Chapter 6 Faith in Divine Leadership

1. The Antinomy of Predestination

It might seem odd or strange to begin a chapter about faith in divine leadership by discussing concepts of "predestination." But, as you will soon see, concepts of predestination pull in other concepts pertaining to human willpower and choice, and these concepts in turn lead to that of faith in divine leadership.

In rough terms, predestination is a theological doctrine that all events have been willed by God. Oftentimes the concern with the question of predestination is heavily tied to speculations regarding the eventual fate of a person's soul and whether a person has "free will" or if it only seems that he does. Proposed answers to these questions differ both within and between the world's major religions. These differences in turn produce doctrinal differences among various sects making up the major theological divisions.

Predestination speculations are the most prominent in the three Abrahamic religions. They are much less prominent – even to the point of unimportance – in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Hinduism and Buddhism, with their doctrines of *karma* and *samara* ("wandering" from one lifetime to the next), can in a way be regarded as a synthesis between popular predestination theses and antitheses found in the Abrahamic religions. This Eastern theology might be described, no doubt too crudely, as: "Yes, you have free will; go ahead and do as you will; if you're wrong, you'll be condemned to come back and go through all the trials and travails of life again until you finally make all *the* right choices and live a perfect life." In as much as the cycle of rebirth is regarded as a kind of punishment and retribution, and because a human being doesn't get to judge what "*the*" right choices are, it is a doctrine not-incongruent with many of the main theological arguments found in the Abrahamic faiths, albeit the ideas are quite dissimilar.

Taoism doesn't have a doctrine comparable to the *karma*-and-*samsara* doctrine of Indian religions. It does have teachings, however, that some have described as "*karma* without rebirth." These seem, at least to a Westerner, to affirm personal free will but, as in the Indian religions, one's deeds have consequences judged by and punishments following upon a person's bad choices according to divine standards. In the Thâi-Shang it says,

> 1. There are no special doors for calamity and happiness [in men's lots]; they come as men themselves call them. Their recompenses follow good and evil as the shadow follows the substance.
>
> 2. Accordingly, in heaven and earth there are spirits that take account of men's transgressions, and, according to the lightness or gravity of their offenses, take away from their term of life. [Legge (1891), pg. 235]

In Taoism "the term of life" pertains to one's *Existenz* within a mortal body. Death is just another phase of *Existenz*, and not necessarily a "personal" *Existenz* in any sense recognizable in Western religions. "After life" is something Taoism is mystically vague about. One might be "transformed" into something else; or one might gain immortality as one's spiritual self. One begins his corporeal life with a fixed lifespan; transgressions are punished by taking time away from this initial allotment. In a manner of speaking, when one commits a transgression, one is "rushing to judgment," and no Taoist is in a hurry to face that. But, unlike Western religions, this is a judgment without a judge. In Taoism, "salvation" is not an escape from this world but, rather, an alignment with the Tao and harmony with the universe. "Immortality" and "afterlife" are two quite different things; the former is deathlessness for one's spirit, the latter is – who knows? but something not desirable. The concept of "destiny" in Taoism is quite complicated but it is pretty safe to say Taoist "destiny" and "predestination" are not at all the same thing. Taoism is deeply focused on life and living and devotes little or no effort to speculations regarding an afterlife in any Western sense of that word. In Tâ Shăng it says,

> He who understands the conditions of Life does not strive after what is of no use to life; and he who

> understands the conditions of Destiny does not strive after what is beyond the reach of knowledge. [*ibid*., pg. 11]

Taoism as a religion simply doesn't concern itself with any question of "predestination" at all.

In Western religions, including the pagan religions of ancient Greece and Rome, the central problem of predestination has always been how to reconcile the idea that everything is predetermined by some divine power with meaningful concepts of morality and virtue. After all, if "the devil made me do it" is a legitimate excuse for your actions then how can you be held responsible for your deeds? The ancient Greek Stoics had what is perhaps the "purest" example of trying to reconcile an absolute pre-determinism with virtue. Stoic theology on this point strongly influenced the later theologies of Christianity. At the core of their idea was that virtue lies in your *attitude* toward your predestined fate. Your fate was your fate no matter how you might feel about it, but your happiness entirely depended on willingly living in accord with "nature." Marías explained the Stoic doctrine this way:

> The wise man accepts Nature just as it is, and molds himself completely to the will of destiny: *parere Deo libertas est*, obedience to God is freedom. This acceptance of destiny is characteristic of Stoic ethics. The Fates, say the Stoics, guide the man who wishes to be guided; the man who does not wish to be guided they drag along with them. [Marías (1967), pp. 92-93]

Stoic "free will" thus amounted to your having the freedom to choose to come along willingly ('stoically') or be dragged kicking and screaming to whatever end Fate had already determined yours would be.

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all have theological divisions within them about predestination, and all these divers speculations share in common the goal of expounding a doctrine capable of preserving some real meaning for morality and personal responsibility. Like every ontology-centered philosophy, science, and theology, the Abrahamic theologies are forced to posit a set of absolute fundamental characteristic of God's *Existenz*. This is because ontology seeks to explain all phenomena in terms of *things* and all things in terms of some ultimate, simple, causative, and original thing that cannot itself be further explained. This ultimate Entity is always some thing which is the Object of ideas that lie far beyond the horizon of possible human experience. It is a secondary quantity of mathematical thinking for which objective validity can never be established.

In the case of the Abrahamic religions, the common characteristics posited for God's *Existenz* are that God is: single (there is only one God); eternal; omniscient (all knowing); omnipotent (all powerful); omnipresent (exists everywhere at once at all times); the original source of everything, the author and creator of everything; the original cause of everything; the supreme ruler of the world; and the absolutely perfect and highest Entity (*Wesen*). God is held-to-be the highest and absolute determiner of what is good and what is evil and, therefore, the ultimate judge of good and evil.

But, in addition to these, the divers sects within each Abrahamic religion and between the Abrahamic religions also posit non-common characteristics of God's *Existenz*. These differences, which are also ideas of secondary quantities, lead to differences in theological doctrines between divers sects. The competing theologians generally cite some passages of scripture upon which their opinions are based, and also cite other passages of scripture to refute contrary opinions in the doctrines of other sects. The dialectics of theologies are usually quite subtle, and settled doctrinal opinion often is decided by theologians' *interpretations* of what the cited scriptural authorities *meant* by particular comments. Here it is important to keep in mind that theologies came long after when these cited authorities lived – usually coming one or more centuries later – and, therefore, these interpretations cannot be "fact checked" by directly asking the authority what he *actually* meant. The turbulent uncertainty left in the wake is one of the unfortunate consequences of the homonymous babel of natural human languages.

In the case of predestination theologies, most adopt some intermediate position between two polar extremes. The thesis and antithesis poles one most often sees are:

1. God has predetermined everything that happens (thesis); and
2. God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen, including the choices individuals will make, but allows people the freedom to do as they chose in life (antithesis).

A third position sometimes taken is that God predetermines some things but chooses to leave some other things to be determined – for instance, by the free choices of human beings – although he does have foreknowledge of what those choices are going to be. This position amounts to a rejection of the idea of predestination. For example, Shiite Islam adopts this doctrinal position. Sunni Islam, on the other hand, makes a moderated predestination doctrine part of the core of its theology.

A fourth position, closely related to the antithesis above, draws a distinction between predestination and foreordination. Foreordination doctrine rejects predestination doctrine but holds that individuals are "called on" by God to fulfill particular roles and missions in life *and* that these individuals have the free will to either accept or refuse their callings. Foreordination doctrine is particularly prominent in Latter Day Saint (LDS) doctrine. Mormon[1] doctrine holds that to refuse one's foreordained calling is an act of rejection of Christ (and, therefore, is a sin). This doctrine is explained to church members in Hymn 90 of their LDS Hymn Books:

> Know this, that every soul is free
> To choose his life and what he'll be;
> For this eternal truth is given,
> That God will force no man to heaven.
>
> He'll call, persuade, direct aright –
> Bless him with wisdom, love, and light –
> In nameless ways be good and kind,
> But never force the human mind. [William C. Gregg]

In Mormon doctrine, human souls are held to preexist in heaven before their human birth on earth. However, this raises a number of questions such as "if one knows his foreordained calling prior to birth, why is no one born with knowledge of this calling?" LDS doctrine makes figuring out or discovering one's calling part of his life's mission on earth, but even so there are other issues and problems that arise in understanding this doctrine that end up having to be regarded as fundamental mysteries.

One element of doctrine that appears in the hymn just quoted and in doctrines of many sects, both non-Christian and Christian, is contained in the line "every soul is free to choose his life and what he'll be." This implies that the individual, as part of his free will, possesses a power of creativity to at least the extent of having the freedom *to make himself the person he chooses to become*. Some sects who hold to a strict predestination doctrine reject this idea on the ground that God alone is "the" creator and, therefore, human beings are not – especially in regard to any ability to make themselves other than what they were created to be. Here, however, epistemology-centered Critical metaphysics *is* able to make an objectively valid statement concerning this issue. The question of human creativity is discussed in chapter 8.

The spectrum of opinions regarding predestination vs. free will questions is very broad even within all three major divisions of the Abrahamic religions. Just to adequately treat and explain these diverse views requires a separate and very extensive treatise. The treatise you have before you right now attempts no such treatment nor undertakes literary criticism of these diverse doctrines. The reason for not doing so is very simple. All these doctrines are ontology-centered and *this* treatise proceeds from an epistemology-

[1] The term "Mormon" is used in this treatise as a convenient way to designate the largest denomination of the LDS movement. Officially this denomination prefers to be called The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. But there are doctrinal differences overall in the LDS movement that make it necessary sometimes to distinguish this church from other denominations in the LDS movement such as the Community of Christ Church (formerly known as the Re-organized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints).

centered treatment of theology. Rather than starting with an initial ontology of God's *Existenz*, the method being followed here is to examine what we know about the phenomenon of being-a-human-being and use this knowledge as the ground for reasonable hypotheses about the relationships between God and human-kind. In the interest of full disclosure, I will confess to you upfront that your author finds *none* of the traditional ontology-centered dialectics convincing. This is why he undertook to study and reflect upon theology using an epistemology-centered approach.

Historically, ontology-centered theologies have tied the idea of "free will" (and, therefore, the issue of predestination vs. non-predestination) to some idea of the human "soul." However, this ontology of soul requires one to make a *real* division between "body phenomena" and "mind phenomena" because "soul" is regarded in metaphysical terms as a substance distinct from the substance of corporeal matter. But in Critical epistemology such a division is without objective validity. A *logical* division can be made in distinguishing body phenomena from mental phenomena, but this logical division is merely classification for purposes of understanding. It has epistemological significance but not ontological significance. Put rather baldly, the question of predestination is a meaningless question in an epistemology-centered theology because there is no hope whatsoever of ever dealing with it from objectively sufficient grounds.

However, the same is *not* true for the idea of a "free will" divorced from all ties to "soul theory." This is the topic of the next section.

2. Choice and Free Will

The notion of "freedom" appeared earlier in this treatise. Specifically, it appeared in the third or 'causality' antinomy of pure Reason:

> Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them.
>
> Antithesis: There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature. [Kant (1787) B: 472, 473]

The religions of the world today ally themselves with the freedom thesis. The most basic reason human beings speculated about the *Dasein* of God (or gods) was to explain the *causes* of phenomena of nature and, eventually[2], of the *Existenz* of the world (universe). People are part of this *Existenz*. It is objectively valid to posit the *Dasein* of an unexplained cause of one or more phenomena as a noumenon and principal quantity at the boundary of possible human experience. It does not pass beyond this horizon and become merely mathematical speculation until one begins to speculate about the *Existenz* of that noumenon.

The physical sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, and their offshoot sciences) ally themselves with the antithesis as a matter of professional necessity. This is because science is limited to studying nature and cannot address, or pretend to address, supernature. Scientists themselves can, of course, be people of faith and most of them are. But *as* scientists they must limit their theories and hypotheses to accord with the antithesis or commit professional malpractice. The situation is different for the social-natural sciences (psychology, economics, sociology, etc.) because in these fields of study the "social atom" is the

[2] We don't know when people first posited the *Dasein* of gods as an explanation for the origin of the world. When writing first appeared, this speculation was already established in religion and myth. It is certain beyond reasonable doubt that prehistoric societies limited their supernatural explanations strictly to causes of specific natural phenomena. We see this in the pantheons of all the ancient religions of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and the Nordic people of Scandinavia. We see it in more primitive form in the BaMbuti society of the Congo where they credit all good things to their forest and do not trouble themselves to ask "where did the world come from?" There is evidence suggesting the BaMbuti may be the oldest still-existing society on earth. Mention of them is made in the tomb inscription of ancient Egyptian governor Harkhuf, dated *c*. 2270 BC during the reign of Pharaoh Neferkare.

individual human being. When *people* are the "atoms" then the hypothesis of *psychological* causality (causality of freedom) *must* be explored. Indeed, this is the principal difference between physical-natural sciences and social-natural sciences [Wells (2012), chap. 1]. However, objectively valid treatment of psychological causality (causality of freedom) is *only* possible from an epistemology-centered "way of looking at the world." In ontology-centered metaphysics, the causality of freedom is an idea lacking objective validity. William James (who, as a psychologist and as a philosopher, held an ontology-centered view of the world) illustrated the problem ontology-centeredness poses quite neatly when he wrote,

> However inadequate our ideas of causal efficacy may be, we are less wide of the mark when we say that our ideas and feelings have it than the Automatists[3] are when they say they haven't it. As in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical criticism all causes are obscure. But no one has the right to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject only, as the Automatists do, and to say *that* causation is unintelligible, whilst in the same breath one dogmatizes about *material* causation as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One must be impartially *naif* or impartially critical. If the latter, the reconstruction must be thorough-going or 'metaphysical,' and will probably preserve the common-sense view that ideas are forces in some translated form. But Psychology is a mere natural science, accepting certain terms uncritically as her data, and stopping short of metaphysical reconstruction. Like physics, she must be *naive*; and if she finds that in her very peculiar field of study ideas *seem* to be causes, she had better continue to talk of them as such. She gains absolutely nothing by a breach with common-sense in this matter [James (1890), vol. 1, pg. 137].

In the physical-natural sciences, there is no objectively valid ground upon which to base the *Existenz* of psychological causality, a human power of choice, or human willpower. This is because these sciences must ultimately seek this grounding in the four fundamental forces of nature (gravitation, electro-magnetism, the strong force, and the weak force). In these sciences these theories and objects are, epistemologically, products of what Critical metaphysics calls the theoretical Standpoint and *from the theoretical Standpoint* the Critical Philosophy *agrees* there is no objectively valid ground for drawing any conclusion regarding the *Existenz* of freedom, etc. However, there is *equally* no objectively valid ground for concluding freedom, choice, and willpower do *not* exist. The theoretical Standpoint pertains to ontology and, ontologically, freedom, choice, and willpower are ideas having no ontological significance in terms of thing-like material Objects. But theoretical objective validity is not the only type of objective validity an idea may have. There is another type – one that ontology-centered metaphysics do not have.

In Critical epistemology the type of objective validity for the idea of psychological causality (causality of freedom) is *practical* objective validity, i.e., objective validity from the practical Standpoint (chap. 4). The practical Standpoint evaluates philosophical concepts with regard to practical Reason and the appetitive power of a human being, and is the Standpoint for a human being's power to act spontaneously as an agent. Its concern is with intelligible objects inasmuch as these objects are causes *as grounds necessary for the possibility of experience*. When James wrote of the "causal efficacy of ideas and feelings," what he was saying was that ideas and feelings somehow have the power to produce empirical effects. The *challenge* for him and other ontology-centered theorists was to understand how an "idea" or a "feeling" could possibly have such a power. The *problem* he and they faced, and could not find a way to solve, was to understand what sort of *ontological things* "ideas" and "feelings" are.

In a somewhat impressive act of mental yoga, James managed to draw the conclusion that an "idea" is a no-thing but is also, and at the same time, both a "mental event" (basically, something that happens in the mind) and a brain state "underlying" that event. Present day ontology-centered psychology still officially holds with this view [Reber & Reber (2001), "idea," def. 3]. James wrote,

[3] "Automatists" was the name used in James' day for those who today are called "scientific materialists" [Joad (1936), pp. 495-539].

> The object of every thought, then, is neither more nor less than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and however symbolic the manner of thinking may be. . . . The next point to make clear is that, however complex the object may be, the thought of it is one undivided state of consciousness. [James (1890), vol. 1, pg. 276]

For James, a "thought" and an "idea" are synonyms, however queasy one might feel about the notion that "a thought thinks." He was correct to distinguish the object of an idea (or thought) from the idea (or thought) "itself." But an "event" (mental or otherwise) is not a no-thing; it is a some-thing, and what this some-thing is – other than the vaguely worded suggestion it is a "brain state" of some kind – he never successfully described. Nor has psychology since then ever been able to do it. Nor can biology (e.g., neuroscience) answer this question; an "idea" is not a physical object and physical-natural science can deal only with physical objects. No matter how sophisticated the experimental technique may be, and no matter how expensive the equipment is, no one can "look inside someone's brain" and say, "aha! *There's* a thought! *That's* an idea!" (Personally, I think science's metaphorical slip is showing a bit when it doesn't really know what it's talking about). An "event" is what Critical metaphysics calls an "*Unsache*-thing."

In Critical epistemology, "ideas," "concepts," "feelings," "practical rules," and other mental objects have epistemological significance but no ontological significance whatsoever. Their meanings are practical, which is to say the objective validity lies in "what they *functionally* do" for understanding and experience rather than "what they are as empirical things." What, then, is meant by psychological causality?

This question belongs to philosophy[4] and philosophy has its own technical vocabulary one must understand if philosophical explanations are to "make any sense" at all. In Critical epistemology, causality is the notion of the determination of a change by which the change is established according to general rules. Causation is the objectified idea of cause-and-effect relationships, under which all effects are determined by actions according to general rules. A *causatum* is a rule for the determination of a change under the condition of a cause. A cause is: (1) the notion of the agency of a substance in which the substance is regarded as containing the ground for the actuality of change; or (2) that which grounds a *causatum*. A substance is the notion of a transcendental object persistent in time. Persistence is the *modus* of time involving the representation of the *Dasein* of an object. When you declare the *Dasein* of an object, the notion of what you are declaring to exist is a "substance." Materiality and immateriality are irrelevant.

For example, I think we can all probably agree that the physicist Albert Einstein existed. We can also agree that we can make objectively valid statements about him such as: (a) "Einstein *is* an important figure in the history of physics"; (b) "Einstein *was* German"; or (c) "Einstein *will be* long remembered." All these statements refer to *the same* object – Einstein – but do so in the present, past, and future tenses. The object "Albert Einstein" is an object "persistent in time." The individual statements refer to the *Existenz* of Einstein, but his object refers to the *Dasein* of Einstein and this is what is meant by Einstein-as-a-substance. (As you can see, the Critical distinction between *Dasein* and *Existenz* is quite crucial).

The idea of psychological causality is the idea that *you* have the power to *make yourself* do things. The Automatists of James' day and the scientific materialists of today are forced by their ontology to say *you* are nothing but a collection of atoms, that everything you *think* you do is just the result of forces and stimuli acting on "the collection of atoms that is you," and, in effect, that you-*as-you* "don't really exist." Personally, I think there is no more preposterous statement that could be uttered, and I wholeheartedly believe not one person alive holds this view *of himself*, regardless of how strongly he might hold it of *you*.

[4] Physicist-turned-philosopher Henry Margenau wrote, "The words *cause* and *effect* are among the most loosely used in our language. Elsewhere in this book, when we faced a similar tangle of usage and desired pentecostal illumination, we turned trustingly to science for a decision on the proper meaning of words. Unfortunately, we shall find science of no help in our present quandary, for cause and effect are not primarily scientific terms, despite widespread opinion to the contrary. Science uses them with no less a variety of meanings than does common speech, and, it may at once be noted, the more sophisticated mathematical investigations of science do not use them at all." [Margenau (1977), pg. 389]

Descartes got many things wrong, but he was totally correct to say *cogito ergo sum* ("I think, therefore I am"). Put the idea of "everything *you* think *you* do" next to the idea "*you-as-you* don't really exist" and the absurdity and self-contradiction of the materialists' position leaps out at you (figuratively speaking).

Kant introduced the idea of what he called "the *I* of transcendental apperception" and pointed out that this *I* is implicit in every predication a person makes, e.g.: (a) "*I* think *x* is *y*"; (b) "*I* feel *y*"; or "*I* do *z*" – which are theoretical, judicial, and practical predications, respectively. For each of us, this transcendental *I* is the most *personal and individual* object there is. The transcendental *I* does nothing less than declare *your own real and actual* Dasein. You are, for yourself, the *one* noumenon for which *Dasein* is held-to-be-certain *absolutely*. You can, like Hume, entertain yourself with questions like, "Does the tree I see outside my window still exist when I'm not looking at it?" [Hume (1739), Bk. I, pt. IV, sec. II] but you can't get away from yourself. As the old quip says, "Wherever you go there you are." Your transcendental *I* declares your personal *Dasein* but declares nothing whatsoever about your own *Existenz*.

Kant pointed out that there are two aspects to being-a-human-being, namely, the *homo phaenomenal* and the *homo noumenal* aspects. The first refers to the human being as a natural object – a physical being in the natural world of sensible experience – and is the aspect of being-a-human-being in the theoretical Standpoint. As an object in nature, the notion of *physical* causality is the objectively valid type of causality in regard to *homo phaenomenon*.

The latter is being-a-human-being from the practical Standpoint. It is the aspect for regarding a human being as an *intelligible* being *who is himself the first cause of his own actions*. The ground for objective validity of the human being as a *noumenal* object is the spontaneity of his actions. This is demonstrated through the experience of a person acting as the agent of changes in appearances in sensible Nature in consequence of his mental representations. Kant tells us,

> In all appearances of an event the causality of the cause of the event is itself an event. Now, if all causes themselves have causes, then there is nothing in the world except nature. Now since there is nothing in the sensible world except events, we can go to infinity; everything that we will come to know will still be either event or effect. For were it not an event it would not be an Object of experience at all. Experience subsists just in this: that my perceptions are connected with each other by the combination of cause and effect. Were this not, then my perception is not much more than a dream that has merely private validity for me – but never can be called experience. We thus come to experience no event in the world which would be the first, for our regression goes to infinity. But there is no actual infinite series of causes but, rather, merely a regression that is infinite. . . .
>
> If an event ensues from a cause which is no event then it is said to happen of its own accord. It happens first for no event precedes it. Freedom is the capacity for starting a series of states oneself. If something is an action of nature then it is already a continuation of the series of states; if it is an action of freedom then it is a new state; that is the transcendental concept of freedom. [Kant (1783) 29: 860-861]

Mental representations are not events in the *physical* world nor are they *appearances* in the sensible world. They are (mathematical) conditions necessary for the possibility of apprehending appearances and sensuous effects of objects (*Sache*-things), events (*Unsache*-things), and affective perceptions ('feelings'). Mental representation is a primitive term describable as "something in me that refers to something else" [Kant (1794-95) 29: 970]. As Kant noted elsewhere,

> For understanding does not permit among *appearances* any condition that is itself empirically unconditioned. But if an *intelligible* condition, which therefore does not belong to the series of appearances as a member, may be thought for a conditioned (in appearance), then such a condition could be admitted as *empirically unconditioned* in such a way that no violation of the empirically continuous regress would occur anywhere. [Kant (1787) B: 559 fn.]

The objectively valid *ground* for inferring the *Dasein* of an intelligible cause is the action-appearance as an empirical effect in the sensible world. Thus, this objective validity is *practical* rather than theoretical.

As an intelligible being (*homo noumenon*), the objectively valid notion of human causality is psychological causality – i.e., the causality of freedom. We thus have in *one* Object – the human being – the synthesis of unity for the thesis and the antithesis of the classic causality antinomy, and in this synthesis the antinomy is resolved. Freedom *is* objectively valid *and* it is *not* a causality of physical nature.

Let us next turn to the ideas of "choice," "willpower," and "free will." Freedom generally is the capacity for one's Self-determination to take action. If a doctor taps your knee with his hammer and your leg jerks, this is not freedom. It is only a physical effect of an empirical cause and not a Self-determined action. If smoke gets in your eyes and they water this is likewise not an act of freedom. In both cases your physiological response follows physical laws of nature. Freedom, in contrast, requires that the action you take *not* be grounded in any sensuous stimuli but, rather, by your Self-determination of the appetitive power of pure practical Reason. As a visual aid to this discussion you may refer to figure 1 below. Appetitive power is the practical ability of a person to take an action and thereby *be* the cause of the actuality of the object of that action. It is the capacity of a person to be, through his mental representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations. It draws information from impetuous inferences of reflective judgment but these do not *determine* appetitive power. That determination falls to the regulation of practical Reason under the law of the categorical imperative.



Figure 1: Mathematical representation of the processes and information flows of human mental organization.

This capacity is related to desires but is not to be viewed as something *caused* by desires. Rather, it is viewed as the cause of the actuality of the object of representation, whether that representation is linked to the clear representation of an object in intuitions and concepts or is merely an affective representation in which one says "a desire" subsists (e.g. a condition or state presenting a feeling of satisfaction). Kant's word for appetitive power (*Begehrungsvermögen*) could be rendered "faculty of desiration" and its connotation is that of *transforming* an affective perception into an action. In this sense, a determination of appetitive power *gives* a *practical* object to mere feeling. Kant put it this way:

> All representations refer to the object as Object of knowledge, but they can also be regarded as acts, and then the ground of the production of the same Object lies in the representation. Herewith corresponds the *capacity of the soul to become, through the representation of an object itself, the cause of the actuality of the object*, and this is appetitive power, which one can just as well validly determine as *causality of the representation in regard to its Object*. That act of the soul in general, through which the representation seeks to attain the actuality of its Object, is in general appetite and desire, which is sensuous or intellectual. [Kant (1794-95) 29: 1012-1013]

Now, Kant did not use the word "soul" in any supernatural context in his Critical writings, and his use of it above should not be construed in a religious context. He uses the word to denote a human being as *homo noumenon*. In a similar vein, he uses the word "spirit" to mean an inner principle of animation for a living being. In terms of figure 1 above, the notion of "spirit" refers to the logical division of *psyche* as an organization of animating principles for mind-body reciprocity. This restricted usage reflects Kant's self discipline in adhering to his Critical principle of introducing into his theory nothing that is not an idea necessary for the possibility of experience in the manner that human beings *have* experience. In his day, it was the common practice of philosophers to rather freely use the words "soul" and "spirit" in their writings. However, given what Palmquist has called Kant's theocentric orientation in philosophy, and given the further evidence of this orientation in Kant's *Opus Postumum*, I have little doubt Kant hoped to someday somehow find a way to bring God and philosophy together in an objectively valid union. I am in agreement with Palmquist's statement,

> Does Kant's appeal to a direct experience of God merely take us back to the pre-Kantian practice of philosophers calling on God to fill the 'gaps' they could not fill in with empirical evidence or rational proof? No. The difference between Kant's appeal to God and the typical 'God of the gaps' approach[5] is that the latter treats God as *an element in the system*, so that our knowledge of God is regarded as absolutely certain, whereas Kant appeals to a person's *experience* of God, interpreted through an act of *faith*, as a paradoxical awareness of the presence of transcendence within the world – a purely subjective validation of a System that begins and ends with a recognition of objective ignorance of the transcendent. To some this may be an inadequate, intellectually dissatisfying way to conclude such an impressive philosophical System. But to Kant it is the only way to be philosophical without letting your philosophy rob us of what is most authentically human. [Palmquist (2000), pp. 366-367]

Let us now see what to make of Kant's remark above that appetite and desire are either "sensuous or intellectual." It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that people sometimes do things in order to get sensuous satisfaction (or avoid sensuous dissatisfaction) out of it. For example, I would eat a hamburger rather than a plate of broccoli if I could *because* I like the taste of hamburger and dislike the taste of broccoli. But it is also clear beyond reasonable doubt that people sometimes do things *because of some moral principle they hold dear* even if they *dislike* what they have to do in order to act on that principle. The first case is one of sensuous appetite; the second is one of intellectual appetite. Thirdly, people are also known to sometimes do something they find sensually pleasurable but which, at the same time, fulfills what they

[5] What Palmquist calls the 'God of the gaps' approach is a direct consequence of ontology-centeredness in the way other philosophers approached their philosophy. An ontology-centered metaphysic forces the philosopher to reduce everything to some ultimate Essence, and this is what the 'God of the gaps' does for ontology-centered philosophy.

hold to be a moral obligation. Duty is not necessarily something unpleasant and pleasure is not necessarily contrary to Duty. It is the Duty of a teacher to teach the student, but a good teacher feels no less delight than the student does when the latter exultantly masters some difficult lesson.

And, sometimes, people find themselves in situations in which they feel a conflict between acting to attain a sensuous satisfaction (or avoid a sensuous unpleasantness) vs. acting according to an intellectual principle they hold and resolve that conflict by acting in favor of the sensuous satisfaction at the neglect or even violation of their intellectual principle. The concept of a Duty resides in the manifold of concepts, not the manifold of rules, and, for this reason, a Duty is the concept of an "I ought to" rather than "I have no choice but to." The "sense of conflict" arises because no matter which of two actions might be taken, there is something about the situation that sets up some violation of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason and the person must grope to resolve this disturbance to his equilibrium.

Finally, sometimes a person finds himself confronted by a sense of conflict between two actions that *both* pertain to concepts they hold to be Duties. College ethics courses seem to revel in posing hypothetical situations of this sort and challenging the students to resolve them. Perhaps nowhere is the "no win situation" found more often than in these courses. Personally, I have my doubts about the efficaciousness of such lessons. Whenever you hear someone speak of having to choose between "the lesser of two evils" the odds are pretty good that he is speaking of such a situation.

What all these cases have in common is that they exemplify the human capacity to judge and decide upon what action to take in some particular circumstance. The Latin word for this is *arbitrium*. Kant taught,

> The capacity to desire practically . . . is *arbitrium*. *Arbitrium*, or choice, is either *sensitivum*, which represents things to us that are agreeable to the senses, or *intellectuale* – things that understanding approves. However, dividing *arbitrium* into *brutum*[6] or *liberum*[7] is better. *Brutum* is that which is bound or necessitated by *stimulis*[8], and *liberum* that bound through *motiva*[9]; animals have the former, human beings the latter . . . Man can as well be affected by stimuli but not necessitated [by it] for he is autonomous of *stimulis*. [Kant (1783) 29: 896]

As I suspect you might have already guessed, this discussion is leading up to the ideas of "free will" and "willpower." We aren't quite there yet, and both terms have been – and to a degree still are – controversial in theologies and also in science. Because I don't want you to think I'm sneaking up on you with them, it's best to spend a little time now with the idea of "choice."

First, "choice" is not a *technical* term in science. Not in *any* of them. Perhaps this isn't surprising to you in the cases of physics and chemistry, nor should it be in the case of biology when you consider that this science gets its building material from the first two. Perhaps it's a bit more surprising to learn "choice" is not a technical term in psychology either – a legacy bequeathed to that science by its birth in the heyday of what was known as "positivism" in science. Nor is it a technical term in economics, sociology, or any of the other non-Critical social-natural sciences of today. Most scientists avoid using the word "choice" as much as possible, and when a scientist does use it, he uses it in the same way you do – out of convention and habit. Mathematics uses the term in a very restricted way, namely, "the axiom of choice." Translated from mathematics' hieroglyphic language into English, the axiom of choice says,

> For any set S there is a function f (called the *choice* or *selection* function) such that for any nonempty subset X of S, f(X) is a member of X [Nelson (2003)].

[6] brute
[7] free from physical constraint or compulsion
[8] goads; things that urge or stimulate into action
[9] motives

I would be surprised if this was what *you* meant the last time you used the word "choice."

Ontology-centered philosophers neatly try to sidestep defining "choice" also. In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy it says,

> **choice** The philosophical crux is whether choice is a process in which different desires, pressures and attitudes fight it out and eventually result in one decision and action, or whether in addition there is a "self" controlling the conflict in the name of higher desires, reason, or morality. [Blackburn (1996)]

If you didn't already notice it, this isn't a definition. It's a confession of ignorance.

"Choice" is an English word originating from Middle English, and it is perhaps obvious that "choice" was not the word Kant used in the quote above. Quite naturally, he used a German word, *Willkür*, which is translated into English as "option, choice." The interesting question is, why did he equate *Willkür* with the Latin word *arbitrium*? The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* lists eight dictionary definitions for *arbitrium*, and the ones that connect most closely with the context we have at hand here are: (a) the action or process of deciding generally; and (b) wishes, desires, inclinations, etc., especially with regard to procedure or policy. Some of the other definitions include notions of "arbitrary and irresponsible action," "whim," "caprice," and "pleasure." It is somewhat, if not totally, clear what Kant's context for the word was, i.e., "the capacity to desire *practically*." What does it mean to "desire practically"?

First of all, in Critical metaphysics when you see the word "practical" or "practically," the immediate context is *action* taken by a human being. This *always* involves some form of motoregulatory expression (figure 1)[10] and often, but not necessarily, some form of ratio-expression (a purely mental process) via the process of speculative Reason. In Critical metaphysics the *Realerklärung* ("real explanation") of "choice" (*Willkür, arbitrium*) is: the practical capacity to make a representation the object of one's appetite. An appetite is the representation of a determined practical purpose. Appetition is the act of representing an appetite by the process of the appetitive power. If an appetite arises from a ground in sensibility appetition is called *appetitio per stimulos*; if it arises from a ground in understanding and concepts appetition is called *appetitio per motiva* [Kant (1783) 29: 895].

The act of choice implies expression in action, such expression being either motoregulatory expression or ratio-expression (expression through speculative Reason) or both. In all cases the action is regarded as *made* necessary (practically necessitated) by the person who chooses. An action necessitated on the ground of sensuous stimulation is said to be *arbitrium brutum* (brute choice). An action necessitated on the ground of intellectual motives is called *arbitrium liberum* (free choice). Kant wrote,

> Appetitive power in conformity with concepts, so far as its ground of determination for the act falls in itself, not in the Object, is called a capacity *to do or to refrain as much as one likes*. So far as it is combined with consciousness of the ability for its act to bring forth the Object it is called *choice*; if not combined with this same deed the act is called a *wish*. Appetitive power whose inner ground of determination falls within the reason of the Subject . . . is called *will*. Will is therefore the appetitive power considered not so much in regard to the act (as choice is) but rather in regard to the ground of the determination of the choice to act, and has itself no proper prior ground of determination as such, but rather is practical Reason itself so far as it can determine choice. [Kant (1797) 6: 213]

In ontology-centered metaphysics, "will" and "choice" are irresolvable controversies because they either must be or have some ontological noumenon to serve as their basis and no such noumenon satisfying the requirement for objective validity can be found. In an epistemology-centered metaphysic the significance

[10] In the Critical theory of the phenomenon of mind, measurable "brain activity" is a form of motoregulatory expression because this form of motoregulatory expression is co-determined reciprocally with mental representation. This is called the *principle of emergent properties*, which is a theorem stating that all parts in the logical divisions of *nous*, *soma*, and *psyche* are reciprocally determining in their accidents coexisting in the same moment in time.

of "will" and "choice" is epistemological, not ontological. Their noumenon is none other than the *whole* human being (no real mind-body division) whose *homo phaenomenal* actions empirically exhibit them.

In this regard, it is a worthwhile reminder that, in figure 1, specific action expressions (motoregulatory expression) are determined by the *unvetoed* meaning implications represented in impetuous reflective judgments. When the process of practical Reason intervenes to veto all or parts of these expressions and initiates by ratio-expression the engagement of determining judgment and concepts to resolve conflicts with the person's manifold of practical rules under the formula of the categorical imperative, this intervention is called the synthesis of the motivational dynamic. Figure 2, which was presented earlier in this treatise, re-illustrates this synthesis. Due to this "negative" character of intervention by pure practical Reason, it is perhaps more accurate to say human beings exhibit "free won't" rather than "free will."

The principle of emergent properties (see footnote 10 above) says that it should be possible to find empirical evidence congruent with what the mathematical theory of the phenomenon of mind says here. In point of fact, such congruent evidence *has been found* and reported in a very interesting article by Obhi & Haggard in 2004. Obhi & Haggard (2004) described a very interesting neuroscience study in which brain activity (neurobiology) and self reports of the test subjects (neuropsychology) were compared while the test subjects performed some simple exercises in voluntary movements. The study was not made as a test of the theory of the phenomenon of mind – naturally, because in 2004 that theory had not yet been published – and so Obhi and Haggard were duly cautious in broaching the subject of "free will" in their report – which is also natural considering the comments made above about the status of the idea of "choice" in science. Nonetheless, their findings obviously moved them to comment on it. That comment was the same as above – that it is more correct to say human beings exhibit "free won't" rather than "free will." Empirical science can never *prove* the correctness of any theory – because a scientific theory involves ideas of noumena – but it is possible for it to *refute* them if it finds that the theory and the facts are incongruent. As Feynman said, "There is always the possibility of proving any definite theory wrong; but notice that we can never prove it right" [Feynman (1965), pg. 157]. The Critical theory is unrefuted.



Figure 2: synthesis flow in the motivational dynamic.

In this chapter of this treatise, there is a very specific choice we are faced with making. That choice is whether or not to choose to have faith in divine leadership. Before such a choice can be made, we must understand more deeply what "leadership" means and, then, what "divine leadership" means. Let us turn next to the phenomenon of human leadership.

3. Human Leadership and the Choice to Follow a Leader

Leadership is one of the most poorly understood, and widely *mis*understood, of all social phenomena. Most people assume leadership is some kind of personality trait or innate skill but this is not so. Critical analysis [Wells (2010)] reveals the objectively valid *Realerklärung* (real explanation) of leadership to be: *the reciprocal relationship between two or more people by which the self-determinations of actions by some people (followers) are stimulated by actions taken by another person* (*a leader*). It is, in other words, not a character trait but rather a *social dynamic*. In most human organizations and societies it is a common habit of speech to refer to those people employed in management, administration, or rulership positions as "the leadership" of that organization or society but this is a false equation. Leadership and leader are not the same thing, and such appointees are properly called *authority figures*. At any given moment some particular person fills the role of a leader but leadership itself is not permanently vested in any one person [*ibid*.].

A *leader* is *any person who **purposively** stimulates the self-determination of another person to express an action*. A person who expresses an action because of this stimulation is called a *follower*. There is no such thing as a leader who doesn't have any followers. One of the outcomes of the Critical analysis of the phenomenon of leadership is *every human being possesses the potential ability* ("*Vermögen*") *to be a leader*. Whether or not a person chooses to actualize this potential is a complex function of experience in his or her development of the manifold of rules in practical Reason and the manifold of concepts in understanding. The ability to act as a leader is a skill that can be developed through practice. So, too, is the ability to be a follower. The old bromide, "Leaders are born, not made," could not be more false.

There are some important things to understand about this social dynamic. First, the leader's action is intentional and goal directed. A leader wants something to be achieved as a consequence of the follower's action. If the follower's action is congruent with achievement of the leader's goal, the leader's action in stimulating the follower's reaction is called a *successful* leader's action. If the follower's action is such that it contradicts the leader's goal, then the leader's action is called an *unsuccessful* leader's action. If the follower's reaction is contrary to, but not contradictory to, the leader's intention then the leader's action is called a *non-successful* leader's action. This is a subtle but important difference. If the follower's action neither hinders nor promotes accomplishment of the leader's aim, this is contrary to the leader's intention. If the follower's action opposes or hinders this accomplishment, this is contradictory to that intention.

For example, suppose your neighbor's television is disturbing you because it is on too loudly. You go over and ask him to turn down the volume. If he does, your leader's action was successful. If he ignores you, it was non-successful. If he turns the volume *up* instead of down, your action was unsuccessful. It is important to note that the *same* leader's action can be all three of these (successful, unsuccessful, and non-successful) at the same time. For example, in 44 BC Julius Caesar intimidated the Roman Senate into naming him dictator-for-life (a successful leader's action); but this same action also provoked a group of these senators to assassinate him a month later (an unsuccessful leader's action).

A second important thing to understand is that leaders' actions are *deliberately upsetting* to a follower's equilibrium. I do *not* mean by this that a leader's action *necessarily* angers the follower or causes him to feel resentment or is emotionally unpleasant for him. Indeed, the majority of leader's actions are none of these. What I do mean is that the leader's action *provokes* a disturbance to the follower's equilibrium so that in order to restore his equilibrium the follower *does something he would not have done if the leader had not expressed the action he did*. If your boss comes over and tells you to do something you were about to do anyway, his action is unnecessary and has no bearing on the fact that you do it. It might annoy

you that he did it but, provided it doesn't annoy you enough to provoke you into *not* doing it, his action led you nowhere and so he did not act as a leader. If it does annoy you enough that you refuse to or postpone doing it, then his action was an unsuccessful leader's action because your reaction contradicts the intention of his action. It is part of human nature that people settle into routines and habitual behaviors. Part of the intent behind a leader's action is to achieve something different from or additional to what the follower, left to himself, would do. To do this he must provoke a change in the follower's behavior. In one way or another, a leader's action is always *practically* provocative.

Third, merely holding a title of manager, supervisor, boss, king, &etc. does not make a person a leader. There are some so-called leaders who "lead" the organization the same way a carved wooden figurehead "leads" a ship. It is true that conferring a title such as "manager" on a person does incline other people to do as he says – studies in managerial psychology show this is so – but this inclination is born of social conventions. The persons who are organizationally subordinate to the appointed manager look upon his appointment with an *expectation of authority* that the appointed authority figure must live up to if his actions are to be successful. *Authority* is possession of the *Kraft* (power)[11] of causing something to become greater, to increase, to be strengthened, or to be reinforced in some way. *Expectation of authority* is the ***demand*** by others that a person holding a position as a designated authority figure possess the *Kraft* of authority and will actualize it *for the benefit of their common association* [Wells (2010), chap. 6].

The leader is the person the followers have *chosen* to follow, and in every association, community, or group, *the person who is acting as the leader is constantly changing* over surprisingly brief intervals of time – day-by-day, hour-by-hour, sometimes minute-by-minute. There are often considerable stretches of time when *no one* is leading at all because everyone is already doing their part to make the organization, group, etc. successful in achieving their common goals. Being a leader does not make you the boss; being the boss does not make you the leader. The leader *at this moment* is the person whose actions provoke subsequent actions that follow upon it and are taken by other people. Because their actions subsequently follow upon his, these other people are properly said to be his followers *at the moment*. When a group of people have someone appointed or designated as the group's authority figure, the principal and most important leader's action this authority figure can take *is to see to it that appropriate persons in the group step forward at appropriate times to act as a temporary leader* of the group or some subset of its members. Put another way, the authority figure's primary task is *to guide the group's leadership dynamic*. If this is accomplished with sufficient skill, the group's members often do not even notice that this is what the authority figure is doing. It isn't even a requirement that the person effecting this guidance of the group's leadership dynamic *be* the officially recognized authority figure. Lao Tzu taught that there is a hierarchy of skill levels that a leader can exhibit:

> When the Master governs, the people are hardly aware that he exists.
> Next best is a leader who is loved.
> Next, one who is feared.
> The worst is one who is despised.
>
> If you don't trust the people, you make them untrustworthy.
>
> The Master doesn't talk, he acts.
> When his work is done, the people say, "We did it ourselves!" [Tao Te Ching, verse 17]

The actions of followers might or might not positively cooperate with the purpose of the leader whose actions provoked theirs. When their actions are congruent with his purpose, this is positive cooperation. If their actions contradict his purpose, this is negative cooperation (uncooperation). If their actions are

[11] *Kraft* is a technical term in Critical metaphysics. It translates into English as "power" regarded in the connotation of an *ability*. In general, it is the matter of an ability in terms of what the ability is able to do. In our context here, *Kraft* refers to the ability of a person to do or to cause to be done something in particular that stands as the Object of the particular *Kraft*. An ability a person has but chooses not to actualize is called a *Vermögen* or potential power.

contrary to his purpose without being contradictory to it, this is non-cooperation. Language convention generally labels only those people whose actions are cooperative the "followers" of a leader. Those whose actions are uncooperative are, in most cases, either not given a label or, in some cases, might be called the leader's opponents or protesters. Such labels are found most often in political contexts. However, in both cooperation and uncooperation the actions taken by others are responses to the leader's action and so the technical term "followers" is the proper and correct description for the *social dynamic*.

In cases of non-cooperation, it can be properly said that the person attempting to act as a leader has failed to lead and the others have either *chosen* to ignore his stimulating action or have misunderstood what action he wanted them to take. The non-successful leader *has* had an effect on them but the effect is contrary to his purpose. If the action of the person attempting to act as a leader had no stimulating effect at all then it produced no social dynamic and the action is not a *leader's* action at all. If the follower's action is *unintentionally* contrary to the leader's purpose then the leader's action is a miscommunication – what psychologists sometimes call an "error in message transaction" [Kiesler, *et al*. (1997)], [Wells (2012), chap. 8]. The person attempting to lead intended to convey a particular meaning implication to the follower but the follower interpreted it to have a different meaning implication [Wells (2011)].

When people are uncooperative or non-cooperative with the person attempting to act as a leader, the cause of this might lie with the leader, or with the follower, or with both at once [Wells (2012), chap. 8]. Leadership is a social dynamic, and this means it is interaction and interrelationship co-determined by the concepts, presuppositions, interpretations of meanings, likes, dislikes, private moral codes, and the non-conscious practical rules (in the manifold of rules) of the individuals involved. Indeed, there are some people who develop an intense, even pathological, aversion to being cooperative followers. Antisocial and narcissistic people are two examples who come readily to mind. People who develop such aversions are frequently disruptive or even destructive to the association. Their uncooperative behaviors can often bring about their expulsion from the association. Imprisoned criminals are extreme examples of this. So, too, are people who are shunned or excommunicated by their church. People whose employment in a business association are terminated for behavioral cause make up a less extreme example.

The human phenomenon of positive cooperation implicates the *Dasein* of some sort of agreement – either tacit or explicit – that has gained the consent of the people said to be cooperating. Such an agreement is in general called a ***social contract*** [Wells (2012)]. A social contract can range from only the short-term (in cases of temporary cooperating groups) to the long term (in cases of Societies and nations). It is always based on common interests and mutual benefits gained through positive cooperation. Wells (2012) presents the Critical theory of social contracting in detail. Leadership is the social dynamic through which social contracting succeeds (good leadership dynamic), fails (bad leadership dynamic), or stagnates (ineffective leadership dynamic). Usually, as goes the leadership dynamic so also goes the survival of the association. Stagnation of the leadership dynamic rarely remains stagnant. Usually it goes on to outright failure. This is a finding historian Arnold Toynbee made in his study of civilizations [Toynbee (1946)].

As a dynamic in which continual disturbances to individuals' equilibria are purposively provoked, the dynamic of leadership is one in which individuals' manifolds of concepts and manifolds of rules undergo continuing changes and accommodations that affect behaviors, attitudes, morals, and thinking. Leadership is perhaps the primary and most fundamental way by which people learn, grow, and develop socially. What Mill said of governments can equally well be applied to the phenomenon of human leadership:

> We have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division of the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its actions upon men and by its actions upon

> things: by what it makes of its citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them and by means of them [Mill (1861), pp. 20-21].

So, too, can leadership be judged.

4. Divine Leadership

I now propose to you that the phenomenon of human leadership suggests a different way of looking at relationships between God and humankind. In the traditional one, the civilizations of antiquity had only one model for their notions of how to regard their relationships with God. That model was by inference of analogy building on how they understood their relationships with the absolute rulers of the ancient city-states and empires. The king was the most powerful – hence the most fearsome – person in their political and social world. It was logical for the ancients to think of deities as being like kings – powerful; remote; awesome; terrible in their wrath; lords to be prudently appeased and obeyed. What I am proposing for your consideration is that the more perfect way to regard your relationship with God is to regard God as a supremely sublime and benevolent leader guiding the social dynamics of human leadership.

Earlier in this chapter the objective validity of transcendental freedom was established as one of the basic properties of human beings as *homo noumena*. To repeat, freedom is the capacity for one's Self-determination to take action. Transcendental freedom is independence from the laws of appearances due to the ability of pure Reason to be a practical Reason. Freedom of choice is the autonomy of appetitive power from being determined by sensuous impulse and this freedom is possible because of the ability of the process of pure Reason to be a practical regulator of all non-autonomic human actions.

Epistemologically, this *homo noumenal* trait grounds the practical *Realerklärung* of what it means to be a *person*. A person is a being who can be regarded with practical objective validity as the agent of its own actions and to who alone these actions can be attributed as effects for which he or she is the original cause [Kant (1797) 6: 223]. If you deny that you possess in yourself transcendental freedom and freedom of choice then you are denying that *you yourself* are a person. If someone else denies that you are constituted with transcendental freedom and freedom of choice, he or she is judging you to be a non-person and merely an automaton.

If God created you and in some manner did so in his image, then transcendental freedom and freedom of choice were made part of your *Existenz*. The obvious implication of this is that *God values freedom*. But with freedom come pitfalls. Your choices have temporal consequences, and some of these lead to further experience affecting your self-construction of not only your manifold of concepts in understanding but also your manifold of rules in practical Reason. How you act, what you think, and how you judge right vs. wrong all follow from these constructions. The choices you make are yours alone and, taken in total, determine the person you *practically* become.

From this it follows that *every person **makes** himself or herself the person he or she **chooses** to become*. You are, in a very practical sense, your own creator – not of your *Dasein*, which theology credits to God, or of your *homo phaenomenal* Self (which is an object of science), but of what you make your own *homo noumenal Existenz* to be. Transcendental apperception – your absolute certainty of the reality of yourself, whoever and whatever you are – is innate knowledge of your own *Dasein* **without** knowledge of your own *Existenz*. There is a lesson in all this which stands as a corollary to one in Exodus,

> And God said to Moses, "I AM THAT WHICH I AM" [Exodus 3:14].[12]

The corollary is, "You are that which you chose to make yourself become."

[12] Young's Literal Translation of the obscure Hebrew phrase *Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh*. The phrase doesn't travel well into English. See the parenthetic note in the text below.

[Note: There are a number of different English translations for the Hebrew phrase *Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh* in Exodus 3:14, and I feel it is important to at least some readers to briefly talk about this. The obscurity of this phrase leads to translators translating it according to one or another theological doctrine. Even people who are fluent in Hebrew have different theologically based interpretations of its meaning. Sachs (2010) points out four (or, more accurately, five) different possible interpretations of this phrase:

1. "I am who I am"; this rendering metaphysically refers to an eternally unchanging Being;
2. "I am who I shall be"; this rendering stands for a fundamental constancy of Eternity regardless of variations. It doesn't ignore temporal variations in nature but regards them as being of only secondary importance;
3. "I shall be who I am"; the metaphysical connotation here is that of evolution inherent in the idea of God;
4. "I shall be who I shall be"; (a) the first possible connotation of this is "to everyone I am something else"; (b) the second possible connotation is "each person has a different idea of me."

The Critical problem with all these various translations except 4(b) is that each contains a predication of time attached to the *Existenz* of God. But, according to both the Critical theology and Augustine of Hippo, *Existenz* in "time" cannot be predicated of God with objective validity. The notion of "Eternity" has no beginning, no end, and no middle. But it is impossible for human understanding to *not* try to place objects in some kind of temporal or logical ordering structure because *subjective* time is the form of human intuition (Wells (2009), chap. 3, sec. 3).]

There is also another corollary to this in the New Testament:

> Jesus answered him, saying, "I tell you the solemn truth, unless a person is born again he cannot see the kingdom of God." Nicodemus said to him, "How can a man be born when he is old? He cannot enter into his mother's womb and be born a second time, can he?" Jesus answered, "I will tell you the solemn truth, unless one is born of water and Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit. Do not be astonished that I said to you, 'You must be born again'." [John 3:3-7]

Spirit is the inner principle of animation for a human being. You are "born again" by using your freedom of choice to re-make your manifold of concepts and manifold of rules, which are the determinations of your *homo noumenal* Self. You *are* the person you chose to become. *You* can also *change* that choice whenever you choose to become a different person. It can be hard but some famous people have re-made themselves. Examples include Augustine and Mahatma Gandhi [Collins & Lapierre (1975), pp. 49-62].

In a moment we will turn to what this has to do with the idea of divine leadership. But first we should talk about the distinction between a "person" and a person's "personality." Webster's dictionary defines "personality" as "the state or quality of being a person." But what determines this "state or quality"? We know people judge other people's personalities all the time, but can they do so with objective validity? If so, how?

One of the more interesting discoveries of psychology is that how a human being judges his own personality usually differs from how other human beings judge his personality. This phenomenon lies at the core of the sciences of interpersonal psychology. I say 'sciences' here rather than 'science' because psychologists have not been able to agree upon a single explanation or description for what 'personality' means. This is not too surprising because psychology is an empirical science trying to understand *homo noumenal* aspects of being-a-human-being by means of their *homo phaenomenal* exhibitions, and trying to do so from a potpourri of idiosyncratic ontology-centered metaphysics. As theoretical sciences, they are and can only be mathematical systems, and ones generally recognized as "interpersonal psychology" doctrines more or less all follow doctrines of functional methods largely conforming to principles of methods first set out in the 1950s [Leary (1957)]. The first of these principles holds that "personality" is "the multilevel pattern of interpersonal response (overt, conscious or private) expressed by the individual"

[*ibid*., pg. 59]. Epistemologically, interpersonal psychology methodology as doctrine is contained in the theoretical Standpoint of the phenomenon of mind. From the theoretical Standpoint, the Critical *Realerklärung* of personality is "the entirety of the *nexus* of practical rules in the manifold of rules regulating a person's habits expressed by his physical and mental activities." Empirically, this means that exhibitions of your personality *subsist in what you do and do not do*.

From the *practical* Standpoint, personality is the way one employs the capacity for freedom to be his own Self-determining agent with autonomy in regard to factors outside of his Self. All real meanings are *at root* practical, and so a person's personality is practically defined by what he or she *chooses* to do or not do. *Your personality is Self-constructed by your choices*.

Now, what about *judgments* of personality? When one human being judges another's personality, this judgment is necessarily empirical. Theoretical personality *subsists* in expressions of physical and mental activities; this is not the same as saying personality *is* the accidents of behavior. We cannot read each other's minds. We can only observe each other's actions and try to understand what these "public" expressions might be telling us. Here our judgments are always speculations evaluated in terms of norms and conventions. Those norms and conventions are what we call the *mores and folkways* of Society. Part of human judgment of other people's personalities involves imputations of other people's motives. To impute is to attribute something to a person as an explanation for his behavior. I think I do not need to belabor the point that an imputation might be true about that which it attributes but it also might be false. This is such an important fact that the New Testament makes it a moral lesson:

> Do not judge others, so that you will not be judged. For by the standard you judge, you will be judged, and with the measure you use it will be measured to you. [Matthew 7:1-2]

The Greek word translated as "judge" in this passage is κρίνετε, which means "to pass sentence upon; to condemn." Matthew is not telling us we must not *impute* a crime or a fault to another person's actions and behaviors. If that was what it meant, a Christian could not assent to having police officers or law courts. No, it is telling us not to take the law into our own hands, not to lynch the prisoner awaiting trial, not to be a vigilante. A juror's verdict is an imputation; κρίνετε is the appointed Duty of the trial judge who acts in accord with and upholds due process of law and is charged with the administration of justice according to the mores and folkways of Society. It also warns us to exercise caution with the laws we pass, ensure impartiality in our court systems, and scrupulously follow its ways and means of due process because these constitute the "measure you use" that "will be measured to you." The 1966 movie, *A Man for All Seasons*, contains a scene that nicely illustrates the prudential wisdom of the maxim in Matthew:

> **William Roper**: So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law!
> **Sir Thomas More**: Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
> **William Roper**: Yes, I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
> **Sir Thomas More**: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws, from coast to coast, Man's laws, not God's! And if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake! [*A Man for All Seasons*, 1966]

What about a person's judgment of his *own* personality? Here, too, such a judgment is necessarily an empirical judgment. Perhaps this may sound surprising, but the reason this is so is because a person's manifold of rules in practical Reason contains only practical rules that are never presented consciously. Practical Reason is a cognitively dark and affectively cold process. How a person *understands* his own motives and reasons for his actions is through the empirical concepts he constructs in his manifold of concepts. In chapter 5, the developmental stages of moral rule judgment was briefly discussed. Figure 3 repeats the illustration of this process. How a person *understands* his own personality is by means of that part of this process dealing with cognizance of rules. An individual's self-assessment of his personality is



Figure 3: Successive stages of practical and cognitive rule development in the development of moral judgment.

no less empirical than is his judgments of others, although he likely has greater faith in the correctness of how he judges himself than in how others judge him. The stage of individualism moves from caprice to egocentrism; the stage of moral realism moves from egocentrism to non-humane dogma in judging, such as that we saw earlier in the example of the Puritan leaders debating whether or not to behead a nine-year-old boy. Moral realism is dogmatizing immaturity in judgment and judges an abstract and transcendent noumenon instead of a person. True morality in imputation and judgment of personality is not achieved until the third stage, the stage of rule cognizance. It is why seven-year-olds do not sit on juries.

Now let us look at all this in the context of leadership. Human leadership is a social dynamic, i.e., a totality of interacting spontaneous actions of two or more persons. What, though, is *divine* leadership?

If one hypothesizes that God is a supremely sublime leader guiding the social dynamics of human leadership then, because leader's actions are always purposive, it follows that a divine leader would guide the human leadership dynamic according to his purpose. Human leadership is an idea of a totality – an *integration* of *differentiated* individual actions combined in a unity of purpose. The practical personality of an individual might sometimes act in agreement with this unity or might sometimes act in opposition to this unity. In the latter instances the individual's actions are, at the same time, actions that affect determinations of actions by others, and these others' actions can agree with this unity of divine purpose. If this happens then the opposing action of one individual is, at the same time, a provocation of agreeing actions by others. The provocative action can therefore be said to *mediately* serve divine purpose even though such indirect service was not part of that person's intention. Again, all *leader's* actions are necessarily provocative because they are effected in order to motivate some change in the behaviors of the followers.

But how can God effect necessary provocations without revealing himself and, thereby, destroying all need for *faith*? The foregoing idea of mediately serving divine purpose seems to provide an answer to this question. It suggests the following hypothesis: *All contrary and contradictory individual actions provide the practical provocations necessarily contained in a divine leader's every action*. If this sounds to you like God manipulates people, it is important to clearly understand that ***every*** leader's-action is *necessarily* manipulative. The leader seeks to achieve a result that would not happen without a provocation. If a leader's purpose is benign, then the provocation is a *benign* manipulation.

It follows from this hypothesis that *an individual human being cannot thwart a divine purpose*. His personality can be in agreement with it, in opposition to it, or be sometimes congruent and sometimes incongruent with it but, *regardless of what that divine purpose is* and *regardless of however ignorant or*

insightful of it the acting person might be, he cannot thwart it, hinder it, or change it. All he can do is affect the ways and means by which a divine purpose is fulfilled *by humanity overall*.

Under this hypothesis, there is no antinomy between the ideas of human freedom and free choice and ideas of divine purposes and divine ends. Insofar as your choices determine your practical personality, you can choose to be saint, sinner, or anything in between and do so without harm or hindrance to divine purpose. The two ideas *co-exist harmoniously*. One might even call this a blessing because it provides every person the opportunity to make mistakes as he or she *builds* his or her personality but to *correct* these mistakes later in life in pursuit of one's own process of Self-perfection. Augustine's *Confessions* is nothing less than a self-report detailing his personal experience in going from what he called himself, "a great sinner for so small a boy" [Augustine (c. 397-400), pg. 33], to becoming a greatly revered saint of the Catholic church.

Although the person you choose to become cannot change, alter, or hinder divine purpose, these choices do effect what Kant called "**humanity**":

> On the other hand, with the human being there is a sympathetic participation in fate and welfare, where human beings are not egotistical. One calls these propensities humaneness, humanity. [Kant (1775-1776), 25: 587]

As Kant uses the term, "humanity" is not the sum total of all human beings. It is the mutual *sympathetic participation* subsiding in *unselfish* behaviors by human beings by which people cooperate in ways that promote their general welfare, mutually provide for each other's safety, and promote the common good of everyone living in this human association. It is, in other words, active partaking in what Rousseau and Locke called a *social compact* [Rousseau (1762)], [Locke (1690)]. Humanity subsists in Communities of human beings, i.e., in the voluntary associations of people who join together for some common purpose. A person who joins in such an association (and is admitted to it by the others), and obliges himself to fulfill its terms and conditions of membership, is properly called a *citizen*. Elsewhere I have presented the Critical theory of the human nature such associations [Wells (2012)].

In this treatise, though, we are drawn into speculations of another kind, namely, of a Community of human beings and God. By analogy with the Idea of the Social contract, we can call all people whose personalities and behaviors immediately and habitually promote divine purposes *citizens of a divine Community*. People whose personalities and behaviors are habitually unsympathetic with and uncommitted to this Community (neither hindering it nor supportive of it) are properly called "alien" to the Community, and those whose personalities habitually conflict with it are properly called *sinners*.

When I speak of divine leadership and aims that cannot be thwarted by individual persons, what sort of effects should it be expected to produce? To ask this is to pursue lines of teleological dialectics, and we know from what was presented earlier in this treatise that these dialectics cannot lead to a *proof* of the existence of God based on objectively valid grounds. But it is not the aim here to do this. Proof is perhaps needed for adult *belief* (although not for childish belief); *faith*, not belief, is the aim of theology.

Still, faith *does* require subjectively sufficient reason for holding-to-be-true that which we are aware we cannot *know* from objectively sufficient grounds. Are there signposts of benign leadership we might look for, as means of building a sense of confidence in ideas of divine leadership and Kantian humanity, by similitude with characteristics of good human leadership and the nature of human social contracting? I propose for your consideration that there are. The chapters of this treatise that follow present what I regard as such signposts and offer them for your consideration. To take this sort of approach is to follow the Latin maxim *ex pede Herculem* (literally, "from the foot, a Hercules"). The maxim, attributed to an ancient story about Pythagoras, means we judge of the whole from the specimen.

One, perhaps the overarching, characteristic of good human leadership, was presented by Mill as he discussed looked-for effects of good government. He called this idea "Progress":

> Progress includes Order, but Order does not include Progress. Progress is a greater degree of that of which Order is a less. Order, in any other sense, stands only for a part of the prerequisites of good government, not for its idea and essence. Order would find a more suitable place among the conditions of Progress; since, if we would increase of sum of good, nothing is more indispensable than to take due care of what we already have. . . . Order, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself. If a gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent loss in the same or in any other, there is not Progress. . . . What is suggested by the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as much the prevention of falling back. The very same social causes – the same beliefs, feelings, institutions, and practices – are as much required to prevent society from retrograding as to produce a further advance. Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life would not be the less an unceasing struggle against causes of deterioration . . . we ought not to forget that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind; which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. [Mill (1861), pg. 15]

True Progress – increase in the sum of good things possessed by a Community without accompanying loss of other good things it already has – is perhaps what is most expected in followers' expectations of authority for a leader. Could true Progress be any less expected for divine leadership? And would not a supremely sublime and benevolent leader know this?

Every human being, through his choices, Self-determines the person he makes himself become. One of these choices is the choice to try to become a person suitable for membership as a citizen of a divine Community, if such a thing is practically achievable, and to enter into fellowship with other people who likewise choose to seek this Community. But how does one do this? The challenge is enormous, and perhaps a lesson set out in Matthew can be taken under a Critical interpretation as a warning about this:

> For many are called but few are chosen. [Matthew 22:14]

The difference between this parable and the Critical dialectic here is found in the viewpoint of who makes the choice. The choice presented in the parable is made by God as a logical dialectic of God-as-king; the incident in the parable involves a man answering the call of a king dressed unsuitably for the occasion, and the king rejecting him from the gathering he has called because of this unsuitability. In the Critical dialectic presented here, "suitability" is suitability for membership in a Community of humanity, in the Kantian sense, and *is made by individual people*. It subsists in their choices by which each person has determined the person he has chosen to become. ***If you are unchosen, you have unchosen yourself***.

The most obviously formidable challenge faced by people is that we are all born into the world without any knowledge of divine purposes, no way of obtaining Knowledge[13] of it through experience, no concept of God or sin, and no innate idea of humanity. Every infant is born in a state of innocence such as that suggested of Adam and Eve in Genesis 2:25, and, unlike Adam and Eve, none of us receive a warning at birth such as Genesis says they received from God. As we grow up, however, we do encounter many situations and circumstances that are not without analogy to the Torah's story of the fall of humankind:

> And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves girdles. [Genesis 3:6-7]

[13] Knowledge is systematic and inalterable assertion of truth with consciousness that holding-to-be-true is grounded in judgments having apodictic Modality with both objectively and subjectively sufficient grounds of understanding.

Living presents each person his own choices of 'fruits' from which he must select. *What* one selects is not as important as *why* it is selected, because these 'whys' are the justifications we use for our choices. And yet even a reified idea of "good" – let alone a "highest Good" or *summum bonum* – is a frustratingly elusive notion because it seems that everything one person finds to be "good for something" another person finds to be "bad for something else," as Plato never tired of pointing out.

It is both understandable and justifiable for a person, faced with the challenge of discovering humanity, to ask, "Is it not unfair or even cruel that God would put everyone to a challenge where success is so seemingly hopeless?" I think it is rather obvious that it would be *if meeting the challenge really is hopeless*. But if it was, this would contradict the hypothesis that God is a *supremely benevolent* leader. ***Faith in divine leadership is holding-to-be-true that the challenge is not hopeless and trusting that a way to meet this challenge is within the power of each human being to find***.

Faith like this is difficult to find and maintain. As I said before, belief is easy, faith is hard. It is certainly unsatisfactory for any theologian to just say, "you must have faith" but provide no guidance helping you make such faith possible. It follows that it is a Duty of theology to try to provide this guidance, and it is with the aim of offering such guidance that the chapters which follow are concerned. Like Genesis, Hesiod's *Theogony*, and Hinduism's *Nasadiya Sukta*, we should begin with the beginning: the innocent foundations of human affectivity. And so we turn to chapter 7.

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