

Chapter 11

The *Momenta* of Practical Judgment**§ 1. The Categories of Freedom and the Transcendental Ideas**

Reasoning is the capacity for the determination of the particular through the general. In the context of pure practical Reason, *the particular* is the specific non-autonomic action the Organized Being determines itself to undertake in each specific circumstance; the character of its actual Self-determinations overall is called its **conduct**. *The general* in this context refers to the system of practical regulative acroams *as the schematism of conduct* and these are none other than the transcendental Ideas viewed from the practical Standpoint. Our considerations here deal with how the Organized Being can come to determine, plan, and choose from among the manifold of its possible actions presented to Reason's appetitive power through reflective judgment.

That human beings actually plan and make choices is abundantly evident to each of us in our own experiences. Arguments to the contrary by philosophers or scientists generally give pause only to other members of the same technical community (who all share the same paradigmatic suppositions that define membership in that community) and are unconvincing to the rest of us who do not share those paradigmatic suppositions. As valuable as the method of reductionism is in the practice of science, when reductionism in biology or psychology loses sight of the holism of the Organized Being the thread between the science and its ultimate object (the Organized Being) is cut and theory is set adrift. In this Chapter we have come to the point where we must seek out the structural and functional capacities of the Organized Being necessary for the possibility of planning and choosing, and this exploration brings us at last to the process of practical judgment in pure practical Reason.

The Standpoint here is unremittingly the practical Standpoint. The elements of our theory belong wholly to what Kant called the intelligible world of the Organized Being, and the process of practical judgment stands a step removed from both feelings and cognitions. The representations of practical Reason are, without exception, obscure representations, which means these representations are never immediately presented in any perception whatsoever. We are dealing here exclusively with the *practical* Ideas (as the regulative principles of autonomy) and *practical* notions. The objective validity of the theory is and can only be a practical objective validity and its transcendental criterion is necessity for the possibility of experience.

For the case of practical judgment, we call the practical notions – the *momenta* of practical judgment – by the name **categories of freedom**. Here it must be remarked that in *Critique of*

Practical Reason Kant presented what he called the "table of the categories of freedom in consideration of the ideas of good and evil" [KANT (5: 66)]. These "categories of freedom" are *not* the notions of practical judgment. As discussed in chapter 19 of *CPPM*, they are better called "Kant's moral categories" because: (1) they are not primitive, as the notions of practical judgment must be; and (2) their context is set firmly in Kant's applied metaphysic of moral theory. Kant's second Critique is an admixture of fundamental principles of practical Reason as such with metaphysical considerations of moral theory and there is little room to doubt the latter took priority over the former in *Critique of Practical Reason*. In the introduction to the Gregor translation of the second Critique, Andrews Reath correctly remarks,

Certain remarks in the *Groundwork* suggest that Kant did not originally plan a separate critique of practical reason. He notes that although a critique of practical reason is the only foundation for a metaphysics of morals (i.e. a systematic classification of human duties), the need for critique is less pressing in the case of practical reason than it is for speculative reason, and that an outline of such a critique would suffice for his purposes. [GREG: vii]

Kant was sixty-four years old when the second Critique was published and although he lived to be eighty, numerous remarks he made in his correspondences show he was by then a man in a hurry to complete his system of philosophy before time ran out on him. Perhaps he thought the work of completing the fine details of the theory of practical Reason was a lesser task that could safely be left to the work of others who came after him. He never presented any explicit statement of the transcendental Ideas from the practical Standpoint and he never set down – or even hinted at the need for setting down – the pure notions of practical judgment. This was left as a task for those who came after him. Chapter 20 of *CPPM* presents the deduction of these Ideas and of the pure notions – and this work came some two centuries after Kant's death in 1804. What he did leave us with was a reasonable but not completely clear indication of how to proceed with this work. This indication was noted by Schwegler only a few decades after Kant's death:

With the *Critique of the Practical Reason*, we enter a wholly different world where reason richly discovers that of which it was deprived in the theoretical province. The essential problem of the *Critique of the Practical Reason* is almost diametrically opposed to that of the critique of the theoretical reason. The object of investigation in the critique of the speculative reason was, – whether the pure reason can know objects *a priori*; in the practical reason it is, – how can the pure reason determine *a priori* the will in respect of objects. The critique of the speculative reason inquired after the cognizableness of objects *a priori*; the practical reason has nothing to do with the cognizableness of objects, but only with those questions which relate to the grounds of the determination of the will (motives), and every thing which can be known in that connection. Hence, in the latter critique, we have an order directly the reverse of that which we find in the former. As the original determinations of our theoretical knowledge were intuitions, so the original determinations of our will are principles and conceptions. The critique of the practical must, therefore, start from moral principles, and only after these are firmly fixed may we inquire concerning the relation in which the practical reason stands to the sense. [SCHW:

290]

One can and should take issue with the assertion that the Critique of practical Reason must start from moral principles. A baby's firm determination to suck its thumb can, after all, hardly be called either a moral principle or a moral judgment. At the same time, parents are well acquainted with the effort required to get their little toddler to break the habit of thumb-sucking and it is not rare for a child's determination to continue doing so to rival the convictions of a saint. The well-documented exhibitions of moral realism in young children [PIAG14], while exhibitions of maxims no adult would label as moral, are truly remarkable. Despite the cornucopian variety of specific moral codes and systems of ethics exhibited by our species, the common fact is that human beings are guided in their actions according to what the individual holds to be "right" and "wrong" – regardless of the fact that people do not commonly agree with one another *objectively* on what *constitutes* "right" or "wrong" actions. In this light, it is more understandable why Kant clearly thought moral principles were the best particular *exhibition* of Reason's power to be practical. Still, the categorical imperative is not a moral law *per se*, although it grounds the possibility for each one of us to conceive our own moral codes or codes of conduct (regardless of how perverse one of us might regard another's code of conduct; what is right or wrong to a criminal is far different from what the majority of us hold to be right or wrong). The key factor missing from the Kantian corpus – or, at least, only obscurely presented in his works – was the central principle of Standpoints, the discovery and elucidation of which is Palmquist's enduring contribution to Kant scholarship [PALM]. Without that contribution the deduction in *CPPM* of the material that follows would have not been possible for your author to achieve.

As was the case for the categories of understanding, the transcendental Ideas provide the foundation for the *Realdefinition* of the categories of freedom presented in this chapter. The only difference in deduction between the former and the latter is Standpoint – theoretical for the categories of understanding, practical for the categories of freedom. In both cases, the transcendental Ideas provide, as regulative principles viewed in the appropriate perspectives, the schematism for the notions. With this introduction, we will without further ado get on with the presentation of these categories and principles. Our prime objective in this chapter is summarized by the 2LAR structure of practical judgment depicted in Figure 11.1.1 below. The following sections take on the task of the exposition of the *Realdefinition* of these *momenta* of judgment.

§ 2. The Schematism and Notions of Quantity in Practical Judgment

The categories of freedom are primitive practical notions of judgment and as such the *Realdefinition* is required for each in terms of the Critical acroams in practical reflective perspective.




Figure 11.1.1: 2LAR structure of the process of practical judgment.

These are the logical-practical perspective (Rational Physics), the transcendental-practical perspective (Rational Psychology), the hypothetical-practical perspective (Rational Cosmology), and the empirical-practical perspective (Rational Theology).

§ 2.1 The Practical Schematism of Quantity

The transcendental Ideas in these perspectives provide the schematism of practical judgments for the manifold of rules. For the practical Ideas of Quantity, these are:

Axioms of intuition – the extensive magnitude in an intuition is the aggregation of effects in sense of those practical acts of appetitive expression that are validated under the manifold of rules;

Psychological Idea of Quantity – unconditioned unity of the rules of action in the multiplicity in subjective time;

Cosmological Idea of Quantity – absolute completeness in the composition of all wants;

Entis Realissimi – synthesis of all practical perfections in one Object, namely *universal law* subsisting in a manifold of rules.

The extensive magnitude *in* an empirical intuition is the outcome of the topological synthesis of the pure intuition of space. So far as the process of active perception is concerned, the actions of motoregulatory expression producing kinaesthetic feedback in receptivity (through which the representation of space is put together) are precisely those actions that have passed the censorship of practical Reason in its determination of appetitive power. This means these actions have passed validation in the motivational dynamic. The only criterion for this validation is *practically universal compatibility* with the manifold of rules. The appetite for the action of motoregulatory

expression must be one that can be assimilated into the manifold of rules, in compliance with the formula of the categorical imperative, *a parte posteriori*. This is to say the appetite can stand under the condition of a practical rule (the highest of which is the categorical imperative itself). This is the schematism of Quantity in logical-practical perspective.

In transcendental-practical perspective the psychological Idea of Quantity can be viewed as the synthesis of the Idea of *logical* unity of cognition (transcendental-theoretical perspective) with the Idea of regulating for *functional* unity of affective and objective perception in sensibility (transcendental-judicial perspective). In the practical Standpoint our concern is with actions. Thinking, perceiving, and reasoning are noetic actions, just as motoregulatory expression is expressed in somatic actions. We can allow no *real* division in how we regard noetic action as opposed to somatic action; rather, we must find a practical unity that contains both types and, furthermore, this unity must be unconditioned. This unconditioned unity is and can only be an unconditioned unity of practical rules of action.

A **condition**, as Object, is the object of a concept applied as a delimiting characteristic or mark, either as part of the totality of the conditioned concept standing under it or as a ground for that conditioned concept, during synthetic integration. The general cosmological Idea is absolute completion in the series of conditions. From the practical Standpoint the manifold of rules in practical judgment stands as the highest regulatory determinant of behavior (and therefore the highest general condition in the agency of the Organized Being save only for the categorical imperative itself), but it does so in a largely negative way. Actions proposed in reflective judgment are not permitted to gainsay the manifold of rules in the determination of appetitive power. If the proposition of reflective judgment is not discordant with the manifold of rules then the action is permitted, and this constitutes a default condition of judgment. It provides for the possibility of constructing new practical rules in the march of experience by permitting actions to be undertaken in the absence of foreknowledge of their outcomes. Thus the manifold of rules constitutes the highest condition of acting but only in the connotation of conditions viewed as practical *regulations*. Realization of an act in an action must come to pass according to this regulation by rules, and for composition in Quantity such a rule in reference to the motivational dynamic is the rule of a want. This is the hypothetical-practical schematism of Quantity.

The empirical-practical perspective pertains to the structuring of Reality and thus is in regard to structuring in terms of epistemological *Dasein*. While the hypothetical-practical perspective refers the motivational dynamic to the causality of freedom, the empirical-practical perspective refers it to **practical perfection** as the Object of the executive acts of Reason. Critical perfection is always understood in the connotation of *making* something more perfect and not in the

connotation of "a perfect object" – an idea better called that of an Ideal. Kant tells us,

The idea of perfection in the *practical* sense is the fitness or adequacy of a thing for all sorts of purposes. This perfection, as *property* of the human being and so as *intrinsic*, is nothing other than *talent* and what strengthens or completes this, *skill*. [KANT (5: 41)]

Practical perfection goes to our appetites, through which activity comes to be brought about. [KANT (24: 809)]

Practical perfection is determination of the purposes of human acts. [KANT (24: 814)]

These explanations of practical perfection are empty unless we presuppose some kind of standard or Ideal or rule *a priori* for such a determination. A purpose of an action, viewed theoretically, is an objective or end, towards which the realization of the act is directed. However, pure practical Reason knows no theoretical objects and we must therefore seek out the Idea of such a determination from either an idea of the form of a regulation of actions or in the form of a rule for making a choice.

From the theoretical Standpoint, the Idea of *entis realissimi* is the regulative principle of what it means to make a predication "to be X." Taken in the widest significance of "predicate," *entis realissimi* is the Idea of the synthesis of all possible predicates in one Object (namely Reality). It is the Idea of what is to be looked for as the essential characteristic in a representation that signifies thinghood for its object. From the judicial Standpoint, *entis realissimi* is the Idea of what is essential for the subsumption of imagination under the condition of understanding – thus the Idea of the synthesis of all possible aesthetic predicates of expedience for happiness. From the practical Standpoint, it is the Idea of the synthesis of all possible action predicates. It is from this Standpoint that we see *entis realissimi* as a principle of originality:

The idea of an *entis realissimi* contains at the same time the ground for every other idea. Consequently it is the fundamental measure according to which I must think or even pass judgment on all other things . . . From here it equally follows that the idea of an *entis realissimi* is at the same time the idea of an *entis originarii*¹ from which all the ideas of other things are derived. But obviously this is only an *entis originarii logice tale*², a being whose idea from no other idea can be derived because from it all other ideas of things must be derived. [KANT (28: 1014)]

From the practical Standpoint all appetites for actions logically derive as limitations of an Idea of the synthesis of all action predicates and this is the regulative schematism of the empirical-practical perspective of Quantity. The Idea of *entis realissimi* contains nothing beyond the Idea of a form of composition for a transcendental Ideal, valid as a regulative principle of Reason but lacking objective validity as a constitutive principle because

¹ (point of) origin of being

² logical kind of origin of being

If I undertake to prove the possibility of an *entis realissimi* (that is, the possibility of the synthesis of all predicates in one Object), then I try to know *a priori* through my reason and with apodictic certainty that all perfections can be united in a single stem and derived from a single principle. But this oversteps the possible insights of all human reason.
[KANT (28: 1025)]

§ 2.2 The *Momenta* of Quantity for the Categories of Freedom

The physical Idea (axioms of intuition) is the regulative principle for bringing the noetic structure of the practical manifold of rules into contact with experience. In the theoretical Standpoint of Critical epistemology an intuition *presents* an object of appearance; because this representation is not itself judged by determining judgment, the intuition is a "Self-evident truth" at the moment of its presentation – and this is why the Idea is named *axioms* of intuition. But from the practical Standpoint the principle of axioms of intuition is the Idea of the original possibility for sensibility *to become organized*. Traditionally psychology has tended to treat perception and reasoning as two quite distinct mental phenomena, but the logical-practical Idea tells us this is incorrect and that the executive authority of practical Reason extends even to the *determination* of perception. The power of pure Reason is the determining factor in the faculty of pure consciousness. By this Idea the *nexus finalis* character of the causality of freedom meets up and merges with the *nexus effectivus* character of causality in appearances, and the combination of the two into one Object we can justly call **causality per se** in regard to determination of the aggregate effects on sense by the practical acts of appetitive expression.

Understanding of Reality is achieved as a consequence of a practical aim (empirical-practical perspective) and this aim is absolute practical perfection, i.e. acting to make ever more perfect, according to the manifold of rules constructed to Self-provide a structure of universal law. Here we must always bear in mind that a *final* perfection remains always merely a goal of Reason, an ideal under the Ideal of ***summum bonum*** (the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded by the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason). *Summum bonum is the Ideal of unconditioned coherence in organized being in a strictly practical context*. By its Self-determined structure the Organized Being *gives itself* its own practical universal law.

We understand the fundamental character of this structure of universal law by taking up the transcendental-practical perspective, which tells us that this character is none other than unconditioned unity of the rules of action in all their multiplicity of effects in subjective time. Disequilibrium is disunity so far as practical judgment is concerned and accommodation in the structure of the manifold of rules is aimed at unity-producing assimilation.

We cannot claim (with objective validity) knowledge of an *a priori* rational measure of absolute completeness in the Organized Being's striving for perfection. Rather, the possibility of

such a completion is a rational a priori *presupposition of Reason*, namely that for all Desires there are corresponding rules for the evaluation of actions by which the aggregate composition of all wants can be brought to absolute completeness – and this is the hypothetical-practical Idea of Quantity. The manifold of rules can in this context be regarded as the **policies** of pure Reason.

The categories of freedom in regard to Quantity are the synthetical practical notions for this regulated process of synthesis in general so far as the form of composition in Self-organization is concerned. These notions do not *subsume* Desires under themselves; rather they judge the form of composition of appetites in regard to the formula of the categorical imperative. They are notions, in other words, of *the form of validation of Desires*. **A practical notion is an a priori rule for marking the relationship of a judicial presentation of Desires with respect to the ground of determination of appetitive power.** For Quantity these notions are deduced in terms of our general ideas of Quantity (identification, differentiation, and integration) in the context of *rulings that mark the manner of expressing an appetite*. In logical terminology, these notions are the practically singular, the practically particular, and the practically universal. We name them: (1) instinct; (2) appetite of inclination; and (3) intellectual appetite. Their *Realdefinitions* under the schematism of the Ideas are:

Instinct –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a practical end-in-itself;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the notion of somatic disequilibrium as a trigger for appetite with respect to *Lust per se*;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of a singular practical rule;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of a problematic congruence of an action with the Ideal of universal law;

Appetite of inclination –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of appetitions through stimuli;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of both somatic and noetic grounds of satisfaction with respect to *Lust per se*;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of the structure of a maxim;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of assertoric congruence of an action with the Ideal of universal law;

Intellectual appetite –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of appetitions through motives;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of solely noetic grounds of satisfaction with respect to *Lust per se*;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of the structure of a practical hypothetical imperative;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of apodictic congruence of an action with the Ideal of universal law.

Some additional remarks are in order regarding the practical notions of Quantity. The three *momenta* above carry the words problematic, assertoric, and apodictic in *Realdefinition* from the empirical-judicial perspective. These terms are ones we use in expressing logical Modality yet the notions are notions of Quantity. Why is this not an improper mixing of title ideas within the *Realdefinition* of the notion and therefore an error in deduction? The answer to this quite obvious question is found by considering the practical aim of these notions under the Idea of *entis realissimi*. The overall aim of acts of practical Reason from the empirical perspective is absolute practical perfection, i.e. acting to make absolutely perfect. Now, this aim subsists in the manifold of a practical rule structure as universal law but we must clearly understand what the adjective "universal" means in this context.

Perfection is an ideal under the Ideal of the *summum bonum* of pure Reason. As such, it is not the achievement of any *final* perfection that is knowable by the Organized Being. Rather, it is only *actual imperfection* that stands as a possible object of judgmentation in general. A structure of rules is held-to-constitute a system of universal law only so long as no exceptions to it are encountered in experience. From this it follows that the *momenta* of Quantity in practical judgment are to be seen as practical notions by means of which it is possible for the Organized Being's rule structure to be built up *and amended* in the march of experience yet *remain* systematically organized. The notions dictate how compositions in the manifold *must be held-to-be-congruent with regard to the universal Ideal* and *not* with regard to the relationship of the manifold to *apperception*. Problematic, etc. are *condition* terms here, not Modality *notions*.

For appetite of instinct congruence is wholly subjective and its *materia in qua* originates entirely from the connection of teleological reflective judgment with motoregulatory expression alone. One might call it a natural appetite but it is better called a *natural precept of judgmentation* since the ground of its origin is mere expedience in the form of a reflective judgment. The practical notion of instinct is logically singular. For appetites of inclination there is more in the overall judgmentation than mere blind instinct. In inclination there is still expedience in the reflective judgment but this expedience now contains something from actual experience within it owing to previous successes (satisfactions) or frustrations (dissatisfactions); this experience is absent in singular instincts. Inclinations are *particular anticipations from experience*. Finally, in intellectual appetite there is again more contained in the appetite than the precept of an instinct. Here the reflective judgment reflects contributions in sensibility that originated from ratio-expression and go to *the general and overall congruence of the manifold of concepts with the manifold of rules itself*. The theoretical concept held-to-be-necessitated from practical rules is the concept of a *theoretically categorical* imperative of Reason. Thus, *the terms problematic,*

assertoric, and apodictic in *Realdefinition* of the *momenta* of Quantity refer to the conditioning of the manifold of concepts by the manifold of rules. In instinct there is no established conditioning. In appetites of inclination the conditioning is pragmatical and the ratio-expression of Reason is *recognized* in the form of a *theoretically hypothetical* imperative. In intellectual appetites the manifold of concepts is structured not by receptivity in experience but by conditioning in ratio-expression. This expression conditions determining judgment to conceptualize ideas of practical necessitation as *theoretically categorical* imperatives. These are the meanings of the adjectives problematic, assertoric, and apodictic for the practical notions of Quantity.

§ 3. The Schematism and Notions of Quality in Practical Judgment

Next we turn to the matter of composition in the manifold of rules and the rational schematism of pure Reason in the construction of this composition. From the latter we obtain the over-arching rational context for our general ideas of agreement, opposition, and subcontrarity. From the former we obtain their specific practical context for judgments of Reason.

§ 3.1 The Practical Schematism of Quality

The transcendental Ideas of Quality viewed in the practical Standpoint are:

Anticipations of Perception – the degree of perception is a consequence of the regulation of sensibility through validation of acts of reflective judgment;

Psychological Idea of Quality – unconditioned unity of value;

Cosmological Idea of Quality – absolute value in the division of a given whole of *Existenz*;

Ens originarium – the regulative principle of good choice under an original Ideal of absolute goodness (Ideal of the *summum bonum*).

Anticipation in general is knowledge through which the Organized Being can recognize and determine *a priori* what belongs to empirical cognition. Within the logical-theoretical reflective perspective of Rational Physics, Anticipations of Perception is the Idea of the principle for intensive magnitude in appearances. In the logical-judicial reflective perspective the Idea is the principle of judicial continuity in the aesthetic Idea and provides for the objective validity of the idea of degrees from an ordering procedure in the synthesis of intuitions. The degree of perception is seen as an amount in coalition that undergoes variation from moment to moment in subjective time, and in the logical-practical reflective perspective we consider what is necessary for the possibility of this variation. This is to say we consider the cause of this variation and we can look for this cause only within the representing powers of *nous* (because to look elsewhere is to invoke a copy-of-reality hypothesis in violation of Kant's Copernican hypothesis).

The process of perceiving is an active process and thus a process in which the validation of possible actions presented in reflective judgment is an act of regulation of perception. This act logically antecedes the actuality of the actions that formulate the *Gestaltung* of sensibility in a *coherent* sequence. In the on-going process of validation specific actions can either: (1) retain validation from moment to moment (that is, in successive acts of reflective judgment), in which case the degree of perception in sensibility holds steady; or (2) become disvalued, in which case we have diminishing degree of perception; or (3) be introduced through reevaluation, in which case we have increasing degree of perception. In terms of consciousness, we often describe this as remaining aware of, or ignoring, or concentrating on something, respectively.

Turning now to the transcendental-practical perspective, we begin with the idea of value. A **value** is the form of affective perception of a desire presented in an aesthetic Relation of sense-of-interest as understood in the judicial Standpoint. Practically, though, when we view compatibility in the matter of intent as a unity in an appearance what we have is *the value of an action*. Valuation of a presentation of reflective judgment is valuation in regard to the manifold of rules. The **unity of value** is the Idea of the compatibility of desires and rule structure. The regulative principle of the transcendental Idea is an orientation through laws of *unconditioned* unity in this. The valuation of Desires is the **determination of intent** as matter of composition in practical judgment. Inasmuch as intelligence is regarded as the use of Reason in directing conduct, the unconditioned unity of value is the regulative principle for the application of the power of intelligence.

In the hypothetical reflective perspectives, the Idea of Quality is seen as a negative principle in the hypothetical-theoretical perspective (the principle of a "something is wrong" as a spur to the synthesis of cognition); it is seen as a positive principle in the hypothetical-judicial perspective (a principle of holding-to-be-binding in the reflective judgment of belief). The hypothetical-practical perspective of the Idea is the synthesis of these two poles. This is to say the Idea *impresses* as a principle of subcontrarity for the determination of appetitive power. A contradiction seen as a mainspring for action is a driver-of-the-mind (*elater animi*). The idea of "the drive behind an action" is an idea of a condition under which what is contrary to equilibrium is resolved. Projected to an Ideal of equilibrium, we have the Idea of the Ideal matter of composition for perfect organization of equilibration under the structure of practical rules, and this is the regulative principle of the transcendental Idea.

The empirical-theoretical Idea of *ens originarium* is the Idea of a primitive essence as the matter of an Ideal, i.e., the "one single possibility" in regard to which all else is derivative. It is the regulative principle of understanding requiring that the representation of a thing must contain

a notion of the real in appearance (sensation). The representations of all real things stand under the regulation of this principle as limitations set out against the backdrop of an unlimited All-of-Reality. The empirical-judicial Idea of *ens originarium* is the Idea of an original Quality of an affective state of being, namely happiness, from which all Desires are derivative. Satisfaction is an aesthetical mark of a state of happiness. In the empirical-practical perspective, *ens originarium* is the Idea of the regulative principle for choosing among Desires, from which all actions are derived. This can be called the Idea of **good choice** as the original source of actions.

Transcendental **good is the Object of practical Reason by which an object is represented to be a necessary object of appetitive power**. Good choice means choosing to effect or maintain the actuality of an object of representation in judgment. The notion of good is contained in an act of practical determination of appetitive power (as a means) according to a practical maxim. The opposite of good is **evil**, which **is the Object of practical Reason by which the non-being of an object is represented as a necessary object of appetitive power**. Evil refers to the choice to effect or maintain the non-actuality of an object of representation. In speaking of the mature determinations of choices made by an adult, Kant said:

In human beings satisfaction is *Lust* in an Object. Thus I find, for example, a satisfaction in a house even if I can only see the plans. But satisfaction in the *Existenz* of an Object is called *interest* . . . The stoics thought of the ideal of the sage as one who would feel no compassion for distress but would feel no greater delight in anything than in remedying all distress. This is not possible for human beings; here a mainspring must be added to my knowledge of the good before I can actually bring forth the good. This is because my activity is limited, and thus if I am to apply my powers to the production of some good I must first pass judgment on whether I would not want to deplete my capacity for the production of some other good in this way. Therefore I need certain mainsprings to direct my powers to determine this or that good, since I do not have enough capacity for the actual production of everything I know to be good. – Now these mainsprings subsist in certain subjective regards through which is determined my satisfaction in choosing, subsequent to the first determination of my satisfaction in judging or my knowledge of the good. If this subjective regard were taken away then my selection of the good would be removed. [KANT (28: 1065-1066)]

What Kant is describing here is not merely one simple choice but rather the phenomenon of choosing from among multiple possible actions. This is what points us toward an Ideal of choice, from the Idea of which all specific choices are represented in terms of affirmations, negations, and limitations.

This is the Idea of a transcendental Ideal of an original and highest good, which we call the Ideal of *summum bonum*. Thus in empirical-practical perspective *ens originarium* is the regulative principle of good choice under an original Ideal of absolute goodness, i.e. under the Ideal of *summum bonum*. *Summum bonum* is the Ideal of unconditioned coherence in a practical context and denotes a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical

imperative of pure practical Reason.

§ 3.2 The *Momenta* of Quality for the Categories of Freedom

The negation of the intensive magnitude of *Lust per se* is the subjective goal of every action. This is because negation of the degree of the feeling of *Lust per se* is the affective mark of equilibrium. The manifold of Desires is presented as a unity in judgment of expedience but the determination of appetitive power involves an analytical act. This is division of the unity of Desires (such that some desirations can be vetoed, others validated) and by this act multiplicity in the unity of the manifold is demonstrated.

Now, acts of reflective judgment made distinct in this division do not lose their affective character of formal expedience merely because they might not be validated. Rather, a place for them must be found within the *value structure* of the Organized Being. Values are means for organizing processes of equilibration and value structure is the totality of all such means. A structure is a system and so a value structure is a system of particular values (validated acts). However, this necessarily presupposes an Idea of a unity and this is the psychological Idea of *value per se*. Just as Reality must be viewed as the necessary substratum or backdrop against which all "realities" are viewed as limitations, absolute value *per se* must be viewed as a substratum against which all particular values are seen as limitations. Thus the practical notions of Quality are functions making transcendental affirmations, negations, or limitations determining values.

The cosmological Idea of absolute value *in the division* of a given whole of *Existenz* is the Idea of completeness in the value of a given circumstance of *Existenz*. One way to look at this is to say that contained in every value is a central or "core" value as a kind of nucleus about which the *Existenz* of a particular value coalesces. This is the picture of value as a manifold. In a more psychological manner of speaking, this is the idea of "the reason" a particular act "is valued" or "is-not valued" or "is not-valued."

Finally, the theological Idea (*ens originarium*) is the regulative principle of good choice. This Idea tells us that no non-autonomic action is to be regarded as idle or "lacking in purpose." This purpose need not be profound and, indeed, often is not and sometimes is even trivial. On the practical plane, good choice means that the action serves the categorical imperative, either through *Lust* (bringing something into actuality in *Existenz*) or *Unlust* (preventing or abolishing the actual *Existenz* of something) and by doing so leading to overall negation of *Lust per se*.

We can see from all this that the practical notions of Quality in the categories of freedom are notions of value structuring. However, we must likewise bear foremost in mind that these notions

are *practical* and therefore their context is that of rules of acting and not cognitions of objects.

Taking all of this together, the practical notions of Quality are:

Validation –

- from the logical-practical perspective, identification of a presentation of reflective judgment as a value;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, a transcendental affirmation of value;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the justification of an act;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion that an act is a good choice in serving the categorical imperative;

Invalidation –

- from the logical-practical perspective, differentiating a presentation of reflective judgment by marking part of it as disvalued in a particular circumstance;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the transcendental affirmation of a disvalue (= transcendental negation of value);
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, negation of an action through the veto power of pure practical Reason;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion that an act is in opposition to good choice (= a bad choice) in serving the categorical imperative;

Reevaluation –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of contradiction placing value in an adaptation of a vetoed action for the purpose of conflict resolution (practical subcontrarity);
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the notion of a practical act of intelligent limitation of an action;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of a cause for ratio-expression accompanied by the veto of an act of motoregulatory expression;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of an act as containing the ground for a purpose in an act of ratio-expression.

§ 4. The Schematism and Notions of Relation in Practical Judgment

Causality is a notion of Relation and because the causality of freedom is the keystone for practical Reason it is not surprising that Relation takes the role of leading title in our representation of the power of pure Reason. Nor is it surprising that the schematism of practical Reason and the notions of practical judgment achieve their objectively valid exposition through relationship to perception and appearances by means of Margenau's Law. Now and again some neural network theorists propose network models in which "the epiphenomenon of free will" is "simulated" by the use of random variables. (When a philosopher criticizes the philosophical equivalent of this, he often labels it 'caprice'). As a theory or even an hypothesis, this is quite wrong because it is equivalent to saying acts of Reason are determined for no reason at all. That

this idea is self contradictory should be quite self evident. The schematism and notions of Relation provide, in effect, the practical *Realerklärung* of reason as a "because."

§ 4.1 The Practical Schematism of Relation

The transcendental Ideas of Relation viewed in the practical Standpoint are:

Analogies of Experience – the rule of determination of relationships in perception is the enforcement of continuity in *Self-Existenz* by acts of validation in practical Reason; under this general Idea stand the three *modi* of the analogies, i.e.,

1. all non-autonomic actions contain an appetite as the persistent in the changeable appearances of the action;
2. every non-autonomic action is connected in a series in subordination to the practical unconditioned rule of acting to negate the degree of *Lust per se*;
3. all actions of equilibration involving multiple differentiable schemes are conditioned and co-determined by structures of coordinations in the manifold of practical rules;

Psychological Idea of Relation – unconditioned unity of all three-way relationships of interest, valuation, and cognition;

Cosmological Idea of Relation – the origin of appearances through conformity with an equilibrated structure of practical rules;

Ens summum – structuring the context of actions in the manifold of rules in Relation to a transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*.

From the theoretical Standpoint the transcendental Idea of Relation in Rational Physics is the Idea of the Analogies of Experience: as regards to their *Dasein*, all appearances stand *a priori* under rules of the determination of their relationship to each other in one time. This general Idea is further broken down according to the three *modi* of time into the principle of persistence, the principle of generation, and the principle of community. From the judicial Standpoint, the Analogies of Experience ground the principle of continuity in *Self-Existenz* (the judicial Idea) in terms of the principles of: the generalized power of locomotion; noetic expression in the particular of motivation; and the reciprocity of somatic and noetic representations in the data of the senses. These judicial *modi* are captured in the judicial statement of the general principle: experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.

But without invoking a copy-of-reality hypothesis how are we to see *any* connection of perceptions or appearances as *necessary*? The only Critical answer to this question is contained in the idea that all such connections stand *a priori* under rules of determination of their relationships. Here is where the agency of the Organized Being comes into the overall picture. This called-for necessity is found in the regulation of the process of perception by practical Reason, and it is by this regulation that these connections are *made necessary* through the

validation acts of practical Reason. The practical statement of the Analogies of Experience is brought out from this context.

The psychological Idea of Relation in the transcendental-theoretical reflective perspective is the Idea of unconditioned unity of all relationships. From the transcendental-judicial perspective the unity of relationships is a connection of interest and the principle is: unconditioned unity of all relationships is grounded in the *a priori* anticipation of the form of connection of perceptions in time. Now, we have seen there is a close interrelationship between the value structure of Reason and the sense of value (aesthetic interest) in reflective judgment. From these two perspectives we can see that their synthesis in the practical bespeaks of a three-way binding of interest, value, and transcendental anticipation at work in the transcendental-practical Idea of Relation.

In *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant proved that freedom and the pure practical law (the categorical imperative) "turn mutually back on each other" (that is, they reciprocally imply each other) [KANT (5: 29)]. Because the categorical imperative is the fundamental and highest universal law of the Organized Being and the causality of freedom is the uttermost ground of the agency of the Organized Being, it is little wonder that the hypothetical-practical Idea of Relation required the lengthiest deduction of all the transcendental Ideas from the practical Standpoint in chapter 20 of *CPPM*. The issues involved go to the heart of such contentious debates as mechanism versus free will, mechanistic causality in science, and psychological causality. From the theoretical Standpoint the cosmological Idea of Relation is: for the appearance of anything that happens there exists (in the *Dasein* sense) some Object that stands as the ultimate origin, the first cause, in an absolutely complete causal chain. However, from the theoretical Standpoint we can obtain no sure knowledge of the *Existenz* of this first cause; speculative attempts to obtain such knowledge are doomed to be transcendent failures that will inevitably produce paralogisms and antinomies from a dialectic of *speculative* Reason. There is, however, one *noumenon* that is for each one of us a transcendental rather than transcendent Object and this one *noumenon* is the *I* of transcendental apperception. Thus, judicially we have the Idea of absolute completeness in the origin of one's *understanding* of Nature through judgmentation. The Idea, as a regulative principle, expresses a law of compatibility for the representations of speculative Reason. As an acroam of judgmentation and a standard gauge for the speculative use of Reason, the Idea speaks to the causality of representation in the Organized Being. But to be an Idea of causality this determination must be bound to rules and it is from this that the synthesis of the Idea in the other two Standpoints yields the Idea of Relation in hypothetical-practical perspective.

Finally, for the Idea of Relation in empirical-practical perspective the central question is, "What is the practical substance in relationship to which an appetite is its practical accident?"

This is easily seen to be the idea of some "good" to be actualized or some "evil" to be averted through the action of the appetite. Simply put, an action is realized "because it is good to do." Desire is merely a mainspring for a pronouncement by practical Reason that it is particularly good to take the action. Now, the idea of any particular good must be viewed against the backdrop of the Idea of universal good, the Ideal of which is *summum bonum*. But human beings do not come equipped with any *a priori* knowledge of "a" *summum bonum* as an *object*. Rather, the Ideal of *summum bonum* can obtain objective validity only in regard to a regulative principle and this is the practical Idea of *ens summum* for the empirical-practical perspective.

§ 4.2 The *Momenta* of Relation for the Categories of Freedom

The practical Analogies of Experience gives us the principle of causality of freedom in regard to effects exhibited in motivation. The practical psychological Idea is the principle of final cause for non-autonomic action, which is to say it is the "set point" for practical Self-regulation at which all acts of judgmentation and reasoning aim. The cosmological Idea is the general principle of assimilation in equilibration. The theological Idea is the principle of *practical* empirical direction in the orientation of choices. The *momenta* of Relation in practical judgment, as the notions that make possible the achievement of the practical schematism of the Ideas, are deduced within this context as specific practical instances of our general ideas of internal, external, and transitive Relation. Accordingly, the notions of Relation are:

Maintenance of purpose –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of expression of appetite through rhythmic action expression;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of unity of purpose subsisting in the Relation of the action to the categorical imperative;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the practical notion of assimilating the acts of reflective judgment in a rule structure;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a final purpose;

Subordination of means to ends –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of expression of appetite through the series of regulations of action expression;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of unity of purpose in the seriation of appetites;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the practical notion of progressive organization of the manifold of rules;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a series of efficient causes;

Coordination of rules in a means –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of expression of

- appetition through groupings of rules;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of unity of purpose through reciprocal determinations of appetites;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a tenet organization;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a determined equilibrium.

If we say (as we do) that the practical notions of Quality go to the practical determination of drive in the motivational dynamic, the practical notions of Relation go to the *Realdefinition* of drive state in the motivational dynamic. The motivational dynamic is not part of our mental anatomy of *nous* but rather is part of our mental physiology in the agency of the Organized Being. Reason carries out its work by expression, both motoregulatory and ratio-regulatory. Seen in this way, the notions of Relation in practical judgment are rules *a priori* for the synthesis of *form of expression* as a *nexus* of actions.

It was shown earlier that the idea of equilibrium in the Organized Being cannot be an idea of an unchanging *stasis* because in that case there is no ground for the marking of moments in time and, according to the Critical *Realdefinition* of life, one would have to say "life has ceased" for the Organized Being if a *stasis* resulted from its actions. Equilibrium denotes *Existenz* in a robust and stable cycle. This characteristic of being human can easily be observed in very young children, who exhibit a pronounced behavior of developing *rhythms* of elementary actions and who construct in their play *rituals* of more complex actions [PIAG2]. The linkage between practical judgment and observable behavior belongs to Rational Physics and we see the logical-practical perspective of the notions of Relation in this light.

The succession of appearances in an action must have a "center" – that is, something regarded as that to or around which the action is directed – and this is what we commonly call the practical end for that action. But for this we must establish the form of connection between acts of practical judgment and the over-arching dictates required by the formula of the categorical imperative. Non-autonomic actions are likewise expressed in a series, thus requiring in the manifold of rules a logical series in the manifold of an appetite determination. Finally, any action-event expressed as a composition of sub-actions at any moment in time requires coordination of its constituents. These requirements of expression give us the transcendental-practical *Realdefinitions* of the *momenta* of Relation.

Maintenance of purpose is a practical homologue to substance (persistence in time) in the theoretical Standpoint of understanding. A purpose subsists in this Relation. The determination *in concreto* of the expression of the causality of freedom is connection of a rational series of action rules, and this is the notion of subordination of means to an end. Finally, the expression of any

multiplicity of practical rules in one determination of appetite is a coordination of rules as a means, the homologue of the Relation of community in understanding.

Lastly, the empirical-practical perspective of the practical notions brings us *the practical real context of action expression* according to the *modi* of persistence (final purpose), succession (the series of efficient causes), or coexistence (the determined equilibrium of the cycle of action expression). To use a mathematical simile, these notions are like the integral expression of laws of physics, by which we state such physical principles as Hamilton's principle; the notions of Relation in understanding are correspondingly like the differential equation form of the physics law. The transcendental connection we require by Margenau's Law, between the intelligible and physical characters of the Organized Being, takes place through Relations of action expression in the manifold of rules, and the practical notions of Relation provide the form of this *nexus*.

§ 5. The Schematism and Notions of Modality in Practical Judgment

Modality in judgment is always a judgment of a judgment. While it adds nothing to the object of representation of the judgment, it fixes the relationship of that object to the Subject. The schematism of practical judgment in Modality follows from the transcendental Ideas of Modality from the practical Standpoint.

§ 5.1 The Practical Schematism of Modality

The transcendental Ideas of Modality viewed in the practical Standpoint are:

Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General –

1. those acts that cannot be validated under the conditions of the manifold of rules are impossible (cannot be expressed in actions);
2. the act of reflective judgment that coheres with the conditions of the manifold of rules becomes an action;
3. that whose context with the actual is determined in accordance with the general conditions of valuation is made necessary (necessitated);

Psychological Idea of Modality – unconditioned unity in the apperception of coherence in the Ideal of *summum bonum*;

Cosmological Idea of Modality – absolute completeness of the changeable in appearance is sought through apperception of *Existenz* in relationship to the transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*;

Ens entium – coherence of all actions with the Ideal of *summum bonum*.

The *summum bonum* is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical imperative. The practical Analogies of Experience in Relation determine continuity of

Self-*Existenz* through the Organized Being's acts, but the practical Idea of the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General set *standards* by which this continuity in Self-*Existenz* is *enforced* by practical judgment *a priori*. As practical Modality in Rational Physics, the general postulates have to do with the relationship between the acts of the Subject and (1) the establishment of *meanings* for its actions from the judicial Standpoint and (2) the synthesis of apperception from the theoretical Standpoint. The schematism of the Ideas of practical Modality in Rational Physics concerns the Organized Being's ability to determine its capacities to act for specific types of *ends*. In accordance with the three-fold *modi* of Modality, these can be called *possible*, *actual*, and *necessitated* ends. In all cases, these ends take their context from and cohere with an *a priori* orientation of practical judgment directing the acts of the Organized Being toward the practical Ideal of *summum bonum*. Every action taken by the Organized Being is taken in the context that, in one way or another, the action taken is *good to take* and the action not taken is *good to omit*. This notion of goodness gets its ultimate point of reference in judgment from *coherence with the categorical imperative*.

The schematism of the other Ideas of practical Modality deal with the procedure for *how* this coherence is to be determined. For the psychological Idea of Modality, from the transcendental-theoretical perspective the Idea regulates the investment of symbolic meaning in concepts; from the transcendental-judicial perspective it pertains to the relationship in pure consciousness to accommodation, equilibration, and assimilation. But from the transcendental-practical perspective its schematism is to be regarded as the ***mind set*** of the Organized Being in relationship to the practical notions of good and evil. These are notions of *modi* of the causality of freedom. The action that coheres with the Ideal of *summum bonum* is good; that which conflicts with it is evil.

Viewed from the hypothetical-practical perspective, *summum bonum* is the Object under which the opposing notions of good and evil stand *united* as members of a disjunction. The hypothetical reflective perspective, regardless of Standpoint, is always a perspective of unity in a series of conditions and so the cosmological Idea of Modality in hypothetical-practical perspective is the Idea of *making an absolute unity* of the series of conditions for all determined actions. In this context *summum bonum* stands as the highest condition in the action series, by which the series *as a whole* is made *one whole*. In this sense, *summum bonum* is pictured not merely as an end but as *an end-in-itself*, the ultimate aim of all practical acts. Having said this, however, one must immediately remind oneself that such an end can never be anything but an intelligible aim *as a regulative principle* and *never* as a constitutive principle. Kant writes,

Deciding whether in a certain thing is encountered an end in itself or only a consequence of still higher ends, which constitute the context of all ends, is impossible for our reason. For the presupposition that all in the world has its utility and its good intention, if it is

supposed to be constitutive, would go much farther than our observations up to now can justify; yet as a mere regulative principle it serves very well for the extension of our insight and can therefore always be useful to reason and yet never harm it . . . In any case, the only error that can result from this is that where we, expecting a teleological context (a *nexus finalis*), encounter only a mechanical or physical one (a *nexus effectivus*), through which in such a case we merely miss one more unity but do not spoil the unity of reason in its empirical use. In a *nexus effectivus* the end is always last and the means, on the contrary, is first, but in a *nexus finalis* the aim always precedes the use of means. [KANT (28: 1069-1070)]

A *constitutive* end in itself is the fiction of a false and ontology-centered metaphysic.

Ens entium in the empirical-practical perspective is the practical Idea of *coherence in Reality*. But to understand what this means we should begin with the Idea in its theoretical and judicial perspectives and from these arrive at the synthesis of its practical perspective. From the theoretical Standpoint the category of causality & dependency is a notion of mechanism, i.e. that for every effect in time we must ascribe a prior cause (*nexus effectivus*). When our speculations come to the point where they are divorced from actual sense we must nonetheless, from the theoretical Standpoint, posit an "outside" cause as "that which has affected our senses." This is the transcendental Object. However, our knowledge of this Object is limited to knowledge of its appearances. Beyond these appearances we cannot go and retain objective validity in our ideas of this Object's *Existenz*. But this differs from our knowledge of its *Dasein*, which is apodictic by the category of necessity & contingency. Our knowledge of the *Existenz* of the Object is contingent, but our understanding of it *must* hold its *Dasein* to be theoretically necessary. As Kant put it, a *transcendental idealist* is also and always at the same time an *empirical realist*.

The regulative principle of *ens entium* from the theoretical Standpoint is the principle of reasoning along the following lines. If the *Dasein* of one transcendental Object is real then it is necessary that something real exists. But as soon as we have cognitions of more than one transcendental Object, each such Object is identified by transcendental affirmations and negations and hence the Object is limited by these negations. But if any Object must be viewed as a limitation, then it must be a limitation imposed on something else and we call this something else All-of-Reality. This Reality is the absolute condition of all transcendental Objects and the transcendental Ideas drive the reasoning process to understand this Reality.

Now, the transcendental Subject (the *I* of transcendental apperception) is the one *noumenon* every person holds as absolutely true and certain (the reality of his or her own personal *Dasein*). The crucial step in the mental development of an infant comes when it first draws that dividing line, thought as a real division, between the Self and the not-Self, for at this point the infant's system of cognitions has recognized the *Existenz* (and therefore the *Dasein*) of other transcendental Objects. One could say this is the moment when the baby has ceased to be, for

itself, the entire universe and has become merely its king. This recognition of other transcendental objects *is what practically defines empiricism* for the Organized Being.

From the judicial Standpoint, *ens entium* is the Idea of the matter of the form of a standard for the perfection of the judicial Ideal of happiness. It is the Idea of the coherence of satisfaction, desire, expedience, and the binding of these in the Ideal of happiness. *Ens entium* is the regulative principle of aesthetical perfection. In this context, Kant tells us,

An appetitive power is the causality of the power of representation with respect to the actuality of its objects. Will is the capacity for purposes . . . Now *Lust* itself does not subsist in the Relation of my representations to their Object; it subsists rather in the Relation of my representation to the Subject insofar as these representations can determine the Subject to actualize the object. Insofar as the representation is thus the cause of the actuality of the object it is called appetitive power, but insofar as it first determines the Subject itself to appetite it is called *Lust*. Thus one obviously sees that *Lust* precedes appetite. Satisfaction with one's own *Existenz*, when this is dependent, is called *happiness*. Thus *happiness is contentment with my own dependent Existenz*. But a complete satisfaction with one's independent *Existenz* is called *acquiescentia in semetipso*³ or self-sufficiency (*beatitudo*⁴). [KANT (28: 1059-1060)]

Now, there is a difference between Self-contentment, which has a judicial context, and Self-sufficiency, which has a practical context. Even so, these ideas are linked because we can regard Self-sufficiency as a sort of ideal, namely as a maximum of self-contentment (in the sense of a power to make myself content) since if I am completely self-sufficient I need look to nothing else but myself to find Self-contentment and can be said to be existentially *independent* in regard to satisfaction. The boundary between these two ideas will lie somewhere in the transition from mere contentment to self-sufficiency. Kant provided the clarification of this boundary in *Critique of Practical Reason* in the following way:

Have we not, however, a word that does not denote enjoyment, as the word happiness does, but that nevertheless indicates a satisfaction with one's *Existenz*, an analogue of happiness that must necessarily accompany consciousness of virtue? Yes! This word is *self-contentment*, which in its strict meaning always designates only a negative satisfaction with one's *Existenz* in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Freedom and the consciousness of freedom is a capacity to follow the moral law with an unyielding disposition, is *independence from inclinations*, at least as determining (even if not *affecting*) motives of our desire, and so far as I am conscious of this in following my moral maxims it is the sole source of an unchangeable contentment necessarily combined with it and resting on no special feeling, and this can be called intellectual . . .

From this we can understand how consciousness of this capacity of a pure practical reason through deed (virtue) can in fact produce consciousness of mastery over one's inclinations, hence independence from them and so too from the discontent that always accompanies them, and thus can produce a negative satisfaction with one's state, i.e. *contentment*, which in its source is contentment with one's person. Freedom in this way (namely indirectly) is capable of an enjoyment, which cannot be called happiness because

³ Roughly, the phrase means "to find peace or comfort in what one sows."

⁴ beatitude; happiness of the highest kind.

it does not depend upon the positive concurrence of a feeling; nor is it, strictly speaking, *beatitude*, since it does not include a complete independence from inclinations and needs; but it nevertheless resembles the latter so far namely as one's determination of will can be held free from their influence and so, at least in its origins, it is analogous to the self-sufficiency that can be ascribed only to the Supreme Being [KANT (5: 117-118)]

Determination of a power of self-contentment is a practical object of choice, springing not from sensuous appearances but rather from the executive power of pure practical Reason. *Absolute* Self-contentment is an Ideal of pure Reason, something to strive for, and in this Ideal we can see the reflection of *summum bonum*. This is the Idea of practical regulation expressed in the empirical-practical perspective of *ens entium*.

§ 5.2 The *Momenta* of Modality for the Categories of Freedom

In a restricted way we can say that all the practical judgments of the infant are *practically moral* judgments in the Piagetian connotation of morality as the logic of actions. This is not to say the child has from its beginning any concepts or ideas of "right and wrong" according to any norm an adult would call moral. Quite the opposite is true. In any culture and in any society, the moral norms of the majority are social *mores* that are taught to the child through its social environment. Differences between various groups or cultures in their theoretical understanding of these *mores* are a major factor in human conflict. It is to say, however, that the course of *construction* of the manifold of rules, and the accompanying construction of the child's concepts of Nature, is charted from the beginning according to an Ideal of Reason carrying the practical weight of what Piaget might have called a moral pseudo-necessity. Direct psychological research has demonstrated that young children display a naive moral realism founded upon the unquestioning character of belief. The child's construction of the manifold of concepts reflects this moral realism in cognition and contributes to the behavioral forms in which it is expressed.

The practical notions of Modality in practical judgment are at the root of this construction. They are *anticipations of bonitas* (goodness) in the three Modal forms. The notions are:

***Bonitas problematica* –**

- from the logical-practical perspective, the notion that the act of practical judgment is grounded in the unexpected inexpedience of an actual consequence of an action;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, merely problematic judgment of the relationship of Desires with respect to the structure of the manifold of rules;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, apperception of the absence of connection between the action and the transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*;

- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of the possibility of coherence of satisfaction, expedience, and desire;

***Bonitas pragmatica* –**

- from the logical-practical perspective, the notion that the act of practical judgment is grounded in an inexpedience of anticipation prior to the actual expression of an action;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, assertoric judgment of coherence or incoherence of Desires with respect to the structure of maxims in the manifold of rules;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, apperception of a need to establish the connection of rule in the manifold of rules;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of the actuality of the coherence or incoherence of satisfaction, expedience, and desire in the structure of the manifold of rules;

***Bonitas moralis* –**

- from the logical-practical perspective, the notion that the act of practical judgment is grounded in conflict originating in the manifold of rules itself;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, apodictic judgment of a made-necessary coherence or incoherence of Desires with respect to universal practical law;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, apperception of a necessitated accommodation of the structure of the manifold of rules;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of making a necessary coherence among satisfaction, expedience, and desire by means of the structure of the manifold of rules.

In practical judgment, Reason's first interest, pure and *a priori*, is in acting for the perfection of the system of rules that this process itself constructs. This interest is what we call Critical **Self-respect**. The *momenta* of practical Modality are the notions of connection of the manifold of rules to this pure and *a priori* interest of Reason. As such, they are the rules for determination of the type-of-motive in the motivational dynamic and provide the *Realdefinition* of that term. The notions of practical Modality do not forge the connection to *Lust per se in psyche* but rather to the Object of the Ideal of *summum bonum*, thereby setting up the relationship, via the faculty of pure consciousness, to *Lust per se*. These practical notions judge the matter of the form of rules, and this is nothing else than the connection of the rule to the condition of the categorical imperative. In naming these *momenta*, we take our terminology directly from Kant:

All imperatives are formulae of a practical necessitation. Practical necessitation is a made-necessary free act . . . The formula that expresses the practically necessary is the *causa impulsiva* of a free act, and because it is objectively necessary one calls it a *motivum* . . . Imperatives enunciate objective necessitation, and since imperatives are

threefold, there is also a threefold goodness.

1. The pragmatic imperative is an imperative according to judgment of prudence, and says that the act is necessary as a means to our happiness. Here the purpose is already determined, so this is a necessitation of the act under a condition, but one which is a necessary and universally valid condition, and this is *bonitas pragmatica*.
2. The problematic imperative says: Something is good as a means to an optional purpose, and this is *bonitas problematica*.
3. The moral imperative enunciates the goodness of the act in and for itself, so that moral necessitation is categorical and not hypothetical. Moral necessity subsists in the absolute goodness of free acts, and this is *bonitas moralis*. [KANT (27: 255-266)]

It was stated earlier that Kant did not adequately distinguish between the idea of moral law and the categorical imperative; the possibility of *constructing* (for oneself) the former is grounded in the latter. Especially in regard to the third statement above, we must understand that Kant's reference to moral necessitation as categorical refers only to the Organized Being's *concept* (theoretical understanding) and not to a categorical practical structure in the manifold of rules. There is only one practical categorical imperative and it is the formula for manifold construction and not part of the manifold itself.

These practical notions are not notions of an appetite or a choice but, rather, notions of the matter of connection in the manifold of rules. They distinguish the manner in which practical rules are held-to-be-necessary within the overall structure of universal law this manifold represents. Practical judgments are acts of accommodation in the manifold of rules through which the *materia* of an appetite is assimilated as an aliment of choice. Before any act of practical judgment takes place there must first be not merely a disturbance in equilibrium but also a failure to equilibrate through the action. In other words, satisfaction by means of action must be *thwarted* before the condition of the action is brought to *Attention* in the process of practical judgment. The power of choice is to be regarded as a capacity for choice (*Willkürsvermögen*) rather than a *Kraft* of choice (*Willkürskraft*). The objective validity of free will is vested in the Organized Being's potential to develop organized schemes of behavior and affective schemata that free the Organized Being from having all its actions and behaviors immediately determined solely from the here-and-now of sensuous stimuli.

Thus, judgments of Modality fix the relationship of the rule structure as it is constructed and accommodated to the absolute regulation of the categorical imperative in terms of *the ground for the act of practical judgment* rather than in terms of the ground of determination of appetitive power. For *bonitas problematica* this ground is the *unexpected inexpedience* (presented through the feeling of *Unlust*) in an actual consequence of an action. Accommodation of the practical rule

structure is founded upon acting to remove this inexpedience. The original condition of satisfaction, which was the thwarted objective of the inexpedient action, remains unaltered and only the means of attaining this satisfaction is changed by bringing the condition for action expression under an additional *intelligible* condition.

In the case of *bonitas pragmatica* the ground for the act of judgment is an anticipation of inexpedience before the fact. What is thwarted is not an action already in progress but, rather, the mere anticipation of satisfaction before the actual expression of the action. In this the synthesis of reproductive imagination must be involved in bringing into sensibility an intuition of comprehension made possible by the connection of appearances according to the category of causality & dependency in determining judgment. The impetuosity of reflective judgment is checked before motoregulatory expression can get underway and assertion via ratio-expression for an accommodation of motoregulatory expression is made from a ground of merely intelligible inexpedience. What was once the condition of a mere instinct of appetite is thus taken into the practical structure of a maxim. In the *aesthetical* judgment of desire, what once was a feeling of *Lust* is converted to a feeling of *Unlust* (or vice versa). This difference is presented in desiration (by means of the Quality of *implication of real significance* in teleological judgment, which is a teleological Quality of subcontrarity) to practical Reason. **This is what the phrase "anticipation of inexpedience" means.**⁵

All processes are governed by their own local rules of transformation (the "interests of the process"), and such rules are effectively rules-about-rules if the function of the process is to *make* rules. Determining judgment cannot go against its own function, nor can reflective judgment, nor can practical judgment. In *bonitas moralis* the ground for the act of judgment is *conflict originating in the manifold of rules itself*. Here it is not the initial condition of the action (i.e. the original presentation in reflective judgment) nor is it the actual consequence of the action that grounds the act of practical judgment. Rather, it is the discovery of a practico-logical contradiction in the manifold of rules itself. An appetite *that should have been satisfactory according to a maxim* under the notion of *bonitas pragmatica* is *discovered to be* inexpedient (either actually or through anticipation). This means that what was regarded as coherent in universal law in the manifold of rules *is-actually-not universal*. It goes against the constitution of practical Reason and is struck down by the "supreme court" of the process of practical judgment. The accommodation required is *accommodation of the form of the manifold of rules itself*.

Bonitas moralis is "moral goodness" only in the strict context of regarding morality as the

⁵ It merely *seems* ironic at first glance that a reflective judgment of anticipation of *inexpedience* is formally *expedient*.

logic of actions. Reason knows no objects of outer sense, possess no innate rationalist ideas of such objects, and feels no feelings. In its functional character there is much reminiscent of Freud's idea of the ego just as there is much in the functional character of reflective judgment reminiscent of Freud's idea of the id (although neither alignment is strictly correct). All moral and ethical standards and maxims, as humankind generally treats these words, are theoretical constructs learned by individuals from experience, and there are deviations from norms accepted even by the great majority of people in a society. These norms are *practically* regarded, by those who hold to them as maxims, as conforming to a system of *universal* law presented in their manifolds of rules. The consequences of the categorical imperative can, depending on experience and/or individual brain structure (reciprocally determining *soma*), produce either sinner or saint when seen from the viewpoint of another person, just as one man's leader is another man's tyrant.

§ 6. The Character of Practical Judgments

The process of practical judgment makes judgments of conditions for the manifold of Desires being suitable or unsuitable for appetite under the formal criterion of coherence in universal practical law. The notions of practical judgment (categories of freedom) categorize how the rules constructed fit within the general constitution of a practical structure of the Organized Being's universal law. The manifold of rules is an Organized Being's ***practical Idea*** (practical exposition) of the Ideal of *summum bonum* wrought from experience. The process of practical judgment has no *immediate* interest in choice or appetite. To use a simile, it is like a judge who has no immediate interest in legislation but rather has an immediate interest in whether and how particular acts of legislation conform to a supreme law governing laws.

To understand the role of practical judgment it is important to first understand that in every operation of practical judgment there are *two* acts taking place in the cycle of judgmentation in general. The first act *marks the negative assertion* on the condition for the manifold of Desires. This act begins the process of adaptation and here practical judgment produces a disturbance in the cycle of judgmentation we can justly call an ***intelligible disturbance***. The second act *marks a condition of successful closure* in the process of equilibration. This act *makes a ruling* that a particular organization of formal conditions on the manifold of Desires is *not-unacceptable* under universal law (the negative regarded as affirmative). Note that not-unacceptable does not mean acceptable. The latter stands under the general idea of agreement while the former stands under the general idea of subcontrarity.

From this character of practical judgment one may now perhaps better see why the term "satisfaction" (*Wohlgefallen*) has the connotation of "this is not-bad" while "dissatisfaction"

(*Mißfallen*) carries the connotation of "this is not-good." There is no positive criterion for formal evaluation of "good" or "universal" in practical judgment. The only formal criterion possible is a negative criterion, i.e. the practical assessment of that which contradicts the condition of universal law, the mark of which is disequilibrium (= non-conformity with the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason). As was stated in chapter 9, the role of practical judgment is that of a critic in an actor-critic system (Figure 9.2.2, reproduced as Figure 11.7.1 below).

§ 7. Reason and Choosing

We close this chapter by returning to the idea of *choosing* as the executive act of practical Reason. The considerations to be discussed involve: (1) the synthesis of appetite; and (2) the power of choice. These two facets are discussed in the subsections below. **Choosing is the action of Reason in harmonizing the free play of the synthesis of appetite and the process of practical judgment by means of ratio-expression.** That which results from this action is called *the choice that is made*, and this connotation of the word "choice" differs from the connotation of "choice" as the Modality of the power of choice as well as from the connotation of "choice" as the practical capacity to make a representation the object of one's appetite.

§ 7.1 The Synthesis of Appetition

Figure 11.7.1, illustrated below, provides a central illustration for the explanation of the synthesis of appetite. In many ways, the synthesis of appetite is analogous to the synthesis of sensibility with the most important distinction being the absence of an analogue of imagination.




Figure 11.7.1: Critic structure model for the synthesis of appetite.

Like the synthesis of sensibility, the synthesis of appetite is a threefold synthesis involving what we may call the **acts of appetite**. By analogy with the *Verstandes Actus* of the synthesis of apprehension, we will call these *practical Comparison*, *practical reflexion*, and *practical abstraction*. Similar to the previous case, the act of practical *Comparison* is paired to the function of association, that of practical reflexion to the function of compatibility, and that of practical abstraction to the function of anticipation. Owing to the placement of appetitive power within the logical anatomy of *nous*, our explanations of these acts are best presented in mathematical form (for the sake of precision). However, the practical significance of this mathematical presentation will be stated non-mathematically as well so that the explanations are not too dark to the reader who has not had the benefit of adequate training in mathematics. Our mathematical objects belong one and all to Slepian's facet B under Critical restrictions.

§ 7.1.1 Practical Comparison

The act of practical *Comparison* makes an association and we must now ask, "What kind of association does it make?" When reflexion was discussed previously its explanation was that reflexion structured congruence relations⁶. Before a congruence relation can be structured another and weaker type of relation is needed (by the definition of congruence relation), and this weaker relation is the *equivalence* relation. [The act of practical Comparison is the act of making an equivalence relation between the manifold of Desires and the manifold of rules.](#) What remains to be explained is the specific kind of equivalence relation this is.

For any equivalence relation we must first have a set, which we will denote as D , and a binary operation $*$ that operates on members of this set. Furthermore, the structure $[D, *]$ must form a semigroup. A semigroup is a set D and an operation $*$ such that operation on D has the properties of closure and associativity. Closure means that any pair of members of D , a and b , when operated upon must produce some c that is also a member of D . We write this symbolically as

$$a * b \rightarrow c.$$

Associativity means simply that we can group operations in pairs such that

$$a * b * c = (a * b) * c = a * (b * c) \rightarrow d.$$

The first thing we must do is identify what the set D is and what the operation $*$ is in the context of practical *Comparison*. D is easily identified by referring to Figure 11.7.1; it is the set of all possible Desires that reflective judgment can present to practical Reason. Recall that the

⁶ Note that relation (lower case r) is distinct from the title of Relation (upper case R). We are speaking of mathematical relation here in all cases.

matter of Desires is desire and the form of Desires is desiration. As for the operation $*$, the context for our theory is that of the overall process of judgmentation. From this context for Figure 11.7.1 one can easily see that $*$ is the operation of *concatenation*, i.e. the successive presentations of reflective judgment one after another in logical sequence. The fact that the structure $[D, *]$ must form a semigroup means that the concatenation of successive presentations of reflective judgment must possess the associative property.

This, in its turn, brings to light a restriction (condition) that must be imposed *a priori* on the intelligible Nature of reflective judgment that was neither evident nor deducible in our earlier investigation of reflective judgment considered in isolation. Desires have no context unless an appetite can be synthesized from this representation. For the synthesis of an appetite to be possible the property of associativity in concatenation of Desires is a *structural law of transformation* for *nous*. In other words, it is part of the general organization of the faculty of *nous* in an Organized Being.

To move from this to an equivalence relation we now require another mathematical object, R , we will call the **rule set**. Now, Desires and appetite are not the same thing, although there clearly exists a close relationship between them. Because they are not identical we require within the synthesis of appetition some law of transformation T by which Desires can be mapped over into appetites. What sort of *formal* transformation is required? Here is where consideration of the categorical imperative comes into the picture.

The categorical imperative is a formula mandating that the act of Self-determination of the Organized Being must aim at the achievement of equilibrium in *Self-Existenz*. Real equilibrium, however, is *Existenz* in a *stable cycle* (as we saw earlier) and for this no single presentation of Desires suffices for the determinability of a cycle in *Existenz*. Its possibility minimally requires *two* such presentations *in concatenation*. Thus the members of rule set R can at once be identified as matters in the manifold of rules such that each member $r \in R$ must *correspond* to some possible concatenation $a * b$ of presentations of reflective judgment. However, $a * b$ is merely another member of D and so r is not the same thing as $a * b$. We denote this symbolically as

$$r : (a, b)$$

where (a, b) denotes an *ordered pair* of presentations of Desires and $:$ denotes [the association of \$r\$ with this ordered pair](#). We see from this that the association function of practical *Comparison* stems from the concatenation of Desires by reflective judgment.

In mathematics the set of all possible ordered pairs of members of a set S is called the Cartesian product of S and is denoted symbolically as $S \times S$. Because each r in R is associated

with (at least) one member of $D \times D$, we can say that R is a representation of some subset of this Cartesian product and thereby define the transformation T as the general association of R with some subset of $D \times D$. In mathematical notation this is written as

$$T: D \times D \rightarrow R \subseteq D \times D$$

where *it is to be understood* that the subset symbol $\subseteq$ does not denote equality, $r = (a, b)$, but only association, $r : (a, b)$.⁷

Now, the rule set R minimally inherits the semigroup properties of $[D, *]$ since it is synthesized from this mathematical structure. This is to say $[R, \sim]$ has closure and associativity in regard to its members r under the **equivalence relation** $\sim$. *Practical Comparison* is the act of synthesizing the equivalence structure $[R, \sim]$. Let a , b , and c now denote members of R . The synthesis of $[R, \sim]$ then requires the following three properties hold for this structure:

- (1) $r = (a \sim a) \in R$ ("belongs to R ") for every $a \in R$;
- (2) if $(a \sim b) \in R$ then $(b \sim a) \in R$ as well;
- (3) if $(a \sim b) \in R$ and $(b \sim c) \in R$ then $(a \sim c) \in R$.

These formal properties reveal several things about practical *Comparison* and by stating them we will arrive at once at the proper *Realerklärung* for this mathematics. We begin by noting that *Comparison* is always regarded as a logical comparison. What is being compared in this case is the transformation of a presentation of reflective judgment, $T[q * s]$, – where q and s are members of D – with a matter in the manifold of rules (what we may call a **practical concept** in analogy with the manifold of concepts). Thus in the notation $(a \sim b)$ the symbol a stands for some $T[q * s]$ that is to be logically compared with the matter of some rule b in the manifold of rules.

Second, the relation being structured is an equivalence relation. This lets us translate the mathematical notation directly into words, e.g. $(a \sim b)$ means " a is equivalent to rule matter b ." If there is **no** b contained in the manifold of rules (so that no equivalence relation can be formed from the logical comparison) then property (1) tells us that the presented rule matter a is placed in the manifold of rules. (This case will occur, for example, the first time reflective judgment presents from innate sensorimotor reflexes; the corresponding appetite is an instinct). This act of placement (analogous to the synthesis of recognition in imagination) is legal under the formula of the categorical imperative because presentations of reflective judgment are grounded in the principle of formal expedience and, therefore, unless actual experience gainsays the legality of

⁷ Something often overlooked in our present day teaching of mathematics is that mathematical symbolism is a kind of shorthand – a concise way to represent things we quite often want to say using the *language* of mathematics. Symbols are representations but behind each such representation there is always an object.

this presentation the **default presupposition** of Reason is that a is permitted under the categorical imperative.

Third, property (2) also tells us implicitly that $a = T[q * s]$ cannot be the same thing as the concatenated Desires q and s of the reflective judgment. If a and b are distinct representations and yet we also have the property $(a \sim b)$ implies $(b \sim a)$, the transformation law T must be leaving out something by which two cases of concatenated Desires, $a = T[q_1 * s_1]$ and $b = T[q_2 * s_2]$, differ so that only something common between them remains. It is this common factor that is made into a rule matter for the manifold of rules.

Taking this one step further, practical *Comparison* is a merely logical comparison, and this means that the basis of comparison cannot take account of the matter in Desires (desire) because logical comparison makes abstraction from all matter (desire) and is a mere comparison of form (desiration). It is possible for an $a = T[q_1 * s_1]$ and a $b = T[q_2 * s_2]$ to have different matters of desire yet equivalent forms of desiration. **The rule matters in the manifold of rules are forms of desiration.** We might have anticipated this sooner because the representation of desiration is an act of *teleological* reflective judgment. A purpose of Reason is by its very nature something that stands in the role of a *nexus finalis* in accordance with the transcendental acroam of the **principle of final purpose: the practical presupposition of a final purpose as the unconditioned condition of all empirical purposes is a necessary presupposition of pure Reason.**

Finally, property (3) is the **property of rule consistency**. If $(a \sim b)$ is a lawful (permitted) rule matter and $(b \sim c)$ is likewise so, then $(a \sim b \sim c)$ cannot be an unlawful rule matter since this is merely an *aggregation* of lawful rule matters in series. Property (3) is the logical ground for the possibility of the motivational dynamic and of the logical possibility of closure of a cycle of equilibration. It is that in practical *Comparison* which makes possible the function of ratio-expression in the synthesis of appetite as a **predictive act of regulation** by Reason.

§ 7.1.2 Practical Reflexion and Abstraction

The act of practical reflexion is the synthesizing act that takes the mere equivalence structure of *Comparison* on to that of a *congruence* structure. Let us use the symbol γ to denote the congruence relation. A mere equivalence relation $a \sim b$ is not necessarily also a congruence relation $a \gamma b$ merely because of the fact that an equivalence exists. To have a congruence relation it must also be possible to *substitute* equivalent rule matters for one another *in concatenations of rules*. Let us suppose a, b, c , and d are all members of rule set R . Let us further suppose these have the equivalence relations $a \sim b$ and $c \sim d$. Let α, β, χ , and δ represent concatenated presentations of reflective judgment such that $a = T[\alpha]$, $b = T[\beta]$, $c = T[\chi]$, and $d = T[\delta]$.

It is an obvious logical possibility for these presentations to be concatenated one after the other such that reflective judgment could present logical sequences $\alpha * \beta$ or $\chi * \delta$. Furthermore, from the semigroup property such concatenations must be equal to some other concatenation operation on D , e.g. $\varepsilon = \alpha * \chi$ and $\phi = \beta * \delta$. Let $e = T[\varepsilon]$ and $f = T[\phi]$. If and only if for every pair of equivalence relations $a \sim b$ and $c \sim d$ established in R it is also true that $e \sim f$, then the structure of R is that of a congruence relation. In this case a is said to **substitute** for b and c is said to substitute for d . This is a stronger condition than $a \sim b$ and $c \sim d$ alone implies. Equivalence relations that are also a congruence relation are written $a \gamma b$, $c \gamma d$, and $e \gamma f$. The notation $a \gamma b$ translated into English reads " a and b are congruent" when γ is otherwise unspecified; for practical reflexion we would read it as " a and b are-equally not-illegal" since the adjudication of practical judgment can never validate a rule as *legal* but only find it *not-illegal* under the formula of the categorical imperative.

The corollary in this is: if $a \gamma b$ and then at some later stage the presentation of a is invalidated in some specific circumstance then b is *a priori* invalidated as well for that same circumstance. Now, a and b are distinct *in their origin* only by stint of different desires in the presentations of reflective judgment. In this way ratio-expression, even though it has nothing whatever to do with sensuous matters, obtains the capability to regulate judgments of expedience *mediately* through Reason's practical orientation of determining judgment and the corresponding act in the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. *Practical reflexion gives rise to the possibility of motivation*, i.e. the accommodation of perception, despite the purely *formal* character of the manifold of rules.

The act making invalidation possible is the act of practical abstraction. Note in Figure 11.7.1 that the presentation of Desires projects both to the synthesis of appetite and to practical judgment. We also have the projection from the manifold of rules into the synthesis of appetite. Now, practical *Comparison* and reflexion are positive acts of composition for appetite. But representation also requires connection in a manifold and the accomplishment of the act of practical abstraction is *determination of the sphere of an appetite in the manifold of rules*. It is ***the act of delimitation of the practical context of the conditions of appetite***. To delimit a rule means to place limitations on its application, and this practical abstraction can accomplish only by noting contradictions between the determinations of reflective judgment (and the projection of desiration) and conditions contained in the manifold of rules.

There is in this an act of practical anticipation. All or parts of the possible appetite can be cancelled (placed in a real opposition) by the synthesis of practical abstraction (via the projection from the manifold of rules into the synthesis of appetite, which plays a role analogous to the synthesis of reproduction in imagination). The immediate outcome of this is the veto by practical

Reason. However, this veto is not based upon immediate circumstance but rather upon the anticipation of a disequilibrium *that would follow from concatenation of appetites*.

Again, all presentations by reflective judgment carry the *presumption* of formal expedience for the categorical imperative. It requires an actual occurrence of a disequilibrium, judged as a violation of universal law, to arouse the opposition of practical abstraction. Such an arousal can come only *a posteriori* and as a consequence of prior acts of practical judgment on the manifold of rules. In the early stages of life reflective judgment, acting through motoregulatory reflexes, seeds the manifold of rules with appetites of instinct and from these come later practical maxims for early sensorimotor schemes.⁸ If the action sequence results in a cycle of equilibrium then the condition presented through desiration conforms to the requirements of the categorical imperative and this is enough for the condition to be made the condition of a not merely expedient but *legal* act. But practical judgment judges the judgments of reflective judgment across the entire backdrop of the whole of experience and accommodates the manifold of rules accordingly according to *the frustration of equilibrium in practical experience*. Sensorimotor scheme adaptations and coordinations in turn follow from this. All of human intelligence is built from this base.

In this way higher maxims and hypothetical imperatives are gradually formed in the manifold. The synthesis of practical abstraction works from this manifold *to bring practical distinctness to actions*. That in the manifold of a rule matter presented from reflective judgment that cannot be assimilated into a congruence relation in the manifold of rules is projected into the synthesis of appetite *as a representation of real opposition* (i.e. cancellation – *Widerstreit* – of the representations being opposed). Put another way, distinctness in the manifold of rules leads to multiplicity of appetites possible for each presentation of Desires, and this is the origin of the transcendental requirement *for making choices*. Without this the Organized Being would be nothing but an automaton driven exclusively by sensuous matters and of it we could not even say it exercises *arbitrium brutum* because instead we would have to say *it cannot choose at all*.

Acts of practical abstraction can in one sense be said to co-opt the representations of reflective judgment to substitute possible desirations, produced directly from the manifold of rules, in place of direct desiration in the synthesis of an appetite.⁹ (And in this way it becomes possible for a

⁸ Although at this time it is mere speculation to say so, this seeding of the manifold might be the practical function of child's play.

⁹ Although it is mere speculation to say so, there appears to be something like this present in the general organization of the spinal cord system in mammals. Descending projections from higher brain centers appear to work in part by co-opting the spinal cord's system of spino-muscular reflex pathways (called by some the general reflex afferent pathways) and substituting signals originating in the brain in place of the feedback signals coming directly from the peripheral nerves in the body. The effect is *voluntary motion*.

determined appetite to contain nothing at all immediately presented by teleological judgment as a result of sensuous stimuli from receptivity). Practical abstraction makes possible an overall context for actions represented by a multiplicity of possible appetitions and, as we are about to discuss, this establishes a *scope of choices* that constitutes a determination we will call [attention](#).

§ 7.2 The Power of Choice

The power of choice is Reason acting to harmonize the free play of the synthesis of appetite and the process of practical judgment by means of ratio-expression. The involvement of ratio-expression in this act calls into play the full capacities of *nous* through acts of judgmentation originating logically from practical Reason's effort to bring about this harmonization. Kant explained what is meant by "to harmonize" in this specific context in the following way:

Substances harmonize if the state of one substance corresponds with the state of the other. [KANT (28: 758)]

Figure 11.7.1 has an explicit feedback loop connecting the synthesis of appetite and practical judgment. This information pathway denotes an organization of processes within practical Reason in which appetite and practical judgment are co-determining. By "state of one substance in correspondence with the state of the other" it is meant that some sort of equilibrium is established in the reciprocal co-determination of these processes. What we must do is understand this equilibrium and to do so we begin by examining what constitutes the substances involved.

Substance is the pure notion of something persistent in subjective time. In our present context this means we are to look for something in the representation of our object (the free play of the synthesis of appetite and practical judgment) that is regarded as the persistent in time *when we make a concept of this object for our theory*. Because our object is unity in the *commercium* (reciprocal action) of appetite and practical judgment, this persistent-in-time is merely the *cycle of interaction* that takes place within the overall process. It follows at once that harmonization in the free play of these two processes of Reason means the establishment of a stable cycle of interaction between practical judgment and the synthesis of appetite. Stability means the absence of further innovations¹⁰ forthcoming from the synthesis or the construction of the manifold of rules. Thus this stability implies rational equilibrium. *Mathematically* this does not mean the accidents in representations of the synthesis of appetite and the process of practical judgment do not change at all in *objective* time¹¹. It merely means that over some finite period in

¹⁰ In this practical context, *to innovate* merely means to bring in something new. Innovation in this context therefore merely means to introduce a change in the cycle. Thus the equilibrium of which we speak is a dynamic rather than static equilibrium as in, e.g., a mathematical limit cycle.

¹¹ We cannot employ *subjective* time in the representation of Reason because Reason is not bound to it.

objective time these accidents repeat their sequences such that no further change in the sequence of accidents occurs. (Remember that objective time is merely a Slepian secondary quantity).

Innovations are kept out of such a cycle by the suppression of factors that would otherwise disturb the cycle or prevent its closure or carry the expression off into some other cycle (rupture of a first cycle followed by establishment of another). Acts that oppose innovations are acts Piaget dubbed *type- α compensations*. Type- α compensation is compensation by either ignoring or eliminating a disturbing factor.¹² In the synthesis of appetition it is practical abstraction that provides this function. But in the functioning of judgmentation innovations are compensated by setting up other representations that present a real opposition (*Entgegensetzung*) to the innovative representation. In the practical context of Reason the name we give to this action is *attention: the expression of type- α compensations in judgmentation that oppose innovations hindering the cycle of equilibration*. The *phenomenon* of attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*) originates through ratio-expression in the determination of appetitive power by the power of choice.

In practical harmonization the regulative Ideas of the hypothetical-practical perspective call for a maximization of the contributions from the sphere of allowable practical rules in the acts of practical *Comparison* and reflexion (because practical perfection – the standard gauge in the determination of acts of practical judgment – calls for acting in a direction for attaining an absolute completeness of conditions). If a presentation of reflective judgment *can* be brought under a rule, maxim, or law in the manifold of rules, completion requires that it *be* brought under this condition. A presentation of reflective judgment can harmonize at once if for the condition it represents (formal expedience) the manifold of rules already contains the same condition, i.e., the desiration *transformed into a practical rule*. But the manifold of rules is a connected unity in which rules are connected in series and in coordination. These connections immediately bring into play other possible rational conditions, and if the presentation of reflective judgment is not already assimilated under them, ratio-expression stimulates *motivation*. Thus Reason acting through the motivational dynamic attempts to assimilate as many conditions as possible subject to the requirement to equilibrate a cycle. *This is nothing else than the empirical employment of speculative Reason in the service of the categorical imperative*.

On the other hand, it may be that for the presentation of reflective judgment no corresponding rule in the manifold has yet been constructed. In this case it is practical judgment that must undertake accommodation of the manifold. We can well expect this to be a frequent occurrence in the early stages of life when the infant's actions consist of primal sensorimotor reflexes. It also

¹² Compensation in general is any modification of a structure by which equilibrium is re-established following a disturbance.

accounts for the empirically observable role that initial failures are seen to play in sensorimotor adaptation: the presentation of reflective judgment is similar enough to a rule contained in the manifold to summon this condition into the process of choice, but it is dissimilar enough to require accommodation of the rule.

Stimulation of motivation through ratio-expression exhibits the practical Idea of the causality of freedom. Motivation through ratio-expression accommodates sensibility through the Organized Being's original capacity for spontaneity, and this we can regard as accounting for the non-sensuously-determined character of behavior that is the basis for psychology and neuroscience to posit the *Dasein* of what scientists in these fields call a "motivational state."

There remains as a task for mental physics the further quantitative development of the model of this process. This task is not yet completed nor will we, here in this book devoted to setting out the fundamental principles and structure of the theory, complete it in these pages. Nonetheless, the theory is subject to limitations according to Critical acroams and it is appropriate to discuss these here. The causality of freedom – dressed up in an amorphous and undefined phrase of "free will" – has been called a "minefield" by some scientists. Many ontology-centered philosophers object to this vague idea on the grounds that a "free will" – a "will" independent of effects of the stamp of some fictitious copy-of-reality – must necessarily be a "lawless will" under which any sort of thing must be regarded as possible in regard to thinking and behavior. Some scientists go along with this mistaken presupposition, either deliberately or else as a consequence of their own ontology-centered system of pseudo-metaphysics, by proposing to model "will" as a stochastic process (i.e. by introducing random variable sources in their model). But the causality of freedom does not implicate a capricious and "lawless" determination of actions. Quite the opposite is the case, as Kant remarked:

Since the concept of causality leads to laws according to which something, which we call cause, must establish something else, namely the consequence, thus freedom is by no means lawless even though it is not a property of will according to natural laws; but on the contrary, it must rather be a causality of a peculiar kind according to immutable laws; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. [KANT (4: 446)]

"Natural laws" here means laws of empirical experience understood through thinking and determined through the notion of causality & dependency in the categories of understanding. An objectively valid mathematical theory must be a theory from which it is possible to make principal quantities that can be set against experience in Slepian's facet A. It is true enough that this brings with it a degree of uncertainty owing to the simple fact that our ability to observe and measure occurrences in Nature is limited by our senses and by the resolving power of scientific instruments. Mathematical representations of principal quantities must be objectively valid, and

this requires us to develop Critical mathematics from a new base of axioms that are themselves objectively valid under the Critical acroams presented here. These acroams tell us that the traditional "point solutions" standard in most applications of mathematics cannot provide for this needed objective validity. From this springs the utility of the set membership paradigm discussed earlier, for set membership theory does not require the introduction of the specious and *ad hoc* crutch of random variables in our models. (The interested reader with a sufficient mathematics background can consult [COMB] for an overview of the formal theory and [MCCA] for an application example of set membership theory).

The mathematical theory of Reason must be one in which the theorist has clearly recognized the Critical distinction between the pure intuition of subjective time and the mathematical idea of objective time. Reason is not bound to subjective time but the theoretical representation of Reason can employ the idea of objective time, although only as a parameter in its parametric equations and without losing sight of the fact that objective time is wholly a secondary quantity except at that one point where we must have a principal quantity in order to relate it to behaviors measured with clocks. This principal quantity cannot be a "point in time" because such a thing is only a secondary quantity; the principal quantity in the representation of time will always and only be objectively valid as an interval, i.e., it will be a set membership variable – a *set* held to contain a multiplicity of times intervals; it is an *interlude* with a determinable start and stop.

That the distinction between subjective and objective time is necessary in the mathematical modeling of pure Reason is owed to the Critical character of the causality of freedom. In *Critique of Pure Reason* we find:

The causality of Reason in the intelligible character *does not arise* or start working at a certain [subjective] time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, so far as this determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom. Thus we could say: if Reason can have causality with respect to appearances, then it is a capacity *through* which the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in Reason is not sensuous and does not itself begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what we did not find in any empirical series: that the *condition* of a successive series of occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensuous condition or to any time determination through any passing cause. [KANT: B579-580]

Reason is the master regulator of all non-autonomic actions of the Organized Being, be they actions of physical movement or actions of the mental class, e.g. thinking. It is the power of Reason that determines the employment of determining judgment and is the final arbiter of judgmentation in general. It is through the latter that we have the origin of the regulation of sensibility from which comes the synthesis of the pure intuition of subjective time. Because it is

in the free play of the synthesis of apprehension, imagination, and determining judgment that the synthesis of subjective time and the transcendental schematism of time are formed, and because Reason regulates these processes, ***pure Reason directs time-determination*** and not the other way around. The mathematical theory of pure Reason does require representation of *logical* ordering (objective time) because a theory is always a cognitive representation and, as such, we as human beings can represent it in no other way than through representations of appearances in space and time. But we must be cognizant of the transcendental place of our theoretical objects in our theorizing. Furthermore, this model is bound to the restriction of Margenau's Law because

Nevertheless, this very same cause in another regard also belongs to the series of appearances. The human being is himself appearance. His choice has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his acts. There is not one of the conditions determining human beings according to this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects and obeys the laws according to which no empirically unconditioned causality is encountered among what happens in time. But of Reason one cannot say that before the state in which it determines choice another [state] precedes it in which this state is itself determined. For since Reason itself is no appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility, no time sequence takes place in it in regard to causality, and thus the dynamical law of nature, which determines the time sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it. [KANT: B580-581]

From this Critical character of Reason we may well expect its theory development may bear a fruitful resemblance to integral methods such as those employed by advanced physics and exemplified by such methods as those used in the Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics, e.g. the famous principle of least action, and in the theory of quantum electrodynamics.

In the end, that which we can call *empirical* choice is merely the schematic in appearances of the process of harmonization we call the power of choice. The *process* is what provides the practical and fundamental *Realerklärung* of the empirical idea of choice. While the process of harmonization works as adaptation toward equilibrium, it is equally the case that this adaptation must try to *converge* to this equilibrium. The *Realerklärung* of equilibrium is found only in the idea of a stable cycle and its attainment is an aim of practical Reason under the categorical imperative. Kant said Reason is "the unceasing condition of all voluntary acts," and here we can see the role for practical judgment is "holding together" the process of harmonization in the practical notion of maintenance of purpose in Relation.

Only one thing more remains for us to cover in this book. If Reason and the causality of freedom are not lawless then they are subject to transcendental norms or standards to which all actions and acts of nous are held *a priori*. Passing reference to these has been made in various places in this book already. What we must do next is discuss them explicitly and this takes us into the topic of our next chapter.