

Chapter 8 Critique of the 19th Century

§ 1. The Individual's Practical Manifold of Rules and his Duties-to-Self

Chapter 7 gathered together a set of facts pertinent to understanding the social environment of 19th century America. In this chapter economic detail is added to help seek out the social-natural causes of the course the evolution of the American institution of education took in that century, leading up to the 20th century and the reforms that brought us to where we are today.

To seek social-natural causes is to search for them in the behaviors and choices of individual human beings – the social atoms and the agents of all social phenomena. The individual human being self-determines all his actions by means of the practical manifold of rules he self-constructs out of his own practical judgments of experience [Wells (2012)]. The highest rules in his manifold structure constitute his practical hypothetical imperatives, which for him act as the tenets of a personal moral code. A human being can no more refuse to do actions dictated by his practical hypothetical imperatives than he can flap his arms and make himself fly. Practical hypothetical imperatives and the highest group of practical tenets standing under them in the manifold constitute a system of Obligations-to-Self. They determine individual psychological personality and are manifested in his personality style, habitual interpersonal behavior style, and in his operationalization behaviors by which he communicates nonverbal messages to other people. Personality/interpersonal style/nonverbal operationalizations are empirically describable by a circumplex model called the D-PIPOS circumplex (figure 8.1) first presented in Wells (2012).

The individual's practical manifold of rules can be projected onto the D-PIPOS circumplex. This projection, illustrated by an example in figure 8.2A, brings out the relationship between Self-




Figure 8.1: The D-PIPOS circumplex model of personality-interpersonal-operationalization style. The red and black dots denote psychological personality styles as defined in DSM-IV [Sperry (2003)]. The inner ring identifies Kiesler operationalizations of interpersonal communication [Kiesler (1982)].




Figure 8.2: Projection of an individual's practical manifold of rules onto the empirical D-PIPOS circumplex of his personality, operationalizations, and behaviors. A: example illustration of a manifold of rules projection. B: example illustration showing an active part of the person's manifold of rules provoked by his current environment and social situation. The hypothetical person illustrated in this example would be said to have a predominantly Expressive interpersonal style and in his current provoked situation would be said to exhibit Expressive-like characteristics in his behavior and interpersonal operationalizations. Note that in some places within his manifold of rules (yellow projection in figure A) there is a pronounced sharpening of the highest-level (largest radius) practical rules. This means the individual, when acting under the determination of these rules, has a narrowed range of possible responses to provocations which evoke the activation of these rules during the cycle of judgmentation. Individuals whose manifolds contain extreme cases of limited narrow manifold projections are said to have a personality disorder.




Figure 8.3: Weaver's model of two-person interpersonal interaction and communication.

determined rules in the manifold and types of interpersonal actions and behavioral manifestations of personality the individual will exhibit in his choices and actions. His empirical interactions

with other people will communicate to them – nonverbally as well as verbally – messages other individuals will personally interpret according to their own manifolds of rules and concepts. This is what is described by a Weaver's model of interpersonal communication (figure 8.3) [Wells (2012), chap. 4]. Weaver's models provide the starting point for embedding field network modeling of societies and Society. The semantic messages each person "receives" in the course of his interactions with others partially determines his reactions and pro-actions in every given situation by evoking rules in his manifold of rules and stimulating the recollection of concepts in his manifold of concepts. The latter is his self-constructed understanding structure that defines for the individual his objective experience and his understanding of his real world.

From the perspective of epistemology-centered metaphysics, it is scientifically meaningless to speak of just one "the" real world. For each individual, "the real world" is the world *as he understands it*, and his understanding of it will always differ in the particular from the understandings other persons hold-to-be-true. If you speak to me of "the real world" I am quite apt to ask you in return, "Whose real world? Mine or yours?" Two different people can experience one and the same empirical event and come to two completely different interpretations of the meaning of the event and understand it in two completely different ways. The *meanings interpretations* a human being represents to himself concerning a particular situation or event are called that person's Semantic representing of the situation or event (figure 8.3).

Children come to form their own basic understandings of the world from their experiences while growing up. Experience can be called the child's individual product of educational Self-development. The processes of socialization a child undergoes in the early years provide his experiences of social-Nature and provoke his development of a private and idiosyncratic personal moral code. Commonalities of social experiences shared by many people living in a community with common cultural folkways is the real basis and ground for the possibility of those social customs called a Society's mores. It is because every human being begins life as an uncritical realist that empirically developed social mores come to be understood through the classical (though objectively groundless) theories of consequentialist and/or virtue ethics. This is also the ground for feelings of moral outrage some people experience over a particular empirical situation that other people hold-to-be without moral significance. Heroes and villains are matters of personal Semantic representing and this labeling always reflects human judgments of taste, not objectively valid Objects-in-Reality.

It is important to understand – or, at least, to appreciate – this aspect of the mental physics of human Nature for what follows. It is equally important to remain cognizant of the natural fact that all reciprocal Obligations and Duties-to-others are *grounded* in Obligations- and Duties-to-Self. External obliging and duty are formed only where this formation serves, in individuals' personal judgments, to better perfect individual ability to serve Self-Obligations and Duties-to-Self. To the extent there is reciprocity and commonness of purpose exhibited by socializing individuals it can be said that a social contract has been set up. To the extent there is not, it is said that a state-of-nature relationship exists between people. Individual actions depend on these social states.

§ 2. Proprietor-owners and Wage Laborers

The socio-economic environment of a Community and a Society profoundly affects behavioral dynamics. One empirical consequence of what we usually call an "advanced" stage of civilization is the appearance of what Smith named the "division of labor." Extending this concept beyond the relatively narrow one of mathematical economics and business, there is a "division of labor" in the social roles different people come to fill in a Society. This is sometimes called social stratification and sometimes called class divisions. The social-natural grounds for this phenomenon rest with individual differences in Obligations-to-Self and extent to which the Community takes form

as a deontologically civil Community. The socio-economic environment in which the people in a Society are embedded presents Toynbee challenges that each individual attempts to deal with in what he understands as the best way to respond to challenge-provocations. Social classifications are indicative of basic empirical differences in individuals' manifolds of practical rules and the responses emotively provoked by social situations. For purposes of logical organization in theory, it is convenient and somewhat necessary to set up classifications broadly characterizing different groups of people living in the common Society. Doing so, of course, is stereotyping. But some degree of stereotyping is necessary to understand differences in group actions and behaviors. Put plainly, stereotyping broadly characterizes actions evoked from different groups of people. It does not make any objectively valid statement regarding an individual's "morality."

The first group this treatise identifies is the group of people we usually call proprietor-owners in business contexts. This is an individual whose personal enterprise involves the investment of capital stock in his enterprise for, e.g., buildings, tools, machinery, raw materials, etc. One of the most common business and commercial manifestations of his enterprise is nucleation of a group of individuals who cooperate with him in a group Enterprise. Group Enterprise – in business and elsewhere – is always to be deontologically regarded as an Enterprise-of-enterprises; it constitutes a mini-Society within the larger one. This mini-Society can be a civil, non-civil, uncivil, or mixed Community. The mixed case is by far the most commonly encountered.

To understand the proprietor-owner class of persons – a class Adam Smith called the masters-of-the-business – it is necessary to understand the deontological meanings of the concepts of property, ownership, and what are usually called property rights. The objects for *all* of these concepts *are defined by societal conventions*, and these *nominal* definitions are descriptive of the sort of social contract operating in a given Community or mini-Society.

I have previously described the deontological foundations of these conventions. A discussion of them in the context of deontological ethics is given in Wells (2010), chapter 14. Here I will merely recap the main points of that discussion. The technical term *jus possessus* means *legally sanctioned holding-in-one's-control*. **Property**, in the context of ownership, means *the right to possess, use, and dispose of something*. The object of the right (the thing possessed, used, or disposed of) is called an **item of property**. When the word property is used as a noun it is a synonym for item of property. To **possess** means *jus possessus of an item of property*. From this first group of technical definitions we have that property is a right – thus something conferred under terms of a social contract. In the state of nature there can be physical possession of an object but, because there are no rights in the context of a state of nature, there is no property in that state. This is a point the American poet Carl Sandburg made in *The People, Yes*:

"Get off this estate."
 "What for?"
 "Because it's mine."
 "Where did you get it?"
 "From my father."
 "Where did he get it?"
 "From his father."
 "And where did he get it?"
 "He fought for it."
 "Well, I'll fight you for it." [Sandburg (1936), pg. 75]

To **own** is to *possess rightfully*. The term **owner** means *a person who owns a specific item of property*. The term is functionally synonymous with **proprietor**: *one who possesses rightfully a particular item of property*. The operational distinction is that "owner" is a broadly applied term whereas "proprietor" more specifically denotes an owner of a business of some kind.

Conventions of ownership and property were already established by, in the case of America, folkways and traditions imported to this country from England at the time of first colonization. The Plymouth colony had briefly experimented with a mild form of communism in the first year of its existence but had soon reverted to the traditional convention. Seeking to put a rational base beneath a social custom already uncounted centuries old, Hobbes had written,

The Nutrition of a Commonwealth consists: in the *Plenty* and *Distribution of Materials* conducing to Life; In *Concoction*, or *Preparation*; and (when concocted) in the *Conveyance* of it, by convenient conduits, to the Public use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land and Sea, God usually either freely gives or for labor sells to mankind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals, God has freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the Earth, so as there needs no more but the labor and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty depends (next to God's favor) merely on the labor and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly *Native* and partly *Foreign*: *Native*, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Commonwealth; *Foreign* that which is imported from without. And because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Commonwealth (except it be of very vast extent) that produces all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home by importation of that which can be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by just War, or by Labor. For a man's Labor also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit as well as any other thing. And there have been Commonwealths that, having no more Territory than has served them for habitation, have nevertheless not only maintained but also increased their Power, partly by the Labor of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling Manufactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.

The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment is the constitution of *Mine*, and *Thine*, and *His*; that is to say, in one word, *Propriety*, and belongs in all kinds of Commonwealth to the Sovereign Power. For where there is no Commonwealth, there is (as has been already shown) a perpetual war of every man against his neighbor. And therefore every thing is his that gets it and keeps it by force, which is neither *Propriety* nor *Community* but *Uncertainty*. Which is so evident that even *Cicero* (a passionate defender of Liberty) in a public-pleading attributes all *Propriety* to the Law Civil. *Let the Civil Law*, said he, *be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed) and there is nothing that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children.* And again, *Take away the Civil Law and no man knows what is his own and what another man's.* Seeing therefore the Introduction of *Propriety* is an effect of Commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the Person who represents it, it is the act only of the Sovereign and consists in the Laws, which none can make that have not the Sovereign Power. [Hobbes (1651), pp. 148-149]

John Locke said much the same thing [Locke (1690), pp. 18-30] although, as he seems to have been a less melancholy man than Hobbes, he said it with a more rousing celebration of the gifts and bounties of God. Both, because of their reliance on ontology-centered metaphysics, had no recourse but to assign God as the ultimate original source of "propriety and property." Both men ultimately reduced the justification of the concept of property and ownership to labor, which was an argument that would be ironically turned against their conclusions by Marx in *Capital*.

Hobbes' reference to Cicero gives us an idea – though not really a sufficiently encompassing one – of how long this commonsense way of looking at property and ownership has been going

on. Despite metaphysical inadequacies, Hobbes was correct when he wrote that determination of property was an act of the Sovereign of the Community ("Commonwealth") *provided* we regard the notion of Sovereign in Rousseau's context, i.e., in the context that the collective body politic of the association *is* Sovereign:

This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 16]

In that fine old English tradition of muddling through change, the suppositions of proprietorship and ownership had already been long established before the first English ship departed for American shores. In the case of England the imposition of the *Magna Charta* on King John by the English nobility in 1215 is probably as good a birthday to assign to the custom as any other. Thus was born the icon – more mythical than practical – of the so-called courageous and ruggedly-individualist capitalist-entrepreneur. In point of fact, it takes no special individual quirks of character to be a capitalist entrepreneur; it only takes sufficient tangible power of one's person to become one. The oft-mentioned "risks" associated with it have to do with the practical soundness of how one goes about it, not the action *per se*. Your author and his ancestors going back at least six generations have all been capitalist entrepreneurs and there is nothing notable in our family history that particularly sets us apart in terms of abilities from other people [Doscher (1973)].¹ For me, being a capitalist entrepreneur is merely a family tradition I continue to practice.

Prior to the Economy revolution and the loss of the apprenticeship system in the 18th century, most white American men became proprietor-owners of their own enterprises, either as small farmers, tradesmen, or craftsmen. At the end of a lad's apprenticeship or an indentured servant's term of service, it was customary for the former master to make a money gift to the new freeman to help him get his enterprise started. In some cases the former indentured servant received a land grant. After the Economy revolution this sort of startup capitalization became much rarer and as a result there developed a growing population of non-capitalist laborers.

In this, America became much more Europe-like in terms of the establishment of classes of laborers. One could say that it was at this juncture in history that an American reality became instead "the American dream"; from that time forward, becoming an independent proprietor-owner was for many people only a dream because becoming a capitalist entrepreneur does require startup capital. Capital comes from that part of one's stock-of-economic-goods in excess of one's consumption needs, and a low-paid laborer frequently needed all of his wage income just to meet his basic consumption needs. Thus the economy revolution brought into being in the U.S. labor force an economic class division of a sort previously uncommon in America: the non-wage laborer and the wage laborer. The proprietor-owner generally belonged to the first of these.

It is a commonplace habit in America today to think the term "labor force" is synonymous with "wage-laborer labor force" merely because there are many wage-laborers to each proprietor-owner. It is misleading terminology that we owe to the propaganda of Marx and Engels. It proves

¹ Your author's great-grandfather's grandfather and great-grandfather were farmer-land speculators whose entrepreneurial undertakings led them from Maryland to Ohio to Indiana to Wisconsin and finally to Iowa, culminating in the founding of the town of West Union, IA. At that point the family wanderlust seems to have been satisfied and subsequent generations occupied themselves as small businessmen in Iowa until your author's generation, when the spirit of wanderlust seems to have had a revival.

Table 8.1: Population and Labor Force Statistics 1820 to 1900

year	total U.S. population	total urban population	total rural population	population age 10 yrs+	% of total population	no. of total laborers (10 yrs+)	% of total age 10 yrs+	nonagri-cultural labor (10 yrs+)	agricultural labor (10 yrs+)	% nonagri-cultural labor (10 yrs+)	% agricultural labor (10 yrs+)	population under age 10 years	% total population under age 10
1820	9,638,453	693,968	8,959,708	6,487,815	67.312	2,881,000	44.406	812,042	2,068,958	12.516	31.890	3,150,638	32.688
1830	12,860,702	925,971	12,001,996	8,639,412	67.177	3,931,537	45.507	1,159,084	2,772,453	13.416	32.091	4,221,290	32.823
1840	17,063,353	1,842,842	15,285,089	11,629,006	68.152	5,420,000	46.608	1,700,049	3,719,951	14.619	31.989	5,434,347	31.848
1850	23,191,876	3,548,357	19,153,771	16,452,625	70.941	7,697,196	46.784	2,795,314	4,901,882	16.990	29.794	6,739,251	29.059
1860	31,443,321	6,225,778	24,001,623	22,429,625	71.334	10,532,750	46.959	4,325,116	6,207,634	19.283	27.676	9,013,696	28.666
1870	38,558,371	9,909,501	30,076,475	29,123,683	75.531	12,924,951	44.380	6,075,179	6,849,772	20.860	23.520	9,434,688	24.469
1880	50,155,783	14,143,931	36,069,726	36,761,607	73.295	17,392,099	47.310	8,807,289	8,584,810	23.958	23.353	13,394,176	26.705
1890	62,947,714	22,094,648	40,722,073	47,413,559	75.322	23,318,183	49.180	13,379,810	9,938,373	28.219	20.961	15,534,155	24.678
1900	75,994,575	30,093,852	45,974,490	57,949,824	76.255	29,073,233	50.170	18,161,235	10,911,998	31.340	18.830	18,044,751	23.745




Figure 8.4: U.S. population and labor force statistics for individuals 10 years of age and over from 1820 to 1900. Labor force means all persons gainfully occupied, whether as wage- or non-wage laborers. The graph also shows rural and urban population levels. Agricultural labor means labor gainfully employed directly in agriculture. Non-agricultural labor means labor gainfully employed in other than farming activities. The labor figures do not include children under 10 years of age. [Bureau of the Census (1949)]

to be challenging, however, to obtain a reliable breakdown between the relative populations in each class from 19th century census data. Table 8.1 and figure 8.4 show the census data on the U.S. population and labor force from 1820 to 1900. In looking at this data, one must bear in mind that the Census Bureau defines "rural" to include small rural communities (fewer than 2500 people), in which some laborers will be non-agricultural laborers (e.g., shopkeepers, blacksmiths, general store wage laborers, etc.).

It is not possible to discern from these figures any breakdown between proprietor-owners and wage laborers. Furthermore, there would have been large regional variations in the ratio of wage laborers to proprietor-owners not hinted at from national figures. Census figures explicitly breaking out farm population from rural population were not kept prior to 1880. Figures from the *Statistical History of the United States* (1976) cites the farm population of the U.S. from 1880 to 1900 as: 1880: 21,973,000; 1890: 24,771,000; and 1900: 29,835,000. These figures correspond to 60.9%, 60.8%, and 64.9% of the rural population in these years, respectively. Between 1880 and 1900 the number of U.S. farms increased from 4 million farms to a little over 5.7 million farms. This suggests that on the order of about 40% or less of the rural population consisted of wage laborers over this period. The percentage would have been much higher in the urban population.

An urban vs. rural difference existed in the social interrelationships between proprietor-owner




Figure 8.5: Manufactured product value to capital ratio and product value to wage ratio from 1859 to 1899.

and wage-laborer. The Economy revolution would have had much less effect in rural areas than it did in urban areas because in the former case commercial enterprises were small businesses, just as had been true in the towns and cities prior to the Economy revolution. We even see remnants of this today in what is usually called "small town America." In the urban setting, relationships between proprietor-owners and wage-laborers became considerably more distant and the urban Community less civil (in the Social Contract context) after the Economy revolution. Uncivic free enterprise was born in the urban environment, and this social change accounted for many of the turmoils raised by the Toynbee challenge the U.S. was facing in the 19th century.

When we look at the proprietor-owner as individual-in-the-economic-environment, what we find is that he, no less than the wage-laborer, faced significant challenges by economic threats to the tangible power of his person. The principal difference between him and the wage-laborer was that the threats facing him were direct threats to his capital stock-of-goods rather than to his consumption stock-of-goods revenue. The proprietor-owner of a manufacturing establishment is probably the best exemplar case to use in this regard. Table 7.7 provides a summary of statistical data for manufacturing (almost exclusively an urban Enterprise) from 1859 to 1899. What did the economic situation and the challenges to his personal welfare look like to the proprietor-owner? The market value of his manufactured product is an indicator of his pre-profit revenue income, while the wages paid to his workers is an indicator of his operating costs. Figure 8.5 illustrates the ratios of product value to capital and product value to wages from 1859 to 1899. By examining the data in terms of ratios, we can to a degree remove the uncertainties produced by levels of inflation and deflation in the general economy (whereas dollar figures are affected by these).

From 1859 until some time during the decade of the 1880s manufacturing proprietor-owners were able to maintain a more or less constant ratio of product value to capital invested. On the other hand, his product value to wage ratio appears to show a slight uptrend of about 3.4% per year but the change is not statistically significant in comparison to the hypothesis that this ratio was constant at an average of about 5.37. During this period, both the average wages per wage-earner and the product value per wage-earner increased in dollar amounts (table 7.7) but the ratio remained more or less constant on the average. The average number of wage-earners per manufacturing establishment in this period held constant at about 9.2 wage-earners with a standard error of 1.31, which tells us that employment level per factory held more or less constant and that the average manufacturing establishment was, as it would remain throughout this period, a small Enterprise. The proprietor-owner would have seen, again on the average, an increase in his favor in the spread between product dollar revenues per wage-earner and dollar costs of labor. Thus he was able to maintain an inflation/deflation adjusted constant standard of living, which his maxims of Duty-to-himself and Duty-to-his-family would have Self-required him to try to do.

From 1879 to 1899, on the other hand, he would have seen a significant decline in his product




Figure 8.6: Average manufacturing capital to wage ratio and average wages per wage-earner (dollars) from 1859 to 1899. Wages shown in figure B are annual wages for wage-earners working in manufacturing.

value to capital ratio along with an increase in wages per wage-earner. There was a pronounced dip in product value to wage ratio in the 1880s, which he was able to recover from in the 1890s to restore his traditional product value to wage ratio. This came, however, along with a chronic decrease in the product value to capital ratio: he would have seen his capital investment yielding less revenue per dollar invested. Figure 8.6A shows capital-to-wage ratio rising linearly from 1879 to 1899, although average dollar wages per wage earner remained more or less constant (in dollar terms) from 1889 to 1899 after increasing sharply between 1879 and 1889 (figure 8.6B). The average number of wage-earners per manufacturing establishment rose to a peak of 11.96 in 1889 before falling back to 10.36 in 1899. This strongly suggests that the proprietor-owner was dealing with a perceptible reduction in the buying power of his capital by cutting back on his labor force while holding a line on wages paid per wage-earner.

We see in this data the manufacturing capitalist-entrepreneur behaving consistently with what mental physics predicts for an individual who is obeying tenets of Duty-to-himself unconstrained by tenets of reciprocal Duties-to-the situation-of-others in regard to his personality so far as it concerns his employees. However, the number of manufacturing establishments is small. Can this

Table 8.2: Employment Distribution in the U.S. Economy from 1820 to 1900 (thousands)

Year	AGW	AGRI	F&F	Mining	MHTC	TPUTFRE	Service	Not Allocated
1820	2,880	2,070	0	0	350	0	0	460
1830	3,930	2,770	0	0	0	0	0	1,160
1840	5,420	3,720	0	15	790	0	0	895
1850	7,700	4,900	25	90	1,260	420	940	65
1860	10,530	6,210	40	170	1,930	780	1,310	90
1870	12,920	6,850	60	180	2,750	1,350	1,700	30
1870	12,920	6,730	60	190	2,830	1,430	1,640	40
1880	17,390	8,570	95	320	4,060	2,130	2,140	75
1890	23,720	10,170	180	470	6,020	3,530	3,240	110
1900	29,070	10,950	210	750	7,890	4,890	4,220	160

Abbreviations:

AGW = all gainful workers

AGRI = agriculture

F&F = forestry & fisheries

MHTC = manufacturing, hand trades & construction

TPUTFRE = transportation, public utilities, trade, finance, & real estate

Table 8.3: Detailed Breakdown of Employment Categories in table 8.2 (thousands)

	Mnfc & Hand Trades	Construction	MHTC	Trans. & PU	Trade, Finance & Real Estate	TPUTFRE	Educational Service	Other prof. Service	Domestic Service	Personal Service	Govt.	Service
1870	2,130	700	2,830	580	850	1,430	190	140	940	270	100	1,640
1880	3,210	850	4,060	850	1,280	2,130	330	200	1,080	390	140	2,140
1890	4,620	1,400	6,020	1,470	2,060	3,530	510	350	1,510	680	190	3,240
1900	6,250	1,640	7,890	2,020	2,870	4,890	650	510	1,740	1,020	300	4,220

tiny group of individuals have had a broad impact across the U.S. Society generally?

To address this question we turn to Census Bureau statistics. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 are taken from data published in the *Historical Statistics* [Bureau of the Census (1949), pg. 64, series D 47-61]. The available data is divided into two periods, 1820-1870 and 1870-1900, and was compiled from various monographs and reports prepared mainly from data collected in the decennial Census of the Population. The data was, in a manner of speaking, "pre-digested" before being presented and the population figures disagree slightly in places from other census data by a small amount. Table 8.2 provides the distribution of all gainfully occupied workers in the U.S. across seven categories of employment (with an eighth not-allocated category covering occupations that do not fit into the other categories or were undeterminable). After 1870 these categories were more explicitly divided into subgroups, which table 8.3 presents. The data for 1870 appears twice in table 8.2 because some changes in job definitions required alteration in the figures for the before-1870 and after-1870 periods in order for 1870 data to be comparable to the other figures in these periods. In a manner of speaking, the 1870 data is a "splice" to account for changes in definitions.

This data shows that manufacturing jobs, even after distinguishing them from jobs in the construction industry, were second only to agriculture jobs from 1820 to 1900. In 1820 jobs in manufacturing, hand trades, and construction (MHTC) accounted for 12.2% of the total jobs. In 1900 manufacturing and hand trade jobs alone accounted for 21.5% of the total jobs, and the MHTC-to-agriculture ratio grew monotonically throughout the period, excepting the unreported data point in 1830². The conclusion is clear: the actions of the proprietor-owner(s) of manufacturing Enterprises directly affected between 1-in-8 to 1-in-5 of all U.S. workers from 1820 to 1900. When we consider the Enterprise-protein networking effect in an economy, the conclusion seems inescapable that the manufacturing capitalist-entrepreneurs' actions had either a direct or indirect effect throughout *at least* all the non-agricultural segments of U.S. Society. In the current popular terminology of the business world, they "exerted tremendous leverage" on Society.

Despite the popularity of doing so, the capitalist entrepreneur cannot be blamed for looking out for his Duties-to-himself and not concerning himself with the situations of others. Most of these men had not yet been born when the 18th century Economy revolution had dissolved the close social-chemical bond between employer and employed. The Economy revolution changed the mores of American Society and produced granulated sub-Societies divided between those who invested capital and those who sought to satisfy their consumption-revenue needs through wage labor. From the perspective of Social Contract theory, we cannot hold the capitalist entrepreneur morally culpable for the social environment that had developed. We *can* call into question the intelligence of actions taken that worked to turn merely non-bonding relationships into antibonding relationships. As examples of satisficing decision-making and judgments of tastes, these actions are perhaps understandable in a Society long accustomed to institutions of indentured servitude and outright slavery. If personal satisfaction is achievable by it, all human beings are always satisficing decision-makers. I regret having to tell you this, but if you had been one of these capitalist entrepreneurs, it is much more than likely you would have behaved as they did. You would have cared for your Duties-to-yourself and your *personal* society and that is all.

² Congress apparently directed the 1830 census to just lump jobs data into agriculture and non-agriculture.

But just because a satisficing action is understandable from the basis of fundamental mental physics, that doesn't mean the action isn't stupid for the long run and inimical to the survival of the national Society. We are about to take a cold-blooded look at the social situation as it would have been seen by the wage-laborer. It seems to me appropriate to preface this with an overview of one of the distinctive symptoms of the tearing of the social fabric in an industrializing Society: the labor movement. I don't do this with the intent of communicating propaganda for or against either side; I am asking you to think about what the wage-earner's situation could be like, in the antisocial environment of uncivic free enterprise, with a clear understanding that this situation develops out of absence of a well-thought-out social contract that promotes *deontological* Duties-to-Society and wins Self-Obligation from its people. I am asking you to comprehend that there are two kinds of free enterprise, uncivic and civic, and that the 19th century was a social environment of the former kind. Part of the reason it became one is the failure of the American institution of education to teach people how to tell the difference.

Now for the aforementioned overview. Morison and Commager had this to say about the period from 1825 to 1850:

The first labor movement in America, as in England, was initiated by urban handicraftsmen rather than factory operatives; but it took a different direction. Merchant-capitalists, in order to exploit the new western markets the canals were opening up, were organizing trades, such as tailoring and shoemaking, on a larger scale, with a system of long credits, division of labor, and wholesale marketing, that drove small establishments out of business. The old-time master workman, who employed a few journeymen and apprentices, was degraded to a foreman or boss under an entrepreneur. Minute specialization broke down the apprenticeship system. With the introduction of gas in the cities, the old working hours of sun to sun were lengthened in the winter, making a twelve-hour [work] day the year round.

Unions already existed in many of the handicrafts, but they had not yet received legal recognition; and the ranks of labor were so constantly diluted by immigrants and women that the artisans were alarmed over their declining status. This was an old story in England; but the American workman had the vote. Manhood suffrage was established in every Northern state save Rhode Island by 1825. Three years later a group of Philadelphia artisans organized the Workingmen's Party. The platform of this pioneer labor party had nothing to do with wages, everything to do with status: free public education, mechanics' lien laws to protect wage-earners from rascally contractors, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt. This last was a crying evil. Five-sixths of the prisoners in New England and the Middle States were confined for debt, the majority of them for sums under twenty dollars.

There have always been two great obstacles to political labor parties in the United States: social democracy and federal government. Opportunity for social betterment prevented the worker from becoming class-conscious. Westward pioneering was in the back of his mind in 1825, as is the new car today. The federal form of government made it both impossible and useless for the workers to gain control of a congress that had no power to enact social legislation. It was to the state governments that labor looked for the laws they wanted. Yet no party organized for purely state purposes could hope to survive as an independent unit since 'voting the straight ticket' – for the same party in national, state, and municipal elections – was becoming a fixed habit.

The most that a labor party could do was to wage a vigorous state campaign, and acquire enough strength to give it bargaining power with the Democratic Party, whose hostility to banks made a point of contact. The Workingmen's Party, with its moderate program of social betterment, was making fast progress in the cities of Pennsylvania and New York when it fell into the hands of mal-practitioners. [Morison & Commager (1930), pp. 390-92]

The chiefs of these mal-practitioners were Robert Owen, an immigrant British industrialist and

radical, and his allies. Owen and his comrades coined the term "socialism." Muravchik tells us,

Owen's socialist philosophy was derived from two fundamental pillars of his thought. The first was that no human "is responsible for his will and his own actions." This is because "his whole character – physical, mental, and moral – is formed independently of himself." Each person is entirely the product of his "constitution or organization at birth, and of the effects of external circumstances upon it from birth to death." Therefore, it is futile to call individuals to account for their behavior. Instead, society should recognize its power to shape each of its members into a person of high character. [Muravchik (2002), pg. 37]

Mental physics tells us Owen's so-called 'philosophy' is utter hogwash. The individual human being, as *homo noumenon*, is *solely* "responsible for his will and his own actions" and is himself the *sole* determiner of his "whole character." Note how Owen reifies the notion of "society" into a mystical thing-in-itself (what Kant calls a *Ding an sich selbst*) with a magical power to act upon individuals. What, though, is any society if it is not the individual human beings who comprise it? The answer, of course, is: nothing. Divorced in context from its social atoms, the idea of "society" has no objectively valid real meaning whatsoever. Are we to believe that a collective of beings who all lack willpower and freedom of Self-determination somehow magically gain precisely these merely by association? What causes such a magic that makes something from nothing? Owen's "philosophy" is the most specious sort of absurdity and *all* political socialism is founded upon nothing else than a fiction of ontology-centered mysticism.

Under the influence of Owen and his like-minded associates, the Workingmen's Party soon fell into socialism and shortly afterward broke up, as all socialist and other movements contrary to human nature inevitably do. The Democratic Party absorbed many of its former members. To continue with Morison & Commager's accounting:

In 1833, when a period of prosperity and increasing costs began, the American labor movement adopted contemporary British methods. Politics were abandoned in favor of trade organization, the closed shop, and the strike. Unionization was pursued so rapidly and widely as to include even seamstresses and cloak-makers. Trades' unions – federations of all the organized trades in a single community – were formed in twelve Northern cities; and in 1837 delegates from these cities formed a National Trades' Union. Strikes became frequent, and on several occasions included not only the organized workers but the unskilled laborers of an entire city. The ten-hour day was established in several cities for municipal employees, and in the navy yards in 1836 by order of President Jackson. Wages were generally improved, and conditions bettered. Harriet Martineau, visiting the Northern States at that time, took note of the well-nourished and intelligent 'dandy mechanics.'

Then came the panic of 1837, bringing unemployment and misery to the landless artisans. Wages fell thirty to fifty per cent, union funds were depleted, federations collapsed, and the 'dandy mechanics' were glad to sell their 'gay watch guards and glossy hats' for a bit of bread. Iron years followed, with long hours and lean wages, of which the workers were often mulcted by payment in kind; years of sporadic, desperate strikes. The Lowell factory girls, speeded up by improved machinery, petitioned the Massachusetts legislature in vain to reduce their twelve-hour day to ten. Immigrants took their places, and by 1840 these show workers of America with their white gowns and literary journal were no longer found in the cotton mills. [Morison & Commager (1930), pg. 393]

§ 3. Capitalist- and Wage-earner Entrepreneurs in the 19th Century

Like proprietor-owners, wage-earners in the 19th century looked first to their Duties-to-self without the reciprocal Duties to the general Community that only an effective social contract can evoke. Growth of their labor associations described above were provoked by common interests.




Figure 8.7: The Snyder-Tucker General Price Index from 1791 to 1910. Also shown superimposed on this graph are the two prolonged periods of recessionary economy in the 19th century and the five distinct model periods of urban population growth, M1-M5, discussed in chapter 7.




Figure 8.8: Immigration and change in the size of the total U.S. population from 1831 to 1920. A: number of immigrants and change in U.S. total population over the period. B: Percent of the U.S. population change due to immigrants. The data points mark the net change at the end of the preceding ten year period, e.g., the 1840 data point covers the interval of 1831-1840, the 1850 data point covers 1841 to 1850, etc.

Capitalist and wage earner entrepreneurs shared in common with each other the general economic environment of the country and the fact that immigration was a sizable growth factor in U.S. population. The self-interests these factors provoke differed for these two classes. Figure 8.7 illustrates an economic index, the Snyder-Tucker index, over the 19th century. Figure 8.8 shows immigration levels over the period from 1831 to 1920. How did these factors affect the social environment of the United States and what bearing did they have on the institution of education?

I begin with the Snyder-Tucker General Price Index, which I will call the GPI (figure 8.7). This index is a forerunner to today's familiar Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) of all urban consumers³. The GPI was first compiled by Carl Snyder in 1924 and published regularly until 1939. It was based on wholesale prices, cost of living, rents computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and wages computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Snyder's index extended back to 1875. Later it was further extended, back to 1791, by Rufus S. Tucker. The original index assigned weights to commodity prices at wholesale, wages, cost of living, and rents with weightings of 20, 35, 35, and 10, respectively [Bureau of the Census (1949), pg. 226].

³ The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes two consumer price indexes. CPI-U covers 80% of the current population and includes: wage earners and clerical workers; professional, managerial, and technical workers; the self-employed; short term workers; the unemployed; retirees and others not in the labor force. CPI-W, for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, covers 32% of the current population. When you read or hear about the Consumer Price Index in the news, they are talking about CPI-U.

The first thing we can note from the GPI is that the 19th century was divided into four periods of expansion or recession economy. For about three-fifths of it the United States was in recession (1815-'43 and 1865-'96) with growth periods preceding and following (1800-'14, 1844-64, 1897-1900)⁴. Both recessionary periods were preceded by a large spike in the GPI – boom times that, to borrow Alan Greenspan's phrase, represented intervals of irrational exuberance by speculators. The speculative peaks occurred at the ends of the War of 1812 and the U.S. Civil War. The 19th century ended with the GPI at almost the same level as it was when the century began. The industrial revolution seems to have left no net effect on average real economic *Personnfähigkeit*.

The second thing we can note is: in the GPI we finally can see a causative correlate to the five urban population models. The 1800-1810 period saw a rising GPI, marking a slight economic improvement from a more or less static (no net growth) period in the last six years of the 18th century (Washington's second administration and the administration of John Adams). At the time of the 1810 census, this would not yet have had much effect, but by the time of the 1820 census the effects on the period from 1810 to 1819 were much more significant – thus the 1810 sampling point in the census is a "break point" between models M1 and M2. The decline in progress in 1820 continued until just past 1830, when a bottom began forming in the GPI. The period just before the 1840 census saw a major rally in the GPI, affecting the 1840 census figure and thus making 1830 a second sampling breakpoint between M2 and M3. The bottom of the recession occurred in 1843 and a modest recovery was in process in 1850. By 1860 this recovery advanced ten points in the GPI, enough to make the 1860 census sample diverge from the previous trend and thus making 1850 a breakpoint year between M3 and M4. In 1870, the GPI was 40 points higher than in 1860 and, although by then the second great recession was underway, sampling by the census data could not have yet shown that the uptrend from 1850 had ended. This would have been clear by the 1880 census, however, making 1870 the last breakpoint year between M4 and M5. The inflationary rally that began in 1900 had not yet had time to show up as marking 1890 as a breakpoint year, and so the census year 1900, as will be shown later, becomes a breakpoint year between M5 and yet another model period, M6.

If you have had sufficient rudimentary training in statistical analysis, you can derive for yourself how the model breakpoints emerge by drawing trend lines in the GPI from census year to census year and noting when significant changes in the slope of these trend lines occur. These differences signal possible breakpoints between models; whether or not the breakpoint is statistically significant is then determined by testing the mean-squared drop in the sum of squared error between a more finely-graded set of model intervals and a coarser set of model intervals⁵. In the work I am reporting here, I followed this procedure. First I discerned model intervals from population data (chapter 7) and then I searched for causative factors. The GPI turned out to be a reliable indicator of one: the state of the national economy as measured by this index.

Americans in the 19th century did not have published GPI data, of course; the index wasn't invented until the 20th century. Nonetheless, the factors it measures are factors that are generally, though subjectively, apparent to individuals in the normal course of experience. People know that

⁴ For some reason, perhaps an inclination to prefer to see things as being better than they are, economic historians and business reporters have been reluctant to call the periods 1815 to 1843 and 1865 to 1896 single-recession periods. They have preferred instead to over-finely distinguish eight distinct recessions/depressions between 1815 and 1848 and eight more between 1865 and 1897 (see figure 7.9) as if the tiny little "rally bumps" in the general downward trends in figure 8.7 marked reversals of a declining economy. This is rather like saying that a one-day up-tick in the price of a falling stock marks a stop in its fall. To an experienced and aggressive Wall Street speculator, such an up-tick is just an opportunity to increase profit by increasing one's short position in the stock. Professional politicians, naturally, don't like to admit to a recession because that has a tendency to get them voted out of office.

⁵ Ott (1977), chap. 16, pp. 469-484.




Figure 8.9: Number of manufacturing establishments and number of manufacturing wage earners from 1859 to 1899 according to U.S. Census figures. The timeframe coincides with urban population models M4 (1850-1870) and M5 (1870-1900).

their incomes are up or down, if jobs are plentiful or scarce, if business is brisk, stagnant, or poor, if daily life seems easier or harder, etc. Indexes like the GPI or the CPI-U aren't of very much practical use otherwise; they are attempts to *quantify* these subjective components of experience. A judgment of taste an individual interprets as "a sense that things are getting better" provokes feelings of *Lust* conducive to taking actions to participate in or otherwise take advantage of the situation. One that an individual interprets as "a sense that things are getting worse" provokes feelings of *Unlust* – a Desire to hinder or abolish the worsening state-of-affairs when the person is inclined to be proactive, or a stimulus evoking ignorance when the person is unassertive ("ignore it and maybe it will go away"; "things will soon get better"; "these bad times can't last forever"; etc.). Human beings are satisficing problem-solvers and the nature of human reasoning is a nature that seeks restoration of equilibrium *howsoever the person can achieve it*. In mental physics, the pursuit of happiness *means* acting to balance feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust* in such a way as to produce co-negation of the effects of these feelings. Psychologist Harold Leavitt wrote,

[The] feelings and the facts get intertwined and almost inseparable (though we often think of them separately) in many of our problems. It is the whole man who makes the choices, not just the logical part of him.

The development of personality allows for the coexistence of opposing needs. Conflict situations are those requiring decisions between such coexistent opposing needs.

When conflicts involve critical needs and seem to offer no ways out, reactions may be severe. Fantasy, delusions, and amnesia are such extreme ways out of conflicts.

Conflicts that require extreme solutions usually involve "conscience" needs, centering in morality and social propriety. Extreme solutions often require the person to push one of the needs into unconsciousness and thereby – by forgetting – to deny the conflict.

But such repressive defenses cost energy. Less enervating solutions call for re-organization of perceptions, finding new ways out of apparently dead-end situations.

Serious chronic conflicts may develop in the industrial organization. Conflicts between needs for dependence and for independence are especially prevalent because the industrial environment emphasizes dependency but values independence.

Less deep but equally important conflicts occur in everyday decision-making situations. There emotional and logical mechanisms get mixed into one another. It often then becomes hard to tell how much of our commitment to a course of action is objective and logical and how much of it is an effort to maintain our psychological balance, to avoid dissonance between mutually contradictory beliefs and ideas. Hence, when we make a difficult

decision, we tend to build up our support for our solution and to find more and more reasons for feeling we were right in rejecting the alternative. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 52]

Leavitt's last point is an aspect of human nature Francis Bacon had pointed out 350 years earlier:

The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions. It was well answered by him who was shown in a temple the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the perils of a shipwreck, and was pressed as to whether he would then recognize the power of the gods, by an inquiry, 'But where are the portraits of those who have perished in spite of their vows?' All superstition is much the same, whether it be that of astrology, dreams, omens, retributive judgment, or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe events which are fulfilled but neglect and pass over their failure, though it be much more common. [Bacon (1620), pp. 23-24]

Periods of inflation, such as the one from 1802 to 1814, are perceived differently by capitalist entrepreneurs and wage-earners. The capitalist entrepreneur regards rising prices as an opportunity to be cashed in on; wage-earners, whose incomes generally lag increases in wholesale prices, cost of living, and rents, generally see inflationary trends as a threat to personal welfare – a waning of the tangible power-of-their-persons. The capitalist entrepreneur will have a tendency to take action to expand his enterprise; the wage-earning entrepreneur will tend to go after increases in wages, seek more lucrative employment, or, if he feels he lacks sufficient tangible or persuasive power to counteract the threat by himself, to associate himself with others so that collectively their tangible power to deal with the situation is multiplied. This is, in point of fact, the foundation in experience for social contracts. It is also the natural foundation of labor unions.

It is not known with quantitative precision how much expansion in the number of Enterprise establishments occurred in the U.S. prior to 1849, nor how many such Enterprises were attempted and failed; comprehensive data collection in the Census of Manufactures did not begin until 1849 [Bureau of the Census (1949), pg. 176]. Census figures for the number of manufacturing entities from 1859 to 1899 are shown in figure 8.9 above. Also shown for reference is the number of manufacturing wage earners during this period. For 1849 the census gives the number of manufactories as 123,025 and the number of wage-earners as 957,059 [*ibid.*, pg. 179]. The census defined a manufacturing establishment as a geographically isolated manufacturing unit maintaining independent bookkeeping records, regardless of its managerial or financial affiliations. Wage earners include working foremen and "gang and straw bosses" as well as direct laborers [*ibid.*, pg. 176]. Data was surveyed decennially.

The number of manufacturing wage earners grew at a relatively constant rate of 3.56% per year throughout the period shown. The number of manufacturing establishments, however, shows three distinct periods. From 1859 to 1869 the number of establishments grew at a robust 6.03% per year. This corresponds with the boom period associated with the Civil War in figure 8.7 with a carryover into the beginning of the recession from the 1865 peak year. From 1869 to 1879 the number of manufactories was flat; this corresponds with the worst part of the depression period economic historians call The Long Depression (Oct. 1873 through March 1879). From 1879 to 1899, growth in the number of manufactories returned but at a rate of 3.57% per year, which matches the rate of growth in the number of wage earners. This last period corresponds to an up-tick in the GPI that took place beginning in 1879; the general recession had not ended, but decline in the GPI was much less drastic over this period and the recession period did bottom out in 1896.

We do not have similar quantitative data for the mild inflationary period from 1802 to the

boom peak in 1814, nor for the depression/recession that followed from 1815 to 1843. Anecdotal evidence, however, seems to indicate that capitalist entrepreneur attitudes and actions were likely similar to the period shown above. The Monroe Administration (1817-1825) is known as "The Era of Good Feelings" – possibly one of the most misnamed eras in U.S. history in regard to economics, but accurately named in terms of subjective attitudes and judgments of taste. This was the era that saw the construction of the Erie Canal and the pioneering settlement of the new western territories. The War of 1812 is widely regarded as the stimulus of the American industrial revolution.

Non-capitalist wage-earning entrepreneurs saw the economic situation differently than it was viewed by the capitalist entrepreneurs, as I said earlier. From 1850 to 1870 the urban population grew at a rate of 5.27% per year (figure 8.4), which lags the growth rate of new manufacturing establishments (6.03%). From 1870 to 1900 it grew at a rate of 3.85%, outpacing the rate of growth of new establishments. Thus, during the expansionary period (M4) it would appear jobs would have been adequately plentiful, but during the recessionary period (M5) jobs would have not kept pace with worker demand for them. In point of historical fact, 1893-'99 was a period of extremely high unemployment. Adding to the pressure on urban wage earners was an on-going influx of immigrants (figure 8.8). Again, there is anecdotal evidence that the situation was likely not much different in the boom-and-bust periods from 1810 to 1850.

Capitalist entrepreneurs and wage-earner entrepreneurs alike feel the pinch of recession and satiation of economic expansion, but they feel them in quite different ways and the tangible power of their persons for dealing with these situations could hardly be more uneven. Referring again to figure 8.8B, from 1850 to 1900 immigration accounted for between 25% to 40% of the change in U.S. population with an average of slightly over 30%. These are very large percentages and very few newly arrived immigrants landed with sufficient personal capital to establish themselves as capitalist entrepreneurs. The great majority of them would have entered the labor force in competition with American-born wage-earners. In 1848 one of these newcomers was a twelve year old Scottish boy who, shortly after his thirteenth birthday, landed a twelve-hour-a-day job as a bobbin boy in an Allegheny City, PA, factory at a wage of one dollar and twenty cents per week. His name was Andrew Carnegie.

Carnegie was not the only child laborer in 19th century American industry. The practice of employing even very young children in factories occurred from the beginning of the American industrial revolution. This was not actually something new to America. The precedent of employing children in the workplace had long been set by the now-vanished apprenticeship system. These children likewise competed with adults for available jobs in a tight job market. Figures 8.10 illustrate the situation. In 1859 only about 23% of the urban population were active as manufacturing wage earners; the ratio of factories to urban population was a mere 2.5%. These




Figure 8.10: (A) Number of employed manufacturing wage earners as a percent of U.S. urban population, 1859 to 1899. (B) Number of manufacturing establishments as a percent of urban population.




Figure 8.11: Census indicators of decreasing birth rate among whites, 1800 to 1940.




Figure 8.12: Deaths per 1000 people in the Massachusetts registration area from 1865 to 1899. Reliable national death rate statistics are not available for prior to 1900. Massachusetts was a national birth-death registration area and had reliable figures over the longest period of time. [Bureau of the Census (1965), Series B 155, pg. 30]




Figure 8.13: Infant mortalities per 1000 live births in the Massachusetts registration area from 1851 to 1954 [Bureau of the Census (1965), Series B 113, pg. 26]. The "germ theory revolution" and other discoveries led to the beginning of modern scientific practices in medicine in the 1890s.

numbers are calculated from available census data [Bureau of the Census (1949), Series J 1, 4, pg. 179] and the census data for urban population.

There is no reasonable doubt that for the greater majority of urban Americans life was hard in this economic landscape. A number of vital statistics provide evidence of this. Figures 8.11 show one sign of this: a steady decline in birth rate among whites in the 19th century. Complete figures for non-white Americans are not available over this same period, but what data does exist shows non-white birth rate also declining [Bureau of the Census (1949), Series C 22, pg. 45]. The birth rate does outpace the death rate (figure 8.12), but the more telling data is shown in figure 8.13:

the infant mortality rate. By the 1850s the birth rate had declined to between 4.0 and 4.5% and the death rate was more or less steady at 2%, but infant mortality rate, defined as deaths of live-birth infants before age 1 year, was running at around 13% and climbing. For a quarter-century, from 1870-'95, about one baby in six never lived to see its first birthday. In one of the many passages from *Wealth of Nations* that pro-uncivic free enterprise propagandists never quote, Smith wrote,

Servants, laborers, and workmen of different kinds make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people should have such a share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged.

Poverty, though it no doubt discourages, does not always prevent marriage. It even seems to favor generation. . . . But poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is extremely unfavorable to the rearing of children. The tender plant is produced, but in so cold a soil and so severe a climate [it] soon withers and dies. . . . In some places one half of the children born die before they are four years of age; in many places before they are seven; and in almost all places before they are nine or ten. This great mortality, however, will everywhere be found chiefly among the children of the common people, who cannot afford to tend them with the same care as those of better stations. . . .

Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it. But in civilized society it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further propagation of the human species; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part of the children which their fruitful marriages produce. . . .

The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his master; but that of a free servant is at his own expense. The wear and tear of the latter, however, is, in reality, as much at the expense of his master as that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen and servants of every kind must be such as may enable them, one with another, to continue the race of journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or stationary demand of the society may happen to require. . . . The liberal reward of labor, therefore, as it is the effect of increasing wealth, so it is the cause of increasing population. To complain of it is to lament over the necessary effect and cause of the greatest public prosperity. [Smith (1776), pp. 69-72]

Smith also wrote – and this bit the aforementioned propagandists do not miss quoting – that, *ceteris paribus*, the dynamics of job market supply-and-demand will see to the regulation of the growth of a population. Smith's arguments on this point are quite sound but – and this is an oft-overlooked part of the argument – one of the *conditions* on which his economic *theorem* is based is that of a *closed* economy, i.e., one in which immigration or emigration is a negligible factor. This was *not* the case in the 19th century United States. Theorems for the empirical laws of a social-natural science, like those of mathematics, always have conditions under which they apply, and to quote a theorem without also ascertaining if its conditions are satisfied is sophistry. Where *Smith* stood on uncivic free enterprise is readily apparent in *Wealth of Nations*:

In cheap years, it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in dear ones more industrious, than ordinary. A plentiful subsistence, therefore it has been concluded, relaxes, and a scanty one quickens their industry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen idle cannot well be doubted, but that it should have this effect upon the greater part, or that men in general should work better when they are ill fed than when they are well fed, when they are disheartened than when they are in good spirits, when they are frequently sick than when they are in good health seems not very probable. [*ibid.*, pp. 73-4]




Figure 8.14: Dun & Bradstreet figures on the number of business concerns (A) and business failure rates per 10,000 business concerns (B) from 1870 to 1919. [Bureau of the Census (1965), Series V 1, 2, pg. 570]

Census data from the 19th century appears to refute an overgeneralization of Smith's theory, sometimes inferred by historians, that industrial revolutions in and of themselves lead to increases in population. One thing economic conditions did seem to provoke was a resurgence in capitalist enterprise in reaction to the chief social changes the Economy revolution had produced. Figures 8.14 implicitly illustrate this, although the significance of this data cannot be appreciated unless it is compared to other census factors. Figure 8.14A shows the increase in the number of business concerns in the U.S. reported by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. in 1951-'57. D&B "business concerns" include manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, contractors, and certain kinds of commercial services. They do not include finance, insurance and real estate companies, railroads, terminals, amusements, many types of small service and construction enterprises, professionals, or farmers. The businesses Dun & Bradstreet identified have in common that they are seekers of commercial credit in the usual banking connotation of that term. While recognizing the Census Bureau's caution that

Statistics on the total number and the size distribution of business firms must be treated with caution. No governmental process records all firms, and an entirely satisfactory definition of a firm seems impossible. The boundary between self-employment and conduct of a business is hazy at best. In addition, there are problems of inactive or partly (e.g. seasonally) inactive firms, joint ventures, partial interests, ownership of multiple firms by individuals and families, etc. . . . The statistical importance of these problems is great because of the unusual size distribution of the business population . . . which contains a large number of very small firms, and a minute proportion of larger firms accounting for a substantial or even predominant fraction of total activity. [Census Bureau (1965), pg. 567],

the D&B figures illustrate a phenomenon too important to pass over. From 1870 to 1893, and again after an 1893 to 1897 downturn, the number of D&B business concerns rose at a very brisk rate that outpaced the total growth in U.S. population by a ratio of about 7:4. If we make the reasonable assumption that each of these businesses required a minimum of one capitalist entrepreneur for whom this business was his principal enterprise concern, the data suggests that the fraction of the U.S. population engaging themselves as capitalist entrepreneurs rose from a lower bound of about 1 in every 96 Americans in 1870 to about 1 in every 55 by 1893. As the Census Bureau points out, the larger part of these D&B concerns would be small businesses with only a few employees. They also would have been far more spread out geographically, taking in smaller rural communities (small town America) beyond the urban cities and towns of the 19th century.

Part of the folklore myth of the capitalist entrepreneur is the high-risk nature of his enterprise. It is a bit of folklore strongly promoted by today's Small Business Administration, although SBA data I find to be confused and loaded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Figure 8.14B shows the D&B failure rates of D&B concerns over the period. It averages out at about a 1% rate.

In some ways this is a very remarkable figure and is greatly at odds with the "business infant mortality rate" of new firms claimed by the SBA and others. A D&B business failure is defined as a concern involved in court procedures or voluntary actions including those that lead to discontinuances of the business concern following assignment or attachment of goods, bankruptcy petitions, foreclosure, voluntary withdrawal with known losses to creditors, receiverships, and businesses making voluntary settlements with creditors out of court. It does not include business concerns where the owner-proprietor simply decides to quit his business. It would not, for example, count Andrew Carnegie's father, who closed his hand-loom weaving shop and emigrated with his family to Pennsylvania after he was unable to compete any longer with Scotland's factories. In America the elder Carnegie was again obliged to quit his hand-loom business and become a worker in a cotton factory. It was he who arranged for young Andrew to start work there. Carnegie wrote in his autobiography,

It was a hard life. In the winter father and I had to rise and breakfast in the darkness, reach the factory before it was daylight, and, with a short interval for lunch, work till after dark. The hours hung heavily upon me and in the work itself I took no pleasure; but the cloud had a silver lining, as it gave me the feeling that I was doing something for my world – our family. I have made millions since, but none of those millions gave me such happiness as my first week's earnings. I was now a helper of the family, a breadwinner, and no longer a total charge upon my parents. [Carnegie (1920), pp. 34-35]

One of the very strongest Obligations-to-Self found among human beings is the Obligation one places oneself under to care and provide for one's own children and family. That was difficult to do for the great majority of people in industrializing America and, from a perspective of mental physics, is a far stronger provocation to become a capitalist entrepreneur than is a simple dislike of having to work under the rulership of another individual. By 1855 then-20-year-old Carnegie, whose father's death that year had thrust him into the role of chief breadwinner for his family, made himself a capitalist entrepreneur with the help of his mother. He wrote,

Mr. Scott asked me if I had five hundred dollars. If so, he said he wished to make an investment for me. Five hundred cents was much nearer my capital. I certainly had not fifty dollars saved for investment, but I was not going to miss the chance of becoming financially connected with my leader and great man. So I said boldly I thought I could manage that sum. He then told me there were ten shares of Adams Express stock that he could buy, which belonged to a station agent . . . Of course this was reported to the head of the family that evening [Carnegie's mother] and she was not long in suggesting what might be done. We had then paid five hundred dollars upon the house, and in some way she thought this might be pledged as security for a loan. [*ibid.*, pp. 72-73]

As I said earlier, it does not require any extraordinary personal ability to become a capitalist entrepreneur. The 1878 peak in business failures in figure 8.14 was the highest in U.S. history, edging out the 1932 peak of 1.54% during the Great Depression, and corresponds to a mere 1.58% of D&B businesses. As a capitalist entrepreneur, Carnegie is an exceptional case because in his life he demonstrated an extraordinary degree of intellectual *Personfähigkeit* in conjunction with an even more extraordinary degree of persuasion *Personfähigkeit* (Carnegie was educated, in Scotland). But to become a capitalist entrepreneur does take capital. Here Carnegie's family was one of the fortunate minority of home owners and so he – or, more accurately, his mother – was able to secure a mortgage loan to finance his first capital venture. For the majority of 19th century wage-earners, acquisition of capital was simply beyond their means. As Smith wrote,

It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal to maintain himself until he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally advanced to him from the stock of a master, the farmer who employs him, and who would have no interest to employ him

unless he was to share in the produce of his labor or unless his stock was to be replaced to him with a profit. . . . The produce of almost all other labor is liable to the like deduction of profits. In all arts and manufactures the greater part of the workmen must stand in need of a master to advance them the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their labor, or in the value it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed; and in this share consists his profit.

It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single independent workman has stock sufficient both to purchase the materials of the work and to maintain himself till it be completed. He is both master and workman, and enjoys the whole produce of his own labor, or the whole value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed. It includes what are usually two distinct revenues, belonging to two distinct persons, the profits of stock and the wages of labor.

Such cases, however, are not very frequent, and in every part of Europe, twenty workmen serve under a master for one that is independent . . . What are the common wages of labor depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labor.

It is not difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of Parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, a merchant, although they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate.

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit but constant and uniform combination not to raise the wages of labor above their actual rate. [Smith (1776), pp. 57-59]

This combination doesn't require conspiracy meetings held in dark shadows. Statistics on what is called "the market mean" for wages and salaries is openly published annually, and management in every major and most minor corporations use this information to determine what wages and salaries it is going to offer for the jobs it has to fill. Smith's combination of masters is thereby made institutional in every Western Society. This promotes granulation in a modern Society.

By the time Carnegie was a teenager he had already self-acquired – by learning from the examples set by his elders in his extended family as well as a vigorous self-initiated program of educational Self-development he glowingly describes in his autobiography – a considerable amount of intellectual and persuasion *Personfähigkeit* he was able to subsequently leverage into acquiring a super-abundant amount of tangible *Personfähigkeit*. He also thoroughly exploited his attractive Expressive personality style to win the affections of older men – who quite often find the appeal of a friendly, hardworking, eager-to-please youngster, which Carnegie certainly was, irresistible and therefore lend a hand to help the youngster develop. Carnegie did not lift himself up by his own bootstraps. It was this educational and experiential self-development Carnegie employed that distinguished him from the great majority of other wage-earners – who either lacked similar personal experience, or instructional education for how to self-develop it, or both. What they did have were the usual habituated social maxims of allying themselves with others.

Trade associations and alliances began forming early during the Economy revolution of the 18th century. The basic idea of these (along with the frequent hostility toward them many capitalist entrepreneurs exhibited) is traceable to the far older example of European guilds. These were the first of Smith's combinations of European workmen. Lipsey & Steiner tell us,

No one bothers to define unions any more, perhaps because everyone knows what they are, or perhaps because a union is so many things . . . For the purposes of our discussion of labor markets, a *union* (or *trade union*, or *labor union*) is an association of individual workers that speaks for them in negotiations with their employers.

Unions today have two different principles of organization: the *craft* (or *trade*) union and the *industrial* union. In the craft union workers with a common set of skills are joined in a common association, no matter where or for whom they work. The craft principle of organization was and is the hallmark of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Until the 1930s, virtually all unions were organized along craft lines . . . The *industrial union* is organized along industry lines. All workers in a given plant or industry are collected into a single union. This is the pattern developed by the member unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). . . . The two principles of unionism conflict. . . . Disputes over which union shall have the right to *organize* (i.e., bring into their union) a particular group of workers . . . have led to prolonged, bitter, and bloody battles of union against union, and they have played an important role in American labor history. [Lipsey & Steiner (1972), pg. 409]

Figures 8.15 detail union membership from 1881 to 1896 [Wolman (1924), pg. 32]. The Wolman




Figure 8.15: Union membership in selected unions (A) and as percent of nonagricultural labor force (B).

data was gathered from various data publications put out by the unions themselves. U.S. census data on union membership is not available for years prior to 1897 and Wolman's study constitutes the primary source of data on unions prior to that year. He cautions,

Statistics of membership during [1880 to 1895] must naturally be severely discounted. Diverse cross-currents in the labor movement were simultaneously in operation, working-men at the same time held membership in more than one of the competing unions, and joining a union was often only a temporary incident in the conduct of a strike. Such were the characteristics of the fifteen years after 1880. Warring organizations, also, with the smell of blood still fresh in their nostrils were not beyond making claims for their fighting strength, which it would be impossible now to substantiate. Nor were the records of unions, except in a few instances, in such shape as to constitute the source of adequate and reliable data. Such figures for the period as can be used should for these reasons do no more than give an impression of the general order of magnitude of the labor movement in the eighties and early nineties. [Wolman (1924), pg. 31]

The data on membership in selected unions of figure 8.15A does not, for instance, include the membership data for the Knights of Labor, which had been founded in 1869 and was by 1880 the oldest national labor union still in existence. My reason for their omission is because by the 1880s the Knights of Labor was already suffering from competition from other unions, particularly the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and from its own developing internal collapse and disintegration. Their membership number claims, for that reason, are suspect, especially for the year 1890. Wolman does provide Knights of Labor membership data in his Table 1, pg. 32.

Wolman's remark about "the smell of blood in their nostrils" has to be taken literally. Many strikes and labor protests in the 19th century turned deadly violent. Prior to 1842, the government held that attempts by workers to strike were illegal; strikers could be, and were, arrested, charged with conspiracy, and fined. The precedent for this was an 1806 court case, *Commonwealth v. Pullis*. It was not until March of 1842, in *Commonwealth v. Hunt*, that the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that labor unions were legal organizations and had the right to organize and strike. In July 1851, two railroad strikers were killed and several others injured by the state militia in Portage, New York. During the Tompkins Square Riot in New York City, in January 1874, mounted police charged a crowd of demonstrators, beating men, women, and children with billy clubs and causing hundreds of casualties. A July 1877 confrontation in Chicago between members of the German Furniture Workers Union and federal troops resulted in 30 workers being killed and over 100 more being wounded. In May 1886, Wisconsin Governor Jeremiah Rusk called out the Wisconsin National Guard to put down a strike protesting the ten hour workday. The state militia opened fire on the crowd, killing seven at the scene, including one child; eight more wounded strikers later died. In November 1887, a Louisiana militia shot 35 unarmed black sugar workers who were striking to gain a dollar-a-day wage. These are all cases in which agents of the government took sides in a labor dispute. Violent confrontations between strikers and company-employed private forces – the Pinkerton Detective Agency was frequently used for this – were also not uncommon. During the Homestead Strike against Carnegie's Homestead steel mill, a gun battle between members of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers and Pinkerton agents killed several people and resulted in the Pinkertons being overwhelmed by the strikers. The Pennsylvania National Guard was called in to restore order in the town.

Incidents like these illustrate in a way no dry economic statistics ever can how violations of the social contract in an environment of uncivic free enterprise granulates a Society and provokes antibonding relationships between competing groups. They also demonstrate clear dereliction of Duty by political-party-appointed agents of government when government agents take the side of one segment of their Society against another. This is the seamy and inevitable side of the tyranny of non-consensus political party democracy in action. Toynebee proletariats are its outcome.




Figure 8.16: Census figures on the number of strikes and lockouts and the number of involved workers (in thousands) from 1881 to 1920. There is a data gap from 1906 to 1914, and worker numbers are not reported after 1905.

Anecdotal history describing specific events, such as the Homestead Strike of 1887, can serve to describe the personal and emotional nature of events like a labor strike. On the downside, this sort of history by itself fails to convey a sense for the breadth or narrowness of events, or of its wider import beyond those who were immediately involved. For an appreciation of this, one must turn to more quantitative data. Figure 8.16 illustrates the number of work stoppages and the number of workers (in thousands) who were involved in it from 1881 to 1920. The data is taken from Bureau of the Census (1965), pg. 99, Series D 770, 775. There is a gap from 1906 to 1913 in which no figures are reported by the Census Bureau; after 1905 the Bureau also stopped reporting the number of people involved. They do not explain why they apparently think the number of strikes and lockouts is data of national interest while the number of Americans directly affected is not. By "work stoppage" the Bureau includes both strikes and lockouts. By "workers involved" they mean all workers made idle by the stoppage, whether they were participants in the controversy or not. The data excludes strikes involving fewer than six workers or that lasted less than one full work shift.

There are a couple of facts revealed by the quantitative data. The first one, obviously, is that in terms of the total number of work stoppages and the number of wage-earners involved, the numbers in any given year constitute only a small percentage of the total number of U.S. business entities and population. It would be quite wrong, however, to presume this means these incidents are unimportant in the larger picture or that labor malcontent is confined to a few "troublemakers" in the workforce. Rather, it is far more likely, according to the mental physics of human nature, that the relative smallness of these numbers reflects the difficulty granulated mini-Communities generally face in effecting large movements that recruit allegiance and actions from other people in the Society whose personal interests are not involved in their particular circumstances. Like pus in a wound, work stoppages and participation levels are *symptoms* of deeper social disease.

The second, which is also clear from the quantitative data, is that the underlying provocations producing granulation, social-chemical antibonding, and formation of Toynbee proletariats in the American body-politic were not abating at the end of the 19th century. Rather the opposite appears to be the case: as the number of incidents increases over time, this is indicative that the real societal challenges provoking them were *not* being successfully met. Toynbee's findings say unequivocally that this symptom is a very serious and dangerous sign of social disintegration.

§ 4. Impact on Education and the Reform Movements

Neither economics, politics, nor mini-Community actions, taken singly, can be regarded, with objective validity, as primitive causes in relationship to which the others stand as mere effects.

Critical metaphysics tells us this apodictically. These empirical factors co-occur with each other, they interact socially through the Enterprise-protein structure of an industrialized Society, and because of this their Relation is understood by the category of community in Critical metaphysics (*Gemeinschaft*). This means each must be regarded *simultaneously* as partial cause of the others *and* as a partial effect of the others [Wells (2009), chap.5, pp. 188-190]. If it were possible to view their Relations as Relations of causality-and-dependency, then it would be possible to fix a blame on those that stand as causes and bring attention to bear on them alone with knowledge that fixing a problem *here* solves all other problems *elsewhere*. Unfortunately for human endeavor, empirical Nature isn't so cooperative. The Relation of community is woefully underappreciated in science but it is in fact this Relation, rather than causality-and-dependency, that is most often at the root of every non-trivial natural phenomenon, whether this be physical- or social-natural.

One fecund use we *can* make of economics in a standalone manner is to use economic factors and indicators as a sort of barometer for measuring the degree to which subjective and social-psychological factors are producing loss of domestic tranquility, disturbances to general welfare, societal granulation, and the formation of pockets of Toynbee proletarians. The provocations of the 19th century appear to fall into three more or less crisp periods separated, at fuzzy boundaries, by the two great peaks in the Snyder-Tucker index. Different symptoms of provocations show up on either side of the peaks in population data, in business and employment records, in anecdotal histories of interludes of calm vs. interludes of crime and violence, and in published essays.

Arbitrary labels can be assigned to these periods for purposes of later referral. I call the first period the Washington Period, by which I mean the years from 1800 to 1815 with transition and its gradual disappearance into the next period from 1815 to 1825. I choose this label because during this period there were no national political parties of any consequence (merely political factions) and so it represents the brief interval in U.S. history when the United States most closely resembled the American Republic the Framers of the Constitution had envisioned.

I call the second period, from 1815 to 1861, the Democratic Party Period. It makes a gradual appearance in the transition years from 1815 to 1825 but comes to a much crisper and abrupt end in 1861 with the Confederate secession and the outbreak of the Civil War of 1861-'65. This was the period of the formation and coming-to-power of organized national political parties – precisely the political development Washington and Adams had most dreaded. I call it by this name because the Democratic Party controlled the U.S. Senate for 13 of 16 sessions, the House of Representatives for 12 of 16 sessions, and the Presidency for 12 of the 16 Congressional sessions. Sessions of Congress last for two years each. Hence, for three-quarters of the period the country effectively was under the tyranny of one-party rule by the Democrats.

I call the third period, from 1861 to 1901, the Republican Party Period. It began explosively with the Civil War and effectively extended into the 20th century. I put its cutoff date at 1901 for two reasons: (1) this marks the beginning of the 20th century; and (2) the administration of Theodore Roosevelt was an event peculiar for the fact that a major political party was headed by a President who was in many ways a rebel against party mainstream doctrine and discipline. I call it by this name because the Republican Party controlled the U.S. Senate for 18 of 20 sessions, the House of Representatives for 12 of 20 sessions, and the Presidency for 16 of 20 sessions. Hence, for three-fifths of the period the U.S. was effectively under the tyranny of one-party rule by the Republicans. It would seem the Republican Party, as a corporate person, was a less competent ruling caste than the Democrats in terms of their ability to maintain a lock on their power to rule. They were, however, clearly the principal beneficiaries of the Civil War.

Quantitative national data more directly linked to the institution of education does not appear in the census records until 1870, four years into the great recession of 1865-'96. As gauged using the GPI as economic indicator, the Democrats had failed to resolve Toynbee challenges facing the




Figure 8.17: Population of school-age children in the U.S. and percentage enrollment in public schools.




Figure 8.18: Children age 5 to 17 as percent of U.S. population and number of school teachers, 1870-1920.




Figure 8.19: Education expenditures per student (dollars) and student-teacher ratio, 1870-1920.

U.S. in the 19th century. These were clearly still in play during the third period and were being confronted now for a second time by new political paradigms. As indicated by the GPI, the Republicans were no more successful than the Democrats had been at resolving them, but it would at least seem to be the case that the chronic challenge was at last gaining attention by Census Bureau agents. In the census record there is evidence of changes in education policy.

Figure 8.17 shows the population of children from age 5 to 17 years and the percentage of U.S. children enrolled in public schools from 1870 to 1920. This data was compiled by Morison & Commager (1930) from information provided in their most current *Statistical Abstract of the United States* [Morison & Commager (1930), pg. 925]. By 1870 the percentage of school-age children reported enrolled in school had reached 56%. The percentage enrollment from 1880 to 1920 falls on a straight line (correlation coefficient 0.9924) and the 1870 enrollment percentage makes a statistically significant departure from this line. I hypothesize from this that the decade of

1870-'80 marks a transition point where second-phase 19th century education reform movements were beginning to have a significant effect on public schooling policy.

This hypothesis seems to be supported by data on the growth rate in the number of teachers. The number of children 5 to 17 grew at an annual rate of 2.18% from 1870 to 1890, with this growth rate declining to 1.33% per year from 1890 to 1920 (figure 8.17A). This corresponds to a slight decline in the number of children as a percent of U.S. population (figure 8.18 A), which is another symptom of declining birth rate. During this period the total number of teachers in the U.S. grew at an annual rate of 1.98% from 1880 to 1910 (figure 8.18B). The year 1870 makes a statistically significant departure below this trend line, suggesting that between 1870 and 1880 there was a surge in hiring new teachers.

This is borne out by figure 8.19, which shows education expenditures per student (figure 8.19 A) and student-teacher ratio (8.19B). There is a significant change in expenditures beginning in 1880. The growth rate in expenditures is roughly 3.6% annually but there is a large variation in spending (model errors -7.1% to $+12.3\%$). Complicating the modeling is the fact that from 1880 to 1895 the Snyder-Tucker GPI was declining and then began rising again after 1895. Student-teacher ratio, on the other hand held roughly constant at an average of 34.3 students per teacher with a standard error of 1.595 students per teacher. This suggests that teacher hiring was being regulated by some student-teacher ratio policy of administrative decision makers.

Evidence of a new public emphasis on education is also hinted at by what appears to be the beginning of a growth trend in the number of high school graduates (as a percentage of 17-year-olds) that seems to be getting underway in 1880 (figure 8.20). High school graduation percentage was a paltry 2% in 1870 and graduation levels seem to be consistent with degree-seeking enrollments in higher education at this time. From 1890 onward, we can see a growing divergence between high school graduation percentages and college enrollments [Bureau of the Census (1976), Series H 599, pg. 379, and Series H 707, pg. 383]. This seems to suggest a shift in public reasoning about the purposes of education since the traditional role seen for secondary education in earlier times had been that its primary purpose was to prepare young men to go to college. As figure 8.20 illustrates, that is clearly no longer the case by 1900.

It is unfortunate that we do not possess similar data for the Democratic period. Without it, we can draw no immediate conclusions, such as whether one party or the other had a proactive policy of education or how such a policy, if it existed at all, affected real events. The only piece of actual




Figure 8.20: High school graduates (as percent of 17-year-olds) and degree-seeking higher education enrollment (as percent of 18 to 24 year-olds) from 1870 to 1920. A 0 denotes 'not reported.'




Figure 8.21: Percentage of U.S. urban population grouped by size of the urban area from 1790 to 1940. Source: Bureau of the Census (1949), Series B 147-158, pg. 29.




Figure 8.22: Number of U.S. cities and towns grouped by size from 1790 to 1940. Source: Bureau of the Census (1949), Series B 147-158, pg. 29.

quantitative data provided in census records is an intriguing tidbit telling us that school enrollment rates per 100 population stood at 47.2 in 1850, rose to 50.6 by 1860, then declined back to 48.4 in 1870. From there the figures for 1880 to 1900 are, respectively, 57.8, 54.3, and 50.5 at the turn of the century. Afterward the enrollment rate began a steady climb decade by decade, without reversals, from 1900 to 1950 [Bureau of the Census (1965), Series H 374, pg. 213]. Note that these enrollment figures differ from those of figure 8.17B because the two sets of figures are calculated from different bases – children ages 5 to 17 for the Morison & Commager compilation vs. ages 5 to 19 for the Series H 374 data. From this we can conclude nothing more than that we *can not* conclude there either was or was not an *effective* national policy difference under Democratic Party vs. Republican Party rule.

What census figures do tell us directly is that the period from 1830 to the outbreak of the Civil War of 1861-'65 exhibited a quantitatively different effect the industrial revolution was having in comparison to the postwar period. Figure 8.21 shows the explosive increase in the percent of the U.S. urban population living in cities of over 100,000 people that occurred from 1830 to 1860. The companion data in figure 8.22 tells us the number of cities of different sizes arranged in groups as cities of: 2,500 to 5,000 people; 5,000 to 10,000 people; 10,000 to 25,000 people; 25,000 to 50,000 people; 50,000 to 100,000 people, and greater than 100,000 people. Figure 8.21

also shows a clear break occurring in the increase of urbanization after 1860, a fact that suggests there were at least two qualitatively and quantitatively different phases to industrialization in the United States: an antebellum phase and a later phase.

These periods correspond precisely to two major reform movements in public education in the United States [Blake (1961), pg. 55; Reese (2011), pg. 10-13, 45-47]. The first is associated with Horace Mann, its leading spokesman, from circa 1820 to 1860. I prefer to call it the **Republic Era** because the main arguments mounted for education reform during the period stressed the importance of public education for America as a republic. The latter period is not graced with a common labeling, and indeed it seems difficult to find one that suitably describes it. It set the basic organizational structure of the American institution of public education we know today, established universal free public education as a state responsibility, and likewise initiated an educator-professionalism movement that in principle is a beneficial idea but in practice led to an anti-Republic elitism in education. It also led to a three-sided power struggle between education theorists, businessmen, and politicians that still exists today to the general detriment of American public education. It was a **Plutocratic Era** and an era of opinion.

Whatever one prefers to call these periods, there can be little doubt that both reforms were provoked by social conditions that developed in the industrial revolution and the urbanization of the United States this produced. I discuss the Republic Era first. It was provoked by feelings of genuine alarm felt by the proponents of education reform over what developing socio-economic conditions were leading to. Reese tells us,

Progressive citizens throughout New England [Horace Mann said in 1845] wanted to perfect the schools and affirm their centrality in shaping the character, morals, and intelligence of the rising generation. They pressed for consolidation of small schools and more state intervention into local affairs. To build a sturdy system of schools, Mann warned, would not be easy, and the failure to do so ominous. Social class divisions had widened in recent years. Riots and public disorder were especially common in the cities, reflecting social tensions between rich and poor, native born and immigrant. Mass education, however, promised to restore social harmony to the land. Rising wealth among the few had been accompanied by rising rates of poverty among the many, but the schools could cement bonds in a world where community ties had dissolved. So said America's leading advocate of the common schools. [Reese (2011), pp. 10-11]

Mann was perfectly correct to call attention to the symptoms of embroiling social challenges appearing in America's cities, and he was not incorrect to say schools "could" cement social bonds capable of uniting America's multitude of divers mini-Communities. To say these things is to say the least. Schools "could" do something about it; the pertinent question is: *would* they? It is one thing to promise something; it is another thing altogether to deliver on that promise. School institution *per se* promises nothing because the mere fact that a Society erects a school system *guarantees* nothing specific. A school building is not a magic tabernacle of a social soul curative of social ills merely because the shrine exists. No ethereal spirit emanates from it to soothe the savage beasts who live and die in state-of-nature relationships with one another. To think merely setting up any formal institution solves any problem is Neo-Platonism of the most useless and socially destructive sort.

Even so, to do *nothing* is to guarantee the failure of a Society to meet the Toynbee challenges it faces. Mann and his fellow reformers were right to try, and if the result was flawed and fell short of success, it was at least not a total failure and it is incorrect to judge lack of success as the equivalent to total failure. These are simply not the same thing. An institutionalizing effort will succeed if and only if the institution addresses fundamental causative factors and does so in a way that is wholly congruent with human nature (because it is the human nature of Man in his

character as *homo noumenon* from which the phenomena to be dealt with arise in the first place). A riot, a strike, or an armed robbery is not the problem, merely a symptom of the problem.

Let us take a brief look at the situation from 1830 to 1860 as Morison & Commager describe it for 1842:

Leaving [Martin van Buren] safely seated in the White House, let us turn to the material and moral forces that were pulsing through the United States of his generation. Statesmen and parties had done much to shape those forces, and more could be done with foresight and courage. Without violence they had transferred power to a new class and sectional combination. They had . . . evolved from the political anarchy of the twenties two national parties, both pledged to preserve the Union. Yet, in spite of their efforts, social and economic issues were pulling North and South apart. Both were progressing, but divergently. Northern society was being transformed by the industrial revolution, by cheap transportation, and migratory movements that touched the border states very little and the lower South not at all. Southern society was readjusting itself to the cotton plantation, tilled by slaves. By 1850 two distinct civilizations had been evolved, as different in the material basis, moral ideas, and view of life as Canada and Mexico of today. . . .

It was America's awkward age. The rather attractive child who had left his parent's roof, the marvelous boy who had proclaimed great truths (or perhaps delusions) to a candid world, was now a gawky hobbledohoy. He had fashioned for himself an excellent pair of skies that he called republicanism and democracy; but like pioneer skiers, he was in the stick-riding stage of development. His outrageous antics in the snow, his hair-breadth escapes, and colossal tosses were viewed with mingled amusement and disgust by devotees of the old-fashioned snowshoe. Avid of praise, he resented advice, believing that observers were really criticizing him for skiing at all.

Republicanism and democracy did work, and the resources of a new country, exploited by the inhabitants under laws of their own making and breaking, had brought a degree of comfort and security to the common man that he had not known since the days of Good Queen Bess⁶. It was not surprising that Americans were full of bounce and bluster, contemptuous of old-world monarchies. . . . Respect and deference were not to be had of him at any price; but those who addressed him as an equal discovered a natural civility and spontaneous kindness that took the place of manners. Intercourse between man and man was easy and pleasant because there was no assumption of social superiority on the one side, or acknowledged inferiority on the other. . . .

Forbearance the Americans carried to excess in their uncritical attitude towards their own books, customs, institutions, and abuses. Almost every English traveler of the period remarked the patience of Americans under the afflictions of contemporary travel, denounced their deference to majority opinion, and deplored their fear of expressing unpopular theories. This meant that the Americans were becoming less independent and more gregarious; a deference to the opinion of others being a condition of social intercourse on a democratic basis. Yet so complex was the American character that the excess of one quality was balanced by the excess of its reverse. Intolerance appeared in the persecution of unpopular groups such as free negroes, immigrants, abolitionists, and Catholics; and in hot resentment of unfavorable criticism. Yet we should be mistaken in ascribing these qualities wholly to democracy or to immaturity [Morison & Commager (1930), pp. 377-379]

A rather bubbly-sounding perspective, is this not? It's certainly not inconsistent with the bright hopes Mann and others held out for free public education as a cure for society's ills. Let us suppose for the sake of speculation that this adolescent American character was stereotypic of most Americans of this period. How do you suppose a personality of the sort as Morison &

⁶ Queen Elizabeth I of England

Commager have just described would react to the conditions of this same period as described by Wilson?

The financial storm had already begun to break upon the country when Van Buren assumed the chief post of the federal government. Business was already on the threshold of the crisis of 1837⁷. The volume of paper currency which had gone West for the purchase of lands was thrown back upon the East for redemption, or to add still further to the plethora of circulation already existing there. Credit had received a stunning blow, under which it first staggered and then fell. There was a sudden rise in prices. There had been a very rapid increase in the amount of imports since 1832, and considerable sums of specie [gold and silver coinage] had been sent abroad to meet balances. Flour rose from five dollars (1834) to eleven dollars per barrel (1837); corn from fifty-three cents to one dollar and fifteen cents per bushel. In February and March, 1837, there were bread riots in New York. The banks were driven everywhere to a suspension of specie payments, the deposit banks going down with the rest, in May. [Wilson (1909), pg. 93]

It doesn't take rocket science to see the answer to my question. A very great number of people were facing severe threats to and actual reductions in tangible *Personfähigkeit*. This directly provokes tenets of Duties-to-Self that, if the situation is not quickly redressed, will override lesser tenets of Duty to the general Community. People will circle their wagons around their own personal societies and express actions aimed at preserving and restoring personal welfare.

In this environment, the primary accomplishment in the institution of public education in the Republic Era was the widespread establishment of the common school (also known as the grade school) in the North and East. In the antebellum South there was little change in the existing institution. Responsibility for school institution was state-by-state, and the local institutions differed greatly, particularly between urban and rural areas. A few high schools – by some estimates perhaps forty – were established but these reached only a tiny fraction of fifteen-year-olds. The intent of the reformers was to produce good citizens, but the teaching methods used rote memorization and curricula were unimaginative continuations of elements of the Era of Tradition (1790-late 1830s). The "4 R's" of religion, reading, writing, and arithmetic were taught fairly generally, and most schools contained some additional topics as well. Horace Mann listed the subjects taught in some, not all, Massachusetts common schools as including U.S. history, general history, algebra, bookkeeping, Latin, Greek, rhetoric, geometry, physiology, logic, surveying, botany, chemistry, natural history, astronomy, intellectual philosophy, and French. In his *Sixth Annual Report* (1848), he wrote,

Latin and French are sometimes pursued by those who cannot write, grammatically, a sentence of English. Algebra and the extraction of roots are studied by scholars who cannot carry an item even through a set of books kept by single entry. The heights of astronomy are scaled by those who know almost nothing of the earth they inhabit; and ancient mythology and the history of antediluvians are studied by pupils who are wholly ignorant of the history of their own country. – Horace Mann [Potter (1967), pg. 233]

The schools in Boston were among the best in the United States. An 1845 examination given to Boston school children, with questions based on the textbooks for the required subjects taught in the common schools, produced the following pair of results: (1) out of the 57,873 total answers possible (if every child had answered every question), only 31,159 answers came back and only

⁷ Wilson is referring to the Panic of 1837, a financial crisis brought on by a fever of speculation that had produced runaway inflation. On May 10, 1837, every bank in New York City began accepting payment only in gold or silver coinage, which produced a deflationary backlash. The Panic was followed by five years of economic depression that saw widespread bank failures and record-high unemployment.

17,216 of these answers were correct; (2) the 31,159 returned answers contained 2,801 errors in grammar, 3,733 errors in spelling, and 35,947 errors in punctuation [Potter (1967), pg. 234]. These are not particularly encouraging outcomes.

The intent of the reformers was good and true. That the movement did at least succeed in getting the public common school accepted and seeded in the North in the teeth of opposing tradition was not a trivial accomplishment of populist democracy. Politicians opposed to the ruling Democratic Party were quick to side with public sentiment on the issue of education for the republic. When the ineffective old Whig Party finally collapsed and the new Republican Party was formed in 1854, the new party was quick to become, briefly and for virtually the only time in its almost 160 year history, an ally to the social cause of public education institution.

But the reform movement was crippled by: (1) a serious undersupply of teachers who had themselves been educated adequately to be able to effectively teach the subject-matters; and (2) an approach to curriculum based on unscientific judgments of taste and ungrounded suppositions of what subject-matters could and would accomplish the social object. These two problems are a lethal positive-feedback combination because even if the normal school movement (i.e., the movement to train professional teachers) had been ten times more effective, it would have been no more successful because its own subject-matter taught was social-naturally unscientific and inadequate. The reform movement in the Republic Era produced institutions that failed to satisfy either the social need or the public expectation. In the South, the movement accomplished little at all. Figure 8.23 gives the rating score social-natural education science must assign to its outcome.




Figure 8.23: 3LAR ratings for the institution of public instructional education in the Republic Era of reform on the eve of the Civil War. (A) personal division of instruction. (B) social division of instruction.

Given the moral underpinnings of the reform movement during the Republic Era, it is rather surprising and disappointing that the institution failed to address instruction in either corporal civics or civil values or in intellectual civics or civil planning functions. This, however, can be directly attributed to the underlying mainly-Protestant ideas of morality upon which everything else in the institution was based. It is true enough that largely nondenominational common school education was the order of the day, but this meant only that the religious presuppositions going into the institution sought common Protestant grounds. Catholics in particular complained about this bias in the common schools, but these complaints were ignored by the reformers. It cannot be said, however, that broader inclusion of Catholic dogma would have improved matters in the least. No institution in human history has a more unbroken track record for dogma than the institutions of religions. Virtually all Protestant presuppositions of morality and ethics derive, in varying numbers of steps, from either Luther's or Calvin's doctrine, and both of these derive heavily from Catholic doctrine.

The presuppositions they use are ontological presuppositions of morality and ethics. Further, these presuppositions are communicated to the faithful by appeals to Duties-to-Self alone. If you want to achieve *personal* salvation, go the doctrines, here is what you must do and how you must behave. It is merely another of the myriad instances where Uncritical ontology-centered metaphysical suppositions exert immediate effects on people's actions and expressions. These effects are all, without exception in the records of history, ultimately fatal to their Society.

I have no doubt that many religious spokesmen and apologists sincerely object to the way I have characterized it here. They are more or less committed, by very deep-lying practical maxims and habits of thinking based on judgments of taste, to objecting. It is certainly true that examples of "public morality" are found in the Bible and in religious instructions in no small number. It is also certainly true that their objections are honestly felt and often honestly expressed. However, and this is my point, the *ground* for these teachings is lodged nowhere else than threat: do this or *you* will personally go to hell. This is a basis for an individual to form practical tenets of Obligation-to-Self, but no basis whatsoever to ensure he will Self-adopt *any* Obligation-to-others. Without that kind of Self-obliging, civic intercourse becomes based on tenets of prudence alone, not on ideas of Duty. No lasting moral Society can be based on tenets of prudence alone.

In a homogeneous Society in which every person has precisely the same understanding of religion and faith, such ontological doctrines can be made to work for a time. Sparta made it work for many centuries. In a heterogeneous Society, and one that places a high social value on freedom of religion, it can not. The only type of moral-ethical theory capable of winning the allegiance of *all* people in a heterogeneous Society is one that is *deontological*. Even this speaks only to the capability potential; whether this potential is actualized depends utterly on the details of the theory, its soundness in *homo noumenal* human nature, and the practices it mandates.

The moral intents of the reformers did not go entirely without bearing fruit. To the degree their intended social consequences were realized, it came in the tangible-social dimension of lessons of *mos maiorum*. This, however, counted for little more than pupils absorbing particular maxims of social custom and an idealistic Platonic idol of what it meant to be a good American citizen. Small children will accept these lessons and believe in them a great deal more than do the adults who teach them. But because the foundation is unsound, childish notions so formed are extremely vulnerable to disillusionment later when they encounter in experience appearances of what is usually labeled hypocrisy in the behaviors of others. Cynicism and personal adoption of socially-outlaw maxims of taste are typical effects.

§ 5. The First Disintegration Era

If the first reform movement had accomplished its object, there would not have been a second

one that took place beginning *circa* 1870. What was this movement and what was its outcome? To understand the answers requires us to first briefly overview the period of the great rupture that destroyed the first Society of the United States and led to the formation of present one. This is the period from the end of the 1840s to 1870, the time period empirically identified in chapter 7 as model M4. During this time, the first education reform movement reached its zenith and then faded into the background behind the enormities of civil war.

1848 to 1860 were years of roiling controversy and radicalism. It saw the creation of six new political parties that drew their memberships from the Democratic Party and tired old Whig Party: the Free Soil Party, which absorbed the Liberty or "Abolitionist" Party (1848); the Anti-Nebraska Party (1854); the American Party, more commonly known as the Know-Nothings (1854); the Opposition Party (1854); the Constitutional Union Party (1860); and the Republican Party (1854). The Whigs collapsed and disintegrated completely in 1856 and the Democratic Party found its reach sectionalized and largely confined to the Southern States. The election of 1848 was so heavily factionalized it can be said the political parties had all briefly lost their holds on the rulership of the country. Sixty-three ballots and three weeks of bickering were required before the 1849 House of Representatives was able to elect a Speaker and begin to conduct its business. The political flashpoint issue was what to do with the new territories in regard to slavery.

A war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848 resulted in the United States acquiring a vast new territory covering the present states of California, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and portions of Wyoming and Colorado. This acquisition ignited implacable controversy between northern abolitionists, who opposed slavery with a religious zeal that went so far as to welcome a civil war, and southern "fire-eaters," who advocated secession and were openly willing to give the abolitionists their war. The Missouri Compromise and Fugitive Slave laws of 1850 cooled the political fever for a time – until the Dred Scott Decision by the Supreme Court in 1857 effectively ruled the Missouri Compromise to be unconstitutional. As it happened, the timing of Dred Scott coincided with one of the worst financial Panics in U.S. history.

The long recessionary period that had begun in 1815 had ended in 1843. It was followed by a period of economic expansion from 1843 to 1857 probably best characterized as reckless. Wilson, in any case, saw it that way:

Ever since 1846 there had been a very great prosperity in almost all branches of trade and manufacture. Great advances had been made in the mechanical arts, and easy channels of both domestic and of international trade had been multiplied in every direction by the rapid expansion of the railways and of steam navigation; so that the surplus of enterprise, along with the quickening influence of the great gold discoveries [in California] had been transmitted in all directions. But this period of prosperity and expansion, like all others of its kind, brought its own risks and penalties. Sound business methods presently gave way to reckless speculation. There was an excessive expansion of business; many enterprises were started which did not fulfill their first promise; there were heavy losses as well as great gains; and at last there came an uneasiness, the contraction of loans, failures, and panic. [Wilson (1909), pg. 196]

Morison & Commager provide a bit more detailed overview of this expansion and the times:

With the passage of the [Missouri] compromise of 1850 the slavery question subsided and other matters occupied the public prints, if not the public's mind. Higher prices for cotton restored prosperity to the South and confidence to her sons. . . . Not that slavery was forgotten. *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published in 1852, served to keep it in the back of people's minds; but everyone save Northern abolitionists and Southern 'fire-eaters' wished to let it remain there.

The period 1849 to 1857 was one of industrial development, along the lines already

marked out between North and South. The railroad supplanted the canal as a freight carrier and opened the prairies to profitable settlement. Immigration reached a new high level, and occasioned a new nativist movement in politics [the Know-Nothing Party]. Industrial expansion and westward migration allowed wages to rise evenly with prices. In the labor movement talk gave way to action. Unions of the later American type were concluding trade agreements with their employers, federating nationally on craft lines, but strictly avoiding politics. Marxian socialism came in with the German immigrants, but the 'Proletarierbund'⁸ that [some] of them founded quickly expired. The American workingman discarded Utopia for two dollars a day and roast beef. Neal Dow won an apparent victory for cold water with the Maine prohibition law; humanitarian reform and education [reform] marched hand in hand; Melville and Walt Whitman joined the increasing ranks of men of letters. Baseball became popular; yacht racing and intercollegiate rowing were introduced, together with vulgar luxury. . . .

At the same time the cotton kingdom was consolidating and becoming more conscious of its strength. Kentucky backwoodsmen, who in the thirties had taken up land in the black belts, were now gentlemen planters who mingled on equal terms with the first families of Virginia in the thermal stations of the mountains. Their elder sons, after leading volunteers in the Mexican War, had become lawyers or planters in turn; their younger sons were patronizing the newer colleges of the lower South, or attending the University of Virginia, with hounds and hunters and black servants. Dread of abolition, with its implication of negro equality, was binding the yeomen and poor whites more closely to their slaveholding neighbors. Economically, the cotton kingdom appeared to be growing stronger. The annual cotton crop rose from a thousand million to twenty-three hundred million pounds but never lacked purchasers. De Bow's *Review* was preaching the use of guano, conservation of soil, diversification of crops, and local manufacturers. Southern society was ripening into Southern civilization. If only the South could have achieved security for her social system, or had dared to lift her ban on creative thought, the late fifties might well have brought an outburst of literary activity that would have surpassed that of New England. Instead, they brought a fierce propaganda for Southern independence.

The presidential election of 1852 proved that an overwhelming majority of Americans were disposed to regard the compromise of 1850 as final. . . . The result was a landslide for [Franklin] Pierce . . . The Whig Party never recovered from this defeat. . . . The Democratic Party, purged of democracy, became a national conservative party directed by Southern planters and maintained by Northern votes. It controlled the Federal government for eight years, while the doting Whigs grew almost cross-eyed trying to discern which way thirty-one cats were going to jump. [Morison & Commager (1930), pp. 481-483]

The huge jump in immigration (figure 8.8B) was being fueled by worsening economic conditions in Europe. Indeed, the European economy was one of the important contributors to the Panic of 1857, which brought the brief period of economic expansion crashing down in ruin. Wilson wrote,

Now at length, moreover, immigration was beginning to tell decisively upon the composition of the population. Until the year 1842 the total number of immigrants in any one year had never reached one hundred thousand, and in 1844 it had fallen to seventy-eight thousand. But in 1845 a notable increase began: the number of immigrants exceeded 114,000; in 1846 it was more than 154,000; and in 1847 it was 234,968. Almost the whole decade was a period of disquietude and crisis in Europe. 1846 and 1847 were the years of the terrible famine in Ireland, and much of the immigration of the time came from that unhappy country. 1848 brought a season of universal political disturbance throughout

⁸ "worker league." The term is taken directly from *The Communist Manifesto*, issued in 1848. In the terminology of Communism, "proletariat" means "the workers"; in Toynbee's terminology, it refers to those disaffected people who, because of injustices from perpetuated social contract violations, have morally seceded from the body-politic of the Community and form outlaw mini-Communities residing in its midst.

Europe; and by 1849, the number of immigrants had risen to 297,024. But the causes which brought foreigners in vast numbers to our shores proved not to be temporary. The huge stream of immigrants continued to flow in steady volume until checked by war. And it had its deep significance as a preparation for the war which was at hand [the Civil War]. These newcomers swelled the national, not the sectional, forces of our politics; they avoided the South, where labor was in servitude, for they were laborers; they crowded into the northern cities, or pressed on into the great agricultural region of the Northwest, hastening that development and creating those resources which were to be the really decisive elements in the coming struggle between the slave section and the free section.⁹

The infusion of so large a foreign element, moreover, quickened the universal movement and resettlement of the population which the railroads were contributing to make easy and rapid, and added stimulation to the spirit of enterprise in new undertakings which the prevalent prosperity was everywhere encouraging. It tended, too, to deepen that habit of change, of experiment, of radical policies and bold proposals, which was bringing the people into a frame of mind to welcome even civil war for sake of reform. So long, too, as a vast growth and movement of population continued to be one of the chief features of the national life, the question of free soil [i.e., territory where slavery was prohibited] would continue to be a question of preeminent importance, of immediate and practical interest, which could not be compromised without being subsequently again and again reopened.

Invention still kept pace with industrial needs. . . . Piece by piece the whole mechanical apparatus of quick, prolific work, and of rapid communication of thought and impulse, was being perfected. The South felt these forces, of course; it felt, too, the genuine enthusiasm, the inspiration of national spirit and idea. Southern politicians, indeed, were debating sectional issues; but southern merchants presently fell to holding conventions in the interest of the new industrial development. These conventions spoke very heartily the language of nationality; they planned railways to the Pacific; they invited the cooperation of western States in devising means for linking the two sections industrially together; they hoped to be able to run upon an equality with the other sections of the country in the race for industrial wealth. But in all that they said there was an undertone of disappointment and of apprehension. They wished to take part, but could not, in what was going forward in the rest of the country. They spoke hopefully of national enterprise, but it was evident that the nation of which they were thinking when they spoke was not the same nation that the northern man had in mind when he thought of the future of industry. [Wilson (1909), pp. 163-164]

All of this delicate social-economic-political intercourse came crashing down with the Panic of 1857. The Panic was seeded by a declining European market for American goods, which caused American bankers to become cautious and tighten credit. Western land values fell and western migration slowed, which in turn caused railroad security prices to fall. As commercial credit dried up, debt-ridden manufacturers curtailed purchases and cut wages. On August 24, 1857, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, a major bank, abruptly failed due to fraud perpetrated by the company's management. This caused a banking panic. Grain prices fell from \$2.19 per bushel in 1855 to \$0.80 per bushel in 1858, forcing farm foreclosures on recently purchased land. In the Midwest, tax revenues fell and thousands of properties slipped into tax delinquency. Topping it all off was the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision, which stunned the Republican Party and galvanized it into anti-slavery-ticket action. In the midterm elections of 1858, the Republican Party gained 6 seats (out of 22 being contested) in the Senate and captured a plurality in the House of Representatives of 113 seats vs. 101 for the Democratic Party and 23 for

⁹ To put the contribution of the Irish situation in proper perspective, the percent of immigrants who were from Ireland from 1845 through 1854 was 39.2, 33.5, 44.9, 53.7, 44.3, 58.3, 42.9, 44.1, and 23.7%, respectively. The peak year was 1851 and never again after 1854 was Irish immigration as large a percentage of total immigration. [Bureau of the Census (1949), Series B 304-7, pg. 34].

other parties. The South, the stronghold of the Democratic Party, was alarmed by this, and with the Republican Party victory and the election of Lincoln in 1860, their long-threatened secession became a reality. The result, as you well know, was civil war.

Attitudes harden, mercies are un-tendered, and policies become extreme during long, bloody wars. By the conclusion of the war and the Union's victory in 1865, the Republican Party – which had begun as a liberal party opposing the conservative Democratic Party – had fallen under control of the Radical Republicans and taken up action expressions that in appearance are of much the same character it exhibits today – punitive, uncompromising, harsh, vindictive, and reactionary¹⁰. The Reconstruction Period was hard on the conquered South. It produced deep antibonding enmities some say lasted for the next century and others aren't quite so sure have healed even today:

To the South the Civil War and Appomattox brought the overthrow of the planter aristocracy that had guided the destinies of the section since the days of Thomas Jefferson. A large part of this class was excluded from participation in the government . . . Slave property valued in 1860 at over two billion dollars was confiscated, and so were the savings and sacrifices of the South which were represented by Confederate securities. A labor system which was the very basis of Southern society was overthrown, and the agricultural regime which it served was profoundly disarranged.

As a result of all this the old planter aristocracy almost disappeared from the South. This class had suffered in the war more severely than any other group; for if the war had been a 'poor man's fight,' the poor white had nothing to lose, and his condition in 1870 was far better than in 1850. . . . The blows of reconstruction, more staggering than those of defeat, wasted those impalpable moral values which had been accumulated during a century or more of stewardship. . . .

While the old pattern of Southern society and economy was being rearranged into a new one, a corresponding revolution was being effected in the North. With the representatives of the planter class out of Congress, the spokesmen of industry, finance, and of free western lands were unopposed unless by one another. During the war they pushed through legislation to fulfill the frustrated desires of the fifties, and after Appomattox they consolidated the fruits of victory. The Republican Party was firmly, and for two decades irremovably, entrenched in power. The moderate tariff of 1857 gave way to the Morrill tariff of 1861, and that to a series of war tariffs with duties scaling rapidly upward and carefully adapted to meet the need and greed of Northern business. . . .

In order to secure these new acquisitions the Republican Party sought to throw around them constitutional guarantees. The Fourteenth Amendment, with its provision that no state could deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, protected business interests from undue interference from the states, and taught those interests to look to the Federal government and the Republican Party for protection. . . .

Physical devastation without parallel until 1914-18 preceded the social revolution in the South. . . . All through the countryside was ruin and desolation. Roads and bridges had been destroyed or had fallen into neglect, farms grown up in brush, river levees broken, railroads dilapidated or destroyed. . . . Some of the cities presented a picture as appalling as the rural regions. . . . The entire economic life of the South was paralyzed. Agriculture, outside of rice growing, quickly revived . . . but other industries were prostrated. What manufacturing there had been was destroyed. Not a single Southern bank or insurance

¹⁰ To be more technically precise, if the corporate person of the Republican Party were to be given a D-PIPOS personality style score (figure 8.1), its operationalizations would be scored mistrusting, cold, hostile, and detached – the suite of operationalizations that describes the Driver interpersonal style and straddles the antisocial axis in the D-PIPOS circumplex [Kiesler (1982), Wells (2012a)]. It is the corporate interpersonal style most well matched to monarchy/oligarchy rule in government.

company was solvent . . . Shops were depleted of their goods and everything had to be imported from the North on credit. . . . In some of the more devastated regions actual starvation was imminent. . . . There were scarcely any schools for white children. School funds had been used up in the war, endowments for colleges and universities squandered or confiscated. . . . Young men of family who had interrupted their education to fight for Southern independence had to labor in the fields to keep their families from starving; and a planter's family which still had young men was deemed fortunate. [Morison & Commager (1930), pp. 616-621]

The M4 period came to its end coincidently with a return to more normal political and social conditions in 1870. This return to normalcy also meant an end to the wartime economic boom the North had enjoyed and the beginning of another long period of recession that lasted until 1896. M5 had begun and, with it, the education reform movement of the Plutocratic Era.

§6. The Plutocratic Era of Education Reform

The America that emerged from the Civil War was a different country. In the political slogan of the North, the war had been fought to "preserve the Union." A national union had indeed been preserved, by force, but was it the same Union as the one of 1790? In social-natural context, a Critical analysis must conclude it was not. In Toynbee's terminology, the civilization of the United States had reformed to create a Toynbee universal state, just as Hellenic civilization two millennia earlier had been unionized under the Roman Empire. The shards of the American social contract were preserved still in the words of the Preamble of the United States Constitution, but the meaning of those words had been lost and the intent of the Framers subjugated to attitudes of mere legalism that perverted the meaning of the phrase "liberty with justice for all."

Morison & Commager called the antebellum South a distinct civilization. In Toynbee terms this is not quite accurate, but it is accurately said the Old South was a Society distinct from the North, just as the Hellenic Greeks were a Society distinct from the Roman Republic. They wrote:

At a distance of sixty years [1925 vs. 1865] men wonder at the rash and hopeless gallantry of the Southern war of independence. A loose agrarian confederacy of five or six million whites and three and a half million slaves challenged a federal union of nineteen or twenty million freemen with overwhelming financial and industrial advantages. Yet, futile as the effort proved and tragic in its consequences, the Southern cause was not predestined to defeat.

The Confederacy, in order to win, needed merely to defend its own territory long enough to weary the Northerners of war. The United States, in order to win, had to conquer an empire and crush a people. A negotiated peace, or any less emphatic result than unconditional surrender of the Southern armies and total collapse of the Confederate government would have meant some sort of special privilege to the Southern States within the Union, if not independence without the Union: in either event a Southern victory. Material advantages were not all in favor of the Union. To offset the Northern superiority in numbers, wealth, industry, and sea-power, the Confederacy had the advantage of interior lines, and a social organization better fitted for creating an efficient fighting force. The moral scales were heavily balanced in favor of the Confederacy. Slavery was the cause of secession, but only indirectly a force in the war. From their own point of view, Southerners were fighting for everything that men hold most dear: for liberty and self-government, for hearth and home, for the supremacy of their race. They could abandon the struggle only by sacrificing the very bases of their society; and defeat for them involved the most bitter humiliation to which any people has been subjected in modern times. The Northern people, on the contrary, could have stopped the war at any moment, at the mere cost of recognizing what to many seemed an accomplished fact, and without any sacrifice of the solid and material factors that most closely touch the life of the individual. They were fighting

merely for an idea and a sentiment, the sentiment of Union, which, translated into action, seemed to tender souls scarcely different from conquest. Negro emancipation, itself an ideal, came more as an incident than as an object of the war. It was not the abolitionist 'Battle Hymn of the Republic' that sent the blood leaping through Northern veins in those years of trial, but the simple sentiment of:

The Union forever, hurrah! boys, hurrah!
Down with the traitor, up with the star,
While we rally round the flag, boys, rally once again,
Shouting the battle-cry of Freedom.

Under these circumstances there was every reason to expect the South would win.
[Morison & Commager (1930), pp. 526-7]

But in the end the South did not win and one nation, although not one united civil Community, was the outcome.

The war and reconstruction, together with the industrial, agricultural, and scientific revolutions, demoralized American society, North and South; immigration changed the character of the American people; transportation and new inventions such as the telephone and the automobile broke down old provincialisms, and, together with a host of other factors, made for standardization and uniformity. Science and industry metamorphosed American society from rural to urban, raising a multitude of problems of housing, sanitation, social and racial adjustments, indirectly affecting the family and decreasing the birth rate. With the industrial revolution went the passing of the self-sufficient community and the growth of cities devoting all their energies and resources to the manufacture of a standardized product – cities such as Akron, Ohio, Gary, Indiana, Fall River, Massachusetts, or Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Much of the old diversity and color of life disappeared, and the passing of provincialism did not result in any notable broadening of horizons or deepening of culture. The growth of wealth raised the standard of living in some quarters and introduced new luxuries, partially compensating for the greater variety and savor of life in an earlier generation. But though the national wealth increased at an unprecedented rate, the distribution of that wealth became correspondingly uneven, the extremes of wealth and poverty more striking. The generation that witnessed the growth of fashionable watering places and resorts such as Saratoga and Newport witnessed also the extraordinary growth of the slums. [*ibid.*, pg. 736]

Wilson saw this new circumstance similarly:

The two most notable characteristics of the period stretching from 1877 to 1897 are, first, the rise of a new and much more complicated economic organization of society, and, secondly, the unpreparedness of the American people to deal with the problems presented by this development, – a fact due partly to the institutional character of party alignment, partly to the inadequacy of governmental principles and machinery, and partly to the rapidity of social and industrial change, which far outstripped all possibility of a thoroughgoing comprehension of its elements and tendencies. The period opens with a population still largely agricultural; it shows at its close a population tending increasingly toward the city, there to be regimented by huge aggregations of capital to the service of industries organized on a national scale. We set out with the individual cultivator of the land as the characteristic figure of American economic society; we wind up with the corporation and the labor union occupying the forefront of the American industrial stage. It was noted in the census report of 1890 that the frontier had disappeared from the map of the United States. The fact was significant. Henceforth the trend of American life was to be distinctly away from the simple conditions that characterized newly settled regions.

The transformation thus indicated took its rise from the commercial isolation of the United States during the Civil War, partly deliberate and partly accidental; it was

accelerated by the Panic of 1873, the plain hint of which to individual investors was to organize in corporations of limited liability; but it was furthered much more conspicuously by the Panic of 1893 and its ensuing stress, the one compelling lesson of which was the necessity, in view of new conditions obtaining abroad, of developing an industry capable of absorbing the output of our overgrown agriculture. . . . Politically, socially, and even morally, it took place at an immense cost. The individual, in merging himself with a corporation or a labor union, seemed oftentimes to abdicate his moral responsibility as a citizen. At the same time the old political watchwords staled because of their inappropriateness to the new issues, while the fossilization of ancient affiliations thwarted the adaptation of the political machinery at hand to the new tasks with which society found itself confronted. . . . The result was that the diverse interests by which the country was coming to be divided became militant on their own account, outside of the conventional agencies of public opinion. Both parties had long since come to be directed by small coteries of professional politicians constituting the "machines." What now happened was the rise of a well-paid lobby, standing over the machines of both parties and ready to use either for the benefit of its own employer, that is, to speak generally, capital. The natural weapon of organized labor, on the other hand, was the strike, which from 1886 on became an important feature of American industrial life. [Wilson (1909), pp. 289-291]

Who were 'the capitalists' to whom Wilson obliquely refers? I will come back to that in a moment, pausing here only long enough to say they certainly weren't the owners of the humble and rustic 1871 sawmill or the simple little 25-person 1895 button factory in tiny Sabula, Iowa [Jackson County Historical Society (1989), pg. 87]. First I think it is instructive to take the pulse of America as this was read by Morison & Commager:

Social demoralization, economic disorganization, and moral stagnation were reflected in the cultural life of the nation. The years after the war were years of parvenu society, of new-rich standards, of shoddy architecture and exotic art, of literary sterility. The North, rich, lusty and arrogant, was pushing irresistibly forward to even greater wealth and power, ruthlessly exploiting the natural resources of the nation to private aggrandizement. In the South the flame of life burned but feebly, the institutions and standards of the past had been destroyed, and men were busily engaged in repairing the material damages of the war. The West, raucous and raw, obstreperous and magnificently confident, was repeating the social experience of the frontier from the beginning of our history. Blindly, but with incredible optimism, men were getting and spending and laying waste their powers; creating a new America on the ruins of the old – an America more like contemporary Germany or England than like the America of Jefferson's day; raising problems they could neither understand nor solve; assuming responsibilities for which they were unprepared; lightly abandoning the faiths of their fathers without substituting new gods, unless it were the gods of the mart and of science. [Morison & Commager (1930), pg. 737]

Now to return to the question I asked above: 1870 to 1900 was the era of those who some call the great Captains of Industry and others call the Robber Barons. One of the pronounced attractions of uncivic state-of-nature industrial-and-financial free enterprise – for individuals who possess the capital required to enter into it and the intellectual and persuasive *Personfähigkeit* to succeed at it in the teeth of its economically Darwinian social environment – is the possibility of obtaining colossal tangible *Personfähigkeit*. These 'Captains,' or, if your prefer, 'Barons,' of Industry were the men who found the capital resources and developed the predatory skills needed. Usually named in this list are J.P. Morgan, James J. Hill, E.H. Harriman, William H. Vanderbilt, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller. These men were **outlaw capitalists**.

Others tried it as well and either failed, in which cases their names are lost to history, or succeeded partially only to come up short and wind up as *hirdmen* to those more powerful than they – men lesser noted by history such as Henry Clay Frick. This new phase began quietly:

The organization of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901 came as the climax to an economic movement which had been underway for a generation. This was the concentration of industry and transportation in large units – a concentration taking various forms such as pools, trusts, corporations and holding companies. Already as early as 1873 a Congressional Investigating Committee had announced:

'The country is fast becoming filled with gigantic corporations wielding and controlling immense aggregations of money and thereby commanding great influence and power.'

Yet by this time the trust movement was only in its infancy.

In 1860, 140,433 manufacturing establishments turned out products to the value of \$1,895,861,000. In 1900 the number of establishments had increased slightly to 207,514, while the value of their products had increased eightfold to \$11,406,977,000. Even more illuminating are the statistics of the concentration of manufacturing in large establishments. In 1904 ninety-eight percent of all the manufacturing establishments in the country had an annual output of less than one million dollars, while but one percent of the establishments boasted an annual output over that sum. The former, however, turned out only sixty-two percent of the manufactured products of the country, while the latter turned out no less than thirty-eight percent. Yet even this concentration was but a faint indication of the concentration that was to come in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

The trust movement grew out of the period of fierce competition following hard upon the Civil War. Competing railways cut freight rates between important points, in the hope of obtaining the lion's share of business, until dividends ceased and railway securities became a drag on the market. The downward trend of prices from 1865 to 1895, specially marked after 1873, put a premium on labor-saving machinery, on new processes of manufacture, and on greater units of mass production. Pooling – 'gentlemen's agreements' between rival producers or railroad directors to maintain prices and divide business, or even pro-rata profits – was characteristic of the period after 1872. But on the whole it was found so difficult to maintain these rudimentary monopolies that a 'gentlemen's agreement' came to be defined as one that was certain to be violated. . . .

About 1880 pools began to be superseded by 'trusts' – a form of combination in which the affiliated companies hand over their securities and their power to a board of trustees. A trust, according to Eliot Jones¹¹, 'may be said to exist when a person, corporation, or combination owns or controls enough of the plants producing a certain article to be able for all practical purposes to fix its price.' The first important trust was the Standard Oil Company, organized by John D. Rockefeller in 1870 and reorganized as a Trust in 1882. A large measure of Rockefeller's success was due to improvements, economies, and original methods of marketing; his monopoly was secured by methods that were condemned even by the tolerant business ethics of the day, and pronounced criminal by the courts. Yet it is only fair to say that his competitors were no less unscrupulous than himself. By playing competing railways one against another, the Standard Oil Trust obtained rebates from their published freight rates, and even forced them to pay over to the Standard rebates from its competitors' freight bills! If competing oil companies managed to stagger along under such handicaps, they were 'frozen out' by cutting prices in their selling territory until the Standard Oil had all the business. . . . [The] Supreme Court of Ohio declared the Trust dissolved in 1892, only to have it reorganize under the more lenient laws of New Jersey a few years later.

The Standard Oil Trust was soon followed by a number of similar business combinations. The movement of consolidation gathered momentum in the eighties and the early nineties. . . . Altogether in this period something over 5000 industrial establishments were

¹¹ Morison & Commager are quoting an article by Jones, *The Trust Problem in the United States*. The bibliography in their book is rather poorly organized and I have not been able to locate Jones' article in order to independently evaluate its quality, accuracy, or degree of contextual significance.

consolidated into about 300 trusts or corporations, and of these no less than 198 were formed in the period from 1898 to 1902. . . . These figures spelled the doom of local industry, of the local self-sufficient community. . . . They brought about an ever-increasing specialization in industry, both of the community and of the individual laborer [*ibid.*, pp. 695-697].

There was, of course, a widespread popular backlash against this, prompting prolonged public controversy. The outcome of this adverse political reaction was a famous piece of toothless legislation called the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. Its central provisions were:

1. Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is . . . hereby declared to be illegal. . . .
2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .

One could think that an action calculated to bring economic loss or ruin to hundreds or thousands of citizens might deserve a reprimand somewhat harsher than a misdemeanor, but in any case this turned out to be irrelevant. The 10th Amendment once again, by prohibiting Congress from enacting social legislation, led to the 'among the several states' clauses of the Sherman Act being struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. The 14th Amendment's 'due process' clause served to protect the Trusts in most states as well. Conspiracy aficionados might speculate that perhaps the congressmen knew this all along and worded the bill accordingly, but it makes no difference. The fact is the 10th and 14th Amendments already protected state-of-nature practices by pools and trusts. This makes apocryphal a supposed remark some have attributed from time to time to one or another of the Robber Barons, i.e., "it is cheaper to buy congresses than elections."

But although the trusts were shielded by the courts from the Sherman Act, these protections were not provided to the corporate persons of the labor unions:

By 1897 the Republican Party, in its dual rôle of the defender of the gold standard and champion of the protective tariff, had become the recognized sponsor of the new order of things, in which aggregated capital appeared the dominant and directing force. In this order of things any proposed action on the part of the State was subjected invariably to the test of its probable effect upon "business," there was a general demand for the "business man" in politics, and all wisdom was thought to have found its summary in the gambling phrase "stand-pat," the idea being that government, having done its utmost to smooth the path of business, should now keep its hands off. Of this philosophy, the United States Senate was best adapted, both by its temper and its methods, to become the effective exponent . . . Meanwhile the Democratic Party, given over to financial heresies and to schism, had ceased even to offer effective opposition to, or heeded criticism of, prevailing tendencies. [Wilson (1909), pp. 291-2]

The coming of vast hordes of unskilled laborers to our shores proved an early and compelling cause of labor organization, though more potent doubtless was the rise of aggregated capital. Modern industrial society is a complex of groups, each with its function to perform, each with its interest to pursue, so that, however mutually indispensable their functions make them, their interests make them also, to some degree, mutually antagonistic. A very simple as well as very ancient antagonism is that of employer and employee; much more intricate, and quick with the modern talent for organization, and illustrating its facility of communication, is that of capital and labor. The same year, 1873, that marks the beginning of capitalistic aggregation on a large scale marks also the commencement of the national organization of labor. For that year the Knights of Labor was founded as an association open to all trades and to further the interests of labor as such.

The program of the Knights called for governmental recognition of labor as a distinct interest in the community by the establishment of labor bureaus; for weekly wage payments; for higher wages and an eight-hour working day. Strikes in the coal and iron mining States of the East, in 1882, centering upon one or more of these demands, resulted in legislation, conspicuously in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, regulating the labor contracts of underground workers. Such legislation was, however, hardly enrolled upon the statute book before it was declared unconstitutional by the State judiciaries on the ground that it was an unreasonable interference with the "freedom of contract" of persons *sui juris*, and comprised therefore a deprivation of property without the "due process of law" required by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .

Ever since the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890, the federal judiciary had been elaborating a theory of conspiracy destined to bring the "sympathetic strike" and what is termed the "secondary boycott" under legal condemnation. By this theory the boycott and the strike are legitimately available only to employees directly affected by the adverse action of the employer boycotted or struck against. When, accordingly, the American Railway Union voted to aid the Pullman employees by refusing to handle Pullman cars and proceeded to strike against those of its own employers who resisted the boycott, the United States District Court of Illinois issued a sweeping injunction . . . and, when Eugene V. Debs, president of the Union, ignored the injunction, ordered his arrest and imprisonment for contempt of court. [*ibid.*, pp. 300-303]

Thus an Act of Congress ostensibly aimed at countering the monopolizing practices of aggregated capitalism in an uncivic state-of-nature free enterprise convention ended up being turned on those who were without their own capital resources. This egregious injustice would not in the least have surprised Adam Smith, nor is there anything about it posing a scientific mystery of human nature. The original American social contract had been shredded. Between: the bosses of the political "machines" that had captured the mechanisms of democratic election; the nearly universal lack of any sort of education that might have prepared Americans to deal with the crises of the nineteenth century; the establishment of a tiny dominant class of plutocrats; and the overthrow of republican Sovereignty by an institution of government that had ceased to serve and chosen to rule its people, the United States had been turned from the ideal of a Republic envisioned by the Revolutionary Generation to a mere representative democracy, ostensibly under the tyranny of so-called majority rule but actually ruled by a tiny oligarchy of unelected despots. Wilson has more to say on this topic, and indeed a great deal more can be said of it than he recorded in his book, but what is presented here is sufficient coverage for the purposes of this present treatise.

This is the social environment in which the period M5 education reform movement operated. It was a period of sharp controversies in which different factions representing divers special interests clashed with one another over the reforms to be institutionalized. The following were the principal broad outcomes of the period:

- expansion and revision of the elementary school curriculum;
- broadening establishment of high schools with a small increase in high school enrollments;
- widespread establishment of normal schools for betterment of the training of public school teachers;
- adoption, in a modified and generally inferior form, of teaching innovations that had been developed in Switzerland by Pestalozzi at the beginning of the century;
- expansion of state colleges and universities with an accompanying greater emphasis on science and technical training at the collegiate level; and
- establishment of the National Education Association as a professional society having for its objective the development of education methods and policies.

The implemented reforms, however, still fell short of satisfying anyone's social expectations.




Figure 8.24: Critical rating of the national institution of public instructional education at the close of the 19th century. (A) personal dimension of the learner; (B) social dimension of the learner.

Significant organizational changes took place, and some development of education methods and curricula did result. But these changes were barely in place at the end of the century before yet a third major reform movement, the so-called Progressive Movement, began. Figure 8.24 provides the Critical rating for the state of public education at the close of the 19th century. I will take up a

detailed examination of its constituents that lead to this summary. I postpone that discussion until the next chapter because in many ways the reform movement of the Plutocratic Era was a segue into the Progressive Reform movement that began even as the 19th century came to its close.

The primary things to note from figure 8.24 are the following. First, there is a modest gain in the accomplishments of the institution in regard to the personal dimension of the learner. What is the more surprising aspect of this gain, however, is that it comes in the corporal education segment – the last place most 19th century reformers had in mind. This tells us nothing else than that the gain was accidental. Second, there is also a small gain in the tangible education rating, which is what the reformers were trying to achieve but fell far short of what they were expecting to accomplish. Lastly, there is no improvement of the institution in the social dimension of the learner. This, at least, should not be surprising given the breakup the United States was undergoing into competing and antibonded factions during the 19th century. Let us press on to chapter 9 and the details of the segue into the Progressive Education Reform era.

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