

Chapter 8

The *Momenta* of Reflective Judgment**§ 1. The Formal Expedience of Nature**

The fundamental acroam of the process of reflective judgment is the **principle of formal expedience of Nature**: All acts of reflective judgment legislate for formal unity in Nature according to the expedience of representations for the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. **Expedience** (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) is a property of a representation regarded as possible only with respect to some purpose from the practical Standpoint. The expedience of something is its congruence with that property of things which is possible only in accordance with purposes. Expedience in the narrow sense of being regarded in terms of instantiation by an act of the Organized Being is called *purposiveness*. A **purpose** is the object of a concept so far as the concept has been taken as the real ground of the possibility of the object (i.e., is regarded as a cause by which the *Dasein* of the object is made possible). The concept in this context may be either a **theoretical concept** (a concept of understanding in determining judgment) or a **practical concept** (an obscure representation of a practical rule or tenet for the production of actions; a practical concept belongs to the manifold of rules in practical judgment). A theoretical concept is a speculative rule, a practical concept is a rule for the synthesis of appetites. From the practical Standpoint, an **appetite** is the self-determination of the power of an Organized Being through the representation of something in the future as an effect of this self-determination.

We can see from this that expedience has a two-sided character. On the one side, it requires a judgment of congruence and, by this, links to the *Verstandes-Actus* of reflexion in sensibility. On the other side, it requires a connection with practical purpose and, therefore, with the appetitive power of the Organized Being. The first link is provided by that character of judgment we call aesthetical reflective judgment, the second by that character of judgment we call teleological reflective judgment. The former pertains to the composition of desires, the latter to the *nexus* of desiration. Kant tells us,

What the category is to each particular experience, that is what the expedience or fitness of nature is to our capacity of the power of judgment, according to which it is represented not merely as mechanical but also as technical. [KANT (20: 204fn)]

The laws that arise in practical Reason are entirely practical; the concepts that arise in determining judgment are entirely theoretical. The former are obscure representations (that is, they never appear immediately in consciousness) and therefore do not serve as laws of Nature. The latter are formulated by the categories, but the categories can formulate only particular rules

of appearances (local laws) and not general laws representing Nature *as a system*. Yet no scientist doubts that "nature" is systematic in the sense of possessing or obeying fundamental laws that tie it all together. Indeed, in every human culture we know anything about we find some set of paradigms – whether based on science, magic, religion, or some combination of these – that, however imperfectly and however tightly or loosely knit, attempts to tie all the contingent appearances of Nature together as a system. Human understanding of Nature is driven by the powerful underlying presupposition that, somehow or other, "it all makes sense." World views did not come into being with the invention of science; science came into being from the presupposition of a world view that there is and must be order amidst the chaos of natural experience. There is only one place we can look to find for a foundation for this *psychological* phenomenon, and that place is within ourselves. Kant wrote,

Thus it is a subjectively necessary transcendental *presupposition* that the former disturbingly unbounded diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms are not due to Nature; rather, she herself qualifies for an experience as an empirical system through the affinity of particular laws under more general ones.

This presupposition is now the transcendental principle of the power of judgment. For this is not merely a capacity to subsume the particular under the general (whose concept is given) but likewise vice versa, to find the general for the particular. [KANT (20: 209-210)]

When we survey all the capacities of human mind, we find that these can all be traced back to three general capacities: the capacity for knowledge through cognition ("faculty of knowledge" or *Erkenntnißvermögen*); the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*; and the appetitive power of practical Reason. All conscious representations pertain to one or more of these basic capacities and there is a great difference among various representations that depends on the manner of their relationships to these capacities. We can say of some specific representation that it "belongs" to the capacity that produces it, but this same representation may nonetheless *appertain* to the other capacities in some way or another and either immediately or mediately. Kant breaks this down in the following manner [KANT (20: 206)]:

1. Representation appertains to knowledge insofar as it is relative to Objects and the unity of consciousness the objects serve;
2. Representation appertains to appetitive power insofar as it has an objective reference by which it is regarded, at the same time, as the cause of the actuality of this Object; and,
3. Representations are referenced to the Organized Being so far as they are regarded in relationship to the feeling of *Lust*, where they are grounds merely to keep or maintain their object's *Existenz* or, in the case of *Unlust*, they are grounds for the prevention or abolition of their object's *Existenz*.

In the third case, we must add that the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* is not knowledge nor does it provide knowledge, but it can presuppose a ground of determination in cognition.

Now, to have a *system* of knowledge, and to have this system understand Nature in general, requires that the objective and subjective perceptions in sensibility be linked with the obscure representations of practical Reason (appetites and practical concepts). Reason knows no objects and feels no feelings; sensibility makes no judgments; the categories of understanding provide none but local laws objectively valid only for sensible experiences. Immediate experience presents us with no pre-given and necessary order-in-the-world in appearances. That human judgment nonetheless posits such an order in Nature presupposes what Kant called the suitability (*Angemessenheit*) of the power of judgment for being able to find order in nature. We cannot say the *world*, regarded as it is in itself, possesses any such order, but our power of judgment in understanding Nature carries on *just as if it does*. The order-in-Nature that science holds dear and never questions must be regarded not as a property the world possesses (because that idea is transcendent) but, rather, as a property of Nature *made* in human understanding by means of the process of reflective judgment.

To have a system of Nature we require a capacity for systematic judgmentation, and this in its turn requires an *a priori* principle regulating the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*. This principle is none other than the principle of formal expedience, and the capacity for unifying determinant concepts and practical concepts is the capacity for reflective judgment.

§ 2. The Reflective Perspectives of Reflective Judgment

At first encounter it likely seems quite strange that *objective* order-in-Nature should be adjudicated by the *subjective* process of reflective judgment, a capacity that knows no objects and deals only in affectivity for its joining together the logical divisions of *nous* and *psyche* in the Organized Being. And yet we find that when our greatest scientists describe how they work their practices of science, the subjective factor appears again and again. Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman, in describing how one "guesses" the laws of nature, said,

One of the most important things in this 'guess – compute consequences – compare with experiment' business is to know when you are right way ahead of checking all the consequences. You can recognize truth by its beauty and simplicity. It is always easy, when you have made a guess and done two or three little calculations to make sure that it is not obviously wrong, to know that it is right. When you get it right it is obvious it is right – at least if you have any experience – because usually what happens is that more comes out than goes in. [FEYN2: 171]

The renowned mathematician Henri Poincaré expressed something quite similar to this:

Mathematicians attach a great deal of importance to the elegance of their methods and of their results, and this is not mere diletantism. What is it that gives us the feeling of elegance in a solution or a demonstration? It is the harmony of the different parts, their symmetry, and their happy adjustment; it is, in a word, all that introduces order, all that gives them unity, that enables us to obtain a clear comprehension of the whole as well as

of the parts. . . Elegance may result from the feeling of surprise caused by the unlooked-for occurrence together of objects not habitually associated. In this, again, it is fruitful since it thus discloses relations till then unrecognized. . . Briefly stated, the sentiment of the mathematical elegance is nothing but the satisfaction due to some conformity between the solution we wish to discover and the necessities of our mind, and it is on account of this very conformity that the solution can be an instrument for us. This aesthetic satisfaction is consequently connected with the economy of thought. [POIN: 30-31]

Reflective judgment bridges sensibility and the motoregulatory expression of *psyche* (and thus the passivity of effect in *nous* with the spontaneity of actions in *soma*), and it bridges the aesthetic of sensibility and the coldly rational process of Reason (and thus the empirical in knowledge with the rational in the spontaneity of thinking). Santayana wrote,

Man's rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious. What is absent then works in the present, and values are imputed where they cannot be felt. Such representation is so far from being merely speculative that its presence alone can raise bodily change to the dignity of action. Reflection gathers experiences together and perceives their relative worth; which is as much as to say that it expresses a new attitude of will in the presence of a world better understood and turned to some purpose. [SANT2: 2-3]

A great many people, and probably scientists even more than lay people, find the proposition that "nature" must necessarily conform to that which is subjective in human understanding to be unacceptable (which, I will point out, is a reaction that is a *subjective* reaction). Sir James Jeans, who was acknowledged to be one of the foremost physicists of his day, wrote,

If *a priori* knowledge does not come from our knowledge of the world, how can it tell us anything about the world? The answer is that it cannot; it can only tell us about the structure of our own minds.

All this throws a vivid light on the different methods of science and philosophy. Kant proposed in effect that we should base our knowledge of things on something that 'we ourselves put into them'; the scientist is anxious to eradicate just this something, knowing it is not knowledge of the outer world at all. [JEAN: 54-55]

Jeans' subjective belief in the copy-of-reality hypothesis is betrayed in his phrase, "that we should base our knowledge of things on . . ." Note carefully that he objects to *basing* our *knowledge* of *things* on something other than the "things" themselves – which precisely expresses that which is most characteristic of an ontology-centered prejudice, namely that "things" are primary and "knowledge" is secondary. He greatly erred, however, in his statement that this "is not knowledge of the outer world at all." Quite the opposite is true: It is *all* the knowledge of the outer world possible for a human being to possess. Knowledge itself is something belonging only to human understanding and judgmentation, and it does not come via some mythical knowledge-wavicle floating about and irradiating us from "the outer world." Jeans' ontological prejudice led him to make a rather pessimistic confession:

In brief, we can never have certain knowledge as to the nature of reality.

We know now that there is no danger of even one perfect model appearing . . . A detailed investigation of the sources of our knowledge has shown that there is only one type of model or picture which could be intelligible to our restricted minds, namely one in mechanical terms. Yet a review of recent physics has shown that all attempts at mechanical models or pictures have failed and must fail. . . Thus an understanding of the ultimate processes of nature is forever beyond our reach; we shall never be able – even in imagination – to open the case of our watch and see how the wheels go round. The true object of scientific study can never be the realities of nature, but only our own observations on nature. [JEAN: 175-176]

Jeans' copy-of-reality mechanism is, he thinks, a distorting lens peppered with opaque patches and, rather ironically, he ends up in the place Kant had warned him he would end up in from the beginning: namely that our knowledge of objects is knowledge of their appearances. For physicists of Jeans' generation (and many of those today as well), this is a rather obvious disappointment for which Jeans, and some present day physicists as well, tried to find some comfort by means of a retreat to Platonism. There is for the physicist a certain inevitability of this fox-and-the-grapes impasse, owed in large measure to the fixation of physics' paradigm on the insistence that *everything* be explained in terms of dead matter but owed *fundamentally* to its clinging to a failed ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysic.

If, as Jeans was eventually forced to (correctly!) conclude, human beings have no recourse but to acknowledge all that human understanding *understands* depends on the "nature" of the human mind, the rather obvious corollary is: to better understand "nature" requires us to better understand the Nature of human *thinking*. Now, the judicial Standpoint in Critical metaphysics is the root global synthetic perspective for Self-organized experience. As it is the process of reflective judgment that makes possible the synthesis of Nature as a system, the Standpoint from which we explore reflective judgment is none other than the judicial Standpoint. Within this, we must consider the four judicial reflective perspectives, namely the logical-judicial, transcendental-judicial, hypothetical-judicial, and empirical-judicial reflective perspectives.

We have previously seen (in Chapter 2) that the Standpoints of Critical metaphysics proper are the three synthetic poles by which we understand representation in terms of representation being a presentation of knowledge. They can be regarded as the specific interests of the judgment processes within judgmentation overall. We also recall that knowledge is any conscious representation or capacity for making such a representation by or through which meanings are determined. The four reflective perspectives (logical, transcendental, hypothetical, and empirical) are objective perspectives for evaluating philosophical concepts with regard to metaphysics proper. Each identifies one of the four titles of metaphysics proper as the context of this evaluation. However, the reflective perspective is also conditioned by the Standpoint that is adopted for the evaluation. Figure 8.2.1 summarizes this organization of metaphysics proper.




Figure 8.2.1: Synthetic and analytic views of Standpoints and reflective perspectives. (a) 1LSR of the synthesis of the Standpoint; (b) 2LAR structure of the reflective perspectives.

Regarded in general terms of representation, in the metaphysics of objects of sensible Nature every action taken by an Organized Being is a singular event and the purpose is what is affirmed by the action. Thus the logical-practical and transcendental-practical reflective perspectives occupy the functional roles of identification and agreement, respectively, in the 2LAR of Figure 8.2.1(b). Understanding has a universal role and cognitions place limitations on the object within Nature overall, hence the logical-theoretical and transcendental-theoretical perspectives take up their places as integration and subcontrarity, respectively, in the 2LAR. The logical-judicial and transcendental-judicial perspectives can be viewed as the synthesis of the first two placements. Expedience has the character of the particular (hence is an idea of differentiation), while belief is not *objective knowledge* in the synthesis of knowledge (hence it is subjective and therefore has the character of a negative function, i.e. opposition, in object-knowledge synthesis).

Turning to the metaphysics of objects of Reason, reflective *judgmentation* is the processing of internal Relation insofar as objects of Reason are concerned¹ and is the problematical (hence determinable) term in the synthesis of knowledge. Thus the hypothetical-judicial and empirical-judicial reflective perspectives occupy the slots shown in the figure above. Determining judgmentation is the processing of external Relation and is assertoric in its modal character, hence the hypothetical-theoretical and empirical-theoretical assignments are as shown. Practical judgmentation is the processing of transitive Relation (reasoning) and the determining factor for the construction of reasoning – thus the placement of the hypothetical-practical and empirical-practical reflective perspectives shown above.

¹ This placement does not contradict reflective judgment as the external Relation in the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness because in that context we are concerned with ideas of the power of *apperception*.

The process of reflective judgment is the judgment of affectivity. Affective perceptions *as* perceptions are objects of inner sense and thus come under the metaphysics proper of Rational Psychology. The general Idea of Rational Psychology is the Idea of the complete Subject, i.e., [absolute unity of the Organized Being](#). Rational Psychology in its transcendental-judicial perspective regards the *momenta* of reflective judgment as aesthetic *momenta*, i.e., as functions of representation by which affective perceptions are made.

What, though, is the *practical function* of perceptions? A perception is merely a representation and not the object represented. That the representation is conscious merely means it is presented, and so to ask this question is to ask what role for consciousness is filled by perceptions of sensibility. The answer to this question is rather obvious after a small amount of consideration; their role is the presentation of something of which we say *knowledge is exhibited in the presentation*. Taken in the wide sense, knowledge is any conscious representation or capacity for making such a representation by or through which meanings are determined. A word has come down to us from the ancient Greeks that speaks to this role. The word is *hypotyposis*, a term that in modern times has been given a specialized meaning in rhetoric and scientific writings (where it is defined as a concise outline of a subject-matter). But in its older and wider sense, it means a sketch, outline, model, or pattern. Kant tells us,

All *hypotyposis* (presentation, *subjectio sub adspectum*²) as sensualization is twofold: either *schematic* where the corresponding intuition for a concept that understanding grasped is given *a priori*; or *symbolic* where the corresponding intuition is imputed to an idea that only reason can think, and to which no sensuous intuition can be suitable, with which the procedure of the power of judgment that it observes in schematization is merely analogous, i.e., with it merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself, comes to agreement – consequently, according to merely the form of reflexion, not the content. [KANT (5: 351)]

The practical function of perception is *to make a representation symbolic* through the manner of its presentation in empirical consciousness. This *practical* symbolism is the capacity by which the ability to represent something as a limited something-in-Reality is made possible. This ability, in turn, falls under the transcendental Idea of Rational Theology, i.e. [absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thinking in general](#). Applied to reflective judgment, this falls under the empirical-judicial perspective.

These two reflective perspectives, the transcendental-judicial and the empirical-judicial, speak to the character of reflective judgment that deals directly with sensibility and sensualization. When we regard reflective judgment under these two perspectives, we call this **aesthetical reflective judgment**.

² "placing under observation"

We must also deal with the "other face" of reflective judgment, that is, with the character of reflective judgment "turned toward" the motoregulatory expression of *psyche* and the appetitive power of pure practical Reason. Now, every sensuous perception has a two-fold relationship in regard to objects. The first is the relationship of perception to objects-as-things, the second to objects as *objects-in-Nature*. An affective perception, of course, is a perception that itself never becomes part of the intuition of an object. However, as a conscious representation, an affective perception nonetheless stands in a *mediate* relationship to objects as a determination of what Kant called its transcendental place. A perception's **transcendental place is the point of origin of a representation in sensibility, either as arising from the power of receptivity or from the power of spontaneity**. The former reflects the Organized Being as patient, the latter as agent, in representing. The transcendental place of a representation makes a profound difference in how the Organized Being is affected by the act of representing. If I look out my window and see snow on the ground, I will dress warmly before going outside. If I merely imagine the snow I expect will cover the ground in a few more weeks, I might go buy a snow shovel.

Acts of reflective judgment are not the representations themselves but, rather, the acts of synthesizing representations. Contained in these acts must be *the determination of* transcendental place for the representations, and this act of determining transcendental place is called the judgment of transcendental topic. The theoretical Standpoint explains the idea of transcendental topic from the perspective of its characterization of representations, and this is nothing other than the 2LAR structure of the general ideas of representation (i.e., identification, differentiation, etc.). However, the root *Realerklärung* of transcendental topic lies with the judicial Standpoint, where **transcendental topic is the structure of the dynamics of determining transcendental place in the aesthetical perfection of sensibility**. Kant tells us,

The transcendental topic . . . contains nothing more than the cited four titles of all comparison [*Vergleichung*] and distinction, which are distinguished from the categories [of understanding] for the reason that what is exhibited through them is not the object according to what makes up its constitution (magnitude, reality), but rather only the comparison of representations in all their manifoldness, which precedes the concept of things. This comparison, however, first requires a reflexion, i.e., a determination of the place where the representations of things that are compared belong, thus of whether they are thought by pure understanding or given by sensibility. [KANT1: B325]

Because the functions (*momenta*) of reflective judgment from this perspective are concerned with formal unity of synthesis in sensibility and orientation of expression (motoregulatory in *psyche* and ratio-expression in Reason), we here consider reflective judgment from the logical-empirical reflective perspective and will distinguish the 2LAR of transcendental topic from the general 2LAR of the structure of representations we presented in chapter 2.

We have previously seen (chapter 7) that empirical meanings are bound up with the actions

taken by the Organized Being and that the unity of these actions comprises what Piaget often called a logic of meanings. The possibility of this is grounded in the proactive character of reflective judgment exhibited by the structuring of actions. Such actions speak to the *objective expedience* reflected in judgments because all actions undertaken by the Organized Being must answer to the uncompromising master regulation of the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. The process of reflective judgment is called upon and tasked with the job of producing a formal order-in-Nature and thereby comes under the regulation of the general Idea of Rational Cosmology: *absolute completion in the series of conditions*. This is, of course, the hypothetical-judicial perspective of the process of reflective judgment. When we view reflective judgment under the logical-judicial and hypothetical-judicial reflective perspectives, its relationships to aesthetical perfection (through transcendental topic) and order-in-Nature (through judgments of formal expedience) give us the process of judgment we call **teleological reflective judgment**.

§ 3. Aesthetical Reflective Judgment

Figure 8.3.1 illustrates the 2LAR structure of the process of aesthetical reflective judgment. The deduction of this 2LAR was carried out in Chapter 14 of *CPPM* and here we again confine the treatment of it to an explanation of its *momenta*. As the part of reflective judgment overall that faces sensibility, acts of aesthetical judgment are closely tied to the *Verstandes-Actus* of the synthesis of apprehension and are judgments of the produce of that synthetic process. It is through the act of aesthetical judgment that the representation of desire, the judicial subject of the feeling of *Lust per se*, is synthesized. Aesthetical judgment obeys the principle of formal expedience, the governing acroam of reflective judgment; expedience in its case is called *aesthetical expedience*.




Figure 8.3.1: 2LAR structure of aesthetical reflective judgment.




Figure 8.3.2: The synthesis in sensibility.

For our discussion of aesthetical reflective judgment, it is useful to recall our diagram of the synthesis in sensibility, which for convenience is repeated here as Figure 8.3.2. Affective perception is separated from the objective perception of intuition during the synthesis of the *Verstandes-Actus*, and it is this separation that is adjudicated by aesthetical reflective judgment according to aesthetical formal expedience. Expedience in representation is marked by aesthetical reflective judgment as a feeling of *Lust per se*, and this aesthetical judgment always signifies a purpose, whether that purpose is derived from experience or is a pure purpose of practical Reason. Kant wrote,

[The] subjective in a representation *which cannot become part of the cognition at all* is the *Lust* or *Unlust* combined with it; for through this I know nothing about the object of the representation, although it can well be the effect of some cognition. Now the expedience of a thing, so far as it is represented in a perception, is not also characteristic of the Object itself (for such a thing cannot be perceived), although it can be deduced from a cognition of things. Thus the expedience that precedes the cognition of an Object – which moreover is immediately combined with it without wanting to use the representation of it for a cognition – is the subjective that cannot become part of cognition at all. The object is therefore called expedient in this case only because its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of *Lust*; and this representation is an aesthetic representation of expedience. [KANT (5: 189)]

Quantity and Quality in aesthetical judgment are tied to *Comparison* and reflexion, the two acts of comparison in general in the synthesis of sensibility, respectively. *Comparison* is logical, hence formal, comparison and so is aligned with the form of the matter of aesthetical judgment. We call this form the **sense of satisfaction** because

The subjective representation of the collective power of life to receive or to exclude objects is the relationship of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Thus the feeling is not the relationship of the object to the representation but rather to the collective power of mind, either to most intimately receive or to exclude the same. [KANT (28: 247)]

Lust that springs from the play of the power of imagination without a determined concept to combine immediately with it is satisfaction. [KANT (28: 676)]

This idea of satisfaction-dissatisfaction is an idea of a *criterion* for comparison and, as such, is a function that pertains to identification, differentiation, and integration. The aesthetical judgment here has the character of an act of association.

The act of reflexion, on the other hand, is an act of determination for the function of compatibility in representations. Here we recall that any act of composition in combination is the synthesis of a manifold of homogeneous matters – or, more accurately, representations *made to be homogeneous* – in which the matters in the synthesis do not necessarily belong to one another. Quality is an act of coalition in this synthesis and we can regard the function of compatibility as a function making matters homogeneous for the manifold in composition. Determination of the transcendental place of representational *materia* in this case is a factor in the synthesis of this coalescence because from their transcendental place of origin these *materia* may stand in agreement, in opposition, or be synthesized as subcontrary matters in functional coalescence. We call the representational matter of affective perception a *feeling* in the narrow sense, and this is why the *momenta* of Quality in aesthetical judgments are called **feelings of** – . However, the act of judgment is nothing else than the making of a *transcendental* affirmation, a *transcendental* denial (negation), or a *transcendental* not-affirmation (a negation regarded as an affirmation of an undetermined "something else"). Judgments of Quantity and Quality jointly compose the feeling of desire (when referenced to *Lust*) or un-desire (when referenced to *Unlust*).

Relation in aesthetical judgment aligns with the *Verstandes-Actus* of abstraction. For *intuition*, abstraction is a segregating act, an act of exclusion from the manifold in an intuition. However, because what is removed from intuition yet made conscious is still a perception (an affective perception), here what is a negative act insofar as concerns cognition is still a positive *function* of judgment, and this function is called **transcendental anticipation: the form of knowledge *a priori* necessary in order for the Organized Being to determine *a priori* what belongs to empirical consciousness**. The act of aesthetical judgment in regard to Relation is an anticipation of value (value being the form – *nexus* – of desires). Now, because an intuition is a representation of the *Existenz* of an object but desire is non-objective affectivity, the form of *nexus* adjudicated in an aesthetical judgment can be nothing else but a connection of matters of desire. However,

The satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the *Existenz* of an object is called interest. [KANT (5: 204)]

It is for this reason that each *momentum* of aesthetical Relation is called a **sense of interest**. Interest is the representational form of a value.

Modality in judgment is always a judgment of the judgment. Its reference is not made to apprehension but rather to apperception (and this is why aesthetical Modality is not aligned with any of the *Verstandes-Actus* in apprehension). For aesthetical reflective judgment, this reference can be neither objective nor theoretical and must, instead, be a reference to the practical consequences of the act of judgment, i.e., what the judgment *means* to the Organized Being. Furthermore, the ruling acroam of reflective judgment is the principle of the formal expedience of Nature, and for aesthetical judgment our *context* is one of expedience in the Nature of the Organized Being itself insofar as consciousness of desire is concerned.

The process of reflective judgment judges the expedience of the representations of an Organized Being for a purpose of Reason. Reason, however, knows neither objective nor affective perception and so the subjective expedience in a reflective judgment cannot be regarded as something directly connected to the formula of the categorical imperative (the one pure purpose of practical Reason). It can instead be found only in something that can serve as a conditioning factor for the determination of a practical appetite and as a possible ground for the determination of the actions of the Organized Being. We have a word for such an idea and that word is *happiness*. This is, however, an idea of notorious difficulties in philosophy and for it we require a Critical *Realerklärung*. This explanation, by the nature of the *function* happiness must serve, is two-sided. This is to say it must on the one hand be viewed from the practical Standpoint for its relationship to pure Reason and, on the other hand, be viewed from the judicial Standpoint in its relationship to reflective judgment. Critically, **happiness** is: (1) from the practical Standpoint, the expedience of the disposition of the Organized Being to act on the basis of the matter of desire; and (2) from the judicial Standpoint, the consciousness of the Organized Being of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying its whole *Dasein*. Kant remarked,

The idea of happiness is not one such as man has abstracted by chance from his instincts and so derived from the animality in himself; on the contrary, it is a mere Idea of a state to which he would make the latter [his animality] adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible³). He sorts this out himself and indeed in different ways through his complicated understanding by imagination and the senses; yes, and what is more he amends these so often that this nature, even if it were to be totally subjugated to his choice, nevertheless could by no means undertake to determine a general and firm law with this unstable concept, and so harmonize with the purpose that each arbitrarily intends for himself. But even if we either reduce this to the genuine urge of nature in

³ Kant means that a complete, final, and enduring achievement (actual perfection) of this state is impossible to achieve in practice owing to the contingency of empirical experiences. However, the fact that a final and enduring state of happiness may be unachievable in practice does not prevent the Organized Being from *acting in the direction* of attempting to realize its perfection. The Ideal of happiness is a standard gauge.

which our species generally agrees, or, on the other hand, raise our skill so high as to provide for such an imagined purpose, yet even so what man understands by happiness, and what is in fact his own proper natural purpose (not purpose of freedom), would never be attained by him; for his nature is not of the type to stop anywhere in possession and enjoyment and to be gratified. [KANT (5: 430)]

Yet, despite the slippery and unstable character of our objective concepts of what will make us happy, that human beings do in fact strive to be happy is a clear empirical fact. For this empirical psychological character of the Nature of the Organized Being we must have a transcendental principle that grounds its possibility. This is called the **principle of happiness**: *An Organized Being's disposition to act on the basis of the matter of desire (i.e., to make an appetite from this matter) is a pure purpose of practical Reason*. This is a principle by which acts of reflective judgment link judgments of expedience to the determination of appetite by practical Reason. It is for this reason that the *momenta* of Modality in aesthetical judgment are called **feelings of expedience for happiness**.

§ 3.1 The *Momenta* of Quantity in Aesthetical Judgment

The *momenta* of aesthetical Quantity are functions of the sense of satisfaction-dissatisfaction as viewed jointly by the transcendental-judicial Idea of Quantity in Rational Psychology and the empirical-judicial Idea of Quantity in Rational Theology. The psychological Idea is: *unconditioned functional unity of affective and objective perception in sensibility*. The theological Idea is: *synthesis of all possible aesthetic predicates of expedience for happiness*. Sense is the capacity to present sensations. As for the idea of satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Kant tells us,

For *Lust* and *Unlust*, satisfaction and dissatisfaction is either objective or subjective. When the ground of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the object agrees with the determined subject, then this is subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This springs from the senses . . . Thus what pleases or displeases according to private grounds of the senses of the subject is subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The satisfaction from private grounds of the senses of the subject is *pleasure*, and the object is pleasant. Dissatisfaction from private grounds of the senses of the subject is *displeasure* or *pain*, and the object is unpleasant . . . *Objective* satisfaction or dissatisfaction subsists in *Lust* or *Unlust* in the object, not in the relationship to particular conditions of the subject but to the universal judgment that has a general validity irrespective of the particular conditions of the subject and holds good for everyone. Therefore, whatever is a universal ground of generally valid satisfaction or dissatisfaction, that is one of *objective* satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This objective satisfaction or dissatisfaction is *two-fold*: something pleases or displeases either according to general sensibility or according to the general power of knowledge. [KANT (28: 248)]

In this quote Kant is describing factors that speak to the Quality of the feeling of *Lust per se*, i.e., what pleases (agreement) or displeases (opposition and subcontrarity). We will be looking at this in the following section. For the *momenta* of Quantity, however, we are concerned with those

characteristics of the sense of satisfaction-dissatisfaction he describes as subjective or objective. This is because such characteristics speak to sense as being *subjectively* singular, *subjectively* particular, or *subjectively* universal. These are *aesthetical* predications and as such come under the empirical-judicial Idea. Kant described the context of aesthetical predication in the following way:

With the perception of an object the concept of an Object in general can be immediately combined, for which the former contains the empirical predicates for a judgment of cognition, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced . . . However, a perception can also be immediately combined with a feeling of *Lust* (or *Unlust*) and a satisfaction which accompanies the representation of the Object and serves it instead of a predicate, and thus an aesthetic judgment, which is not a judgment of cognition, can arise. [KANT (5: 287-288)]

At issue in this idea is regarding a mere affective perception – which in its essence can refer to nothing else than the effect of sensibility on the Organized Being itself – as being in any way "universal" (or even "singular"). Put another way, what do the terms *subjectively* singular, particular, and universal mean? Here we recognize that Quantity in an aesthetical reflective judgment is an act of association. The *feeling* is associated *with a form of expedience*, and it is solely in regard to the latter that the logical terms singular, particular, and universal have a context for aesthetical judgment. The **subjectively singular is expedient (or inexpedient) for equilibrium in the free play of imagination and understanding without involving harmony with the power of reasoning**. The **subjectively particular is expedient (or inexpedient) for the private dispositions of the Organized Being**. The **subjectively universal is expedient (or inexpedient) for a state of harmony (or disharmony) among all three powers of objective representation (imagination, understanding, and reasoning)**. The sense of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) associated with these specific capacities of knowledge is associated, respectively, with private satisfaction in the mere feeling itself, particular satisfaction through association with an object of desire, or general satisfaction in the overall state of *Existenz* of the Organized Being.

This empirical-judicial explanation is by itself not sufficient to complete our *Realerklärung* of the *momenta* of Quantity. To this we must also add the transcendental-judicial explanation of how unity in sensibility is brought about. An aesthetical judgment of Quantity marks a "sense of x" we can describe overall as a *sense of knowing* (because perceptions are presented to the general faculty of knowledge of the Organized Being) that arises in the synthesis of apprehension. Here we must recall that the homogeneity between intuition and concept is owed to the determination of a transcendental schema (Chapter 5 §3), and so we find the judicial ground for unity in sensibility subsists in the manner in which sensibility is *bound in inner sense* by determination of transcendental schemata. Figure 8.3.3 reviews the transcendental schemata in 2LAR form.




Figure 8.3.3: 2LAR structure of the transcendental schemata of time-determination.

The subjectively singular, as an idea falling under the general idea of identification, marks the expedience of a representation in sensibility only on the ground of a harmony in the free play of imagination and understanding. It marks the attainment of a state of apprehended representation but this is grounded merely in a sense of order and completion for the manifold of representations of the *materia in qua* in intuition. The transcendental schema here is [the schema of aggregation](#) and we may call the sense adjudicated in aesthetical reflective judgment a **sense of culmination**.

The subjectively particular, which falls under the general idea of differentiation, is the *momentum* for judging [the schema of change](#). In the transcendental aesthetic of time we noted that an intuition marked at a moment in time must be regarded as "growing out of" its direct cover, i.e. the prior moment in time. The unity of affective and objective perception here is the unity of continuity in time and so the subjectively particular is the **sense of continuity**.

Finally, an intuition based on the harmony of imagination, understanding, and reasoning is a cognition that contains within it a representation drawn from more than one object. This is because its *materia in qua* is made up in part of concepts re-produced in sensibility through the synthesis of reproductive imagination and every concept is a mediate representation of an object. Hence, the aesthetical judgment in this case gives us the [schema of integration](#). The expedience of the representation in this case is bound to the harmony of all three cognitive powers (reasoning, imagination, and understanding) and this harmony is a *subjectively sufficient material ground* for holding-to-be-true that which is contained in the intuition. Thus, the *momentum* of the subjectively universal is a **sense of belief or unbelief** (depending on whether the feeling is one of *Lust* or *Unlust*). We will often shorten the name of this function to merely "the sense of belief" with the tacit provision that this refers to *Lust*; when the case is one of the feeling of *Unlust* the sense is the sense of unbelief.

To summarize, the *momenta* of Quantity in aesthetical reflective judgment are as follows:

the **sense of culmination** is subjectively singular and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of aggregation;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, judgment of a private satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) based merely on sensation in sensibility;

the **sense of continuity** is subjectively particular and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of change;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the presentation of a particular satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) combined with an object of desire;

the **sense of belief/unbelief** is subjectively universal and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of integration;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the presentation of a general satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) in the Organized Being's state of *Existenz*.

§ 3.2 The *Momenta* of Quality in Aesthetical Judgment

The *momenta* of aesthetical Quality are functions of the feeling of transcendental affirmation and denial as viewed jointly by the transcendental-judicial Idea of Quality in Rational Psychology and the empirical-judicial Idea of Quality in Rational Theology. The psychological Idea is: **unconditioned unity in compatibility** (that is, the division between objective and affective perception is a merely logical division; affective and objective perception in combination make up the complete state of conscious representation). The theological Idea is: **happiness is the original Quality in the affective state of being from which all desires are derivative as limitations**. Quality in aesthetical judgment is tied to the *Verstandes-Actus* of reflexion and the *momenta* are compatibility functions in judgment.

The *momenta* of aesthetical Quality come under our general ideas of agreement, opposition (*Widerstreit*) and subcontrarity, but we must establish the proper context for these ideas as we specialize them to Quality in aesthetical reflective judgment. Because the *momenta* are the functions of the feeling of desire, at first glance it seems quite natural to presume the transcendental affirmations or denials involved here are simply affirmations or denials of desirability that would be described by phrases such as "this feels good" or "I don't like this" or other such similar expressions. But note that such interpretations have a flavor of the transcendent in them. This is to say it puts the context of the explanation under a subtle presupposition that the effect of the transcendental object on the state of the Organized Being is somehow vested in a real and *objective* relationship between the two. It would be like saying "wine tastes good *essentially*,"

and this is nothing else than the prejudicial invocation of a copy-of-reality hypothesis, this time applied to affectivity. But the copy-of-reality hypothesis is false, a transcendent creation of an ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysic, and interpretations such as those phrased above are divorced from the fundamental acroam of reflective judgment, namely the principle of formal expedience. We cannot offer a *Realerklärung* of the *momenta* of aesthetical Quality in reflective judgment in terms such as those described above.

Transcendental affirmation in the context of our empirical-judicial perspective is affirmation of the aesthetical expedience of sensation for happiness (in the feeling of *Lust*) or for ill-being (in the feeling of *Unlust*). This is the proper interpretation in the context of *compatibility in reflexion*. Again, what is determined by the judgment is a transcendental schema – in this case, the [schema of sensation persistent in time](#) (because this is the schema of matter-of-sensation in inner sense). This function of judgment coalesces the presentation of a sensuous affective perception joined with the intuition of an appearance. Here the matter of the affective perception is judged, in the transcendental-judicial perspective, as an activation function in the determination of the subjective state as the sensuous element of a determinable factor of a possible practical appetite. This is a subjectively affirmative feeling of material sensuous *Lust per se*, and therefore the name we give this *momentum* is the **feeling of pleasure/displeasure** (the former for the feeling of *Lust*, the latter for the feeling of *Unlust*). The function of a judgment of pleasure (or displeasure) is to excite *desire* as a *material* sensuous *Lust* (or *Unlust*).

The contrary of this (general idea of opposition) is an act of judgment not based on the *materia* of sensation but rather on a determination of the transcendental [schema of kinematical form in time](#) when viewed from the transcendental-judicial perspective. This schema, we recall, deals with the non-sensuous in the moment-to-moment makeup of perceptions filling time. From the transcendental-judicial perspective, one has to call this a subjectively negative judgment since the expedience in this case is not found in the matter of the affective perception but, rather, in a character of the *action* in the synthesis of apprehension itself. Here we recall that [action is change in appearance of accidents](#), thus the character of the function we seek to explain is bound to *lack of compatibility* for reflexion in the making of an intuition, and so the transcendental denial determined by aesthetical reflective judgment, from the empirical-judicial perspective, is a denial of the adequacy of the representation in sensibility for the judgment of expedience for happiness in intuition.

An aesthetical judgment is still made in this case, but this judgment denotes a lack, an inadequacy. Such a judgment is itself a ground for exciting desire, but this time the desire is the energetic for an appetite that marshals the whole of the capacities of the Organized Being to a

greater effort for the equilibration of apprehension made on behalf of *directly* serving the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Viewed from the transcendental-judicial perspective, this is the feeling of a material *intellectual Lust* (or *Unlust*) – material because it is bound to a lack of expedience in intuition and intellectual because it is an energetic for further efforts in judgmentation generally – and therefore we call this *momentum* the **feeling of sublimity**.

The feeling of sublimity is a presentation that brings on consciousness of a *disturbance* in the synthesis of apprehension without any presentation of how this disturbance might be remedied. The ground for a judgment of sublimity is simply the failure of the cycle in the free play of judgmentation to achieve cycle closure in a state of equilibrium. The resulting *Lust per se* is an intolerable situation for practical Reason and thus a spur to action. Kant explained this idea of sublimity in *Critique of Judgment* in the following way:

We call *sublime* that which is *absolutely great*. However, to be great and to be a magnitude are quite different ideas (*magnitudo* and *quantitas*). Likewise, *simply* (*simpliciter*) to say that something is great is also entirely different from saying that it is *absolutely great* (*absolute, non comparative magnum*). The latter is that *which is great beyond all comparison*. – So what does the expression that something is great or small or medium-sized say? It is not a pure notion of understanding that is thereby designated, still less a sensible intuition, and just as little an idea of reason, since it does not bring with it any principle of cognition at all. It must therefore be an idea of the power of judgment, or derive from such an idea, and be grounded in a subjective expedience of the representation in regard to the power of judgment. [KANT (5: 248)]

To take up a quantum intuitively in imagination, in order to be able to use it as a measure or a unit for the estimation of magnitude by means of numbers, involves two acts of this ability: *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) and *concentration* (*comprehensio aesthetica*). Apprehension involves no problem, for it may progress to infinity. But concentration becomes more and more difficult the farther apprehension advances, and it soon reaches its maximum, namely the aesthetically largest basic measure for the evaluation of magnitude. For when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of sensible intuition that were first apprehended are already being extinguished in imagination as it advances to apprehension of further ones, then it loses as much on the one side as it gains on the other, and so there is a maximum in concentration that it cannot exceed. [KANT (5: 251-252)]

Thus it must be the *aesthetic* estimation of magnitude in which is felt the effort at concentration which exceeds the capacity of imagination to comprehend the progressive apprehension in one whole of intuition, and in which is at the same time perceived the inadequacy of this capacity, which is unbounded in its progression, for grasping a basic measure that is suitable for the estimation of magnitude with the least effort of understanding and for using it for the estimation of magnitude . . . [That] magnitude of a natural Object on which imagination fruitlessly expends its entire capacity for concentration must lead the idea of nature to a supersensible substratum (which grounds both it and at the same time our capacity to think), which is great beyond any standards of sense and hence allows not so much the object as rather the disposition of the mind in estimating it to be judged *sublime*.

Thus, just as the aesthetic power of judgment in judgmentation of the beautiful relates imagination in its free play to *understanding*, in order to agree with its *concepts* in

general (without determination of them), so relates the same capacity to *reason* in judgmentation of a thing to be sublime, in order to correspond subjectively with its *Ideas* (which are undetermined), i.e., in order to produce a disposition of the mind which is in conformity with them and compatible with that which the influence of determinate (practical) Ideas on feeling would produce. [KANT (5: 255-256)]

The feeling of sublimity is a judgment of incapacity, of failure to succeed in fulfilling a purpose (ultimately, a purpose of practical Reason). In its milder degrees its experiential manifestations are described by such terms as frustration, disturbance, irritation, or depression. Behavioral manifestations include ignórance (ignoring "disturbing things or factors") and "giving up" (a rupture of a practical cycle of actions). When the feeling of sublimity is tied to *Lust* it is an energetic for judgmentation and action in attempting to remove or extinguish the disturbance; when tied to *Unlust* it can produce listlessness (e.g., sadness) or avoidance, both of which follow from cycle ruptures in the abandonment of one scheme of action and its replacement by another. Its experiential manifestations include terror, aggression, flight, and surrender. All of these labels depend, among other factors, on the intensive magnitude of the feeling.

Our last *momentum* of Quality falls under the general idea of subcontrarity. As such, we can view it as the synthesis of the first two. The feeling of pleasure is an energetic for realizing or maintaining a specific state of being, while the feeling of sublimity is an energetic for preventing or abolishing a specific state of being. These are energetics in a relative relationship of opposition (*Realentgegensetzung*). Their synthesis in balance is a real negation and thus the third momentum of Quality is a *termination* function, i.e. a desire to dwell or linger without undertaking new actions. This differs from the listlessness produced by the sublime feeling of *Unlust* because in that case the *desire for change* is presented (without the presentation of any means for realizing this desire), but in the former case the desire for change is absent altogether. *Contentment* is an experiential manifestation of this third *momentum*, which Kant named the **feeling of beauty**.

The feeling of pleasure is a determination of the transcendental schema of sensation persistent in time, the feeling of sublimity that of the transcendental schema of kinematical form in time. The synthesis of these two is the transcendental schema of [coalition of sensation in a kinematical form](#). Such a schematization, in affective terms, makes a presentation of a real satisfaction (in the case of *Lust*) or a real dissatisfaction (in the case of *Unlust*; here rather than "beauty" one might call the feeling "ugly"). The subcontrary character of this judgment is easily seen when one recalls that Critical satisfaction (*Wohlgefallen*) is described as a feeling that "this is not-bad" while dissatisfaction (*Mißfallen*) is described as a feeling that "this is not-good." This is our empirical-judicial explanation of the feeling of beauty.

From the transcendental-judicial perspective, the feeling of beauty presents the closure in equilibrium of the cycle of free play in imagination and understanding. It is thus the presentation

of a *feeling of equilibrium* in judgmentation and marks a state of expedience for pure Reason in both its practical *and* its speculative character. Kant wrote,

We linger over the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (yet not identical with) that lingering when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly awakens attention, in which the mind is passive. [KANT (5: 222)]

He contrasted this with "the sublime" and "the pleasant" in the following ways.

But there are also notable differences between [the beautiful and the sublime] striking the eye. The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which subsists in limitation; instead the sublime is found in a formless object so far as *limitlessness* is represented in it or through its occasion, and yet totality of the same [i.e. the object] is additionally thought. [KANT (5: 244)]

Pleasure (the cause of which may still lie in Ideas) always seems to subsist in a feeling of the promotion of the collective life of a human being, hence likewise of corporeal well-being [KANT (5: 330-331)].

The beautiful, the sublime, and the pleasant are the objects represented in the intuition that accompany the judgments of beauty, sublimity, and pleasure at the moment in time marking the intuition. The objects are not the feelings nor are beauty, sublimity or pleasure characteristics of the object (although the Organized Being tends to *invest* these objects with these qualities). Some readers may think it strange or even objectionable that the *momenta* of Quality in aesthetical reflective judgment bear these names of beauty and sublimity. However, these names accord well with what many philosophers conclude in various theories of aesthetics (in the typical, not the Kantian, significance of the word "aesthetics"; indeed, were someone to wish to make a *science* of aesthetics in art, Kant's theory provides a metaphysical ground upon which such a science could be raised). For example, in his aesthetics theory Santayana writes,

Now it is the essential privilege of beauty to so synthesize and bring to a focus the various impulses of the self, so to suspend them to a single image, that a great peace falls upon that perturbed kingdom. In the experience of these momentary harmonies we have the basis of the enjoyment of beauty, and of all its mystical meanings. But there are always two methods of securing harmony: one is to unify all the given elements, and another is to reject and expunge all the elements that refuse to be unified. Unity by inclusion gives us the beautiful; unity by exclusion, opposition, and isolation gives us the sublime. Both are pleasures: but the pleasure of the one is warm, passive, and pervasive; that of the other cold, imperious, and keen. The one identifies us with the world, the other raises us above it. [SANT3: 144]

What we objectify in beauty is a sensation. What we objectify in the sublime is an act. This act is necessarily pleasant, for if it were not the sublime would be a bad quality and one we would rather never encounter in the world. The glorious joy of self-assertion in the face of an uncontrollable world is indeed so deep and entire, that it furnishes just that transcendent element of worth for which we were looking when we tried to understand how the expression of pain could sometimes please. It can please, not in itself, but because it is balanced and annulled by positive pleasures, especially by this final and victorious one of detachment. [SANT3: 147]

Other than for the improper use of the word "pleasure" and its connotations in place of *Lust* and its connotations, what Santayana has written might have just as well been written by Kant.

To summarize, the *momenta* of Quality in aesthetical reflective judgment are as follows:

the **feeling of pleasure/displeasure** is subjectively affirmative and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of sensation persistent in time, affirming a feeling of material sensuous *Lust per se* as an energetic for a determinable appetite;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the presentation of a transcendental affirmation of expedience for happiness (*Lust*) or ill-being (*Unlust*);

the **feeling of sublimity** is subjectively negative and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of kinematical form without sensation and presenting a subjectively negative feeling of material intellectual *Lust per se* as an energetic for further acts of judgmentation;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the presentation of a transcendental denial of expedience for happiness denoting a lack;

the **feeling of beauty** is subjectively infinite and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of coalition of sensation in a kinematical form presenting the feeling of a state of equilibrium;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the presentation of a feeling of real satisfaction or dissatisfaction through the negation of *Lust per se*.

§ 3.3 The *Momenta* of Relation in Aesthetical Judgment

The *momenta* of aesthetical Relation are the functions for the Organized Being's sense of interest, which is to be seen as the anticipation of value. They are viewed jointly by the transcendental-judicial Idea of Relation in Rational Psychology and the empirical-judicial Idea of Relation in Rational Theology. The psychological Idea is: *unconditioned unity of all relationships is grounded in the a priori anticipation of the form of connection of perceptions in time according to the modi of persistence, succession, and co-existence*. The theological Idea is: *aesthetic context in the presentation of Reality is connection of desire in a manifold of Desires*. The first reflective perspective tells us that the *momenta* of Relation specify the forms of value in terms of connection between representations and something the Organized Being will invest with a value. The forms of value anticipation are three-fold according to the determination of the transcendental schema of Relation in time, namely as subjectively categorical, subjectively hypothetical, and subjectively disjunctive. These Relations are defined by their alignments with the schemata of: (1) the Object persistent in time; (2) association in time-order; and (3) co-determination of multiple Objects contained in the manifold of one intuition.




Figure 8.3.4: Timescape illustration of intuitions, s , and affective perceptions (ovals).

The act of abstraction is a segregating act insofar as intuitions in sensibility are concerned but, as noted earlier, the removal of a part of a representation prior to the presentation of what remains as an intuition does not annihilate what is removed. This is because this representational *materia*, if it is *to be* removable, must nonetheless bear upon formal expedience since it has already passed muster with the acts of *Comparison* and reflexion. Because it is segregated from all intuitions in the timescape of inner sense (Figure 3.3.3, reproduced above as Figure 8.3.4), it overlays and binds everything in sensibility and by doing so *sensuously* binds Objects to the state of mind of the Organized Being. As Kant put it,

By the designation "an aesthetic judgment about an Object" it is therefore forthwith indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an Object but that what would be understood in the judgment is not the determination of the Object but of the Subject and its feeling. For in the power of judgment understanding and imagination are considered in relationship to one another, and this can, to be sure, first be considered objectively, as belonging to cognition . . . but one can also regard this relationship of two faculties of knowledge merely subjectively, as far as one helps or hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the *state of mind*, and so as a relationship which is *sensitive* . . . Now although this sensation is no sensuous representation of an Object, still, because it is subjectively combined with the sensualization of the notions of understanding through the power of judgment, it can be reckoned to sensibility, as sensuous representation of the state of the Subject who is affected by an act of that capacity, and a judgment can be called aesthetic, i.e. sensuous [KANT (20: 223)].

Aesthetic expedience is, first and foremost, expedience in sensibility. But the representation of this expedience is also required to be formal and, therefore, aesthetic Relation can pertain to nothing other than a relationship of sensibility to the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* and to the capacity of practical Reason to regulate the non-autonomic actions of the Organized Being. Now, the idea that every capacity of *nous* responds to a "when" (i.e., a condition) and a "how" (i.e., an orientation for acting in the particular) is contained in the general idea of "interest." In Kant's words,

Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e. becomes a cause determining will . . . Reason takes an immediate interest in an act only when the universal validity of the maxim of the same is a sufficient ground of determination of will. Only such an interest is pure. But if it can determine will only by means of another Object of desire or

under the presupposition of a special feeling of the Subject, reason then takes only a mediate interest in the act, and . . . this latter interest would be only empirical and not pure interest of reason. The logical interest of reason (to further its insights) is never immediate but rather presupposes set aims of its employment. [KANT (4: 459-460 fn)]

The *sense* of interest represented in the form of desire can therefore rightly be called a sense of value, and we can classify these according to the determination of the transcendental schemata of Relation as: (1) categorical sense of value; (2) hypothetical sense of value; and (3) disjunctive sense of value. To further understand these senses of value we call upon the general ideas of Relation (the internal, external, and transitive Relations) to obtain the following real explanations.

The categorical sense of value is **immanent interest**: *the representation of formal expedience judged aesthetically as subsisting in the representation itself*. This is value vested in the object of the representation. However, since this sense of value precedes the representation of the object (because the judgment is part of the process of *presenting* the intuition of the object), immanent interest can be called an **objective disinterest**. By this term we do not mean un-interest (for that which is not interesting neither captures nor holds our attention) but, rather, we mean expedience serving the process of equilibration in the free play of understanding and imagination.

The hypothetical sense of value is **transeunt interest**: *the representation of formal expedience as subsisting in the joining of the aesthetic manifold to appetitive power by which the interest values the *Existenz* of an object of desire as an end*. Thus, transeunt interest is a value vested in the form of the manifold of sensibility in succession in time. This does not mean that the representation of a desired end is a representation in which an external object is differentiated from the action that produces it. Such a distinction is objective, not affective, and belongs to determining judgment. Transeunt interest *anticipates a satisfaction* (or a dissatisfaction) and remains entirely affective in its character. We must further note that the aesthetical judgment of transeunt interest, because it is *aesthetically analogous* to the notion of causality & dependency in understanding and to the hypothetical logical *momentum* in structuring the manifold of concepts, must presuppose prior judgments of immanent interests as a ground for its possibility, just as the logical hypothetical proposition in connections in the manifold of concepts must presuppose the making of previous categorical propositions in determining judgment.

The disjunctive sense of value is **reciprocal interest**: *the representation of formal expedience judged aesthetically as subsisting in the subjective state of the Organized Being for which the co-existing object of appearance is interesting merely as a means*. A judgment of reciprocal interest presents a distinction between a subjective end and action as an objective means for realizing this end. The possibility of such a judgmentation overall necessarily presupposes prior acts of judgment from which distinct comparates have been conceptualized with sufficient aesthetic

clarity to make possible acts of *Comparison*, reflexion, and abstraction (and the functions of association, compatibility, and anticipation) by which it becomes possible for means to be differentiated from ends. Developmental psychology has long noted the remarkable universality of the staging order in which sensorimotor intelligence and affectivity develop in young children. While not all children go through these stages at the same rate, all children go through them in the same order. The ability to differentiate means and ends always comes relatively late in the development of sensorimotor intelligence, and we can see now that this must be so from the conditions upon which the possibility of making judgments of transeunt and reciprocal interests depend under the acroam of the transcendental-judicial Idea of Relation.

We turn now to consideration of the *momenta* of aesthetical Relation from the empirical-judicial perspective. We have already seen that the aesthetical functions of Relation involve judgments of connection between affectivity and the representations of objects (cognition). This should, by this point, be unsurprising since we saw in chapter 7 that aesthetical Relation and Modality belong to reflective Quantity in reflective judgment overall, and that reflective Quantity makes connection with the somatic *Kraft* of *psyche* through the synthesis in continuity of objectivity⁴. The empirical-judicial perspective is the perspective from which we understand the real Nature of desire in terms of its metaphysical standing and limitation in Reality.

In the empirical reflective perspective we distinguish three classes of objects as *real things* in Nature according to Relation. A **Sache-thing** is an object regarded as a *substantial thing-in-the-world (an entity) under the *modus* of persistence in time*. The German word *Sache* has a philosophical connotation that probably is best rendered as "object-matter" in English, and it is this connotation from which we here take the name of this class of objects. Contrary to this is the **Unsache-thing**, which is an object regarded as an *event-in-the-world under the *modus* of succession in time*. The term *Unsache-thing* denotes a natural event or occurrence, i.e., a change-in-Nature or "happening" and is often described as "that which unfolds in time." The synthesis of these two ideas in the empirical perspective gives us the idea of **state**, which is the *coexistence of the changeable with the fixed*, i.e., coexistence of *kinesis* (change in general) and the persistent-in-Nature. Specialized in context under the empirical-judicial Idea of Relation, this becomes the idea of an Organized Being's **state-of-being**.

Now, reflective judgments do not represent objects as objects. Rather, Relation in aesthetical reflective judgment has the function of *making a representation symbolic*. In Critical ontology a **symbol** is an intuition insofar as it serves as a means of representations through concepts. But no

⁴ Similarly, aesthetical Quantity and Quality belong to reflective Quality and have connection to the noetic *Kraft* of *psyche* through the synthesis in continuity of the aesthetic Idea.

intuition is inherently a symbol merely through the synthesis by which it is represented. It must be *made* symbolic by an act of judgment that joins the representation to an object of representation. Seen in this light, desire is a representation that makes an intuition symbolic through a value anticipation. The subjectively categorical function in aesthetic Relation is a **Sache-desire** symbolized by the anticipation of the *Existenz* of a *Sache-thing*. The subjectively hypothetical function in aesthetic Relation is an **Unsache-desire** symbolized by an action anticipated to realize a satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) in an aesthetic context. The subjectively disjunctive function in aesthetic Relation is an **Ideal-desire**, i.e. a state-of-being expedient for realizing a general state of happiness, symbolized in an idea of a tenet of Reason⁵.

To summarize, the *momenta* of Relation in aesthetical reflective judgment are as follows:

the **sense of immanent interest** is subjectively categorical and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of the Object persistent in time by a sense of formal expedience judged aesthetically as value subsisting in the representation and vested in the object of that representation;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, a *Sache-desire* symbolized by the anticipation of the *Existenz* of a *Sache-thing*;

the **sense of transeunt interest** is subjectively hypothetical and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of association in time-order by a sense of formal expedience judged as value subsisting in the joining of the aesthetic manifold to appetitive power by which the interest values the *Existenz* of an object of desire as an end;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, an *Unsache-desire* symbolized by an action anticipated to realize a satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) in an aesthetic context;

the **sense of reciprocal interest** is subjectively disjunctive and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of co-determination of the manifold (in an intuition) by a sense of formal expedience judged as value subsisting in the subjective state of the Organized Being for which the co-existing object of appearance is interesting as a means;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, *Ideal-desire*, a state-of-being expedient for realizing a general state of happiness, symbolized by an idea of a tenet of Reason.

§ 3.4 The *Momenta* of Modality in Aesthetical Judgment

The *momenta* of Modality are judicial functions judging the judgment of expedience in sensibility for happiness under the Ideas of Modality in Rational Psychology and Rational

⁵ A **tenet** is a practical fundamental principle containing a general determination of will in the practical manifold of rules that has multiple practical rules contained under it. The *idea* of a tenet is a conceptualized representation of this practical rule represented in the manifold of concepts by determining judgment.

Theology. The psychological Idea is: [unconditioned unity in apperception of all perceptions in the interrelationships of meaning](#). The theological Idea is: [perfection of the judicial Ideal of happiness is the coherence of satisfaction, expedience, desire, and the binding of these in the Ideal](#).

An **Ideal** is an Object by which the Organized Being understands an Idea not merely *in concreto* but rather as an individual thing determinable through the Idea alone. Here it is important to recall that the transcendental Ideas are pure and *a priori* regulative principles by which Reason regulates the Organized Being's powers of judgmentation and understanding. A transcendental Ideal is the practical object of this regulation that serves as the practical *a priori* standard of perfection. The empirical-judicial **Ideal of happiness is perfect satisfaction in the equilibration of Lust and Unlust**. Practically speaking, the Organized Being would judge such a perfect satisfaction to be present if it found itself to be living in a state of *Existenz* that appeared as a cycle in equilibrium that is absolutely robust. This *Existenz* would be a closed cycle because Critical equilibrium can only be defined dynamically in activity; a static state of equilibrium, one in which no changes whatsoever are perceivable, is not possible for the Organized Being because in the absence of all change there are no grounds for marking a moment in time and, therefore, time itself – the pure form of inner sense – would cease for the Organized Being. This would be equivalent to saying the Organized Being's mental life had ceased, a situation we would characterize as mind death. To say the life cycle is absolutely robust means that no disturbance is capable of rupturing the cycle. This situation is obviously an Ideal – something the Organized Being will strive to achieve regardless of the real possibility of actually achieving it.

It is not out of place here to make a remark regarding how empirical psychology views the idea of "happiness." In a number of psychological mini-theories, "happiness" is regarded as an emotion and the word has a number of different, and not entirely compatible, usages. It is a sufficiently vague term that *Reber's Dictionary of Psychology* contains no entry for it. In the main psychologists tend to fall back on the standard dictionary definition of happiness as "a state of well-being and contentment." But how does one determine whether a person is experiencing such a state? For empirical psychology this is an open question at present. One of the most interesting hypotheses was proposed in 1987 by Elaine and Arthur Aron, who argue that happiness is the "neutral gear" of the nervous system [ARON]. This hypothesis is quite compatible with the Critical explanation we have looked at here.

Turning now to the transcendental-judicial perspective, the *momenta* of Modality are functions of determination of the transcendental schemata of Modality. These are:

1. [Schema of non-contradiction – the harmonization of the synthesis of various representations with the condition of time in general for the determination of an object](#)

- at a moment in time (this can also be called the schema of possibility);
2. Schema of actuality – the union of receptivity and reproductive imagination in representing the *Dasein* of an object at a definite moment in time;
 3. Schema of necessity – coherence of possibility with the sum-total of the actual at every moment in time.

This alignment of the *momenta* of Modality with the transcendental schemata tells us our three *momenta* are *momenta* of subjective possibility, subjective actuality, and subjective necessity, respectively. Kant offers us the following observations regarding subjective possibility, actuality, and necessity:

Of every representation I can say: it is at least *possible* that it (as cognition) be combined with a *Lust*. Of that which I call *pleasant* I say that it *actually* produces *Lust* in me. Of the *beautiful*, however, one thinks that it has a necessary reference to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a special kind; not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be recognized *a priori* that everyone *will feel* this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me; nor a practical necessity where, through ideas of a pure rational will fit for rules for freely-acting beings, this satisfaction is a necessary consequence of an objective law and means nothing other than that one by all means (without a further aim) ought to take action in a certain way. On the contrary, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called *exemplary*, i.e., a necessity of the assent of *everyone* to a judgment that is esteemed as an example of a universal rule that one cannot state. Since an aesthetic judgment is no objective and cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determined concepts and is therefore not apodictic. Much less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (from a prevailing unanimity of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly procure much covering hereto, but itself permits no concept grounded on empirical judgment of the necessity of these judgments. [KANT (5: 236-237)]

To employ an old saying, "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Subjective necessity is revealed when *you* become upset because *I* do not concur with one of your aesthetic judgments and call ugly that which you call beautiful, call unjust that which you call just, call vulgar that which you call refined, etc. We are all familiar with phrases that reveal such aesthetical conflicts of opinion: "He has no taste"; "He is uncouth"; "He is a person of ill-breeding"; etc. When someone gainsays one of our aesthetical judgments that carries subjective necessity, we often choose to think there is something wrong with the gainsayer rather than with the judgment⁶.

Yet these examples only scratch at the surface appearances of aesthetic Modal judgment and we must do rather better than this in mental physics. Even though it is often said, "There is no accounting for taste," the theory of mental physics must do precisely this. The *momenta* of aesthetic Modality are the functions of judgment that underlie the possibility of these sorts of experiences.

⁶ It is not out of place to note in passing that such a choice reflects the consequences of an aesthetic judgment carrying the Quality of sublimity by the manner in which the conflict is resolved in the mind of the person whose aesthetic judgment has been gainsaid.




Figure 8.3.5: 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness.

Subjective possibility takes its context from the Modality of the faculty of pure consciousness we call the power of the potential for perception (Figure 4.1.1, reproduced here as Figure 8.3.5). This is the context of the obscure representation, and the task of the Modal judgment in this case is to produce the harmonization of representation with the condition of time in general. Put into other words, the subjective possibility of intuition hinges on the ability of the synthesis of imagination to bring about a sensible representation in the pure intuition of time. Every aesthetic judgment has some reference to *Lust per se*. The *momentum* of subjective possibility does not judge the matter of composition of the feeling but, rather, the *determinability* of sensibility in the production of an intuition. We call this the **feeling of tendency**: *the judgment that the orientation of the synthesis in the free play of imagination and understanding is expedient for the synthesis of an intuition*. William James provided an excellent illustration of experience reflecting this:

Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with a sense of closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit its mold. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might necessarily seem to be when described as gaps. . .

Again, what is the strange difference between an experience tasted for the first time and the same experience recognized by us as familiar, as having been enjoyed before, though we cannot name it or say where or when? A tune, an odor, a flavor sometimes carry this inarticulate feeling of their familiarity so deep into our consciousness that we are fairly shaken by its mysterious emotional power. But strong and characteristic as this psychosis is . . . the only name we have for all its shadings is "sense of familiarity." . . .

Now what I contend for, and accumulate examples to show, is that "tendencies" are not only descriptions from without, but that they are among the *objects* of the stream [of thought], which is thus aware of them from within, and must be described as in very large measure constituted of *feelings of tendency*, often so vague that we are unable to name them at all. It is, in short, the reinstatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention. [JAME1a: 251-254]

What has this feeling of tendency to do with meaning? Here what we must bear in mind is that an intuition, as the representation of the appearance of an object, is *made symbolic* (that is, is invested with a meaning) by the act of its presentation at a moment in time. But what does it mean to say an intuition is symbolic? Kant answers this question thusly:

It is an incorrect use of the word *symbolic*, accepted of course by the newer logicians but sensibly turned upside down, if one opposes it to the intuitive manner of representation; for the symbolic is only a class of the intuitive. The latter (the intuitive) can be divided up, namely into the *schematic* and the *symbolic* manner of representation. Both are hypotyposes, i.e. presentations (*exhibitiones*) not mere *characterizations*, i.e. indications of concepts through accompanying sensuous signs, which contain nothing at all of appurtenance to the intuition of the Object but only serve them according to the laws of association of the power of imagination, hence in subjective aim to the method of reproduction. [KANT (5: 351-352)]

What is *schematic* in the presentation of an intuition is the association of its form of inner sense (time) with the transcendental schemata. What is *symbolic* in the presentation of an intuition is the formal expedience vested in it by the act of reflective judgment in marking it at a moment in time. The feeling of tendency *judges the expedience of the process* of making an objective representation in the synthesis of apprehension.

Turning now to the empirical-judicial perspective, we consider the manner in which sensuous representation is held-to-be-true-and-binding in the empirical consciousness of the Organized Being. Here we characterize the aesthetical *momenta* of Modality in terms of:

1. the **subjectively problematic** as the feeling of a desire, the symbolized object of which *might be* expedient for happiness;
2. the **subjectively assertoric** as the feeling that the symbolized object of desire *is* expedient for happiness; or
3. the **subjectively apodictic** as the feeling that the symbolized object of desire *is necessary* for happiness.

The symbolism in aesthetic judgment from the empirical-judicial perspective constitutes an objectivity function inasmuch as coherence and context with regard to the state of happiness for the Organized Being is presupposed in the idea of an object of desire. The feeling of tendency is the subjectively problematic function of judgment. Here the judgment has to do with the potential for success or failure in the on-going synthesis of apprehension and can therefore quite rightly be called the **feeling of hope or hopelessness** attaching to the orientation and direction of this process. The former is a feeling of *Lust*, the latter a feeling of *Unlust*.

Now let us take up the second *momentum*. Subjective actuality takes its context from the power for actualizing perception in the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness (Figure 8.3.5). From the transcendental-judicial perspective, its determination is the transcendental schema of

actuality, the fixing of a determination of a *Dasein* at a definite moment in time. This *momentum* of aesthetical judgment acts as a **pulse of consciousness** (in the words of William James) giving birth to full-grown empirical apperception of an appearance exhibited in an empirical intuition. The affective perception made conscious in subjective actuality can be termed the **feeling of presentment**. The feeling is that of a presentment, either of a focus in the case of *Lust* or an ignorance (the consciously deliberate act of ignoring something) in the case of *Unlust*. From the empirical-judicial perspective, the feeling of presentment is subjectively assertoric and asserts that the symbolized object of desire *is* expedient for happiness. Thus we can also call this *momentum* the **feeling of liking or disliking**.

The subjectively necessary *momentum* in transcendental-judicial perspective takes its context from the determining factor (the power of pure Reason) in the 2LAR of consciousness. It determines the transcendental schema of necessity, i.e. the presentment of the *Dasein* of an object in harmony with all its possible accidents of *Existenz* at every moment in time. The subjective expedience standing in relationship with this schema and the power of pure Reason is the expedience of the unconditioned equilibrium dictated by the categorical imperative of practical Reason. Perception stands either in accord with the condition of general equilibrium or it stands in discord with it, and so the third *momentum* is called the **feeling of accord or discord**. This is the general feeling of either equilibrium or disturbance in the connection of perceptions in the *nexus* of all perceptions. From the empirical-judicial perspective, this *momentum* is subjectively apodictic, i.e. it necessitates a relationship between the object of desire and expedience (in the case of *Lust*) or inexpedience (in the case of *Unlust*). For this reason, it can equally well be called the **feeling of rightness or wrongness**. It is worth re-emphasizing, though, that the aesthetical *momenta* are not judgments of cognition and so the feeling of rightness or wrongness is not a conscious *thought*, i.e., "*I think this is wrong.*" It is instead only the perception of a feeling of *Lust per se* of the matter of a possible appetite of Reason. Affective perceptions "color" the apperception of an object of intuition, but they do not become part of the cognition of the object itself. If we render a *description* of this judgment into words, they would be "*I feel wrong (or right).*"

In summary, then, the *momenta* of Modality in aesthetical judgment are:

the **feeling of tendency** is subjectively problematic and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of non-contradiction judging the orientation of the synthesis in the free play of imagination and understanding to be expedient for the synthesis of an intuition;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the **feeling of hope or hopelessness** attaching to the orientation and direction of this process as a feeling of the

potential for success or failure in the on-going synthesis of apprehension and symbolized by an object of desire judged possibly expedient for the aesthetical perfection of happiness;

the **feeling of presentment** is subjectively assertoric and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of actuality as a feeling of focus (in the case of *Lust*) or ignorance (in the case of *Unlust*) in apperception of an actual perception;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the **feeling of liking or disliking** for a symbolized object of desire judged actually expedient (or inexpedient) for happiness;

the **feeling of accord or discord** is subjectively apodictic and is

- from the transcendental-judicial perspective, determination of the transcendental schema of necessity in judging a perception as standing either in accord or discord with the condition of general equilibrium;
- from the empirical-judicial perspective, the **feeling of rightness or wrongness** for a symbolized object of desire judged necessarily expedient for the aesthetical perfection of happiness.

§ 4. Teleological Reflective Judgment

Reflective judgment regarded from the logical-judicial and hypothetical-judicial perspectives is called teleological reflective judgment. The deduction of the *momenta* of teleological judgment is attended by a great many subtleties which are discussed in Chapter 18 of *CPPM*. This deduction is all the more difficult owing to Kant's failure to provide a systematic treatment of the metaphysics of teleological judgment in the corpus of his works. He was, however, quite explicit as to the role teleological judgment plays. It is, as was stated in §1 of this chapter, to make possible construction of a *system* of knowledge. Teleological reflective judgment is tasked with legislating for the construction of an order-in-Nature, i.e., Nature *as a system of natural laws*.

Yet the *momenta* of teleological judgment are not themselves laws of Nature nor even laws of objects because reflective judgment is non-objective and deals only in affectivity. They are rules for the *judgmentation* of Nature, but not *a priori* rules of Nature itself. We are therefore led to ask straightaway: How is it possible for non-objective rules of judgment in affectivity to produce the system of Nature as a human being comes to know it in experience? As is always the situation for our ideas of *nous*, we must examine this question *transcendentally*, i.e., in terms of what is necessary for the possibility of experience, here within the context of order-in-Nature.

What we will find is that teleological judgment from the hypothetical-judicial perspective pertains to functions for making implications of empirical meanings and to affective persuasions and preferences of judgment. We will call upon the transcendental Ideas of Rational Cosmology and will find the deduction reasonably straightforward. The situation is a bit more involved in

regard to the logical-judicial perspective of teleological judgment because this is the perspective of Rational Physics and here we must deal with the considerations pertaining to the possibility of physics itself regarded from the judicial, not theoretical, Standpoint. When we had to deal with this from the theoretical Standpoint, we found that these considerations involved the categories of understanding, the conditions of sensibility to which the objective validity of their use is restricted, and the transcendental schemata that link intuition and concept.

When we turn to the judicial Standpoint, we find an analogous situation. Kant explained the role of the transcendental schemata in *Critique of Pure Reason* in the following way:

We will call this formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the notion of understanding [category] in its use is restricted, the *schema* of the notion of understanding, and we will call the procedure of understanding with these schemata the *schematism* of pure understanding. [KANT1: B179]

In like fashion, the judicial Standpoint deals with judgmentation (rather than understanding) and requires judicial counterparts to the notions of understanding, the transcendental schemata and the schematism of, in this case, judgmentation. The counterpart to the schematism of understanding is the process of teleological reflective judgment itself as the procedure (schematism) of empirical judgmentation. The counterpart to the transcendental schemata we have already introduced in chapter 7, and this is none other than the natural schema of judgmentation. The judicial counterpart to the categories must fulfill the role of *rules for constructing acts of judgmentation* (just as the categories are rules for the construction of concepts). Acts of teleological reflective judgment are obscure representations, and so to find these rules we call upon our general ideas of representation (identification, etc.). These general ideas are concepts of concepts and are stated from the theoretical Standpoint. What we must do now is re-examine them from the judicial Standpoint. When we do so, the general ideas are called the *ideas of transcendental topic* and from them we obtain the *judicial 2LAR* of transcendental topic.

It was stated earlier that the determination of transcendental topic is crucial in judgmentation. However, neither the categories of understanding nor the processes in sensibility make any immediate reference to transcendental topic; the aesthetical *momenta* only *present* transcendental *place*. The reference to transcendental topic is made through the process of teleological reflective judgment, and therefore we must first set out the judicial ideas of transcendental topic. Our understanding of these is aided by the analogy suggested by the following pair of formulae:

Theoretical Standpoint:

schematism (determining judgment)	+	transcendental schemata	⇒	cognition (general ideas of representation)
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Judicial Standpoint:

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \text{schematism} & + & \text{natural schema} & \Rightarrow & \text{judgmentation} \\ \text{(teleological} & & \text{of judgmentation} & & \text{(ideas of transcendental} \\ \text{judgment)} & & & & \text{topic)} \end{array}$$

The general ideas of transcendental topic are ideas for *determining* the transcendental place of representations. Transcendental place refers to the transcendental origin of a representation as being through receptivity of the senses or spontaneity in understanding and judgmentation. The idea of a transcendental place is properly understood as an idea belonging to acts of aesthetical judgment in synthesizing sensibility because it is a functional idea of the dynamics of the synthesis of a conscious state of mind. Indeed, we can regard the general ideas of representation, Figure 8.4.1(a), and transcendental topic in judgmentation, Figure 8.4.1(b), as matter-and-form, respectively, in a 1LAR division of theoretical and judicial mental orientation in the context of *reflecting upon acts of representing*. Kant tells us,

Reflection⁷ (*reflexio*) does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relationship of given representations to our various sources of knowledge, through which alone their relationship among themselves can be correctly determined. . . But all judgments, indeed all comparisons, need a reflection, i.e., a distinction of the power of knowledge to which the given concepts belong. The act through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the power of knowledge in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I call a *transcendental reflection*. [KANT1: B316-317]

The general ideas in Figure 8.4.1(a) pertain to *what* is determined by representation in regard to *objective* knowledge; those of Figure 8.4.1(b) pertain to *how* this is determined in *acts of judgmentation*. Thus the former stands as matter to the latter as form, and the combination of these 2LARs gives us a 3LAR structure of reflection for representation in general.




Figure 8.4.1: The general ideas of representation and judgmentation. (a) 2LAR structure of representation. (b) 2LAR of the general ideas of transcendental topic in judgmentation.

⁷ *Überlegung*, the act of reflecting on something. Reflection is related to but not the same as the *Verstandes-Actus* of reflexion.

§ 4.1 Judgmentation and Transcendental Topic

Let us examine what we obtain when we take the general ideas of Figure 8.4.1(a) out of the Standpoint of their objective (theoretical) context and view them from the Standpoint of their judicial context. This context is in the logical-judicial perspective in relationship to reflective judgment, which means that the judicial ideas of transcendental topic are ideas in the context of motoregulatory expression and desiration and must be viewed from this context.

§ 4.1.1 Quantity in Transcendental Topic

The general ideas of Quantity in combination are the general ideas of the form of the matter of Object representation. However, all cognitions are made representations according to rules of representing and a rule is an assertion made under a general condition. A meaning implication is a function by which a mere presentation is made representative and by which the context and orientation of acts of judgmentation serve aesthetical generality (which is the idea of Quantity in the synthesis of aesthetical perfection). Now, this orientation has a purposive character that we denote by the word *intent*. In Critical epistemology, **intent is the determination of an action expression according to a rule or maxim of practical Reason**. The matter of intent is a feeling of subjective expedience and the form of intent is a determined appetite of Reason. The formal expedience for the structuring of intent in a meaning implication is a *logical* expedience in service of pure practical Reason.

The role of and what is accomplished by intent was very well described by Santayana:

Intent is one of the many evidences that the intellect's essence is practical. Intent is action in the sphere of thought; it corresponds to transition and derivation in the natural world. Analytic psychology is obliged to ignore intent, for it is obliged to regard it merely as a feeling; but while the feeling of intent is a fact like any other, intent itself is an aspiration, a passage, the recognition of an object which not only is not part of the feeling given but is often incapable of being a feeling or a fact at all. What happened to motion under the Eleatic analysis happens to intent under an atomizing reflection. The parts do not contain the movement of transition which makes them a whole. . . The importance and absurdity have disappeared. Yet it is the pronouncement concerning what things are absurd or important that makes the intent of those judgments. . . Feelings and ideas, when plucked out and separately considered, do not retain the intent that made them cognitive or living; yet in their native medium they certainly lived and knew. If this ideality or transcendence seems a mystery, it is such only in the sense in which every initial or typical fact is mysterious. Every category would be unthinkable if it were not actually used. . . The fact that intellect has intent, and does not constitute or contain what it envisions, is like the fact that time flows, that bodies gravitate, that experience is gathered, or that existence is suspended between being and not being. . . Cognition, too, is an expedient for vanquishing instability. . . What renders the image cognitive is the intent that projects it and deposes it to be representative. It is cognitive only in use, when it is the vehicle of an assurance which may be right or wrong, because it takes something ulterior as its standard. [SANT4: 172-174]

This "ulterior standard" is the Organized Being's drive to aesthetical perfection, and aesthetical

generality pertains to the scope to which conscious representations can be applied. If we say, as we do in mental physics, that affective perception in aesthetical reflective judgment constitutes the energetics of action, those in teleological reflective judgment pertain to the points of application for these energetics in the synthesis of experience.

The idea of Quantity in transcendental topic is *the intentionality of judgmentation*. The general idea of identification in representation is the idea of the unity of an object *as a system*; a synthesis of identification is the composition of aggregation that identifies the aggregate as a singular object. The corresponding idea in transcendental topic is the idea of intent as **the intentionally systematic** determination of judgmentation. *The intentionally systematic in transcendental topic is the focusing of the energetics of affective perception into the expression of a singular action scheme*. Judgmentation in this case has the character of a recognitory assimilation of perception in a scheme of action, with perception serving here as an aliment for sensorimotor action.

The general idea of differentiation in representation is the idea of the form of composition in which an aggregate is viewed *as* a composition of parts, i.e. as a set of particulars. In mathematics an example of a synthesis of differentiation is the division of a set into disjoint subsets. We call this a synthesis of division rather than an analytic division because the differentiation implies the combination of the idea of a set with some ground for determining how the subsets are to be distinguished. Thus, any particular division of a set into disjoint subsets requires something more be given to the operation than merely the set itself. Taken over into the judicial Standpoint, this is to say the speciation of the subsets reflects some *intent* satisfied by the particular form of division resulting from the operation. This intent takes into account a *context* in which the operation is performed. Generalizing from this example, the particular idea of Quantity in transcendental topic is the idea of *the intentionally contextual*.

From the theoretical Standpoint, **context** *is the sphere of concepts, combined by judgment with the concept said to have the context, that delimits the applicable scope involving that concept in Reality*. From the judicial Standpoint, we must understand context in terms of actions and the effects of these actions on sensibility because all empirical meanings are at root assimilations of intuitions of objects into action schemes. Here we can speak of a *judicial sphere* of related actions, all of which are capable of assimilating the perception but having different degrees of expedience under different circumstances⁸. More formally, *a judicial sphere is the aggregate of all sensorimotor actions capable of assimilating a given perception*. The **intentionally contextual** in transcendental topic *is the differentiation of empirical meanings as a*

⁸ A **circumstance** is the outer connection in which an occurrence happens. An **occurrence** is a single act with its result.

structure of sub-schemes of sensorimotor action. Developmental psychologists of the Piagetian school will see in this *Realerklärung* the transcendental ground of what Piaget termed "reciprocal assimilations" [PIAG12: 6-7, 90-91].

The general idea of integration in representation is the form of composition of many given parts into an entire whole in which the object is known as a totality of composing aggregates. To borrow an Eastern phrase, it is the idea of "the Many in the One." Now, reflective judgment knows no objects and so when we take up the judicial Standpoint we must refer this idea to one in which we view the action rule for the intent *as* a rule of expedience serving aesthetical generality, i.e., the action-structure asserted by the rule makes it possible for cognition in one concept to be put to use in understanding many Objects. Even though reflective judgment knows no Objects, concepts of objects obtain meanings, at their roots, only through sensorimotor actions. Aesthetical generality is a perfection of perception – specifically, an aesthetical perfection. In Kant's *Logik* we find,

[Aesthetic generality] subsists in the applicability of a cognition to a number of Objects that serve as examples, to which application of it can be made, and whereby it becomes useful at the same time for the purpose of popularity. [KANT (9: 39)]

But since reflective judgment knows no Objects as objects, *the intent can serve only to organize perception through the generalization of action schemes*. Stated as a judicial idea of transcendental topic, this is called **the intentionally organized**.

§ 4.1.2 Quality in Transcendental Topic

Acts of reflective judgment are *impetuous* in regard to the *nexus* of desiration that links perceptions to motoregulatory expressions. In this character, the process of reflective judgment is reminiscent of Freud's idea of the id. The Idea of Quality in Rational Physics is called the Anticipations of Perception, and with regard to affectivity acts of reflective judgment constitute a judicial anticipation of happiness. Happiness is expedience judged as being sufficient to serve practical Reason as well as for marking sensibility in intuition at a moment in time. For this reason, we can well call an anticipation of perception in transcendental topic a **demand for happiness: determination of the transcendental place of acts serving to realize an affective state of satisfaction or negate a state of dissatisfaction**.

The idea of agreement in transcendental topic is **demand for agreement: the placing of the demand for happiness in an act of reinforcing an existing and present state of being**. The demand for agreement services the feeling of *Lust*. The contrary idea of opposition is **demand for Widerstreit: the placing of the demand for happiness in an act of negating an existing and present state of being**. We earlier discussed the ideas of opposition in chapter 5 (§5), where we saw that

opposition in general can be viewed in terms of Quality (*Widerstreit*) or Relation (*Entgegensetzung*). *Widerstreit* is opposition in the context of being in conflict and implies a real negation, i.e., two real representations in sensibility that mutually cancel out each other's effect. The demand for *Widerstreit* services the feeling of *Unlust* and is a determination that establishes a condition for satisfaction.

Finally, the judicial idea corresponding to subcontrarity in transcendental topic is **demand for equilibration**: the placing of the demand for happiness in an act that balances the demand for agreement and the demand for *Widerstreit*. Kant wrote,

Unlust is accordingly not merely a lack of *Lust* but rather a positive ground that wholly or in part cancels the *Lust* which arises from another ground, and I call this a *negative Lust*. The lack of both *Lust* and *Unlust*, in so far as it arises from the absence of their respective grounds, is called *indifference* (*indifferentia*). The lack of both *Lust* and *Unlust*, in so far as it is a consequence of the real opposition of equal grounds, is called *equilibrium* (*aequilibrium*). Both indifference and equilibrium are zero, though the former is a negation absolutely, whereas the latter is a deprivation. The state of mind in which *Lust* and *Unlust* are unequally opposed so that there is something left over from one of these two sensations is the *preponderance* of *Lust* or *Unlust*. [KANT (2: 181)]

Equilibrium as Kant describes it here satisfies a state of happiness, and, in this regard, the principle grounds and validates the Arons' view of happiness as "a neutral gear" but adds the footnote that this neutral gear cannot be a state of indifference but rather must be seen as a balancing of real tensions in the *Entgegensetzung* of *Lust* vs. *Unlust*.

Piaget's empirical research revealed that the development of intelligence and cognitive structures follows the strict regulation of a central process of equilibration. The process he describes in [PIAG12] is completely consistent with equilibrium as Kant describes it above. Indeed, the appearance of central regulation by equilibration is *none other than a real exhibition of the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason*. Hence it follows from this that the Organized Being's *disposition* for happiness is, judicially, a pure purpose of practical Reason. In speaking of this central regulative process of equilibration, Piaget wrote,

Thus the only regulator we could assign to the cognitive regulations is an internal one. As their program [i.e., the cognitive regulations] is not hereditary, their existence can be attributed to the mutual conservations inherent in the functional process of assimilation. This interpretation might appear as a disturbing vicious circle, since the cycle of interactions would thus be both the cause and the result of regulations. But in dealing with any biological or cognitive system, we must characterize the whole as primordial and not proceed from the assembled parts or the differentiations based on the assembling. Thus, the whole possesses a force of cohesion and therefore characteristics of self-conservation which distinguish it from nonorganic physical-chemical totalities. . .

. . . It is a significant fact that in all vital and cognitive fields the total form appears more stable than its components. Not only does an organism maintain its own form despite a continual metabolism, but . . . the total behavior "is infinitely less variable from one instant to another than the momentary activity of its elements." In any cognitive system

the laws governing the whole override the changing characteristics of the components. . .

Thus there is no circle (or more precisely it exists but has nothing vicious about it) predicated when we admit that a whole system plays the role of regulator for the sub-systems, for it imposes on them an extremely refined standard: to submit themselves to conservation of the whole, i.e., to the closing of an interaction cycle, or be carried off in a general dislocation comparable to the death of an organism. [PIAG12: 22-23]

We can quite easily see how the demand for equilibration in the determination of transcendental place fills a central and vital role in reflective judgment's service to pure practical Reason.

§ 4.1.3 Relation in Transcendental Topic

The determination of transcendental place in regard to Relation plays a key role in the manner in which acts of *Gestaltung* (formation) in sensibility and acts of judgmentation in self-determination play out. Fantasy and error are as much a characteristic of human thought as the understanding of truth. As Kant observed,

Now sensibility flows into acts of understanding, and from this springs the diagonal direction of understanding, where it sometimes obtains truth, sometimes semblance. Sensibility, and understanding insofar as it passes judgment, is therefore the cause of semblance. Sensibility as such is not a source of errors, however, for so far as it aims at its objects there is congruence with the laws of this power of knowledge. The ground that the senses do not judge erroneously is that they cannot judge at all. For only understanding judges. Error is therefore neither in understanding alone nor in the senses alone, but rather always lies in the influence of the senses on understanding, when we do not distinguish well the influence of sensibility on understanding. [KANT (24: 824-825)]

The power of judgment immediately "under the influence of the senses" is, of course, reflective judgment. Inferences of judgment (ideation, analogy, and induction) mark out the general concepts that determining judgment then determines. Reflective judgment is tasked with making a system of Nature, but the only pure principle regulating it is the acroam of the formal expedience of Nature, which regulates entirely on *subjective* grounds for holding-to-be-true-and-binding. "Believe what you will" could easily be the motto of reflective judgment.

Relation in transcendental topic does not concern the constitution of objective cognition but rather goes to the determination of the point of origin of sensuous perception. Put in other words, Relation in transcendental topic goes to *the determination of sense*. It deals with the connection of judgmentation and emergent properties, i.e., Relation in the data of the senses in *psyche*. The Relation of emergent properties in the data of the senses refers to the three functions we examined earlier: *nous* → *soma* (the internal), *soma* → *nous* (the external) and *nous* → *nous* (the interior). The first employs *soma* as means of perception, the second places the origin of the perception with an external cause, and the third places it entirely within the capacity for understanding. Relation in transcendental topic determines from which of these points of origin judgmentation will proceed, i.e., determines the transcendental place from which reflective judgment will

affectively contextualize sensibility. Thus the ideas of Relation in transcendental topic are, respectively: **internal agent-patient Relation** (determination of transcendental place as internal Relation in the data of the senses); **exterior agent-patient Relation** (determination of transcendental place as external Relation in the data of the senses); and **interior agent-patient Relation** (determination of transcendental place as interior Relation in the data of the senses).

Objective truth is, of course, a factor in whether or not a representation in sensibility is formally expedient in Nature. However, we must bear in mind that we have no *material* criterion of truth, no Hegelian Absolute. We are in possession of no rationalist innate ideas, nor is there any innate *Gestalt* for intuition (the pure intuition of space is a topological *synthesis*, not some facetious cookie-cutter for stamping out intuitions), nor do we possess a copy-of-reality mechanism. The transcendental place for the context of sense influences the self-determination of motoregulatory expressions that provide kinaesthetic feedback to sensibility for synthesis of the *Gestaltung* of the intuition of space. It likewise orients judicial reflections made on the possible forms of expedience in sensibility.

§ 4.1.4 Modality in Transcendental Topic

In the context of transcendental topic, that which is the determinable is matter and that which is the determination is form. Neither, however, is "given" in sensibility in the sense of it being, in a manner of speaking, something that is just "laying around in the mind waiting to be fetched into consciousness." Matter in perception is properly called *sensation* when the perception is objective and properly called *feeling* when the perception is affective. Whether the *materia ex qua* of sensibility is the one or the other is adjudicated by means of the synthesis of the *Verstandes-Actus* acting in concert with reflective judgment. As for form in sensibility, we already saw in the transcendental aesthetic of sensibility that the pure intuitions of space and time are both products of synthesis in sensibility. All perceptions are formally represented in time; the distinction between objective and affective perception is that the former is also represented in space while the latter is not.

The significance of the determination of transcendental place in this regard is seen when one asks if matter is a condition for the representation of form, or whether form is a condition for the representation of matter, or if sometimes it is the one and sometimes it is the other, or if neither is a condition for the synthesis of the other. Of these four logical possibilities, Kant found it is the third that is the case. He writes,

[Matter and form] are two notions that ground all other reflexion, so inseparable are they bound up with every use of understanding. [Matter] signifies the determinable in general, [form] its determination (both in the transcendental sense since one abstracts

from all differences in what is given and from the way in which that is determined) . . . In every judgment one can call the given concepts logical matter (for judgment), their relationship (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment. In every being its components (*essentialia*) are the matter; the way in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form . . . Understanding, namely, demands first that something be given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine in a certain way. Hence in the concept of pure understanding⁹ matter precedes form . . . But if it is only sensuous intuitions in which we determine all objects merely as appearances, then the form of the intuition (as a subjective constitution of sensibility) precedes all matter (the sensations), thus space and time precede all appearances and all *data* of experience, and instead first make the latter possible . . . But since sensuous intuition is an entirely peculiar subjective condition, which grounds all perception *a priori*, and the form of which is primitive, thus the form is given for itself alone, and so far is it from being the case that the matter (or the things themselves, which appear) ought to be the ground (as one would have to judge according to mere concepts), that rather their possibility presupposes a formal intuition (of space and time) as given. [KANT1: B322-324]

Synthesis is the act of combining diverse representations and so we call our first two ideas of Modality in the structure of the dynamics of determining transcendental place the synthesis of matter and the synthesis of form. The **synthesis of matter is the problematic idea in that it positions *materia* in sensibility in the place of the determinable for perception. Synthesis of form is the assertoric idea in that it positions *materia* in sensibility in the place of determination of form** (e.g., the *materia circa quam* of kinaesthetic feedback synthesizes spatial form).

This still leaves the determining factor in transcendental topic. This factor must answer to the fundamental acroam of reflective judgment, namely the acroam of formal expedience in Nature. Because presentations of reflective judgment are Desires under the principle of happiness, the subjective character of this determining factor is that of *presentation of a condition of expedience for happiness*. We call this **presentation in belief** and it is the apodictic idea of transcendental topic. Here we recall that belief, *judicially* considered, is unquestioned holding-to-be-binding. The objective outcome is a cognition held-to-be-true and this holding-to-be-true is *unquestioned* holding-to-be-true. Kant tells us,

Indeed, persuasion – which is a holding-to-be-true for which we can not make out on our own whether it rests on merely subjective or on objective grounds – in contrast to merely felt conviction – in which the subject believes himself to be conscious of [objective grounds] and of their sufficiency, though he cannot name them or make clear their connection with the Object – are both not to be reckoned among the modalities of holding-to-be-true in dogmatic knowledge, whether it be theoretical or practical, since this should be a knowledge from principles, and must therefore also be capable of a clear, intelligible, and communicable representation.

The meaning of this holding-to-be-true, distinct from opinion and Knowledge which are founded on judgmentation in the theoretical sense, can now be set in the expression of

⁹ By *concept* of pure understanding, Kant means a concept that is the product of pure thinking – what we commonly call a "product of one's imagination" and sometimes call a fantasy. Griffins and goblins are objects of concepts of pure understanding. This differs from a *notion* of understanding, which could be called a "*pure concept* of understanding" because a notion *as notion* cannot be represented in an intuition.

belief, whereby we understand an assumption or presupposition (hypothesis) which is necessary only because it is necessarily grounded by an objective practical rule of behavior by which we indeed do not theoretically examine the possibility of its execution and from it the production of the resultant Object in itself, but yet nonetheless subjectively recognize the only way of harmonization of the same with the final purpose. [KANT (20: 297)]

Belief is not objective Knowledge (*Wissen*) nor knowledge in the cognitive sense but, rather, is an affective state of mind *grounded in some practical rule of behavior*. This practical rule is not a theoretical maxim nor is it a theoretical imperative (because the practical rule antecedes both of these and makes their meanings possible). Instead, it is a sensorimotor connection and its possible action (regardless of if it is made an appetite or not) is an empirical meaning. A belief, which is a representation not yet questioned (by aesthetical reflective judgment), is a holding-to-be-binding that is *aesthetically* certain. Aesthetical certainty is Modality in aesthetical perfection.

§ 4.2 The *Momenta* of Teleological Reflective Judgment

We conclude the business of this chapter with the exposition of the *momenta* of teleological judgment. Figure 8.4.2 illustrates the 2LAR structure. Teleological judgment is reflective judgment regarded from the logical-judicial perspective (the perspective of Rational Physics) and the hypothetical-judicial perspective (the perspective of Rational Cosmology). Thus, it is a process of judgment concerned with the representation of objects of outer sense (Rational Physics) and with the overall structure of Nature (Rational Cosmology). Yet reflective judgment is an entirely non-objective process and this at once raises the important question of how it is possible for a process that judges nothing but affectivity to have anything at all to do with objects and Nature.




Figure 8.4.2: 2LAR structure of teleological reflective judgment.

If human understanding had the character of never making mistaken judgments concerning things-in-Nature and Nature itself, the answer to this question would be "it is not possible" and one could rest comfortably in the assurance that we possess a copy-of-reality mechanism that permits all our cognitions to be reliably stamped on a wax tablet of mind by "nature herself" as the empiricists speculated. Science itself would then be a rather trivial undertaking. But this is not the case with us, mistaken judgments concerning both objects and Nature are commonplace, and *Homo sapiens* is in possession of no copy-of-reality mechanism. Our knowledge of objects and of Nature is *made* knowledge and the *objective* validity of this knowledge is born of experience. But the *possibility of making* this knowledge rests on the *aesthetics* of the capacity for human consciousness, and it is with this aesthetical capacity that reflective judgment deals.

Present day cognitive psychologists will set the statement just made in the context of a well-known and long-standing argument involving a controversy over whether affectivity has "primacy" over cognition or whether the reverse is true. A lively and not-unentertaining debate on this very question was carried out in the 1980s between Robert Zajonc ("Preferences need no inferences") and Richard Lazarus ("Cognitive activity is a necessary precondition of emotions"). Both men presented evidence and arguments supporting their respective views and opposing the other's. Not to put too fine a point on it, but they were *both* right *and* they were *both* wrong. The error stems from misuse of the idea of "primacy." Both men presume that one or the other type of perception ("affection" or "cognition") must come *first* and the other ("cognition" or "affection") must then follow as a consequence. This is a presupposition based on the notion of causality & dependency and the *modus* of succession in time. However, the divisions in the anatomy of *nous* are merely *logical* divisions, the *objectively valid* Relation involved is not causality & dependency but, rather, the notion of community, and we must *objectively* view the question in terms of coexistence in time rather than succession in time. Zajonc and Lazarus both made the very same ontological error that leads to the fictitious mind-body problem.

This is evident to an experienced system theorist by mere examination of our diagram of the logical organization of *nous*. For convenience, this diagram is reproduced once again in Figure 8.4.3 below. Note the presence of the various and *interacting* "feedback loops" in this structure: (1) the "inner loops" from sensibility to judgment and back to sensibility; (2) the "outer loop" from sensibility to reflective judgment to Reason to determining judgment and back to sensibility once more; (3) the "kinaesthetic loop" from sensibility to reflective judgment to motoregulatory expression in *psyche* to receptivity in *psyche* and back to sensibility once more. Add to this the diverging-converging "branch" from reflective judgment to practical Reason and back into motoregulatory expression through the veto power of practical Reason.




Figure 8.4.3: The organization of *nous*.

only be one with *practical* objective validity (because the divisions of the mental anatomy of *nous* and of the Organized Being overall are merely logical divisions). Here what goes to the point at hand is the following. The *Kraft* of the process of determining judgment does not exhibit the ability to spontaneously generate general concepts of Objects and must originally obtain these concepts from intuitions through the synthesis of re-cognition in imagination. What the *Kraft* of determining judgment does exhibit is the ability to combine concepts in a manifold of concepts. The *Kraft* of reflective judgment, on the other hand, does exhibit the capacity to produce general concepts of Objects but cannot do so *immediately* (because its pronouncements are non-objective). Rather, it does so *mediately* by judging that a presentation in sensibility is expedient and presents this judgment to apperception by marking the sensible representation at a moment in time. Objectively, reflective judgment judges no more than this: that a sensible representation is *formally* expedient for a purpose of Reason and is to be presented at a moment in time.

When we turn our focus to teleological reflective judgment, our attention turns from the synthesis of desire to the synthesis of desiration. If we loosely look at the idea of desire as an idea with the character of a "longing for," then the idea of desiration is not merely a "longing for" but has the character of a longing that is *actively demanded* in subjective judgment. Now, what is the practical meaning of this phrase "actively demanded"?

Teleological reflective judgment is the process of judging connection of desire (as matter) in a manifold of Desires, the form of which we have called desiration. **Desiration** in judgment is the form of unity of affective perception in relationship to the capacities of the Organized Being. As

As any experienced system theorist will verify, to assign "primacy" (cause) to any one place within such a recurrent feedback system and then to say that the closed-loop behavior of the system "originates" from this place is mathematically quite meaningless. We use our mathematics as a language for saying things very precisely. Here "primacy" is a statement that is mathematically meaningless and cannot be made mathematically meaningful; this idea of "primacy" is therefore quite meaningless in any *real* sense. The affection-cognition debate is over nothing with any *real* objective validity.

The answer to the question raised above can

an idea, it falls under the regulation of the general Cosmological Idea: [absolute completeness in the series of conditions](#). The connection of desiration is the judgment of a "how" (in contrast to the composition of desire, which is the judgment of a "what"). This "how" pertains indirectly to the *Existenz* of the concept of an Object insofar as cognition is concerned. But it pertains *directly* to the power of the Organized Being to produce this cognition, and here we find acts of teleological judgment must pertain to real actions of the Organized Being that ground the possibility of empirical meanings. The possibility of these actions is twofold: firstly, through the motoregulatory expression of *psyche*; secondly through the ratio-expression of practical Reason. Teleological reflective judgment is not *constitutive* for the generation of general concepts of objects. It is instead *regulative* for the *expedient use* of the faculty of knowledge. **The Object of teleological reflective judgment is practical law.**

As a process, it is essentially proactive, impetuous, is tied to motoregulatory expression, and it serves a final purpose (equilibration under the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason). In relationship to objects and to Nature, acts of teleological judgment satisfy a practical tenet of **unity in purpose and cause**. What this means is that practical objective validity for all ideas about teleological reflective judgment is hard-bound to a fundamental criterion we earlier called **Margenau's law** [MARG: 422-425]. This is: [any mathematical expression of teleological causality \(purpose\), in order to be objectively valid, must be convertible into a mathematical form that expresses physical causality](#). The practical purpose is called a "because"; the actual realization of the action as it appears in experience is called a "cause" in a cause-and-effect Relation *strictly bound* to the *modus* of succession in time. The appearance and the purpose are bound together in this way by the Relation of community so that *at every moment in time* "the purpose" and "the cause" are opposite sides of one and the same logical coin. This is the idea of **psychological causality** (freedom) in the judicial Standpoint of Critical ontology and it has real context *only* in regard to the actions of the Organized Being and *never* has objective validity for appearances in Nature divorced from the Organized Being as *the agent of change*.

The laws adjudicated by and given conceptual representation in consequence of a teleological judgment of formal expedience do not have the rock-hard determinism characteristic of the constructions of the process of determining judgment. They first arise as beliefs held-to-be-binding on merely subjective grounds. One can say that empirical thinking finds itself engaged in an activity of concept-structuring aimed at *preserving the equilibrium of a system of beliefs* under the impacts of the capacity for the arousal of *doubt* by acts of aesthetical reflective judgment. *Composition* in teleological judgment (reflective Modality) aligns with the synthesis in continuity of Meaning, while *connection* in teleological judgment (reflective Relation) aligns with the

synthesis in continuity of the judicial Idea.

In *Critique of Judgment* Kant spent his efforts upon explaining the character of judgmentation in general (*Beurtheilung*) rather than on illuminating for us the *momenta* of teleological judgment as a process. It was an omission in his theory and left a gap we must now fill in. From the logical-judicial perspective we do this through the synthesis of the natural schema of judgmentation with the ideas of transcendental topic. From the hypothetical-judicial perspective, we do so by subsuming this logical-judicial outcome under the judicial Cosmological Ideas of Critical metaphysics proper.

§ 4.2.1 Quantity in Teleological Judgment

The cosmological Idea of Quantity in the judicial Standpoint is: [absolutely complete equilibrium in judgmentation through the suppression or equilibration of innovations](#). This is the regulative acroam for Quantity in teleological reflective judgment in hypothetical-judicial perspective. We introduced [innovation](#) in chapter 4 as [a condition of *Existenz* in which there exists an incongruence of fact with an anticipation](#). In the *Lust-Kraft* of *psyche*, the [act of innovation](#) is a reorganization undertaken in the *Existenz* of the Organized Being as a whole.

Some psychologists would call an innovation a "disturbance." Those who do find the basis for this empirical characterization by first observing that the Organized Being takes some action and then coupling this observation with a supposition that this action is undertaken in response to some condition, usually not itself directly observable by the psychologist. It is the action undertaken, viewed as an effect, that leads the psychologist to hypothesize the *Dasein* of a "disturbance," which he views as a transcendental object standing as cause of this effect. The term "disturbance" is not universal among psychologists and is not dignified with an entry of its own in Reber's *Dictionary*. In Piagetian terminology, a disturbance is: (1) any alteration in a cycle of equilibrium; or (2) anything said to be the cause of such an alteration. The first usage is a theoretical concept of an *appearance* that fits under our *Realerklärung* of the act of innovation. The second usage is also theoretical but vague, being little else than a label for a particular species of cause. "Disturbance" and "innovation" are, Critically, not synonyms. Innovation and act of innovation are ideas of the judicial, not theoretical, Standpoint.

A [fact is a sensuous phenomenon for which the representation in the manifold of concepts is connected with the assertoric logical momentum of Modality](#). Innovation thus refers to a lack of agreement in actual experience between what the Organized Being was expecting (the anticipation) and what actually happens. Some psychologists refer to this sort of occurrence as a "cognitive dissonance." The general Idea of cosmological Quantity regulates against tolerating

such a situation, i.e., it is a judicial regulation for the Organized Being to take action in response to such an occurrence. It is instructive to take a closer look at the psychologist's usage of the term cognitive dissonance. From Reber's *Dictionary* we have:

cognitive dissonance An emotional state set up when two simultaneously held attitudes or cognitions are inconsistent or when there is a conflict between belief and overt behavior. The resolution of the conflict is assumed to serve as a basis for attitude change, in that belief patterns are generally modified so as to be consistent with behavior.

There are some Critical problems with this definition but we need not go off on a tangent concerning them for our present purposes. What we can take from this usage is that its context involves the idea of a conflict of belief. Belief is unquestioned holding-to-be-true, and we can see that innovation denotes the occurrence of a *questioning* of belief. *What is meant by questioning is, from the judicial Standpoint, that the incongruence between the actual experience and the cognition of an anticipation from belief prevents closure (in a cycle of equilibrium) in the free play of understanding and imagination and, therefore, results in the feeling of Unlust in an aesthetical reflective judgment.* Because this feeling evidences that the belief is not unconditioned (since if it was no circumstance could gainsay it), the cosmological regulation is called into play.

We must, however, bear in mind that all this falls under the judicial Standpoint and makes reference to affective perception (and not to a conscious cognition of the appearance in intuition). Teleological reflective judgment, in responding to the cosmological demand of Reason, is tasked with "closing the gap" an innovation reveals.¹⁰ The functions of Relation in aesthetical judgment are value expressions of interest, but the desire judged therein is merely an energetic of Reason. The desire, while providing a focal point for Reason, provides no orientation or direction for Reason. Rather, the orientation of Reason in responding to innovation falls to an act of teleological reflective judgment *in judging the meaning of the feeling*. Here we should recall that composition (Quantity and Quality) in teleological reflective judgment links to adaptive *psyche* through the synthesis in continuity of Meaning, and an innovation is a break in continuity. "To judge the meaning of the feeling" means to make a connection (synthesis of desiration) between the affective perception of desire and a motoregulatory action of *psyche* because *all* empirical meanings, at their roots, amount to assimilating an intuition into an action scheme. The presentation of desire marks the subjective condition under which such an assimilation is held to be (or not to be) accomplished. Formally and practically, the logic of meanings tells us:

It follows that an object is a set of conjoined predicates and its meaning amounts to "what can be done" with it, and it is thus an assimilation to an action scheme (whether

¹⁰ A **gap** (*hiatus*) is a representation containing an interruption of continuity. Any lack of harmony among judicial or representational processes constituting a lack of equilibrium is called a mental gap.

the action is overt or mental). As the for actions themselves, their meaning is defined by "what they lead to" according to the transformations they produce in the object or in the situations to which they are applied. Whether we are dealing with predicates or actions, their meanings always implicate the subject's activities, which interact either with an external physical reality, or with elements that were previously generated by the subject, such as logico-mathematical entities.

Furthermore, we may distinguish various degrees in meanings: They remain "local" in that they relate to limited data and to particular contexts; they may become "systematic" in laying the groundwork for structures; and finally they may become "structural" when they pertain to the internal composition of already constituted actions. [PIAG1: 119-120]

Judicially, any act of judgment assimilating perception into an action scheme is an act that produces a meaning implication. Composition in teleological reflective judgment acts to attempt precisely such an assimilation and we may for that reason justly call the *momenta* of composition by the name **functions of implication**. For the specific case of Quantity in teleological judgment, these are **extensive** functions of implication.

Viewed in logical-judicial perspective, the first *momentum* of Quantity in teleological judgment is deduced from the synthesis of transcendental topic and the natural schema of judgmentation as

intentionally systematic + composition of motoregulatory act → **scheme implication**.

Quantity in transcendental topic is the orientation of the Organized Being for aesthetical generality (aesthetical perfection in Quantity). The purposive character of this orientation is called *intent* and pertains to the points of application for the energetics of desire. In regard to the composition of motoregulatory act, we call a *scheme* [that in an action which can be repeated and generalized](#). The synthetic combination implicates a scheme of sensorimotor action and thus the name for this first *momentum*. From the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **scheme implication is the teleologically singular extensive function of implication having a local meaning implication vested in the composition of a scheme in regulating the process of the constitution of empirical meanings**.

The second *momentum* is the teleologically particular function obtained from the synthesis (in logical-judicial perspective) of

intentionally contextual + generation of topological neighborhood → **contextual implication**.

Kinaesthetic feedback from motor actions constitutes the *materia circa quam* from which the intuition of space is produced (through generation of topological structure) in the synthesis of sensibility. An Object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united, and an object stands under this idea as the "what it is" that brings a necessary unity to a cognition.

Empirical meanings are vested in objects and, therefore, an object is the substratum for a plurality of contexts in regard to meanings. From the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **contextual implication** is the teleologically particular extensive function of implication for judging the meaning of sensibility as presenting an intentionally contextual representation from a plurality of contexts, represented in an intuition, in regulating the constitution of empirical meanings.

While contextual implications are differentiations (*this* situation rather than *that* situation, hence accommodation in sensibility), the object as the unity of divers contexts is integrative. Viewed in logical-judicial perspective, the third extensive function of implication is the universal function and is deduced from the synthesis

intentionally organized + presentation of syncretic *Obs.OS* → **objective implication**.

An object from the hypothetical-judicial perspective is the organization of a multiplicity of divers particular meanings. We introduced the term *Obs.OS* to denote an observable¹¹ in which the Organized Being does not distinguish between the appearance of the object to which its scheme is applied and the appearance of that scheme in an action. The appearance of the object and the appearance of the action scheme are fused in a totality in the manifold of an empirical intuition. The *momentum* of **objective implication** is the teleologically universal judgment of the meaning in sensibility for presenting a syncretic *Obs.OS* in regulating the process of the constitution of meanings.

These *momenta* of Quantity in teleological judgment are not constitutive for concepts of objects. The constitutive task belongs to determining judgment. Rather, the teleological *momenta* of Quantity *regulate* the process of constitution through the synthesis of meaning implications with regard to the form of the matter of empirical meanings. To summarize this,

scheme implication is judicially singular and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of the intentionally systematic in transcendental topic with the composition of a motoregulatory act in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the extensive function of implication having a local meaning implication vested in the composition of a scheme in regulating the process of the constitution of empirical meanings;

contextual implication is judicially particular and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of the intentionally contextual in transcendental topic with the generation of a topological neighborhood of space in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the extensive function of implication

¹¹ An **observable** is that which can be identified as an object of appearance in experience through receptivity in sensibility.

for judging the meaning of sensibility as presenting an intentionally contextual representation from a plurality of contexts, represented in an intuition, in regulating the process of the constitution of empirical meanings;

objective implication is judicially universal and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of the intentionally organized in transcendental topic with the presentation of a syncretic *Obs.OS* in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the extensive function of implication for judgment of the meaning in sensibility, by presenting a syncretic *Obs.OS*, in regulating the process of the constitution of empirical meanings.

§ 4.2.2 Quality in Teleological Judgment

The earliest object concepts in the manifold of concepts are concepts of the *Obs.OS* representations in sensibility. Let us use the term *Obs.O* to denote the external object to which a scheme appearance, *Obs.S*, is applied. Now, different sensorimotor schemes, e.g. *Obs.S₁* and *Obs.S₂*, can be applied to the same external object, *Obs.O*, and eventually the Organized Being *thinks* cognitions of the external object in distinction from its sensorimotor schemes by making abstraction of the uncommon in scheme appearances by a synthesis we represent with the formula

$$Obs.OS_1 + Obs.OS_2 \rightarrow Obs.O.$$

Piaget was fond of saying that the object (*Obs.O*) was the point of intersection for different and coordinated sensorimotor schemes. However, even this common *Obs.O* representation still contains scheme factors in its intuition (because *Obs.O* must still have an empirical meaning) so that in the *reflective* dimension of judgment in structure formation, the acts of judgmentation never entirely get away from the bindings of meanings in actions even as the *cognitive* dimension of judgment is able to think in distinct terms of phenomenal objects and actions. Even within the concept of an *Obs.O* there resides yet another *Obs.OS* that further experience can bring out in cognition. Similarly, cognition of action schemes, e.g. *Obs.S₁*, becomes possible after thinking has conceptualized *Obs.O*. As a concept of an *Unsache*-thing, the concept of *Obs.S₁* likewise contains a latent *Obs.OS* providing the necessary connection in empirical meanings.

This cornucopian character of object concepts is nothing more than the consequence of the acroam of Anticipations of Perception in the theoretical Standpoint: *In all appearances the sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in an object, has intensive magnitude*. A rather striking set of empirical findings that support this Critical theorem was provided by a series of studies carried out a number of years ago by Piaget and his coworkers [PIAG6]. Indeed, Piaget proposed a dynamic (albeit rather qualitative) theory for the development of thought [PIAG12] that can be grounded in precisely this cornucopian character (although Piaget's theory itself is not

entirely free of some ontological defects in its interpretations).

Considered in logical-judicial perspective, the intensive functions of implication in teleological judgment serve the Organized Being's demand for happiness in its state-of-being (Quality in transcendental topic). Furthermore, teleological judgment still serves to regulate the constitution of empirical meanings via the natural schema of judgmentation. We obtain the judicially affirmative function of Quality through the synthesis

demand for agreement + well-being → **real tendency**.

To understand this choice of names for the first *momentum* of Quality, we begin with the acroam of Quality from the judicial Standpoint in Rational Cosmology: [absolute completeness in a common ground of beliefs in all reflective judgments](#). Belief is unquestioned holding-to-be-binding in reflective judgment according to the principle of formal expedience in Nature. The intensive functions of teleological judgment serve to structure the demand for happiness through meanings vested in what is givable in sensibility. In doing so, they regulate a judicial-psychic moving power (the power to be the cause of a change) of desiration. [Tendency is the character of inclining or contributing an influence toward something](#) and in its practical connotation is regarded as a course toward some purpose, object, or result. The natural schema of well-being, as the schema for the promotion of agreeableness in life, is thus seen as the schema of a tendency, and the demand for agreement places the demand for happiness in an act of reinforcement.

Real tendency coalesces this demand in an empirical meaning as an action expedient for the satisfaction of the feeling of *Lust*. Now, because we say the satisfaction is demanded, this means that something in sensibility is antagonistic to equilibrium in the immediate assimilation of sensibility. This in turn means that the function of judgment must produce an accommodation to sensibility in such a way that the disturbing factor is compensated by means of the action judged expedient. The *affirmative* character of the judgment means that the accommodation called upon in performing this compensation involves behavior that satisfies this requirement not by *negation* of the disturbance but rather by regarding what is otherwise a disturbing factor as an orientation for action, i.e., by regarding it as the *positive* sign of a condition to be met in achieving satisfaction. This converts a disturbance into a mere *variation in an occurrence*. We call such a compensation behavior a **type-β compensation**.¹² Here it is helpful to recall that satisfaction takes its context from the feeling of *Lust* (and not from *Unlust*) and its character is describable as a "this is not-bad" in affective perception. From the hypothetical-judicial perspective, [real tendency is the synthesis of agreement in well-being for the coalescence in an empirical meaning](#)

¹² This terminology is owed to Piaget, who introduced the idea of it in [PIAG12].

of an action judged expedient for satisfaction of the feeling of *Lust* through type- β compensation behavior. To make this idea a bit less abstract through use of an example, picking up a baseball and picking up a ping pong ball both involve the sensorimotor scheme of "grasping." Clearly, though, the specific way in which each are grasped differ and so in terms of Quantity picking-up-a-baseball and picking-up-a-ping-pong-ball are subschemes within the general scheme of grasping. In terms of Quality, the motoregulatory difference comes from regarding a baseball and a ping pong ball as differing merely as assimilated variations in sensibility. The hand accustomed to grasping a baseball does not, in a manner of speaking, "see" a ping pong ball as a "disturbance" but rather as a "variation" within "things-that-can-be-grasped."

The second intensive function of Quality is judicially negative. From the logical-judicial perspective we have

demand for *Widerstreit* + ill-being → **real repugnancy**.

Real repugnancy is the function contrary to real tendency. While tendency is the character of inclining toward something, the Latin root of the word repugnancy (*repugnare*) means "to fight against." From the hypothetical-judicial perspective opposition, as *Widerstreit*, demands the abolition or cancellation of what in sensibility is antagonistic to equilibrium in the immediate assimilation of sensibility in the action. In this case, the antagonist factor is felt as a disturbance by the Organized Being. Synthesis with ill-being ties real repugnancy to the feeling of *Unlust*. Thus, in this case the coalescence in meaning is an act that implicates an action judged expedient by stint of that action's *abolition* of the consciousness or actuality of the disturbance. The compensation behavior in this case we call **type- α compensation**. A simple example of type- α compensation is seen when a person simply ignores something unpleasant or contrary to his reasons for doing something he wants to do. Rationalizing away facts that gainsay some cherished bit of fiction or speculation is a common example of behavior that implicates a type- α compensation underlying that behavior. Another example is seen when an Organized Being undertakes some physical action, such as removing an obstacle, that hinders the successful completion of a purposive action. **Real repugnancy in the hypothetical-judicial perspective is the synthesis of opposition in ill-being for the coalescence in an empirical meaning of an action judged expedient for the negation of the feeling of *Unlust* through type- α compensation.**

The third *momentum* of Quality is judicially infinite ("in-finite" in the connotations of subcontrarity and the category of limitation, not in the transcendent connotation of mathematical infinity). From the logical-judicial perspective we obtain it from the synthesis

demand for equilibration + happiness → **implication of real significance**.

Significance is the matter of composition of intent. The empirical meanings of a representation subsist in the actions tied to that representation, and it is this *practical* conjunction that grounds the objective validity of the idea of empirical meanings as *real* meanings in relationships binding the Organized Being to Nature. **Real significance** is the Object that contains all these empirical meanings in its scope. In the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **implication of real significance is the judicial act of coalescing empirical presentations of sensibility in an Object that subsists only in the manifold of actions by which the representation is given meanings.** The Object *symbolizes* the meaning. The implication of real significance is the act of judgment that makes a meaning implication *as a ruling*. When we discussed Modality in the categories of understanding, we said a concept is *made to signify* expedience or inexpedience for some purpose, and that this subsisted in enfolding the representation into a context. The third momentum of Quality in teleological judgment is the act of making a meaning implication that has the by-product of realizing (making real) the *symbolic* meaning of a concept.

Now, pure practical Reason is completely satisfied by nothing less than full conscious accord in the formal expedience of perception, and such an accord is the complete embodiment of equilibrium, in which subsists the judicial idea of happiness. The actions tied to the implication of real significance correspond at a primitive level to the interplay of compensation behaviors that establish transformations of actions through structuring the overall organization of the manifolds of representations in *nous*. We call this interplay of compensation behaviors **type- γ compensation**. In the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **implication of real significance is the synthesis of the demand for equilibration through coalescence of presentations of sensibility for an Object that symbolizes a meaning for a concept through type- γ compensation behavior.**

Summarizing all this,

real tendency is judicially affirmative and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of the demand for agreement in transcendental topic with well-being in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the synthesis of agreement in well-being for the coalescence in an empirical meaning of an action expedient for the satisfaction of the feeling of *Lust* through type- β compensation behavior;

real repugnancy is judicially negative and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of the demand for *Widerstreit* in transcendental topic with ill-being in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the synthesis of opposition in ill-being for the coalescence in an empirical meaning of an action expedient for the negation of the feeling of *Unlust* through type- α compensation behavior;

implication of real significance is judicially infinite and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of the demand for equilibration in transcendental topic with happiness in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the synthesis of a demand for equilibration through coalescence of presentations in sensibility for an Object that symbolizes a meaning for a concept through type- γ compensation behavior.

§ 4.2.3 Relation in Teleological Judgment

From the judicial Standpoint, the third cosmological Idea states: **the causality of freedom is the absolute beginning of all appearances**. Let us compare this judicial form of the Idea with its statement from the theoretical Standpoint: **absolute completeness in the origin of an appearance generally**. In the theoretical Standpoint this Idea is direction-indicating and a regulating compass for directing the employment of determining judgment for understanding through reasoning. But the judicial Standpoint of the Idea is categorical, placing the source of the possibility of cognition with nothing else than the life-function of the Organized Being as the transcendental Subject for all accidents of *Existenz* inhering in its substance. This is the essential character of the causality of freedom, which denies all imputation to external Nature, in the environment of the Organized Being, for the causality of any non-autonomic actions of the Organized Being. Just as there is no copy-of-reality mechanism in receptivity, so also there is no rule of transformation for the structuring of the systematic self-organization of *Self-Existenz* that can be taken from outside the boundary of the Self. The Self is a structure.

Relation in aesthetical perfection is complete congruence in sensibility with the Subject in its laws of sense-semblance, and this congruence is called a state of belief. While sensation in sensibility corresponds to the matter of the transcendental object, the form of intuition in sensibility (figure, *Gestalt*) is attributed to the Organized Being's form-building power of pure intuition (subjective space and time). The object affects through receptivity as sensation but the form of perception is an inner production. How sense is affected is *reconciled* with the *Self-Existenz* of the Organized Being through the power of judgment. The word "reconcile" is used here in the two contexts of: (1) to make consistent, compatible, etc. – i.e., to bring into harmony; and (2) to make content with or acquiescent to. These contexts are used jointly here.

The synthesis of causality of freedom with belief is *an act of Self-reconciliation*. For this reason, the *momenta* of Relation in teleological judgment are called **persuasions of judgment**. We understand these functions in logical-judicial perspective through a synthesis of Relation in transcendental topic with Relation in the natural schema of judgmentation. For the hypothetical-

judicial perspective, we call upon the cosmological Idea from the judicial Standpoint.

The judicially categorical *momentum* in logical-judicial perspective is found from

internal agent-patient Relation + inference of ideation → **reflective subjection**.

The inference of ideation in the natural schema of judgmentation is logically categorical and is the schema for producing general Object concepts in the free play of imagination and understanding through the process of thinking. Synthesized with *nous* → *soma* Relation and then subsumed under the judicial cosmological Idea, it becomes a judicially categorical desideration exhibited by the transformation of appearances in the structuring of an Object. In hypothetical-judicial perspective, we place the causality of perception with the noetic capacity to determine motoregulatory expression and this latter, among other outcomes, provides the *materia circa quam* for synthesis of the *Gestaltung* in a pure intuition of space. Any *action predication* requires that the action be predicated of a logical subject. For judgment this logical subject is a *focus of attention*. The word subjection means "a subjecting or being subjected to," and here what we have is the subjecting of action expression to a sensible focus of attention.¹³ **Reflective subjection is categorical desideration in setting the focus of attention of the Organized Being.**

The judicially hypothetical *momentum*, from the logical-judicial perspective, is obtained from the synthesis

external agent-patient Relation + inference of induction → **reflective expectation**.

The inference of induction is logically hypothetical and is a schema of connection for successive representations in inner sense (intuition of time). This goes to the regulation of natural order in happiness and, in synthesis with the *soma* → *nous* Relation of sense in transcendental topic, the causality of perception is placed with the capacity for receptivity in the hypothetical-judicial perspective. Because of this placement, the inference of induction implicates a belief of expectation, i.e., a holding-to-be-binding *as a rule of expectation*. This *momentum* is the synthesizing function for non-cognitive anticipation of a succession of activities ordered in time, i.e., desideration for the *Existenz* of a natural order in what can *theoretically* only be regarded as contingent. Teleological reflective judgment is not *bound to* determination in time (because only representations in sensibility are represented in inner sense and judgment is not sense). Rather, the capacity for teleological judgment is the power by which time-order *is determined* in the

¹³ Here attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*) is consciousness according to choice. It can be regarded as the ratio-expression of a type- α compensation in judgmentation which opposes making conscious representations of innovations that hinder the cycle of equilibration. The *focus* of attention is the representation made to stand as the logical subject of an action predication.

connection of representations in sensibility. **Reflective expectation is hypothetical desiration as a rule of expectation.** This is the *a priori* ground for induction in thinking and of the sensible intuitions of anticipations. It is likewise the *a priori* mechanism for and ground of the possibility of behaviors for which the appearances are commonly conceptualized under an idea of final cause. The capacity to conceive ends and their means is grounded in this non-cognitive capacity to order *a priori* a succession of imaginative anticipations in time judged as formally expedient for the formula of the categorical imperative of practical Reason.

The transitive, i.e. judicially disjunctive, Relation in logical-judicial perspective is found from the synthesis

interior agent-patient Relation + inference of analogy → **reflective transferal.**

Analogy is describable as "induction applied to predicates" – which is to say it is induction applied to predications of multiple coordinate characteristics. However, teleological judgment does not judge concepts; rather, the interior (*nous* → *nous*) Relation of transcendental topic means the process of judgment adjudicates acts of *Gestaltung* in the three-fold synthesis of intuition during the free play of imagination and understanding. From the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **this momentum acts to orient imagination.** We call it a *transferal* because in consequence of this orientation the *materia in qua* from the concept of one object is drawn into an imaginative synthesis of the intuition of a different object. Analogy generalizes the *application* of the appearance of a predicating concept. Kant used the example of beavers, and the fact that beavers build beaver-dams, to illustrate what analogy accomplishes as well as to point out the speculative limits to what we can actually know by means of analogy:

Analogy (in a qualitative sense) is the identity of the relationship between grounds and consequences (causes and effects) that contain the ground for similar consequences (i.e. regarded outside of this relationship) so far as it occurs in spite of the specific difference between the things or those of their properties as such. Thus, in comparing the artistic acts of animals with those of human beings, we think the ground of this effect in the former, which we do not know, through the ground of similar effects in humans (reason), which we do know, and thus as an analog of reason; and by that also we denote that the ground of the artistic capacity, under the designation of an instinct, is in fact specifically different from reason but yet has a similar relationship to the effect (comparing, say, construction by beavers with that of humans). – Yet on this account, that the human being uses *reason* in order to build, I cannot conclude that the beaver must have the same sort of thing and call this a *deduction* according to the analogy. Yet from the comparison of a similar mode of operation in animals (the ground of which we cannot immediately perceive) to that of humans (of which we are immediately aware) we can quite properly conclude *in accordance with the analogy* that animals also take action according to representations (are not machines, as Descartes would have it), and that, despite their specific difference, they are still of the same genus as human beings (as living beings). The principle of the warrant to so conclude lies in the same ground for counting animals, with respect to the aforesaid determination, as members of the same genus with human

beings, as humans, so far as we compare them with one another externally on the basis of their acts. There is *par ratio*¹⁴. [KANT (5: 464fn)]

There is a causality involved with the third *momentum* of Relation, but what is specifically different is the causal characteristic. In reflective expectation the causal characteristic is that of a phenomenal cause in an *a priori* expectation ("B will cause A"). In reflective transferal the causal characteristic is that of a "because" and this "because" has to be called a *psychological* (efficacious) causality, e.g., "A is x and B is x, therefore A is y because B is y." In the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **reflective transferal is disjunctive desiration as a judgment determining an orientation of the synthesis of imagination**. This function is the ground for the possibility of developing mobile schemes of action. Although it is itself non-cognitive, it is the basis for the capacity for cognitive coordination of concepts, i.e., cognitive inferences of analogy.

To summarize:

reflective subjection is judicially categorical and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of internal agent-patient Relation in transcendental topic with inference of ideation in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, categorical desiration as judgment of a rule setting the focus of attention of the Organized Being;

reflective expectation is judicially hypothetical and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of external agent-patient Relation in transcendental topic with inference of induction in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, hypothetical desiration as a judgment synthesizing anticipation of phenomenal causality as a rule of expectation for the ordering of succession-in-time;

reflective transferal is judicially disjunctive and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of interior agent-patient Relation in transcendental topic with inference of analogy in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, disjunctive desiration as a judgment determining the orientation of imagination as a rule of psychological causality.

§ 4.2.4 Modality in Teleological Judgment

All acts of teleological reflective judgment *immediately* concern nothing else than the synthesis of non-cognitive desiration, which determines nothing but a connection (*nexus*) between perception and an action (immediately through motoregulatory expression in *psyche* and/or mediately through ratio-expression in practical Reason). Even so, these acts of judgment produce cognition as a by-product of the act reflective judgment, and this because the ensuing

¹⁴ equal reason

accommodation of sensibility wrought by the action is directed to attainment of formal expedience in serving pure practical Reason. Now, before any representation can be the representation of an object, there must be a judgment that an object exists. For a sensible object this *concept* is determined by a determinant judgment of the form {unity, reality, substance & accident, actuality & non-being} following a reflective inference of ideation. We call the intuition a *belief of the moment* (in time). However, for a supersensible object (e.g., object-as-a-cause) the category of causality & dependency provides the objective ground for thinking the *Dasein* of the object, but only because judgmentation structures the *Existenz* of an object as a necessary *condition* for an effect in sensibility (the principle here being *in mundo non datur casus* in the synthesis in continuity of the judicial Idea). The idea of a supersensible object cannot come under the category of reality in determining judgment because, by definition, an idea utterly lacks the factor of sensation in intuition and can only be exhibited in intuition by examples.

The third cosmological Idea, considered from the theoretical Standpoint, regulates the employment of determining judgment to seek for every appearance a condition for that appearance. The fourth cosmological Idea, again from the theoretical Standpoint, calls for absolute completeness in that series of conditions for appearances *in terms of something upon which the Dasein of the appearance depends*. Now, this orientation of determining judgment sets up a hopeless task for speculative Reason in the theoretical Standpoint because the series cannot be completed in sensible Nature (every appearance must have *its* condition, and so on *ad infinitum*) and the Organized Being eventually comes to the speculative idea of a supersensible object at the horizon of possible experience – beyond which lie only transcendent illusions utterly lacking theoretical objective validity. Yet even here speculative Reason drives onward under the pressure of the *subjective need* for judgmentation to satisfy this *theoretically unreasonable* demand of Reason. Historically, the most common manifestation of this drive is the idea of a god or gods, and even here the pressure of Reason's need drives onward to illusory speculations concerning "the nature of the god" – e.g., he has a patriarch's beard; he is "a Lord of hosts"; he is "a jealous god"; he will "punish the sons for the sins of their father"; and so on, piling on transcendent characteristics one after another through inferences of analogy often taken from humankind's historical experiences with quite mortal Mesopotamian despots.

Absolute completion of the series is a hopeless task for speculative Reason and the theoretical Standpoint, but not from the perspective of *practical* Reason and the *judicial* Standpoint. The difference is this: in *speculative* (theoretical) Nature the idea of an unconditioned condition that completes the series is placed "out there" in the Nature of the sensible world; but *judicially* this unconditioned condition is found in *the intelligible Nature* of the Organized Being and is

apodictically grounded in the special standing each Organized Being grants *absolutely* to its noumenal *I* of transcendental apperception. The transcendental *I* is, for each of us, the one and only *noumenon* whose *Dasein* (though not *Existenz*) is held-to-be absolutely certain *a priori*. The judicial-cosmological Idea of Modality is: *the I of transcendental apperception is the unconditioned condition for thinking the Dasein of any object*. Just as nothing is real to the Organized Being until it has a concept of the object combined with other concepts that give it meaning in a context, so also nothing is an object to the Organized Being *until it judges there to be an object*. Aesthetical certainty (the aesthetical perfection of Modality) is the Siamese twin of this cosmological Idea. The perfection (making perfect) of aesthetical certainty

rests on what is necessary in consequence of the testimony of the senses, i.e. what is endorsed through sensation and experience. [KANT (9: 39)]

Elsewhere Kant tells us that belief is an assertoric holding-to-be-true sufficient for acting. Strictly from the perspective of teleological judgment, such a conviction must be called holding-to-be-binding because teleological judgment is non-cognitive. Kant writes,

In opinion one is still free (problematic), in belief assertoric (one declares oneself) . . . In belief I am, as to the subject, already bound. [KANT (16: 372-373)]

The holding-to-be-true can be apodictic without the cognition being objectively apodictic. The former is only the consciousness that it is impossible that one could have erred in the application of indubitably certain rules, e.g. in experience. It is certain that it is experience. [KANT (16: 388)]

Belief is, at its very root, *practical*. It is manifested in actions; the conceptualization of *speculative* beliefs (beliefs of the moment) come as necessary by-products of these actions. Kant writes,

Belief is no special source of knowledge. It is a type of incomplete holding-to-be-true with consciousness, and, when it is regarded as restricted to a special class of Objects . . . distinguishes itself from opinion not through degree but through the relationship it has to knowledge for acting . . . Now we have theoretical knowledge (of the sensuous) in that we can bring it to certainty, and in consideration of all that which we can call human knowledge, the latter must be possible. We have just such certain knowledge, and indeed completely *a priori*, in practical laws, although these are grounded in a supersensible principle (freedom) and indeed in *ourselves* as a principle of practical reason . . . Nonetheless, nature as an Object of our theoretical reason must agree with it, for in the sensible world the consequences or the effect of this Idea shall be met with . . .

Between the obtainment of a cognition through experience (*a posteriori*) and through reason (*a priori*) there is no mediator. But between cognition of an Object and the mere presupposition of its possibility there is a mediator, namely an empirical ground or a ground of reason to accept the latter in regard to a necessary expansion of the field of possible Objects above those whose cognition is possible for us. This necessity takes place only in respect of that in which the Object is known as practical and practically necessary through reason, for to accept something on behalf of merely expanding theoretical knowledge is always contingent . . . This is a subjective necessity, to accept the reality of the Object for the sake of the necessary determination of will. This is the

*casus extraordinarius*¹⁵, without which practical reason cannot support itself in regard to its necessary purpose, and here a *favor necessitatis*¹⁶ proves useful to it in its own judgment. It can acquire no Object logically, but only set itself against that which hinders in the use of this Idea which practically belongs to it. [KANT (9: 67-69fn)]

Contingent objective (theoretical) beliefs serve as a *constituted function* in judgmentation for expedience and for determining the Organized Being's acts of adaptation servicing equilibration under the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Without generalizing concepts, which originate in belief, no understanding of Nature *as a system* is possible. The Organized Being makes its own beliefs in the service of the categorical imperative, and when sensuous experience gainsays the concept, the concept is accommodated to bring its sphere back into harmony with Nature as a system. The acts of teleological reflective judgment *bias* judgmentation overall in producing the equilibrations demanded by practical Reason. Because these biases are originally grounded in transcendental apperception, such judicial biases pertain to the synthesis of apperception, hence Modality in teleological judgment, and we may justly call the *momenta* of Modality in teleological judgment the functions of **preference of judgment**.

How are these functions practically manifested in experience? Here we can gain some insight and prepare ourselves for the hypothetical-judicial perspective on Modality in teleological judgment by reviewing the findings of Piaget *et al.* on what he called **constitutive psychological functions**. A **Piagetian function** is the representation of the dependency of some state or condition *y* on some initial state or condition *x*. He symbolizes this as an ordered pair (*x*, *y*). Piaget identified four behavioral manifestations of coordinations of action schemes that appear to make up a set of base *constitutive* functions (a constitutive function being a function by which more complex *constituted* functions are produced) [PIAG13]. One of these "coordinators" is simple association, which he denotes using the symbol *B*. The others are: the repetition coordinator, *W*; the identification coordinator, *I*; and the substitution coordinator, *C*. He explains these terms as follows:

The initial reaction is a random alignment which although preceding regularities naturally comprises partial ones (it would be interesting to analyze these since it is doubtful that pure chance exists in psychology). We will limit ourselves to the basic coordinator presupposed by this alignment, which we shall call *W = repetition*. It consists only in repeating an action. [PIAG13: 33]

Now, if the repetition *W* expresses the reproductive assimilation of the scheme of the action, there exists a second basic coordinator which expresses the recognitive assimilation and will this time focus on the object of the action, i.e., *identification = I*. [PIAG13: 33]

[Substitution] can be conceived as the product of an action . . . of the subject (e.g.

¹⁵ supplementary (or additional) circumstance

¹⁶ necessitated bias

selecting y starting from x and finding a certain transformational correspondence between x and y) or of a causal action (modifying x into y by making it larger, changing its color, etc.) or even of a simple movement (displacing a movable object by substituting position y for the initial position x). [PIAG13: 3-4]

It would have been a good deal more helpful if Piaget *et al.* had cast this idea of coordinator functions in more formal and crisp mathematical terms, but the basic idea is not too difficult to grasp. There are three distinct manners by which action schemes can produce assimilations and these manners are distinguished by the behaviors said to manifest coordinators W , I , and C . These are, respectively, reproductory assimilation, recognitory assimilation, and generalizing assimilation. Piaget tells us,

We call a *scheme* of an action that which makes it repeatable, transposable, or generalizable, in other words, its structure or *form* as opposed to the objects which serve as its variable contents . . . Assimilation, which thus constitutes the formative mechanism of schemes . . . appears in three forms. We will speak of functional . . . or 'reproductory' assimilation to designate the process of simple repetition of actions, thus the exercise which consolidates the scheme. Secondly, the assimilation of objects to the scheme presupposes their discrimination, i.e. a 'recognitory' assimilation which at the time of the application of the scheme to the objects makes it possible to distinguish and identify them. Lastly, there is a 'generalizing' assimilation which permits the extension of this application of the scheme to new situations or to new objects which are judged equivalent to preceding ones from this standpoint. [PIAG13: 171-172]

The relationship of these three forms of assimilation to the general Quantity ideas of identification (logically singular, category of unity), differentiation (logically particular, category of plurality), and integration (logically universal, category of totality) is obvious.

From the logical-judicial perspective, the first *momentum* is judicially problematic and is obtained from the synthesis

synthesis of matter + indifference → **presupposing judgment.**

For our hypothetical-judicial perspective we wish to tie this synthesis to practical behaviors (in order to exhibit its meaning in a context) and this is where Piaget's coordinator ideas are useful. Matter here is the determinable for perception. Indifference is any desiration by which this is joined to a motoregulatory expression satisfying formal expedience. The synthesis of the determinable matter with the natural schema of indifference can be called a merely *phoronomic* preference since the judgment aims at establishing an equilibrium *of any kind*. No factor of cognition is yet involved (because the conditions for cognition are not yet satisfied) and the preference in judgment here can be grounded in nothing other than attainment of equilibrium. Now, all states of equilibrium are *cycles*, and attaining equilibrium requires *closing* the cycle. A determination that a cycle is closed, however, can only be based upon the sensuous effects of repetition, in which sensuous affection through *receptivity* harmonizes with anticipation in

imagination. Thus, presupposing judgment in Modality is seen to ground repetition and thus in action is characterized by a repetition coordinator. In the hypothetical-judicial perspective, **presupposing judgment** is the phoronomic preference of problematical desiration by means of a repetition coordinator function when teleological judgment is in free play with the synthesis of apprehension.

The second *momentum* in logical-judicial perspective is judicially assertoric and is obtained from

synthesis of form + attentiveness → **demanding judgment**.

Here the expedience of satisfaction in the *form* of sensibility takes precedence over that of the matter, and by the law of attentiveness the perception of change in *kinesis* draws the attention of the Organized Being to a particular content in presentation and away from others. Acts of judgment in this case serve assimilation of the recognitory form described above and thus actions are characterized by an identification coordinator function. In hypothetical-judicial perspective, **demanding judgment** is the dynamic preference of assertoric desiration (demand for a specific action scheme) by means of an identification coordinator function when teleological reflective judgment is in free play with the synthesis of imagination.

Our final *momentum* in the logical-judicial perspective is obtained from

presentation in belief + coherence in context → **requiring judgment**

and is judicially apodictic. Whereas the judicially problematic *momentum* views the process of teleological judgment as being in free play with the synthesis of apprehension, and the judicially assertoric *momentum* views the free play of imagination and understanding as being conditioned by an explicit form of desiration, in the third *momentum* both the form of desiration and the free play of imagination and understanding are conditioned and bound by a necessitation of pure practical Reason. This is the necessitation for a generalizing assimilation to stand as the condition of satisfaction for pure Reason. To see this, we recall that the law of coherence states: no presentation of an object of attention can be determined except this determination also include a mutual determination of other objects of experience that provide context for the first object and present this context in sensibility. The non-cognitive desiration synthesized in teleological judgment immediately determines nothing but an action, and in this case the scheme of the action is a made-necessary (necessitated) preference of judgment. We have here a determined sensibility and a determined scheme that must be put together, and this is nothing other than necessitating an accommodation of scheme to assimilate sensibility. But *this* is nothing else than generalizing the applicability of the scheme, hence the action is characterized by a substitution coordinator

function. In hypothetical-judicial perspective, **requiring judgment** is apodictic desiration in generalizing assimilation by means of a substitution coordinator function when teleological reflective judgment is in free play with the full powers of judgmentation in general.

To summarize all this,

presupposing judgment is judicially problematic and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of matter in transcendental topic with indifference in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, phoronomic preference of desiration by means of a repetition coordinator function when teleological judgment is in free play with the synthesis of apprehension;

demanding judgment is judicially assertoric and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of form in transcendental topic with attentiveness in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, the dynamic preference of desiration (demand for a specific action scheme) by means of an identification coordinator function when teleological judgment is in free play with the synthesis of imagination;

requiring judgment is judicially apodictic and is

- from the logical-judicial perspective, judgment reflecting the synthesis of presentation of belief in transcendental topic with coherence in context in the natural schema of judgmentation;
- from the hypothetical-judicial perspective, apodictic desiration in generalizing assimilation by means of a substitution coordinator function when teleological judgment is in free play with the full powers of judgmentation in general.

This completes our cataloging of the *momenta* of reflective judgment. In our next chapter we will begin turning our attention to the overall manifold of Desires, its relationships with motoregulatory expression in *psyche*, and with the determination of appetite in practical Reason. The process of reflective judgment is a bridge between sensibility and Reason, and the next thing we must look at is what is to be found on the banks at the far side of this bridge.