1,428,108	1,470,495
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0	72,927	174,923	315,385	653,119	1,213,935	1,674,657
Montana								20,595	39,159	142,924	243,329
Idaho								14,999	32,610	88,548	161,772
Wyoming								9,118	20,789	62,555	92,531
Colorado							34,277	39,864	194,327	413,249	539,700
New Mexico						61,547	93,516	91,874	119,565	160,282	195,310
Arizona								9,658	40,440	88,243	122,931
Utah						11,380	40,273	86,786	143,963	210,779	276,749
Nevada							6,857	42,491	62,266	47,355	42,335
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0	105,891	444,053	675,125	1,114,578	1,888,334	2,416,692
Washington							11,594	23,955	75,116	357,232	518,103
Oregon						13,294	52,465	90,923	174,768	317,704	413,536
California						92,597	379,994	560,247	864,694	1,213,398	1,485,053
Total	5,308,483	7,239,881	9,638,453	12,860,702	17,063,353	23,191,876	31,443,321	38,558,371	50,155,783	62,947,714	75,994,575




Figure 7.4: Population graphs for the U.S. and its geographic regions from 1800 to 1900. The graph labels identify the data presented in each graph.

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Table 7.2: National and Regional Population Growth Rates

region	growth rate (%/year)	correlation coefficient	Period
United States	**2.74**	**0.998118**	**1800-1900**
	1.91	**0.999992**	**1890-1910**
New England	1.50	0.999178	1800-1900
	1.67	0.999656	1890-1910
Middle Atlantic	2.87	0.997386	1800-1850
	1.90	0.999011	1850-1900
	2.12	0.999298	1890-1910
South Atlantic	1.50	0.996820	1800-1900
	1.61	0.999850	1890-1910
South Central	4.94	0.997026	1810-1830
	3.50	0.998245	1830-1860
	2.36	0.992293	1860-1900
	2.18	0.999101	1890-1910
North Central	19.1	NA	1800-1810
	11.4	NA	1810-1820
	7.00	0.999015	1820-1840
	4.70	0.997204	1840-1870
	2.77	0.999285	1870-1890
	1.45	0.997600	1890-1910
Mountain States	7.40	0.997211	1850-1880
	4.82	0.983700	1880-1900
	3.95	0.995267	1890-1910
Pacific States	15.4	NA	1850-1860
	4.96	0.998686	1860-1890
	3.95	0.978798	1880-1900
	4.07	0.976609	1890-1910

NA: insufficient # of data points to calculate coefficient

The population data from table 7.1 and the census figures from the year 1910 are reasonably well-fitted statistically over an interval of years by piece-wise functions of the form

$$p = p_0 \cdot (1 + r)^n$$

where p is the estimated population, p_0 is a statistical population estimate at the beginning of the interval, n is the number of years in the interval, and r is an estimated annual growth rate per year. Table 7.2 tabulates the result of statistical analysis of the data for the indicated intervals of years. The table includes the correlation coefficient for the fit. In the analysis method used to produce this table, any correlation coefficient greater than 0.99 is regarded as an extremely good fit, whereas a correlation coefficient below this value is an indicator that the curve fit function shows a departure from shape of the actual data trend. A minimum interval of 20 years is required to obtain a meaningful correlation coefficient. There are three estimates in table 7.2 where the correlation coefficient falls beneath the desired minimum of 0.99; all three cases pertain to the Mountain States and Pacific States regions and indicate some unusual dynamical factor affecting population growth was occurring in these places at these times. I make no hypothesis of a causal state-related factor for these cases because I have so far been unable to find any state-related differences in growth patterns that account for the low correlation coefficients.

The annual population growth rate for the United States as a whole was remarkably constant over the span of the 19th century (although there is some sign that it was beginning to slow in the two decades from 1890 to 1910). This is somewhat surprising for two reasons. First, there is no statistical evidence that the American industrial revolution had a significant effect on total U.S. population growth. It has frequently been assumed that industrial revolutions produce an increase in population growth rate, but this apparently did not happen in America. It would be reasonable to suspect that, because the industrial revolution was occurring concurrently with the westward expansion of the country, that westward expansion ameliorated the effect that might have been

seen in a region where the population could not emigrate to new land areas. However, the data does not support this supposition in any obvious way and so this must remain for the present an interesting empirical fact awaiting causal explanation. Second, there is no local evidence of any increase in population growth rates in New England or the Middle Atlantic regions, which were the sites for the major industrialization and financial changes that took place during the industrial revolution. Again, this runs counter to common previous speculation. The North Central region, which includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, actually exhibits a pronounced leveling off of growth rate precisely in the period when the industrial revolution was at its peak.

By 1910 all regions except the Mountain and Pacific states appear to be relatively stabilized in terms of population growth rate, and to have been in this condition for twenty years leading up to 1910. If growth rate has an unusual impact on literacy, therefore, we should expect to find it in the Mountain and Pacific states but not to find a similar effect in the more settled states to the east. By 1910 the major school reform movements of the 19th century that had been provoked by the social effects of the industrial revolution and the widening democratic-populism of the Age of Jackson had run their courses, and the 20th century era of schooling reform was in its nascent period. These reform movements will be discussed in due course and in conjunction with another socio-political change that took place during the 19th century, namely the rise of national political parties and their takeover of the mechanics of the election and governing processes at the national and state levels.

Table 7.3 tabulates the 1910 national and regional illiteracy percentages, as defined by the 1910 census, with the regions listed in descending order from highest to lowest illiteracy rates. The data is revealing although perhaps not especially surprising. Table 7.5 provides the more detailed breakdown of this data on a state-by-state basis with figures included for illiteracy rates among native-born non-black Americans, black Americans, and non-native born immigrants. The population levels for non-native born immigrants is also provided in that table.

Table 7.3: U.S. and Regional Illiteracy in 1910 as % of total population

region (rank)	total illiteracy rate (%)	native-born whites (%)	native-born blacks (%)	white immigrants (%)
total U.S. (-)	5.93	1.66	2.46	1.80
So. Atlantic (1)	11.88	3.56	7.95	0.37
So. Central (2)	11.29	3.76	6.99	0.54
Mid. Atlantic (3)	4.49	0.54	0.14	3.81
New England (4)	4.27	0.51	0.07	3.70
Mountain (5)	3.77	1.71	0.06	2.01
No. Central (6)	2.46	0.86	0.20	1.40
Pacific States (7)	1.92	0.27	0.04	1.61

Percentages in table 7.3 are expressed as percent of the total U.S. or regional population. The percentages are misleading for illiteracy rate among blacks and immigrants because the more relevant figure is percent illiteracy in their populations. Table 7.4 provides a breakdown of this percentage for white immigrant illiteracy relative to total immigrant population in 1910.

Table 7.4: White Immigrant Illiteracy Rate as % of Immigrants

region (rank)	Total Immigrant Population	White Immigrant Illiteracy Rate (%)
U.S. Total (-)	13,515,886	12.1
So. Central (1)	440,017	18.84
Mid. Atlantic (2)	4,851,173	15.16
So. Atlantic (3)	299,994	14.98
New England (4)	1,825,110	13.29
Mountain States (5)	453,322	11.68
No. Central (6)	4,690,461	8.92
Pacific States (7)	955,809	7.08

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Table 7.5: U.S. Illiteracy Data (1910)

State	Total 1910 Population	immigrants	illiterate native whites	illiterate native blacks	white illiterate immigrants	white non-English speaking immigrants	percent illiteracy
New England	**6,552,681**	**1,825,110**	**33,157**	**4,341**	**242,513**	**326,890**	**4.27**
Maine	742,371	110,562	9,824	93	14,394	19,589	3.27
New Hampshire	430,572	96,667	2,839	51	13,485	26,783	3.80
Vermont	355,956	49,921	4,495	69	6,239	8,342	3.03
Massachusetts	3,366,416	1,059,245	9,163	2,584	129,412	171,014	4.19
Rhode Island	542,610	179,141	3,253	752	29,781	36,961	6.23
Connecticut	1,114,756	329,574	3,583	792	49,202	64,201	4.81
Middle Atlantic	**19,315,892**	**4,851,173**	**103,651**	**27,751**	**735,244**	**1,217,698**	**4.49**
New York	9,113,614	2,748,011	36,318	5,708	362,025	597,012	4.43
New Jersey	2,537,167	660,788	12,253	7,405	93,551	153,861	4.46
Pennsylvania	7,665,111	1,442,374	55,080	14,638	279,668	466,825	4.56
South Atlantic	**12,194,895**	**299,994**	**433,809**	**969,432**	**44,934**	**71,389**	**11.88**
Delaware	202,322	17,492	3,525	6,345	3,359	4,824	6.54
Maryland	1,295,346	104,944	18,952	42,289	19,047	17,544	6.20
Dist. of Columbia	331,069	24,902	960	10,814	1,944	1,349	4.14
Virginia	2,061,612	27,057	81,457	148,950	2,368	3,983	11.29
West Virginia	1,221,119	57,218	51,407	10,347	13,075	27,461	6.13
North Carolina	2,206,287	6,092	132,189	156,303	477	779	13.10
South Carolina	1,515,400	6,179	50,245	226,242	399	447	18.27
Georgia	2,609,121	15,477	80,203	308,639	875	953	14.94
Florida	752,619	40,633	14,871	59,503	3,390	14,049	10.33
South Central	**17,194,435**	**440,017**	**645,674**	**1,202,749**	**92,889**	**158,011**	**11.29**
Kentucky	2,289,905	40,162	146,797	57,900	3,300	3,816	9.08
Tennessee	2,184,789	18,607	120,966	98,541	1,488	1,648	10.12
Alabama	2,138,093	19,286	84,768	265,628	2,063	3,028	16.48
Mississippi	1,797,114	9,770	28,599	259,438	1,364	1,491	16.10
Arkansas	1,574,449	17,046	55,025	124,618	1,466	2,741	11.50
Louisiana	1,656,388	52,766	85,359	254,148	12,085	11,547	21.23
Oklahoma	1,657,155	40,442	33,569	17,858	3,828	7,975	3.33
Texas	3,896,542	241,938	90,591	124,618	67,295	125,765	7.25
North Central	**29,888,542**	**4,690,461**	**257,085**	**58,501**	**418,186**	**968,581**	**2.46**
Ohio	4,767,121	598,374	47,310	10,460	66,887	163,722	2.61
Indiana	2,700,876	159,663	40,955	6,959	18,200	40,731	2.45
Illinois	5,638,591	1,205,314	40,486	9,713	117,751	266,557	2.98
Michigan	2,810,173	597,550	17,846	826	51,113	102,286	2.48
Wisconsin	2,333,860	512,865	11,468	113	43,662	120,665	2.37
Minnesota	2,075,708	543,595	5,838	215	40,627	89,850	2.25
Iowa	2,224,771	273,765	11,541	1,272	16,894	37,169	1.34
Missouri	3,293,335	229,779	65,242	23,062	22,631	37,747	3.37
North Dakota	577,056	156,654	1,413	20	9,474	33,491	1.89
South Dakota	583,888	100,790	1,239	38	4,896	18,486	1.06
Nebraska	1,192,214	176,662	4,275	482	12,264	29,519	1.43
Kansas	1,690,949	135,450	9,472	5,341	13,787	28,358	1.69
Mountain	**2,633,517**	**453,322**	**44,947**	**1,491**	**52,950**	**96,637**	**3.77**
Montana	376,053	94,713	736	114	8,445	13,718	2.47
Idaho	325,594	42,578	707	37	2,742	5,805	1.07
Wyoming	145,965	29,020	298	102	2,548	5,970	2.02
Colorado	799,024	129,587	8,133	850	13,897	22,610	2.86
New Mexico	327,301	23,146	30,338	191	6,580	11,776	11.34
Arizona	204,354	48,765	3,776	122	13,758	25,072	8.64
Utah	373,351	65,822	772	49	3,636	8,129	1.19
Nevada	81,875	19,691	187	26	1,344	3,557	1.90
Pacific	**4,192,304**	**955,809**	**11,180**	**1,608**	**67,645**	**113,805**	**1.92**
Washington	1,141,990	256,241	1,836	239	11,233	25,568	1.17
Oregon	672,765	113,136	1,841	40	6,120	13,531	1.19
California	2,377,549	586,432	7,503	1,329	50,292	74,706	2.49
Total	**91,972,266**	**13,515,886**	**1,529,503**	**2,265,873**	**1,654,361**	**2,953,011**	**5.93**

Keith and Bagley do not provide more detailed breakdowns of regional populations for non-white ethnic groups, any Native American data, or Asian and Hispanic immigrants breakouts. Given the racial and ethnic attitudes prevalent among the majority whites at the beginning of the 20th century, this is not surprising nor should it be assumed such census data would be accurate.

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Table 7.6: Native-born American Illiteracy by Age Group

age range (years)	# black illiterates	% of total	est. total blacks	# white illiterates	% of total	est. total whites	sum of age range
10-14	218,555	18.9	1,156,376	131,991	1.7	7,764176	8,920,552
15-19	214,860	20.3	1,058,424	140,323	1.9	7,385,421	8,443,845
20-24	245,860	23.9	1,028,703	148,541	2.3	6,448,826	7,477,529
25-34	380,742	24.6	1,547,732	247,774	2.4	10,323,917	11,871,649
35-44	351,858	32.3	1,089,344	235,489	3.0	7,849,633	8,938,977
45-64	584,514	52.7	1,109,135	446,855	5.0	8,937,100	10,046,235
65+	219,255	74.5	294,302	179,219	7.3	2,455,055	2,749,357
totals	**2,215,644**		**7,284,016**	**1,530,192**		**51,164,128**	**58,448,144**

total immigrant population: 13,515,886 (14.70%)
sum blacks + whites + immigrants: 71,964,030 (78.25%)
unaccounted population: 20,008,236 (21.75%) [Keith & Bagley (1920)]

Using data from *Abstract of the Census, 1910* (pp. 241-242), Keith and Bagley compiled a breakout of native-born illiteracy by age group [Keith & Bagley (1920), pg. 149]. Table 7.6 presents their data along with estimates of the total population of black and white Americans implied by their estimated percentages. This data provides us with a window into likely illiteracy rates extending backwards into the 19th century to around the year 1845. Again, some cautions are in order concerning this data. Most particularly, the Keith & Bagley figures for the number of illiterates is not consistent with other 1910 census data. The discrepancy for white illiterates is small (only 689 people or +0.045% of the number of white illiterates), but it is larger for native black illiterates, underestimating the other census figure by 50,229 people (2.2% of the total). It cannot be ascertained from this data whether the discrepancy is due to an arithmetical or proof-reading error by Keith & Bagley (their book contains such errors), or if it is due to inconsistency in the published census data source itself.[3] When the back-calculated total populations of blacks and whites is added to the census figure for immigrant population, the total leaves around one-fifth of the total U.S. population (20 million people) unaccounted for. Some large fraction of the unaccounted-for group is made up of children under the age of ten[4], but it was not possible to accurately determine how large this fraction is from the data provided.

The first and probably most important thing to note is that illiteracy rate rises monotonically the farther back in time one goes. This is true for both black and white illiteracy. The conclusion appears to be inescapable that illiteracy rates *circa* 1845 were significantly higher than the rates characteristic of the period from 1900 to 1910. For black Americans an illiteracy rate of around 75% appears to be characteristic of antebellum America in the 1840s, while for native-born whites the rate is probably around 7% nationally. The figure characteristic of 1860 is probably around 50% or higher for blacks and at least 5% for whites. This is consistent with the historical fact that there were two publicly-driven movements to, firstly, better organize the institution of schooling in America (from 1820 to 1860) and then, secondly, to reorganize it in the period from 1860 to 1900 [Blake (1961), pg. 51]. It does not, however, speak to causative factors provoking a public movement for schooling reform. It merely testifies that causative factors existed. Taken overall, this provides us with empirical evidence that the initial state efforts to promote schooling were ***not*** satisfactory (because if they were, there would have been no public reform movement).

A second thing that clearly stands out in the tables of data presented above was a general lack of real (that is, practically feasible) adult school-based educational opportunity. Evidence for this is provided by the high illiteracy rate levels seen among immigrants and displayed in table 7.4.

[3] It is not uncommon for parts of U.S. census reports to appear to be, or to be, inconsistent with other parts of the same report. This is something I have noted previously in other studies. Census data must be treated as empirical data with measurement error allowances of at least a few percent.
[4] By definition, a 1910 illiterate must be ten years of age or older.

It is also pertinent to compare illiteracy figures with the crude estimate of colonial literacy, which was possibly as high as 90% for men and 40 to 65% for women in New England [Potter (1967), pg. 28]. This estimate does not, of course, tell us anything about level of proficiency, but neither does the census data cited above. It does suggest that on a national average the schooling institution, at least for white Americans, was about as effective by 1845-50 as it had been in the colonial period if literacy, as measured by the popular definition of that day, is an indicator of general schooling effectiveness. The questions are then: (1) was that effective enough? and (2) if not, why?

Institution of public schooling exists in a Society for one reason only: because the people in that Society have judged that the institution provides important social benefits to *Personfähigkeit*, either by assisting them in the perfection of their own or by providing assistance by which their children can perfect theirs. This ground for public demand of schooling institution pertains to the personal dimension of the function of instructional education. Agents of government set up and finance schooling institution for two general reasons: (1) in antisocial government (oligarchy and democracy), the agents do so because they believe that to maintain their power to rule they must pacify a demand by the ruled for schooling institution; (2) in republican government, agents of government do so because: (i) they regard the institution as a key factor in preparing and developing the people of their Society as citizens (security of civil liberty); (ii) because schooling is a means for accomplishing the fundamental government objective of promoting the Society's general welfare; (iii) because it is necessary for the possibility of providing for a strong common defense of that Society; (iv) because it promotes the establishment of justice in the Society; (v) because it promotes the formation of a more perfect Union – five of the six basic objectives of *all* government specified in the Preamble of the United States Constitution. These pertain to the social dimension of the function of instructional education. The common ground between citizens' and government's motivations is the Society's social contract, whether this contract is explicit or only the product of accepted social mores and folkways.

Therefore, when a school reform movement occurs affecting a large fraction of a Society this means precisely one thing: the existing institution is not satisfying the expectations of those who are involved in the reform movement. For this to happen – and it did *twice* in the 19th century – there must be causative factors at work in the dynamics of the Society. Successful reform only is possible if these causative factors are first correctly identified and then adequately addressed. To accomplish the first, correctly identifying the causative factors, requires us to understand the practical needs of the citizens in a Society by understanding the social environment (this chapter) and then understanding what life-challenges are posed by that environment (next chapter).

§ 4. The American Industrial Revolution

In 19th century America, one principal social force from which causative factors in the social dynamic originate is unmistakably clear: the Toynbee challenge raised by the American industrial revolution. It is estimated that by 1910 roughly sixty percent of American school-age children still lived in rural communities – which the Census Bureau defined as a community of less than 2500 people. This also means that forty percent did not, but even so by the start of the twentieth century most children still lived in a "rural" environment. The percentage would have been even higher throughout the nineteenth century. The most visible feature of an industrial revolution – the factory – is generally found in the urban setting, and so the first question to the assertion that the industrial revolution brought forth a Toynbee challenge for American Society as a whole is: did it really? In view of typical contemporary presuppositions, this might seem to be an inane question. But, as a social-natural phenomenon, a national economy is an extraordinarily complicated thing. Let us begin by examining the statistical demographics of America during the latter half of the 19th century when the American industrial revolution was in its full flowering.

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Table 7.7: Summary of Manufacturing in the U.S. 1859-1899

year	U.S. population (est.)	no. of manufacturing establishments	wage-earners (population)	wage-earners (% of population)	capital (thousands)	wages (thousands)	wages per wage-earner (dollars)	wages per capita (dollars)
1859	30,581,774	140,433	1,311,246	4.29	$1,009,856	$378,879	288.95	12.39
1869	37,501,872	252,148	2,053,996	5.48	$1,694,576	$620,467	302.08	16.54
1879	48,781,515	253,852	2,732,595	5.60	$2,790,273	$947,954	346.91	19.43
1889	61,222,947	355,405	4,251,535	6.94	$6,525,051	$1,891,220	444.83	30.89
1899	73,912,324	512,191	5,306,143	7.18	$9,813,834	$2,320,938	437.41	31.40

year	value of products (thousands)	product value per wage-earner (dollars)	product value per capita (dollars)	product value to wage ratio	product value to capital ratio	capital-to-wage ratio	wage earners per establishment	population to establishment ratio
1859	$1,885,862	1,438.22	61.67	4.98	1.87	2.67	9.34	217.77
1869	$3,385,860	1,648.43	90.29	5.46	2.00	2.73	8.15	148.73
1879	$5,369,579	1,965.01	110.07	5.66	1.92	2.94	10.76	192.17
1889	$9,372,379	2,204.47	153.09	4.96	1.44	3.45	11.96	172.26
1899	$13,000,149	2,450.02	175.89	5.60	1.32	4.23	10.36	144.31

year	U.S. population (total)	U.S. population percent urban	U.S. population percent rural	U.S. population (urban)	U.S. population (rural)	ratio of urban population to wage-earners	ratio of rural population to urban population
1860	31,443,321	19.80	80.20	6,225,778	25,217,543	4.75	4.05
1870	39,818,449	25.70	74.30	9,909,501	28,648,870	4.82	2.89
1880	50,155,783	28.20	71.80	14,143,931	36,011,852	5.18	2.55
1890	62,947,714	35.10	64.90	22,094,648	40,853,066	5.20	1.85
1900	75,994,575	39.60	60.40	30,093,852	45,900,723	5.67	1.53

The demographic manufacturing data for 1859-1899 was compiled by Morison & Commager (1930, pg. 924) from U.S. census data. The rural and urban population percentages are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, *The Statistical History of the United States* (1976) and the Census Bureau's annual publication, *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*. U.S. population data for 1859, '69, '79, '89, and '99 are estimated by derating decennial census figures by the 2.74% estimated growth rate factor from table 7.2 above. For comparison, the percent urban populations for the decennial years 1800 to 1850 are 6.1, 7.3, 7.2, 8.8, 10.8, and 15.3%, respectively.

Data analysis shows that the entire period from 1800 to 1900 cannot be covered by single population models with physically interpretable urban and rural parameters. Furthermore, urban and rural growth rate dynamics are markedly different for differing time periods. Table 7.8 shows the urban and rural growth rate statistics and growth rate model fits from 1800 to 1900. Five urban population models covering different intervals of time are required to achieve model errors of under ± 5%. Three different model periods are required for similarly fitting the rural population data. The table provides the model estimates and estimated annual growth rates.

Table 7.8 US. Urban and Rural Growth Patterns from 1800 to 1900

year	total U.S. population	urban population	urban model estimated population	urban model error percentage	urban annual growth rate (%)	urban model correlation coefficient	rural population	rural model estimated population	rural model error percentage	rural annual growth rate (%)	rural model correlation coefficient
1800	5,308,483	323,817	323,817	0.00	5.021	NA	4,984,666	4,993,149	0.17	2.967	0.9999492
1810	7,239,881	528,511	528,511	0.00			6,711,370	6,688,584	-0.34		
1820	9,638,453	693,968	697,692	0.54	2.844	0.999863394	8,944,485	8,959,708	0.17		
1830	12,860,702	925,971	923,497	-0.27			11,934,731	12,001,996	0.56		
1840	17,063,353	1,842,842	1,822,654	-1.10	6.948	0.999899171	15,220,511	15,285,089	0.42	2.282	0.99421795
1850	23,191,876	3,548,357	3,567,954	0.55			19,643,519	19,153,771	-2.49		
1860	31,443,321	6,225,778	6,026,857	-3.20	5.269	0.998503758	25,217,543	24,001,623	-4.82		
1870	38,558,371	9,909,501	9,912,825	0.03	3.851	0.997813928	28,648,870	30,076,475	4.98		
1880	50,155,783	14,143,931	14,464,284	2.26			36,011,852	36,069,726	0.16	1.221	0.99973746
1890	62,947,714	22,094,648	21,105,539	-4.48			40,853,066	40,722,073	-0.32		
1900	75,994,575	30,093,852	30,796,116	2.33			45,900,723	45,974,490	0.16		




Figure 7.5: Graphs of U.S. urban and rural populations from 1800 to 1900.




Figure 7.6: Railroad mileage and urban population growth. (A) Railroad mileage in the U.S. from 1830 to 1920. (B) Scatter plot of urban U.S. population and railroad mileage from 1840 to 1900.

The five urban population models are

$$M_1\,(1800-1810): \quad p_u(y) = 323{,}817\cdot(1.050208282)^{y-1800}$$
$$M_2\,(1810-1830): \quad p_u(y) = 527{,}857\cdot(1.028435757)^{y-1810}$$
$$M_3\,(1830-1850): \quad p_u(y) = 931{,}085\cdot(1.069477116)^{y-1830} \qquad \text{people.}$$
$$M_4\,(1850-1870): \quad p_u(y) = 3{,}606{,}440\cdot(1.052691761)^{y-1850}$$
$$M_5\,(1870-1900): \quad p_u(y) = 9{,}912{,}825\cdot(1.038508246)^{y-1870}$$

It is interesting to compare the urban population growth to the growth in railroad mileage built in the U.S. from the 1830s to 1900. Figure 7.6A is a graph of railroad mileage vs. year from 1830 to 1920. Figure 7.6B plots urban population vs. railroad mileage from 1840 to 1900. We would expect no scatter plot relation between these two variables at all for 1830 and prior because there were effectively no railroads in the U.S. during that period. The decade from 1830 to 1840 was the decade of the railroad's first establishment, during which railroad mileage grew from 23 miles of track in 1830 to 2,818 miles of track in 1840 [Morison & Commager (1930), pg. 924]. From 1840 on, railroad mileage is describable by three models covering the years 1840-1860, 1860-1890, and 1890-1920. What is more interesting, though, is the relationship shown in figure 7.6B, where two log-linear relationships between urban population p_u and railroad mileage μ can be plainly seen over precisely the same intervals, 1850-1870 and 1870-1900, that are described by models M_4 and M_5 above. With p_u in millions and μ in thousands, the models are




Figure 7.7: Scatter plot of rural population vs. railroad mileage from 1840 to 1900. Log-linear straight line relationships can also be seen in this figure spanning 1860-1880 and 1880-1900 but these are most likely to be phantom relationships because they have no common overlap with rural population model fit intervals.

$$R_1\ (1850-1870): \quad p_u(\mu) = 2.930047 \cdot \exp(0.02337559 \cdot \mu)$$
$$R_2\ (1870-1900): \quad p_u(\mu) = 6.648661 \cdot \exp(0.00780500 \cdot \mu).$$

Correlation factors for these relationships are 0.9979732 for R_1 and 0.9990456 for R_2. The population prediction error range for R_1 is –3.71% to + 1.94% and for R_2 it is –2.66% to +2.00%.

A conclusion should *not* be drawn that railroad mileage μ is a direct causal factor determining urban population p_u (or vice versa). Personally, I think such an hypothesis is absurd. However, the fact that the time intervals for models R_1 and R_2 are identical to time intervals for best models describing urban population in figure 7.5A seems significant. Railroad transportation can be, and was, an *enabler* of urban population growth because it made emigration from the countryside to the larger towns and cities possible for more country people (particularly younger people). μ cannot be a *causal* factor because the mere availability of affordable railroad transportation is not in itself a motivating factor for people to choose to migrate from the country to the urban setting. The relationship that seems to exist between p_u and μ might be a real relationship, but if so we must seek *parametric* causes of such a relationship from real factors in human Self-determination.

We must also always keep in mind that such a putative relationship might be mere appearance. Figure 7.7 is a similar scatter plot between rural population and railroad mileage. Log-linear relationships can also be described mathematically for this plot. The periods 1840-1850, 1860-1880, and 1880-1900 are obvious candidates in this plot. The fits are also very close, with less than ± 0.1% error for 1860-1880 and less than ± 2% for 1880-1900. However, these fit regions do not correspond to rural population model fit regions for figure 7.5B, which are

$$M_{1r}\ (1800-1830): \quad p_r(y) = 4{,}993{,}149 \cdot (1.029665031)^{y-1800}$$
$$M_{2r}\ (1840-1880): \quad p_r(y) = 12{,}197{,}804 \cdot (1.022818636)^{y-1830}.$$
$$M_{3r}\ (1880-1900): \quad p_r(y) = 36{,}069{,}726 \cdot (1.012205525)^{y-1880}$$

The absence of a log-linear relationship covering 1850-1870 (much less 1840-1880) in figure 7.7 argues strongly against concluding there is a real relationship present between p_r and μ elsewhere in this graph.

The case for a real connection between railroad mileage and urban population growth is also supported by the relationship between manufacturing capital investment and railroad mileage. Capital is a more reliable indicator here than the number of manufacturing establishments because businesses do fail but capital investment in it is made regardless of its success or failure.




Figure 7.8: Scatter plot of manufacturing capital investment vs. railroad mileage from 1860 to 1900. The dots denote the data points and the dashed line is the model fit over the period from 1870 to 1900.

Figure 7.8 illustrates this data and the model fit to it over the period from 1870 to 1900. Model correlation is 0.9995753 and the model error range from 1870 to 1900 is –3.17% to +2.22%. If the 1860 data point is included in the model fit the quality of the fit is seriously degraded and the model error spread increases to –9.18% to +12.4%. The fit range again supports the hypothesis that a real relationship exists between urban population and railroad mileage. The real connection between railroad mileage and industrialization is undoubted. Railroads provided transportation of manufactured goods to remote markets and raw materials to the factories. Capacity to transport goods is known to be one of the factors necessary to support wide scale manufacturing activity and to develop an industrialized economy.

That the industrial revolution had a major and fundamental impact on American Society has never been seriously doubted or questioned. The point behind the foregoing analysis is to assert that the revolution brought into play causative factors in the social dynamic, including factors that exerted a fundamental effect on the American institution of public education, and that these factors posed a Toynbee challenge to American Society. Its significant technical finding is that at least three principal sub-periods within the 19th century revolution are identifiable from the historical data: the period prior to 1850, the period from 1850 to 1870, and the period from 1870 to 1900. It is instructive to compare this finding with the date ranges of well known education-related movements in the United States [Blake (1961)]:

- the infant school movement: 1818 to 1838;
- New York Free School Society: 1805 to 1855;
- the national Free School Societies Movement: 1820 to 1835;
- the monitor schools movement: 1820 to 1830;
- the organization of labor associations: 1785 to 1840;
- the Manual Labor Movement: 1800 to 1865;
- Mechanics' Institutes: 1824 to 1855;
- free, non-sectarian public schools reform organization movements: 1820 to 1860;
- the Corporation Schools Movement: 1870 to 1905;
- the Trade School Movement: 1868 to 1912;
- the Manual Training Movement: 1876 to *c*. 1900;
- the California Vocational Education Movement: 1854 to 1915;
- establishment of the United States Office of Education: 1867;
- the utilitarian (or "new") education movement: 1870 to 1900 [Reese (2011), pp. 79-117].

These various movements fall more or less into the same three industrialization time periods just noted. Various education historians [e.g., Reese (2011), Potter (1967), Cubberley (1919)] provide piece-by-piece perspectives on these various movements and political lobbying activities. What I see in overall perspective are processes of social granulation and political conflicts over

divers needs. That one group or another might carry the day for at least awhile and see the institution of its particular theory and opinions put into effect is of lesser importance to understanding the development of the American institution of public instructional education. Of more importance is an understanding of the conflicting Toynbee challenges that gave rise to this social diversity. The victory of one faction and the installation of its viewpoint in no way means that the other factions disappear or that the dissatisfactions that motivated them are resolved. Every one of the divers theories represented by these movements was based on satisficing analyses and was at root unscientific even as some of the participating antagonists claimed that theirs was a scientific way of looking at the issues and challenges. The theories and opinions were based on divers and ontology-centered maxims rather than on the mental physics of human Nature. In this context, the theories can each be labeled "non-natural" at best and "unnatural" at worst. Reactionary groups, who are also part of the overall picture, do not have theories; they have opinions and their efforts largely are directed at preserving an unsustainable *status quo* they happen to judge favorably.

We must do what more purely historical analyses have not, namely, attempt to delineate the disequilibrations that produced social granulation and then dig more deeply into the underlying mental physics of human behavior in order to understand the failure by American Society overall to resolve the Toynbee challenges it faced. To do this, we must examine the factions.

§ 5. Socio-economic Background in the U.S. Institution of Public Education

Human behavior is motivated by affective non-equilibrium; human actions are taken for the purpose of restoring a sufficient state of equilibrium. An individual's state of equilibrium or non-equilibrium is measured by feelings of satisfaction (*Wohlgefallen* in Critical terminology) or dissatisfaction (*Mißfallen*) [Wells (2009), chap. 3, §4.1]. In mental physics, feelings of satisfaction have a peculiar "negative" connotation because Critical satisfaction is a feeling describable as "oh, this is not-bad." Dissatisfaction, in contrast, is describable as a feeling of "oh, this is not-good." The person judges his state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction subjectively in his process of aesthetical reflective judgment as feelings of Critical *Lust* (pronounced "loost"; there is no English equivalent of this word; the "flavor" of the term is described by the American 1960s colloquialism, "I'm up for that!") or Critical *Unlust* (described by "that's a downer").

A person's actions are always aimed either at maintaining or actualizing an object of *Lust* or avoiding or abolishing an object of *Unlust*. When feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust* counterbalance each other such that each negates the effect of the other, the state of the person is called Critical ***happiness***. Psychologists Elaine and Arthur Aron have called happiness the "neutral gear" of human sense-of-being [Aron & Aron (1987)]. Behaviorally, people establish routines and rituals they habitually follow. Behavior patterns of this sort are psychological indicators that the person's state is dominantly one of happiness. He does not seek to change his circumstance and, rather, is acting to preserve and live in it. These routines are generally cyclic, often spanning days or longer at a time with identifiable sub-cycles embedded in it. Do you have a daily routine at your job, some series of actions that, *ceteris paribus*, you always more or less repeat at work? If so, this is an example of precisely this sort of "happiness cycle." My own morning work ritual includes starting the coffee brewing and then going through my Email before commencing whatever my tasks *du jour* might be that distinguish one day from other days of the week. Barring unusual circumstances, the week's pattern will repeat more or less in the same way the next week, the week after that, and so on for as long as school is in session. At the end of the academic year I switch to my "summer cycle." At summer's end I switch back into "school cycle."

In the daily *commercium* of life in a Society, when the actions of the great majority of people fall into a mosaic of individual patterns of behavior of this sort, the Community itself is said to be exhibiting "domestic tranquility" and the Society is operating more or less in equilibrium. One of




Figure 7.9: Oscillogram of economic expansions and recessions in the U.S. from 1790 to 1920. Above-zero ratings denote economic expansion. Below-zero ratings denote economic recession. Strength of expansion or recession is indicated by the size of the stems. The 11 biggest recessions are economic depressions. The larger expansions are called economic booms.




Figure 7.10: Historical estimated inflation and deflation rates in the U.S. from colonial times to 2008.

the key determiners of a general state of happiness and welfare is the Community's economy. Economic dislocations tend to provoke movements and agitations for change. Disagreements in individual judgments of taste concerning changes likewise tend to produce the formation of factions, generation of antibonding relationships between antagonists, and tighter bonding relationships among those whose tastes are in agreement with one another. Understanding the various education reform movements of the nineteenth century requires us to examine economic conditions of the time and the role these conditions played in action determinations insofar as these actions pertain to different people's maxims of Duty-to-Self and social Duty.

Figures 7.9 and 7.10 together provide a qualitative perspective on U.S. economics over the 19th and early 20th centuries. Figure 7.9 illustrates the oscillating character of business cycles in the economy. This semi-chaotic economic characteristics is typical of unregulated uncivic free enterprise: periods of expansion and relative prosperity are interrupted by "busts" or recessions. A recession is defined as "a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales."

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


Figure 7.11: Estimated product value by state in 1919.

Recessions, like expansions, are generally felt across the economy but not with equal impact to all sectors or regions. Figure 7.11 displays the differences among the states in the gross market value of products characterizing the states' divers enterprises in 1919. With the exceptions of North Carolina, Minnesota, Kansas, Texas, and California – and making allowances for the fact that most of the western, Pacific northwest and inland northwest regions were not settled until the latter half of the 19th century – this picture is descriptive of the 19th century as well. The feature most often associated with an industrial revolution – factories – was largely confined to the "industrialized North" (specifically, the northeast). The produce of the factory system did, of course, affect the merchandising and agricultural enterprises in the other regions of the country. It altered the type of merchandise wholesalers and retailers had to offer consumers; it changed the tools available to farmers (farm implements); and it significantly expanded activity in that part of the market economy specializing in the distribution of goods. In all these aspects, industrialization in the form of factories and machinery in the northeast enabled what one might call "soft industrialization" in the merchandising and wholesale trade parts of the overall economy as larger Enterprise operations came into being in these sectors. It also affected resource industries (timber and mining) both by providing more demand for resource products and by providing a supply of tools and technology for carrying out these enterprises.

This is part and parcel of the Enterprise-protein molecular structure of a Society. Significant changes in one part of the economic sector are quickly reflected by changes in the other parts, and the follow-on changes there in turn are reflected by reactions in the first sector. As I said before, a nation's economy is very complicated phenomenon. The one common factor tying it all together is people: an economy is a human-social-natural phenomenon. The most broad based empirical indicator of common effect stimulating popular behaviors and activities is the purchasing power of money – the factor that figure 7.10 illustrates. As the common instrument of exchange, money and its purchasing power is the most direct indicator of tangible *Personfähigkeit* for individuals. Inflation means persistent increases in the general level of prices. Economists frequently regard it as a devaluing of the worth of money. Deflation means a sustained reduction in the general level of prices. It is often, although not always, accompanied by declines in output, wages and employment.

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


Figure 7.12: Map of the distribution of U.S. agricultural and natural resources industries by the 1930s.

As figure 7.10 illustrates, deflation is an economic phenomenon most Americans living today have never experienced. Although inflation has been a chronic phenomenon in the U.S. since 1940, there has been no deflationary interval in the U.S. since the end of the 1930s. It was an ever present feature of the 19th century U.S. economy, alternating with periods of inflation in a pattern that almost perfectly matches the periods of recession and expansion. Deflation was especially prevalent in the U.S. from 1815 through the early 1830s – precisely the germination period of the factory system in the U.S. *and* the first education reform movements *and* the beginning of a wider movement toward more democracy in America's political institutions. The only significant factor distinguishing the pre-1940 and post-1940 periods in U.S. history in regard to a mechanism for affecting the inflation-deflation economic phenomenon is the greater national role the general government assumed in regulating and policing business practices during and after World War II. It is therefore not unreasonable to postulate that if agents of the general government were to cease this role, or perform it incompetently, the economic phenomenon of deflation would return.

It is important *not* to neglect the Enterprise-protein structure of the economy or associate the U.S. industrial revolution exclusively with the factory system. An industrial revolution is called that because it changes the natures of *all* enterprises in an economy. To emphasize this point, figure 7.12 illustrates agricultural and natural resources Enterprise distribution in the U.S. by the 1930s. Wholesaling and retailing Enterprises are distributed throughout the geography of a nation's economy, I point I presume is obvious to you. No rural region is really as rustic as city-dwellers sometimes tend to think, and no urban region is really as purely a factory-and-manufacturing environment as rural people often tend to think. Enterprise differences tend to give rise to controversies in any Society during times of economic and social challenges. The specific enterprise role of an individual likewise tends to produce differences of opinions and promotes controversies and factions in Society. Such factionalism was vividly demonstrated in the controversies over divers proposals for how to institute education in the U.S. What was *not* demonstrated was consensus-building and synergy in planning or carrying out the institution. Instead, an unstable tyranny of democracy-rule steered the institutional development.

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§ 6. Political Factionalism in the 19th Century

Mental physics teaches us that the individual is generally the best and wisest judge of matters in which he has much personal real experience and usually the poorest judge of matters in which his real personal experience is either lacking, cursory, or merely theoretical. This is because in the former case his knowledge is based upon facts of experience whereas in the latter cases it is based on speculation founded upon whatever idiosyncrasies of pseudo-metaphysics he uses as the basis for his speculations concerning matters in which he lacks personal experience. Bear in mind that *any* metaphysic is, at its root, nothing less and nothing more than "the way one looks at the world." For most people, their personal metaphysic is developed during childhood, is the product of personal accidents of experience, and goes no farther than this in its basis. Such a metaphysic is what mental physics calls a "pseudo-metaphysic." A smaller number of people hold theoretical refinements from a more formally-developed *system* of metaphysics. The two major ontology-centered systems we encounter can be called empiricism and rationalism, and it is not uncommon for divers individuals to have Self-developed an idiosyncratic mixture of the two.

Unfortunately, *no* ontology-centered metaphysic is objectively valid because: (1) it posits as an object a mythic reality-entity, typically named either "reality" or "nature," that *acts upon* objects of Nature; and (2) because of this it eventually must attempt to explain this reality-entity from *super*natural grounds. *All* ontology-centered systems of metaphysics ultimately must call upon some sort of deity to rescue their foundations, whether this deity is a god in the religious sense, a "god of probability" in a mathematical-materialist sense, or simply "fate" in a wholly mystic sense. No secure *science* can be built upon such foundations and only an epistemology-centered metaphysic – the Critical philosophy of the phenomenon of human mind – is able to ground an objectively-valid understanding of Nature.

The metaphysic an individual conceptualizes (in his manifold of concepts) plays a direct role in his choices of Self-determination of action. I can hardly say it any clearer than *metaphysics matters*. A metaphysic is a Self-created *mental* Object of Man's *homo noumenal* Nature as a free agent, and it is a partial determiner of the individual's actions and beliefs. Combine individuals' taken-for-granted reliance on their own personal metaphysics with the empirically observable phenomena of adult egocentrism and moral realism, and you have the complete and objectively-valid scientific basis for disagreement and faction in a Society. All else being equal, people judge problems and challenges affecting an entire Society from foundations in personal experience associated with their own individual societies. But every person's society is peculiar to himself, adult egocentrism orients him to assume that all other people understand a society as he does, and adult moral realism orients his judgment of taste to hold that his own view of society is *the one* "right opinion" (*orthodóxa*, *ορθοδοξια*, orthodoxy) and morally *ought* to prevail.

It is no more and no less than an uncomplicated satisficing action for an individual to seek out and establish social-chemical bonding relationships with others whose *ορθοδοξια* is compatible with his own, and to form social-chemical antibonding relationships with those whose *ορθοδοξια* is in conflict with his own. In this way factions coalesce. In 19th century America, factionalism came to take on the socialized structure of political parties. Early signs of it were present soon after George Washington's presidency began. This development was one the Framers of the U. S. Constitution had most feared. A great deal of debate during the 1787 Constitutional Convention revolved around concerns about the socially destructive nature of organized political factions.

Prior to the mid-1820s, political party faction was based on personalities, i.e., the faction was nucleated around individual persons. The first distinct U.S. political party, the Federalists, coalesced around the person of Alexander Hamilton. The group designated the Anti-Federalists was not really a political party but, rather, an alliance of those who were opposed to Federalist policies. *Historians* defined the Anti-Federalists. The second true political party, the Democratic-

Republicans, coalesced around the person of Thomas Jefferson. The first modern form of the institution of political party – the political party as a "political machine" – was the Democratic Party, and this did not happen until after the 1824 Presidential election and Andrew Jackson's loss to John Quincy Adams, a fellow Democratic-Republican, by vote of the U.S. Congress.

Table 7.9 lists the major national U.S. political parties and the date ranges over which they had some political effect on governance of the United States. These parties are political mini-Communities that formed in reaction to Toynbee challenges that first arose in America during the Economy revolution of the 18th century and continued with shifting empirical appearances during the industrial revolution phase and beyond to this day. Enlightenment thinkers among America's Founding Fathers recognized very early the danger political party factions posed to the political and social experiment they envisioned as the new Society of the American Republic. Madison spoke on this at the Constitutional Convention on June 6, 1787:

> Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the Legislature [Congress] by the people immediately as a clear principle of free Government, and that this mode under proper regulations had the additional advantage of securing better representatives as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the General one. He differed from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Government.[5] They were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined them with the necessity of pro-

Table 7.9: Major American Political Parties

Party	also known as	founded	disbanded	Party	also known as	founded	disbanded
Federalist Party		c. 1789	c. 1820	Farmer-Labor Party		1918	1944
Anti-Federalist Party		c. 1789	c. 1792	Proletarian Party of America		1920	1971
Democratic-Republican Party		1792	c. 1824	Progressive Party 1924		1924	1924
Toleration Party		1816	c. 1827	Communist League of America		1928	1934
Anti-Masonic Party		1826	1838	American Workers Party		1933	1934
National Republican Party		1825	1833	Workers Party of the United States		1934	1938
Democratic Party		1828		Union Party		1936	1936
Nullifier Party		1830	1839	American Labor Party		1936	1956
Whig Party		1833	1856	America First Party		1944	1996
Liberty Party		1840	1848	States Rights Democratic Party	Dixiecrats	1948	1948
Law and Order Party of Rhode Island		1840s	1840s	Progressive Party 1948		1948	1955
Free Soil Party		1848	1855	Vegetarian Party		1948	1964
Republican Party		1854		Constitution Party		1952	c. 1968
Anti-Nebraska Party		1854	1854	American Nazi Party		1959	1967
American Republican Party		1843	1854	Puerto Rican Socialist Party		1959	1993
American Party	Know-Nothings	1854	1858	Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party		1964	1964
Opposition Party		1854	1858	Black Panther Party		1966	1970s
Constitutional Union Party		1860	1860	Youth International Party	Yippies	1967	1967
Unconditional Union Party		1861	1866	Communist Workers Party		1969	1985
National Union Party		1864	1868	Libertarian Party		1971	
Readjuster Party		1870	1885	People's Party		1971	1976
People's Party of Utah		1870	1891	New Union Party		1974	c. 2005
Liberal Party (Utah)		1870	1893	U.S. Labor Party		1975	1979
Liberal Republican Party		1872	1872	Concerned Citizens Party		1975	1992
Greenback Party		1874	1884	Citizens Party		1979	1984
Socialist Labor Party of America		1876	2008	New Alliance Party		1979	1992
Anti-Monopoly Party		1884	1884	Populist Party of 1980s-1990s		1984	1994
People's Party	Populists	1887	1908	Looking Back Party		1984	1996
Silver Party		1892	1902	Independent Party of Utah		1988	1996
National Democratic Party	Gold Democrats	1896	1900	A Connecticut Party		1990	?
Silver Republican Party		1896	1900	Green Party		1991	
Social Democratic Party		1898	1901	Constitution Party (1992)		1992	
Home Rule Party of Hawaii		1900	1912	New Party		1992	1998
Socialist Party of America		1901	1972	Natural Law Party		1992	2004
Independence Party	Independence League	1906	1914	Veterans Party		2003	2008
Progressive Party	Bull Moose Party	1912	1914	Christian Freedom Party		2004	2004
National Women's Party		1913	1930	Personal Choice Party		2004	2006
Non-Partisan League		1915	1956	Boston Tea Party		2006	2012

[5] Roger Sherman had proposed that the "objects of the Union" were: 1. defense against foreign danger; 2. defense against internal disputes and a resort to violence; 3. treaties with foreign nations; and 4. regulation of foreign commerce and drawing revenue from it. [Farrand (1911), vol. 1, pg. 133]

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> viding more effectually for the security of private rights and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practiced in some of the States? The gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted that in a very small State faction and oppression would prevail. . . . Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest [states] . . . and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the Government would admit? This was the only defense against the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Government. All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, and interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, & the commercial interests, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are there to restrain them? . . . What had been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves? Had it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number? . . . The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a common sentiment and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure. In a Republican Government, the Majority if united have always an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests and parties that, in the 1st place, a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2nd place, that in case they should have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican system on such a scale and in such a form as will control all the evils which have been experienced. [Madison (1787), pp. 92-93; Farrand (1911), vol. 1, pp. 134-136]

By "enlarging the sphere," what Madison had in mind was counteracting the threat that faction in a majority of states could unite to oppress the other states through legislation; his remedy for this was to create as many different states as possible out of the new westward lands the United States had won from Britain during the Revolution. At that time the state governments themselves were the chief sources of faction in the United States and the closest thing to political parties that existed in the country. Alexander Hamilton agreed with Madison about the threat of factions, but he doubted Madison's countermeasure could really be as effective as Madison thought [Farrand (1911), vol. 1, pp. 146-147]. Hamilton's own radical prescription was to do away with the threat of states-as-factions by doing away with the state governments altogether and making the General Government a national government [*ibid*., June 18, 1787, pp. 294-301].

John Adams took more direct aim at political parties in general:

> National passions and habits are unwieldy, unmanageable, and formidable things. The number of persons in any country who are known even by name or reputation to all the inhabitants is, and ever must be, very small. Those whose characters have attracted the affections, as well as the attention of a whole people, acquire an influence and ascendancy that it is difficult to resist. In proportion as men rise higher in the world, whether by election, [family] descent, or appointment, and are exposed to the observation of greater numbers of people, the effects of their own passions and of the affections of others for them become more serious, interesting, and dangerous. In elective governments, where first magistrates and senators are at stated intervals to be chosen, these, if there are no parties, become at every fresh election more known, considered, and beloved by the whole nation. But if the nation is divided into two parties, those who vote for a man become the more attached to him for the opposition that is made by his enemies. This national attachment to an elective first magistrate, where there is no competition, is very great. But where there is a competition, the passions of his party are inflamed by it into a more ardent enthusiasm. If there are two candidates, each at the head of a party, the nation becomes divided into two

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> nations, each of which is, in fact, a moral person as much as any community can be so, and are soon bitterly enraged against each other. . . . Where there are rivals for the first place, the national attention and passions are divided, and thwart each other; the collision enkindles fires; the conflicting passions interest all ranks; they produce slanders and libels first, mobs and seditions next, and civil war, with all her hissing snakes, burning torches, and haggard horrors at last. [Adams (1790), pp. 362-364]

George Washington also regarded political parties as the enemies of liberty and justice. In his case, he had some quite real and first-hand experience with them, as he reported to Congress in his sixth annual "state of the Union" address. Washington was informing Congress of the actions he had taken as Commander in Chief in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794:

> In the four western counties of Pennsylvania, a prejudice, fostered and embittered by the artifice of men who labored for an ascendancy over the will of others by the guidance of their passions, produced symptoms of riot and violence. It is well known that Congress did not hesitate to examine the complaints which were presented, and to relieve them, as far as justice dictated or general convenience would permit. But the impression which this moderation made on the discontented did not correspond with what it deserved. The arts of delusion were no longer confined to the efforts of designing individuals.
>
> The very forbearance to press prosecutions was misinterpreted into a fear of urging the execution of the laws; and associations of men began to denounce threats against the officers employed. From a belief that by a more formal concert [the operation of the law] might be defeated, certain self-created societies assumed the tone of condemnation. Hence while the greater part of Pennsylvania itself were conforming themselves to the acts of excise, a few counties were resolved to frustrate them. . . .
>
> While there is cause to lament that occurrences of this nature should have disgraced the name or interrupted the tranquility of any part of our community, or should have diverted to a new application any portion of the public resources, there are not wanting real and substantial consolations for the misfortune. It has been demonstrated that our prosperity rests on solid foundations; by furnishing an additional proof that my fellow citizens understand the true principles of government and liberty; that they feel their inseparable union; that notwithstanding all the devices which have been used to sway them from their interest and duty, they are now as ready to maintain the authority of the laws against licentious invasions as they were to defend their rights against usurpation. It has been a spectacle displaying to the highest advantage the value of Republican Government, to behold the most and least wealthy of our citizens standing in the same ranks as private soldiers; pre-eminently distinguished by being the army of the Constitution; undeterred by a march of three hundred miles over rugged mountains, by the approach of an inclement season, or by any other discouragement. . .
>
> To every description, indeed, of citizens let praise be given. But let them persevere in their affectionate vigilance over that precious depository of American happiness, the Constitution of the United States. . . . And when in the calm moments of reflection, they shall have retraced the origin and progress of the insurrection, let them determine whether it has not been fomented by combinations of men who, careless of the consequences and disregarding the unerring truth that those who rouse cannot always appease a civil convulsion, have disseminated – from an ignorance or perversion of facts – suspicions, jealousies and accusations of the whole government. [Washington (1794), pp. 888-893]

Perversion of facts is what political party propaganda routinely disseminates, and this has been so for centuries. Today the propagandists call their lies and distortions "spin" and the fact is they have been lying to us for so long I often think they have either forgotten how to tell the truth or fear the wisdom that, however rocky, the only path to sustainable commonwealth is honesty.

Washington was even more blunt in his Farewell Address:

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> I have already intimated to you the danger of Parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on Geographical distributions. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party generally.
>
> This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human Mind. It exists under different shapes in all Governments, more or less stifled, controlled or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.
>
> The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an Individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of Public Liberty.
>
> Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of Party are sufficient to make it the interest and the duty of a wise People to discourage and restrain it.
>
> It serves always to distract the Public Councils and enfeebles the Public administration. It agitates the Community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.
>
> There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the Administration of the Government and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true . . . But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into flame lest instead of warming it consume. [Washington (1796a), pp. 969-970]

Washington's warning went unheeded by the next generation of Americans. By and large, this was probably through a failure of public education – namely, the failure of the institution of public education in the United States to adequately teach the principles of the Republic to the following generations. Washington seems to have foreseen this, too. In his final state of the Union address to Congress, he said,

> I have heretofore proposed to the consideration of Congress the expediency of establishing a National University and also a Military Academy. The desirableness of both these Institutions has so constantly increased with every new view I have taken of the subject that I cannot omit the opportunity of once for all recalling your attention to them.
>
> The Assembly to which I address myself is too enlightened not to be fully sensible how much a flourishing state of the Arts and Sciences contributes to our National prosperity and reputation. True it is, that our Country, much to its honor, contains many Seminaries of learning highly respectable and useful; but the funds upon which they rest are too narrow to command the ablest Professors, in the different departments of liberal knowledge, for the Institution contemplated, though they would be excellent auxiliaries.
>
> Amongst the motives to such an Institution, the assimilation of the principles, opinions and manners of our Countrymen, but the common education of a portion of our Youth from

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> every quarter, well deserves attention. The more homogeneous our Citizens can be made in these particulars, the greater will be our prospect of permanent Union; and a primary object of such a National Institution should be the education of our Youth in the science of *Government*. In a Republic, what species of knowledge can be equally important? and what duty more pressing on its Legislature than to patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be the future guardians of the liberties of the Country? [Washington (1796b), pp. 982-983]

In 1796 there was probably no one more aware than George Washington of the "unquenchable fire" of party politics that was beginning to ignite the country's body-politic. The Federalist Party had already nucleated around the person of Alexander Hamilton and the Democratic-Republican Party had formed around the person of Thomas Jefferson. The political split between these two men in his Cabinet had probably been the source of Washington's greatest grief during his Presidency. Even so, these parties did not yet control the mechanisms of election and were not yet the well-oiled and disciplined quasi-military organizations they are today. That change would not take place for another three decades. If there is one person identifiably more responsible than anyone else for realizing that development, that man is Andrew Jackson.

Washington was an American Cincinnatus; Jackson was another sort altogether – the great promoter of democracy and the rights of the common man, but also the first President to break the Oath of Office "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States":

> There were more than thirteen thousand Cherokees in the State [of Georgia]. They occupied an extensive and very fertile region in the northwest portion of her territory; they had acquired a degree of civilization and of ordered self-government which rendered it impossible to deal with them as savages; every circumstance threatened to fix them as a permanent independent community within the State. The Georgians were very naturally determined that nothing of the sort should take place. As soon as it was known that Jackson had been elected President, an Act was passed by the Georgia Legislature extending the laws of the State over the Cherokee territory and dividing that territory into counties. In 1829 Alabama followed suit. Jackson approved. . . . When the governor of Georgia requested him to withdraw the federal troops which had been sent down to protect the Indians, he complied. In 1830 Congress passed an Act to encourage and assist the Indians to remove beyond the Mississippi. Three several times between the opening of the year 1830 and the close of the year 1832 were the claims of the Indians taken by appeal from the Georgia courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, and as often did that court decide in favor of the Indians as claimants under treaties with the United States; but the Executive declined to enforce [the Court's] judgments. The last appeal that was taken having been decided in 1832, when a new presidential election was at hand, Jackson declared that he would leave the decision as to the legality of his conduct in this matter to the people, thus making bold avowal of his extraordinary constitutional theory, that a vote of the people must override the action of all constituted authorities when it could be construed to approve what they had condemned. [Wilson (1909), pp. 37-38]

It is disputed by historians whether or not Jackson ever said, "(Chief Justice) John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." Whether he said it or not, Jackson's actions in the Cherokee matter were an outright trampling on the Constitution of the United States and an open violation of the Constitutional principle of checks and balances. Today Jackson is venerated as the father of American democracy – especially by members of the Democratic Party, the party he founded – but in point of fact he was precisely the sort of ruthless man Washington warned the country to beware of in his Farewell Address. Regardless of the good he did do for the country – and it is undeniable that he did do some things of great importance for the preservation of liberty – I hold him to be the first President of the United States to commit a high crime in office. As head of a political machine that ruled Congress and the country in 1832, he did so with impunity.

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Andrew Jackson was the United States of America's first tyrant.

By the election of 1824 the old Federalists coalition of Hamilton had fallen apart. Hamilton himself was long dead and twenty straight years of defeat in presidential and congressional elections to candidates from Jefferson's Democratic-Republicans coalition had ended the Federalists as a political force. Four candidates split the electoral college vote in 1824 and John Quincy Adams had won the run-off election in the House of Representatives. With their unbroken victories, however, had come internal dissension within the Democratic-Republicans. Morison and Commager wrote,

> National political parties in the United States are almost always of local origin, and they never quite lose their essential character as a bundle of factions and interests. In [the election of 1828] the impulse for the defeat of Adams and the election of Jackson came largely from state politicians seeking national power. During the 'era of good feelings,' while the [Democratic-Republican] party appeared to be united under Monroe, it was breaking up into conservative and democratic factions within the different states. The precise differences between them varied from one region to another; but, generally speaking, the democratic group wished to level down all political inequalities that still remained in the state constitutions. One result of their efforts was the abolition of property qualifications for the franchise, thus diluting the electorate with elements susceptible to a different sort of appeal from that of the Jeffersonian school. Another effect was to breed a new litter of professional politicians, among whom enjoyment of state office and state patronage had created appetite for the more luscious emoluments of federal power. The best of these men represented some genuine aspiration towards equality, the worst were mere tub-thumping demagogues . . . Their obvious strategy was to join democratic factions in other states, under some national figure who would reflect glory upon themselves, and lead all to victory and spoils. Adams, stiff and scrupulous, was no sort of leader for such as these . . . General Jackson, the hero of New Orleans, subjugator of the Creeks and executioner of Arbuthnot, was a man who would reward his friends and punish his enemies, a heaven-sent leader for democracy. [Morison & Commager (1930), pg. 352]

Under Jackson, the new Democratic Party was organized like a quasi-military machine. Local professional politicians declared their allegiance to 'the common man' and fidelity to hero Jackson in the election campaign. The campaign itself was the dirtiest and most disgraceful in the United States' history. It was waged in partisan newspapers through slander and the most vicious personal attacks on the candidates' characters.




Figure 7.13: Voter participation as percent of eligible voters in presidential elections: 1824-2004.

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As figure 7.13 illustrates, the propaganda efforts of the campaign were effective. Voter participation doubled from the 1824 level, ushering in what is today called "the Age of Jackson." The Democrats' propaganda was the more effective. Jackson won with 178 electoral votes, with Adams winning only 44% of the popular vote. Democrats captured a 52% majority in the Senate and a 68.3% majority in the House of Representatives. Morison and Commager continue,

> It did not matter that there was no national issue or popular grievance; the politicians would see to that in due time, and principles could be attended to after victory. Adams must be discredited. The 'corrupt bargain' charge, engineered by [James] Buchanan, was the opening gun of the Jackson campaign. Then, in December 1825, Adams innocently introduced the Panama Congress project, which the Jackson supporters regarded as a sort of gala performance invented by Clay to dazzle the public mind and divert attention from the 'bargain.' That is why the President's nomination of commissioners to Panama was held up in the Senate by the Jackson men, while Calhoun, as Vice President, tolerated the most outrageous imputations on the President's and the Secretary's motives. . . .
>
> The pro-Jackson minority in Congress became a majority in the mid-term congressional elections. 'Investigations' of alleged presidential corruption were started, but not pushed home; so that the victim had no chance to clear himself. All the old prejudice against the Federalists was aroused in order to defeat the son of John Adams . . . The most absurdly mendacious tales were made up and broadcasted. . . . The newspapers that supported Adams, however, were not idle; there was a famous 'coffin hand-bill' on the shooting of six militiamen by Jackson for insubordination, and the General's frontier brawls and alleged pre-marital relations with Mrs. Jackson were described in detail. Altogether, it was the most unprincipled and degrading presidential election the United States had ever experienced.
>
> The result was fairly close. . . . But in the last instance it was classes rather than sections that elected Jackson: the Southern hunters and backwoods farmers whom he had led to glory; the Northern democracy, tired of respectable, gentlemanly promotions from the Cabinet to the White House. They cared little for policies, but much for personality, and they voted for Jackson because he was their sort of man . . . uneducated, intolerant, yet professing the immortal principles of Thomas Jefferson. . . . John Quincy Adams never understood why he was spurned by the country he loved with silent passion, and rejected by the people he had served so faithfully. [*ibid*., pp. 353-354]

It took the scattered old conservatives of the now-dead Democratic-Republicans Party another four years, and a second loss to Jackson, before they managed to regroup to form the Whig Party. It would be another dozen years before they finally elected their own man, William Henry Harrison, to the presidency and gained majorities in both houses of Congress. Only once during Jackson's presidency, from 1833 to 1835, did the Democrats fail to control both houses of Congress. The modern political party, with all its antisocial venality, had been born.

If over the next eighteen decades it learned how to better conceal its rankness, it has never in all that time lost its focus: securing its power ***to rule***. It demotes national and civil issues to mere means to this end, and it was entirely predictable that the political party machine would come to write the election laws to secure party control of the mechanisms of election in the United States. With Jacksonian democracy came the loss of the republican Sovereignty of the citizens and its transfer into the hands of political party oligarchy. With it came the subjugation of justice to the rule of the legal system and the perpetuation of civil rights violations through chronic trampling on the American Republic's social contract. The great myth of all representative democracies is the myth of majority rule. John Stuart Mill correctly pointed out in 1861,

> It has been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion

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> that controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority, these being all composed of the same class. . . . A completely equal democracy, in a nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, cannot be divested of certain evils; but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact that the democracies which at present exist are not equal, but systematically unequal in favor of the predominant class. Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege in favor of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the State. This is the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disenfranchisement of minorities.
>
> The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so easily cleared up that one would suppose the slightest indication of it would be sufficient to place the matter in its true light before any mind of average intelligence. It would be so, but for the power of habit; owing to which the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as a far more complicated one. That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to the greater, is a familiar idea; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy . . . the majority of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority must prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. . . .
>
> The injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because those who suffer by them are a minority; for there is not equal suffrage where every single individual does not count for as much as any other single individual in the community. But it is not only a minority who suffer. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different: it gives them to a majority of the majority; who may be, and often are, but a minority of the whole. All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Suppose, then, that, in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, there is a contested election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare majority of the people. This Parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare majority of itself. What guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no influence at all in the decision; and the whole of these may be, a majority of them probably are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and not at all improbable, that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority of that portion of it whom the institutions of the country have erected into a ruling class. If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no means of insuring that but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any minority left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power not to the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the scale. [Mill (1861), pp. 75-77]

It is little wonder political propaganda praises democracy to the heavens; it must sustain a myth.

The usurpation of government by a class of would-be rulers is one more factor in the course taken by the American institution of public education. This chapter has gathered together divers facts of the social phenomena that provoked the course of events in the 19th century. In the next chapter, we will examine the specific impacts these had on the institution of education.

§ 7. References

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